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Abstract 
 
Airports are complex systems involving the continuous interaction of human operators 
with the physical infrastructure, technology and procedures to ensure the safe and efficient 
conduct of flights. From an operational perspective, airport surface operations (i.e. runway 
and taxiway operations) require the interaction of five main stakeholders (i.e. crew or 
pilots, air traffic control, airport operator, ground handling and regulator) both to facilitate 
the ground movement of aircraft and vehicles, and to maintain the surface in a working 
condition. The complexity of these operations makes the runway and taxiway system 
vulnerable and presents a risk of failure with the consequent potential for the occurrence of 
accidents. Therefore, the development and implementation of an effective Safety 
Management System (SMS) are required to ensure the highest level of safety for surface 
operations. 
A SMS is a systematic approach to managing safety based on the four cornerstones of 
safety policy and objectives, risk management, assurance, and safety promotion. Although 
the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) provides the global legislative 
framework for SMS, the relevant regulations are still to be established at the national level 
with the consequence that practical guidance on the development and implementation of 
SMS is rare, and reliable tools to support SMS are lacking. The consequence of this is that 
the current approach to surface safety management is piecemeal and not integrated. 
Typically, a single accident and incident type is investigated from the perspective of an 
individual stakeholder with the consequence that resulting proposals for safety mitigation 
measures are biased and limited in terms of their impact. In addition, the industry is 
characterised by non-standardised data collection and investigation practices, insufficient 
or missing definitions, differing reporting levels, and a lack of a coherent and standardised 
structure for efficient coding and analysis of safety data. Since these shortcomings are a 
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major barrier to the required holistic and integrated approach to safety management, this 
thesis addresses the four cornerstones of SMS and recommends major enhancements. In 
particular, a framework for a holistic airport surface safety management is proposed. The 
framework comprises the static airport architecture, a process model of surface operations, 
the determination of causal factors underlying failure modes of these operations, a 
macroscopic scenario tool and a functional relationship model. Safety data and other data 
sources feed the framework and a dedicated data pre-processing strategy ensures its 
validity.  
Unlike current airport surface safety management practices, the proposed framework 
assesses the safety of the operations of all relevant actors. Firstly, the airport architecture is 
modelled and the physical and functional variability of airports defined. Secondly, a 
process model of surface operations is developed, which captures the tasks of the 
stakeholders and their interactions with physical airport surface infrastructure. This model 
serves as a baseline model and guides the further development of the airport SMS. To 
manage the safety of surface operations, the causes of accidents and incidents must be 
identified and their impacts understood. To do so, a reference data set combining twelve 
databases from airlines, airport operators, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), 
ground handling companies and regulators is collected. Prior to its analysis, the data is 
assessed for its quality, and in particular, for its internal validity (i.e. precision), external 
validity (i.e. accuracy) and in terms of reporting levels. A novel external data validation 
framework is developed and each database is rated with a data quality index (DQI). In 
addition, recommendations for reporting systems and safety policies are given. 
Subsequently, the data is analysed for causal factors across stakeholders and the 
contribution of the individual actors are highlighted. For example, the analysis shows that 
the various stakeholders capture different occurrence types and underlying causal factors, 
often including information that is of potential use for another party. The analysis is 
complemented by interviews, observations and statistical analysis, and the results are 
summarised in a new taxonomy. This taxonomy is applicable to all relevant stakeholders 
and is recommended for operational safety risk management. After the airport surface 
operations have been modelled and the drivers to safety identified, the results are 
combined, resulting in a macroscopic scenario tool which supports the management of 
change (i.e. safety assurance), training and education, and safety communication (i.e. 
safety promotion) functions of the SMS. Finally, a structured framework to assess the 
functional relationship between airport surface accidents / incidents and their underlying 
Abstract 
! '!!
causal factors is proposed and the system is quantified in terms of safety. Compared to the 
state-of-the-art safety assessments that are biased and limited in terms of their impact, the 
holistic approach to surface safety allows modelling the safety impact of each system 
component, their interactions and the entire airport surface system architecture.  
The framework for a holistic airport surface safety management developed in this 
thesis delivers a SMS standard for airports. The standard exceeds international 
requirements by standardizing the two SMS core functions (safety risk management and 
safety assurance) and integrating safety-relevant information across all relevant 
stakeholders. This allows a more effective use of safety information and provides an 
improved overview on, and prediction of, safety risks and ultimately improves the safety 
level of airports and their stakeholders. Furthermore, the methodology employed in this 
thesis is flexible and could be applied to all aspects of aviation SMS and system analysis.  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the context of the research in this thesis by examining the role of 
safety management in preventing accidents and other incidents on the airport surface (i.e. 
runways and taxiways). It establishes the rationale for the need for a holistic and 
comprehensive framework for the assessment of airport surface safety and formulates 
seven research objectives for its realisation. This is followed by a brief description of the 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background   
The demand for air travel has increased steadily over the years such that air transport is 
now a major contributor to global economic prosperity. Since the mid-1980s, passenger 
numbers have more than doubled, while freight traffic has increased almost three-fold (Air 
Transport Action Group, 2005, 2012). Despite the recent economic recession, this trend is 
expected to continue over the next 20 years. Indeed, forecasts suggest that world passenger 
traffic (by revenue passenger-kilometres) and air cargo (by revenue tonne-kilometres) will 
grow annually by 5.0 and 5.2%, respectively (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2012a).  
Airports are a vital component of the air transport system. Although they can be quite 
different from each other, e.g. some may have a single runway whilst others have six, they 
have the same basic function, which is the provision of a safe and efficient transition of 
passengers and goods between the ground and airspace. Whilst airports have considerable 
infrastructure, the most apparent being the terminals, it is actually operations on the airport 
surface that are crucial to achieving this function. 
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The airport surface, which is the runway and taxiway system, accommodates the 
ground movement of aircraft. By its very nature, surface operations require the input of 
various actors. Aircraft use the airport surface for landing, taxiing and take-off. Arriving 
flights land on a runway and then use the surface to taxi to their assigned ramp at the 
apron, where ground handling (servicing) takes place. Conversely, departing flights use the 
taxiway system to taxi from their ramp at the apron to an assigned runway for take-off. 
Vehicle drivers and pedestrians (V/PD), e.g. those associated with the airport authority and 
responsible for the management and maintenance of the airport surface, also use the 
runway and taxiway system. To ensure a safe flow of aircraft on this surface is the role of 
Air Traffic Control (ATC). Finally, it is the duty of the regulatory bodies to oversee the 
system by specifying the rules and regulations governing the different aviation 
stakeholders and ensuring their compliance.  
Given the number of actors and their interactions, it is easy to see just how complex 
surface operations are. Unsurprisingly, this increases the level of vulnerability on the 
airport surface, presenting an appreciable level of risk of failure with the consequent 
potential for the occurrence of accidents and incidents. Research by the Flight Safety 
Foundation (2009) revealed that from 1995 to 2008, a total of 1,429 commercial transport 
aircraft were involved in aviation accidents. Of these, approximately 30.0% were runway 
related, leading to 973 fatalities. This highlights the potentially catastrophic nature of 
accidents on the airport surface. In addition to accidents, incidents in which safety is 
compromised also occur on the airport surface. For example, there were 951 runway 
incursions, in 2009 in the United States (U.S.) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010d). 
Furthermore, it is not just runways that are of concern as accidents and incidents can 
equally occur on taxiways. Therefore, effective risk mitigation strategies must incorporate 
both the runways and taxiways at an airport. In fact, airport surface safety has been 
acknowledged to be a key area of aviation safety by aviation stakeholders worldwide 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2010; National Transportation Safety Board, 
2012) and, therefore, this thesis addresses the safety of surface operations.  
To avoid situations that compromise safety and lead to accidents and incidents, airports 
are supposed to implement a Safety Management System (SMS). The SMS provides a 
systematic approach to managing safety and has four components: safety policy and 
objectives, safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion. At the core of 
the SMS is operational safety management (risk management), which supports the 
development of evidence-based measures for the overall safety management process, such 
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as key performance indicators of safety. In practice, safety risk management is concerned 
with safety data – its reporting, collection, investigation and analysis – and the subsequent 
development of measures for the mitigation of the safety risks. To do this properly, it is 
essential that safety risk management addresses the entire architecture of a system 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e).  
Although an international legislative framework for airport SMS exists, national 
regulations are still under development. Therefore, little practical guidance for its 
deployment and implementation is currently available. Yet to date, initiatives for the 
management of surface safety have addressed the issue from various single viewpoints 
including, regulatory bodies at the national and international levels (the International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2007), multinational aviation safety organisations (Flight Safety 
Foundation, 2009), Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010d), and aircraft manufacturers (Airbus, 2009). In addition, there have 
been action plans at the local airport level (e.g. training campaigns). These initiatives 
highlight not only the divided attention surface safety receives but also the biggest 
limitation in the safety management of surface operations: i.e. single accident or incident 
type focus of current initiatives associated with the viewpoint of a specific aviation 
stakeholder.  
The current approaches to the analysis of accidents and incidents on the airport surface 
are piecemeal focus on the mitigation and prevention of specific occurrence types, and 
often for particular scenarios (e.g. runway-related occurrences only). The consequence of 
this is that awareness for surface safety is channelled towards specific scenarios, discarding 
that others have the potential to result in a fatal accident.  
Typical examples for surface safety analysis and mitigation efforts include the 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation’s (EUROCONTROL) Integrated 
Risk Picture (IRP) and the Causal Model for Air Transport Safety (CATS) developed by 
the Nationaal Lucht- en Ruimtevaartlaboratorium (NLR). Both models have developed 
detailed mathematical models of specific accidents and incidents of relevance to the airport 
surface, e.g. the IRP includes runway and taxiway collisions, whilst CATS considers 
runway excursions and incursions. Yet despite this, both models suffer from the drawback 
of the focus on a particular stakeholder perspective, with the IRP focussed on ATC and 
CATS concerned with the flight perspective. Therefore, a large amount of information 
relevant to surface operations is not considered in each model and hence they are of limited 
relevance in risk mitigation to stakeholders other than those for which they were created 
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(Ale, et al., 2009; The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
Experimental Centre, 2006). 
Whilst such a piecemeal approach might be acceptable at an organisational level as 
stakeholders are interested in determining the risk related to their operations, however, it is 
also found at the highest level of legislation. For instance, the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation’s (ICAO) ‘Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions’ (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2007), provides recommendations for the mitigation of 
runway incursions at a global level. However, its development is based on subject matter 
expert (SME) opinion and fails to capture various factors that are critical in the context of 
runway incursions. For example, the manual does not account for factors related to vehicle 
and pedestrian operations (e.g. vehicle technical failures, V/PD competences) on the 
airport surface.  
Previous analyses also show methodological limitations. These include: missing or 
ambiguous definitions, insufficient specification of safety data, data quality concerns (e.g. 
data accuracy), and unspecified analysis methodologies. The Flight Safety Foundation 
(2009), for instance, initiated a major study to analyse risk factors in runway excursions 
and recommended safety risk enhancements based upon the results of the analysis. 
However, this study fails to account for all types of excursions, uses aggregate accident 
data without assessing its quality and does not specify how the risk factors are extracted 
from the data. 
In summary, the current non-integrated approach to safety management has developed 
from the consideration of specific stakeholder interests. It neglects the operations of the 
other relevant stakeholders, and their inter-dependencies, with the consequent impact of 
less than effective mitigation measures. Therefore, a holistic (integrated) safety assessment 
of airport surface operations is required, based on a reliable methodology and following 
the requirements (specified by the ICAO) of safety management systems. Such an 
approach will enable truly effective risk mitigation strategies to be developed for the 
airport surface. This thesis develops such a holistic model of airport surface safety. 
1 Introduction 
!%*!
1.2 Aim and Objectives 
From the background above, the aim of this thesis is to develop a framework for a 
holistic airport surface safety management. The framework proposes a systematic approach 
to safety management by modelling the airport architecture and the process of surface 
operations, determining its failure modes and their underlying causal factors, developing a 
macroscopic scenario tool to evaluate changes in the system architecture and proposing a 
functional relationship model to quantify the system in terms of safety. Safety data and 
other data sources feed the framework and a dedicated data pre-processing strategy ensures 
its validity. Based upon this, recommendations for safety enhancement strategies are 
proposed. Seven research objectives have been formulated to achieve this aim. These are 
to: 
 
1. Model the physical and functional architecture of airports and define its variability. 
Developing a descriptive model of the airport architecture allows understanding the higher-
level structures and the context of airport safety management. Defining the variability of 
the airport system architecture will later help to specify the research requirements. 
 
2. Develop a 4-dimensional process model of airport surface operations.  
The operations on the airport surface (runways and taxiways) are crucial to the 
achievement of the airport’s functionality. Following the definition of the static airport 
architecture, the second objective addresses the dynamics of its operations and aims to 
develop a process model of surface operations. Such a model helps understanding the tasks 
of the stakeholders and their interaction with physical airport surface infrastructure as well 
as the overall airport surface system architecture. 
 
3. Provide a systematic literature review to highlight the limitations of current 
approaches and potential barriers to the effective mitigation of airport surface 
accidents / incidents.  
The review has the goal to set the initial research requirements. The incorporation of 
further specifications derived from the variability of airports and the characteristics of 
surface operations aids the development of a robust framework for an integrated analysis 
of airport surface safety. 
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4. Develop a data validation framework. 
Based on the research requirements a strategy for the collection of a reference data set is 
derived. To ensure the validity of the data, a framework for data quality assessments that 
accounts for the specific characteristics of airport surface safety data is developed. 
 
5. Determine the causal factors underlying airport surface accidents / incidents. 
The aim is to get a holistic understanding of the causes to accidents / incidents, to identify 
the contribution of the individual actors and to summarise the results in a new taxonomy. 
 
6. Develop a macroscopic scenario tool to support the safety management of airport 
surface operations. 
The research objective aims at developing a model that shows how each component of the 
airport surface system architecture can fail. As the airport environment is dynamic and, 
therefore, characterised by change, such a model can also provide a macroscopic scenario 
tool to evaluate the impact of changes in the airport surface system and to guide further 
analysis. 
 
7. Propose a systematic framework to assess the functional relationship between 
airport surface accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors. 
The last research objective aims at proposing a methodology for the quantification of the 
airport surface system in terms of safety and to provide recommendations for safety 
enhancement strategies. 
1.3 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 discusses the context for airport safety management and the need for 
research. It defines the airport system, both in architectural and functional terms, and 
highlights the central role of airport surface operations and the need for an appropriate 
safety management system. The current management of the airport surface is discussed in 
Chapter 3 and used to develop an initial process model of normal airport surface 
operations. This model describes the physical airport surface infrastructure together with 
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the tasks and interactions of the relevant stakeholders, and serves as a baseline model for 
the subsequent development of the SMS in this thesis.  
Chapter 4 addresses the fundamentals of safety and SMS and defines the requirements 
for SMS. In addition, the current status of its implementation in airports is identified. 
Subsequently, Chapter 5 systematically reviews the state-of-the-art of airport surface safety 
analysis and mitigation strategies. The aim is to emphasise the current approaches in 
relation to the SMS requirements established in Chapter 4. Based on the system 
architecture, the requirements of SMS and the limitations of previous research, a 
framework for an integrated analysis of airport surface safety is proposed.  
In order to analyse the safety of surface operations using the proposed framework a 
reference data set combining twelve databases from airlines, airport operators, ANSPs, 
ground handling companies and regulators is collected in Chapter 6. To assess the quality 
of this dataset a data quality assessment framework is developed that accounts for the 
specific characteristics of airport surface safety data. In particular, the data is assessed for 
its internal validity, external validity and in terms of reporting levels, and each database is 
rated using a Data Quality Index (DQI). In addition, recommendations are offered for 
reporting systems and safety policies. 
Chapter 7 and 8 present the analysis of the data (captured in Chapter 6) to determine 
causal factors using a hybrid methodology. The methodology is applied at the State-level 
in Chapter 7 and at the cross-State level in Chapter 8. Subsequently, the results are used to 
specify a new taxonomy (Chapter 9). This taxonomy provides a common industry 
language and state-of-the-art tool to support the data analysis function in the context of 
SMS. Its unique features are its integration and applicability to all relevant aviation 
stakeholders. In addition, a cross-stakeholder comparison serves to give a unique insight 
into the contribution of each of the stakeholders and to explain the differences in causal 
factors and their drivers. 
After the airport surface operations have been modelled and the drivers to safety 
identified, the results are combined in Chapter 9 to develop a macroscopic scenario tool, 
which supports the management of change (i.e. safety assurance), training and education, 
as well as the safety communication functions of SMS (i.e. safety promotion). 
Chapter 10 analyses the impact of the airport and its characteristics on the occurrence 
of airport surface safety accidents / incidents. The relevant data is collected through an 
airports survey. Using this data, Chapter 11 develops a systematic analysis framework to 
model the functional relationship between occurrences and their underlying causal factors. 
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Following this framework, the airport surface system architecture is dissected into its 
elements with each component and their interactions analysed separately. This provides a 
more detailed analysis compared to traditional accident / incident analysis methods. In 
addition, Chapter 11 summarises this research by presenting the overall framework for a 
holistic airport safety management. 
The thesis ends with Chapter 12 with a summary of the contributions of this thesis. 
Furthermore, recommendations for future research and a list of publications from the 
research presented in this thesis are given. Figure 1 captures the high level structure of this 
thesis. 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of thesis structure 
Chapter 12: Conclusions 
Chapter 11: Airport surface safety model 
Chapter 10: The impact of airport characteristics 
Chapter 9: A macroscopic scenario tool for airport SMS 
Chapter 8: Cross-state analysis 
Chapter 7: Causal factor analysis 
Chapter 6: Data collection and validation 
Chapter 5: Airport safety modelling 
Chapter 4: Airport safety management 
Chapter 3: Airport surface operations 
Chapter 2: The airport system 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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2 The Airport System 
A prerequisite for the development of a holistic framework to assess airport surface 
safety is to define the airport environment. Therefore, and to address the first research 
objective, this chapter develops a model of the airport architecture, which is applied in 
three case studies to identify the physical and functional variability in airports. This is 
achieved in six parts.  
To begin with, the airport architecture in terms of its physical infrastructure, 
operations, and key actors is defined. Subsequently three case studies are used to identify 
the variability in the system architecture. The third part introduces the critical role of 
surface operations for the airport’s functionality and part four introduces the Key 
Performance Indicators (KPI’s) used to measure airport performance and discusses their 
drivers. Subsequently, the importance of safety is highlighted and current approaches to 
addressing surface safety are introduced, before part six concludes this chapter.  
2.1 Airports and their Function in the Air Transport System 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines an aerodrome as  “a 
defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) 
intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement 
of aircraft” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004b). Although, often used 
interchangeably in the aviation industry, the terms airport and aerodrome are different, as 
the former refers to aerodromes for which a certificate has been issued by the appropriate 
authorities (Transport Canada, 2010a). States are required to certify aerodromes used for 
2 The Airport System 
!%&!
international operations in accordance with the specifications contained in Annex 14 to the 
Chicago Convention as well as other relevant ICAO specifications through an appropriate 
regulatory framework (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004b).  
2.2 System Architecture 
In order to understand the airport function, it is necessary to define the airport system 
architecture in terms of its components, operations and the key actors or stakeholders.  
2.2.1 Airport Components 
Airports consist of two major components: landside and airside (Ashford, et al., 1997; 
deNeufville and Odoni, 2003; Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994; Janic, 2000; Wells, 1996).  
The landside comprises the ground-access system (e.g. road network and public 
transportation facilities), the terminals, and the interface between the ground-access system 
and the terminal buildings (i.e. curbside). The terminal area is split into a publicly 
accessible side and a restricted access area. Whilst the passenger processing areas (e.g. the 
ticketing, check-in and arrivals greeting areas) are accessible to the public, access to the 
departure and arrival concourses, and the baggage reclaim area is restricted to passengers 
holding a valid boarding pass and airport personnel. Depending on the underlying system, 
however, national differences may be encountered. For instance, the baggage reclaim area 
is within the restricted access zone at European airports, whilst in the U.S. these facilities 
are accessible to the public. Finally, the control tower is located on the landside. 
The airside facilities are those where the aircraft operations and supplementary services 
are carried out and access from landside to airside is subject to strict controls. The airside 
facilities include the gates that connect the terminal to the aircraft, the apron / ramp, which 
are used for ground handling activities (e.g. loading and fuelling), and the runway (RWY) 
and taxiway (TWY) system (airport surface or manoeuvring area), and associated 
infrastructure (e.g. lighting, markings and signage). In addition, cargo and mail processing, 
fire fighting, hangars, and other facilities (e.g. for general aviation – GA) may be located 
on the airside. 
2 The Airport System 
!%'!
2.2.2 Airport Operations 
Airports are involved in various operations (activities). The term operation refers to “an 
organised activity involving a number of people” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013). When 
mapping these activities to the components section 2.2.1, they can be summarised into six 
management categories: access facilities, terminal and passenger, apron, manoeuvring 
area, airside (activities simultaneously applicable to apron, airport surface and outer 
surface areas), and general. From the literature (Ashford, et al., 1997; deNeufville and 
Odoni, 2003; Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994; International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2009e; Janic, 2000; Kazda and Caves, 2000; Wells, 1996) the six management categories 
can be further broken down as follows: 
1. Access facilities management 
• Parking  
• Shuttle services 
• Other transport services (e.g. taxies, limousines and car rental) 
2. Terminal and passenger management 
• Service (e.g. public information)  
• Check-in  
• Security  
• Sales and retail 
• Customs 
• Immigration 
• Baggage flow management and facilities (e.g. baggage claim, left luggage and 
trolley management) 
• Very Important Person (VIP) assistance  
• Mail and cargo processing  
3. Apron management 
• Gate / stand allocation  
• Gate operations 
• Flight dispatch and ground handling 
• Rules and regulations for airside operations  
• Vehicle management (e.g. licensing) 
• Push-back and towing operations  
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• Taxi operations 
• Apron inspection and management 
4. Manoeuvring area management 
• Manoeuvring area inspection and maintenance (e.g. winter operations) 
• Construction management 
• Taxi and departure / arrival operations 
5. Airside management  
• Air traffic and aeronautical information and communications services  
• Radio navigation aids installations and maintenance  
• Wildlife hazard management 
• Obstacle control 
• Follow-me guidance and marshalling  
• Disabled aircraft removal  
6. General airport management  
• Aerodrome emergency planning (e.g. emergency procedures and simulation 
practices)  
• Rescue and fire fighting (e.g. equipment, facilities maintenance and training)  
• Safety and security  
o Implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) 
o Implementation and monitoring of a security programme 
o Implementation and monitoring of an aerodrome emergency plan 
o Processing of the applications for the issuance of access cards 
• Slot negotiation and allocation  
• Cleaning and waste removal  
• Coordination with multi-agencies / dealing with stakeholders (e.g. local 
communities)  
• Public information (external).  ,-./01!# summarises the physical and functional airport architecture. The arrows 
represent the flow of passengers through the airport system. 
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Figure adapted from Ashford, et al. (1997), deNeufville and Odoni (2003), Horonjeff and McKelvey (1994), Janic (2000), Kazda and Caves (2000), Wells (1996) 
Figure 2: Physical and functional architecture of airports 
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2.2.3 Key Actors or Stakeholders 
Various actors or stakeholders are involved in airport operations. The principle actors 
directly responsible for safe and efficient airport operations are the airport authority, 
airlines, ground handling companies, Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs), and 
various contractors. In addition, external stakeholders, such as local communities or the 
government, interact with the airport. All operations are carried out in accordance with the 
relevant regulations. 
2.2.3.1 Airport Operator 
The airport is owned and operated by the airport authority (airport operator), which 
may be a governmental or a non-governmental (privatized) entity. Its responsibilities 
include the management and oversight operations. Although the airport authority can be 
directly responsible for the activities in section 2.2.2, many are delivered through lease 
agreements and sub-contracts. Where this is the case, the airport authority is responsible 
for the management of the sub-contractors and tenants. For example, air traffic control 
services are often provided by an independent ANSP, or shops in the sales area are usually 
leased to commercial entities. Typical activities that are run by the airport authority itself 
include, construction, facilities and infrastructure management, maintenance, and general 
airport management (Wilding, 2007). 
2.2.3.2 Airlines 
Airlines are service providers, whose basic function is the transportation of people and 
goods. They use aircraft, which provide the physical infrastructure that enables 
transportation in the air. Airlines operate a network that connects different locations (i.e. 
airports). The core of an airline’s operations includes flight operations (i.e. the 
management of flights, including, flight planning, training and crew scheduling), ground 
operations (e.g. traffic handling and ramp handling), and maintenance and engineering. 
These operations are supported by other more administrative functions (e.g. finance and 
sales). Similar to the airport authority, airlines can also sub-contract some of their 
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activities. For instance, ground handling is often sub-contracted to specialised service 
providers as outlined in the next section (International Air Traffic Association, 2013). 
These days, airlines are often part of an alliance, which is a cooperation agreement 
between two or more airlines. A key feature of alliances is code sharing, i.e. agreements 
whereby airlines share the same flight. That means passengers can book a seat on one 
airline, though the flight is actually operated by another one. This allows airlines both to 
offer a wider network without having to schedule extra flights, and to provide a more 
seamless travel experience for passengers through that network (Goh and Uncles, 2003). 
For example, Star Alliance’s 27 member airlines together serve a network of 1,356 airports 
in 193 countries (Star Alliance, 2013).  
2.2.3.3 Ground Handling Companies  
Ground handling services comprise the two functions of traffic and ramp handling. The 
former are mainly landside services at passenger and / or cargo terminals. The main 
services include passenger handling (e.g. ticketing, check-in and executive lounges), cargo 
and mail handling, and information services. Ramp handling refers to operations in relation 
to the servicing of aircraft which take place on the airside. Typical services include aircraft 
loading and unloading, baggage handling, fuelling and de-icing. Several different 
companies can provide handling services for one flight. In fact, at least two suppliers (one 
of which has to be independent of the airport or the dominant airline) for each category of 
ground handling services (e.g. baggage handling, ramp handling, fuel and oil handling) 
must offer services at larger European airports to ensure that airports remain competitive 
(European Commission, 2012). 
The airport authority, airline, or an independent operator, i.e. ground handling 
company, can offer these services but the market share of these stakeholders varies greatly 
across different regions of the world. While many European airport operators offer 
handling services, those in the U.S. do not. Indeed, in North America ground handling is 
most commonly performed by airlines themselves, either through self-handling or third-
party handling (e.g. another airline). However, this practice (ground handling by airlines), 
is prohibited at many airports elsewhere. Independent ground handling companies must 
have a concession to operate at an airport and undergo regular audits from both airports 
and airlines (deNeufville and Odoni, 2003). 
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2.2.3.4 Air Navigation Service Providers 
Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) provide Air Traffic Control (ATC) and 
navigation services for the aircraft that fly in controlled airspace. Aircraft typically use 
airways, assigned routes in the air similar to a road system in the sky, to fly from one 
airport to another. It is ATC’s task to control the aircraft along these airways and to make 
sure that the required separation is maintained.  
At the airport, ground control and the aerodrome control tower (TWR) coordinate the 
ground movements and direct pilots onto the runway and into the air. Once the aircraft is 
airborne, the Approach Control unit (AAP) provides separation for the climb and descent 
phase of flight. En-route, ATC services are provided by the Area Control Centre (ACC) 
(NATS, 2013; Subotic, 2007). 
2.2.3.5 Contractors 
As previously noted, various airport services (e.g. sales, restaurants, cleaning and 
general security) are provided by contractors. The contractors must follow the rules and 
procedures set by the regulator (e.g. security regulations) and local airport operator (e.g. 
safety measures such as airside vehicle driver training). 
2.2.3.6 Regulators 
ICAO requires each member state “to provide for the safe and efficient operation of 
aircraft within its airspace” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006e). Each State 
signatory to the Chicago Convention is obligated to provide infrastructure and services, 
including adequate airports, navigation aids, charting and instrument approach minima, 
weather reporting, air traffic services, search and rescue, aviation security, and the timely 
correction of safety deficiencies. A Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) executes the proactive 
supervision and regulation of aviation activities. Under the convention and its annexes, it is 
the State’s responsibility to provide, and hence the CAA’s responsibility to execute: 
• Licensing of operational personnel; 
• Certification of aircraft, air operators and aerodromes; 
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• Control and supervision of licensed personnel, certified products and approved 
organisations; 
• Provision of air navigation services (including meteorological services, 
aeronautical telecommunication, search and rescue services, charts, and the 
distribution of information); and 
• Aircraft accident and incident investigation. 
Therefore, in each state, a CAA has to develop and implement acceptable certification, 
licensing and operating processes to ensure safe and efficient airport operations. 
Furthermore, it has to oversee that all stakeholders comply with the established 
regulations. 
2.2.3.7 External Stakeholders 
An airport is not a self-contained entity; rather, it actively interacts with external 
stakeholders. Airports, then, are part of a wider air transport system that also includes 
aircraft / airlines, Air Traffic Management (ATM) and customers / system users. This air 
transport system is embedded in the natural environment and regulated by national and 
international authorities (Subotic, 2007) as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
        Figure adapted from Subotic (2007) 
Figure 3: Air transport system !
As introduced in section 2.2.3.2, the airlines’ role in this system is to transport people 
and goods by means of aircraft. Therefore, the users of the system are either passengers 
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Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2005). ATM is composed of a number of 
complementary systems namely; airspace management, Air Traffic Flow and Capacity 
Management (ATFCM) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) (The European Organisation for 
the Safety of Air Navigation, 2011e). 
Regulatory bodies oversee this system by providing a framework of rules and 
regulations and ensuring the compliance of the different aviation stakeholders. While 
regulatory bodies exist at a national level, multinational organisations have been created to 
oversee and harmonise regulatory requirements. The ICAO, an agency of the United 
Nations (UN), founded in 1944, sets regulations and standards at an international level that 
have to be adopted by its 190 member states (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2011d). According to Article 44 of the Chicago Convention, the agency is required to 
“insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world” 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006d). This is achieved through the 
promulgation of Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP’s), published in the 
Annexes to the Chicago Convention (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2011b).  
The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the European regulatory body and 
was established in 2002 to ensure a high and uniform level of safety throughout the 
European Union (EU) by means of the implementation of common safety rules and 
measures. Its responsibilities include certification and the development and 
implementation of safety rules (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation SKYbrary, 2011). In addition, multinational cooperative bodies have been 
established. The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
(EUROCONTROL) is committed to the development of a Single European Sky: a 
seamless, pan-European ATM system. Its activities include, for example, research on the 
pan-European ATM network, support for rule making and regulations in European 
aviation, as well as network management (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, 2010a). 
Besides the stakeholders within the air transport system, other external stakeholders, 
such as government, local communities, investors and suppliers have political, economic, 
and social interests in airports (Luchtverkeersleiding Nederland, 2007). 
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2.2.4 Airport Heterogeneity 
While the literature has identified that airports are homogeneous in their main 
characteristics (i.e. components, activities and key actors), it has also shown that, at a 
lower level, these features may vary (e.g. various stakeholders can be responsible for the 
activities introduced in section 2.2.2). To analyse how airports differ in their characteristics 
and to augment the literature, three case studies are presented here. 
The objective of these case studies is to analyse three airports in terms of their 
components, stakeholder responsibility for activities and key actors. By such an analysis, 
the variant and invariant characteristics of the airport architecture can be derived and the 
functionality of airports assessed. To capture the various features of airports, including 
different underlying operations and regulations, the criteria for the selection of appropriate 
airports were set as follows: 
• Airports from different countries in Europe and North America that are subject to 
varying regulations, 
• Airports with different types of ownership, and;  
• Airports of different size in terms of the number of aircraft movements and 
passenger boarding. 
According to these criteria, Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) in the U.S., 
Liverpool John Lennon Airport (LPL) in the United Kingdom (UK), and Bodo Airport 
(BOO) in Norway (NO) were chosen. The case studies included airfield tours given by 
senior operational personnel and structured communications with them. The aim was to 
identify to what extent each airport conforms to airport architecture derived from the 
literature outlined in the previous sections. Thus, it was important to seek the opinions and 
views of personnel in senior positions (e.g. supervisors) with a minimum of 15 years of 
experience in aviation, airport operations and their safety. As of November 2005, airports 
are required through Annex 14 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (ICAO, 
2004b) to have a SMS in operation. However, safety-critical thinking emerged in the 
aviation industry during the 1990s (Stolzer, et al., 2011) and, therefore, a minimum of 15 
years of aviation experience ensures that the relevant personnel are both knowledgeable 
about the operations and have the necessary awareness for their safety.   
 The structured communications were, therefore, conducted with: 
• An Airfield Operations Superintendent at LAX, 
2 The Airport System 
!""!
• The Head of Health, Safety and Regulatory Compliance at LPL, and 
• The ATC Tower Supervisor at BOO. 
The tours covered both landside and airside facilities. This included the terminals, the 
aprons (both commercial and GA facilities), the manoeuvring area and the perimeter roads. 
The baseline model of airport components introduced in Figure 2 was the basis of the 
guided tours and the personnel were asked to identify each of the components successively 
from the landside to airside. Communication with the operational personnel facilitated the 
identification of each component and the tours enabled the development of a spatial image 
of the airports. The guided tours also facilitated the understanding of airport operations 
which will be detailed in Chapter 3. 
In addition, the list of airport operations compiled in section 2.2.2 and the key actors 
(section 2.2.3) were discussed with the operational personnel in order to identify the 
operations applicable to each airport and the corresponding stakeholders. Table 1 presents 
the operational characteristics of the three chosen airports.  
 
Table 1: General airport characteristics 
 
Characteristic 
 
 
LAX 
 
LPL 
 
BOO 
Location 
 
United States 
 
United Kingdom Norway 
Passenger boarding 
(2011) 61, 862,52 5,251,161 1,556,924 
Aircraft movements 
(2011) 603,912 69,055 43,520 
Airport operator Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) 
Peel Airports Limited 
(Peel) 
Avinor & Royal 
Norwegian Air Force 
(RNoAF) 
Ownership City of Los Angeles Private organisation State-owned organisation & Military 
Sources: Avinor AS (2012a); Los Angeles World Airports (2012); UK Civil Aviation Authority (2012) 
 
LAX is a major hub airport in North America and is one of the busiest airports in the 
world. According to Airports Council International (ACI) it was ranked third in terms of 
aircraft movements, and sixth in terms of passenger boarding in 2010 (Airports Council 
International, 2012a). LPL is a medium-sized airport in the UK with mainly domestic 
traffic and a few international connections. BOO is a regional airport in Norway with a 
unique feature of shared civilian and military facilities.  
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Figures 4 to 6 show the components of the three airports. The differences compared to 
the baseline model introduced in section 2.2.1, Figure 2, are highlighted in red and the 
individual characteristics shown in blue. 
 
 
Figure 4: Components LAX !
LAX’s physical architecture resembles the model introduced in section 2.2.1. The 
airport has eight terminals and a further remote terminal, called the ‘Eagle Terminal’, 
which is connected to the main terminal through a bus service. Currently, only one gate 
can accommodate the Airbus A380 but a further terminal is under construction to 
accommodate the latest larger aircraft models. This development is urgently needed in 
order to accommodate the growing demand for A380’s and similar large aircraft types and, 
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thus, to avoid losing business to other airports (Structured communication with Airfield 
Operations Superintendent Los Angeles World Airports, May 2012). 
 
  
Figure 5: Components LPL !
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the manoeuvring area from outside the airport (Structured communication with Head of 
Health Safety and Regulatory Compliance Peel Airports Limited, March 2012). 
 
 
Figure 6: Components BOO 
 
BOO differs from the other two airports mainly through its shared civil and military 
use (~80.0% civilian activities, 20.0% military activities). The airport has one runway, 
which combines both civilian and military areas. The passenger terminal and associated 
facilities are located on one side of the runway, while on the other side are the military 
facilities, hangars and shelters. Avinor, the airport operator, owns the terminals but the 
remaining airport infrastructure is owned by the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) 
(Structured communication with ATC Tower Supervisor at Bodo Airport, June 2012).  
The management and responsibilities of the different stakeholders in the airport 
activities also differ. Table 2 compares the three airports.  
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Table 2: Activities LAX, LPL, BOO 
  LAX 
 
 
LPL 
 
BOO 
 
1. Access facilities management: 
 
Parking AA contractor AA AA 
Shuttle services AA contractor & PO PO n/a 
Other transport services PO PO PO 
 
2. Terminal and passenger management: 
 
Service (e.g. public information) Volunteers Government 
(Local Council) 
AA 
Check-in Airlines Airlines Airlines, 
Handling companies 
Security Government (TSA) Outsourced to PO Outsourced to PO 
Sales A vendor runs all 
concessions 
POs POs 
Customs Government (CBP) Government (BC) Government (NC) 
Immigrations Government (CBP) Government (BC) Police 
Baggage facilities (infrastructure)  AA AA AA 
Baggage flow management Airlines, 
Handling companies 
Handling companies Handling companies 
VIP assistance AA, police AA AA 
Mail and cargo processing Airlines, 
Handling companies 
AA Handling companies, 
PO 
 
3. Apron management: 
 
Gate / Stand allocation Airlines, 
AA  
AA AA 
Flight dispatch and ground 
handling 
Airlines, 
Handling companies 
Handling companies Handling companies 
Rules and regulations for airside 
operations 
AA AA AA, RNoAF 
Vehicle management  AA AA AA, RNoAF 
Push-back operations Handling companies Handling companies Handling companies 
Taxi operations Pilots Pilots Pilots 
Visual aids maintenance / apron 
inspection and maintenance 
AA AA RNoAF 
 
4. Manoeuvring area management: 
 
Surface inspection and 
maintenance 
AA AA RNoAF 
Visual aids maintenance AA AA RNoAF 
Construction management Coordinated by AA Coordinated by AA For terminal: AA, 
Other areas: RNoAF 
 
5. Airside management:  
 
Air traffic and aeronautical 
information and communications 
services 
ANSP/Regulator* AA/ANSP** ANSP 
Radio navigation aids 
installations and maintenance 
ANSP/Regulator AA/ANSP RNoAF is 
responsible, AA 
executed it 
Wildlife hazard management AA AA RNoAF 
Obstacle control AA AA RNoAF 
Follow-me guidance and 
marshalling 
AA AA RNoAF 
Disabled aircraft removal American Airlines is Handling companies RNoAF subcontracts 
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the designated 
handler 
to PO 
 
6. General airport management:  
 
Aerodrome emergency planning  AA AA RNoAF 
Rescue and fire fighting  City of LA AA RNoAF 
Safety and security APD AA AA, RNoAF 
Slot negotiation and allocation LAX is not slot 
controlled 
AA, Airlines AA 
Cleaning, waste removal  PO PO AA, PO 
Coordination with multi-agencies 
/ dealing with stakeholders 
AA AA PR AA, RNoAF 
Public information (external) AA PR AA PR AA, RNoAF 
*The FAA is responsible for air traffic and aeronautical information and communications services. The FAA 
is an organisation providing both, ANSP and regulatory services. 
**Peel, a private company, providing both, airport operator and ATC services. !
Legend: 
AA – Airport Authority 
AA PR – Airport Authority Public Relations 
Department 
APD – Airport Police Department 
BC – Boarder Control 
CBP – Customs and Boarder Protection 
LA – Los Angeles 
NC – Norwegian Customs 
PO – Private Organisations 
TSA – Transportation Security Administration 
 
In terms of external stakeholders, all three airports interact with the stakeholders 
introduced in Figure 3. In addition, the government, local communities and suppliers are 
external stakeholders with interest in the studied airports. LAX is owned by the city of Los 
Angeles, LPL by a private company, and BOO is run by Avinor, a limited company wholly 
owned by the state. None of these airports, therefore, has external investors. 
Based upon the three case studies, the physical and functional variability of airports 
was derived. This was achieved by comparing the architecture of LAX, LPL and BOO in 
terms of components, operations and stakeholders to the system architecture derived from 
the literature (presented in sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.3).  
The results show that while the physical infrastructure of airports as well as its 
functionality (i.e. activities) does not differ, the implementation of these components and 
operations varies as follows: 
 
Invariable airport characteristics: Variable airport characteristics: 
• Basic airport components (except 
ground access system and apron 
facilities) 
• Frequency of components 
• Location of components 
• Ground access system and airside 
facilities adjacent to the apron 
showed variable components 
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• Main airport activities • Stakeholders responsibility for these 
activities 
• External stakeholders of the air 
transport system 
• Ownership structure 
 
The operations of an airport can thus be summarised in one main function, i.e. the 
provision of a safe and efficient transition of passengers and goods between the ground and 
airspace. To achieve this function the operations on the airport surface, i.e. the physical 
location where this transition takes place, are crucial and, therefore, the next section moves 
on to introducing the central function of airport surface operations. 
2.3 Surface Operations 
In this thesis the airport surface is defined as the manoeuvring area, i.e. “the part of an 
aerodrome to be used for take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons” 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2004b). Both terms are used interchangeably 
throughout.  
 
 
Source: Federal Aviation Administration National Aeronautical Charting Office (2011) 
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The airport surface comprises the runway and taxiway system within the manoeuvring 
area, highlighted in red in $%&'()!*. According to ICAO Annex 14 (2004b), a runway is 
defined as “rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the landing and take-off of 
aircraft.” A taxiway is defined as a “path on a land aerodrome established for the taxiing of 
aircraft and intended to provide a link between one part of the aerodrome and another 
[…].” 
The apron or airport ramp, an area “intended to accommodate aircraft for the purposes 
of loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance” is not 
considered in this research since the nature of operations here is quite different from that 
on the manoeuvring area. The manoeuvring area together with the apron is referred to as 
the movement area.  
The airport surface accommodates the ground movements of aircraft. Inbound flights 
land on a runway and then use the airport surface to taxi to their assigned ramp at the 
apron, where ground handling takes place. Conversely, departure flights use the 
manoeuvring area to taxi from their ramp at the apron to an assigned runway for take-off. 
Thus, the airport surface is the physical location where the transition between the ground 
and airspace takes place. 
Successful surface operations require the input and interactions of several stakeholders 
and the five main actors (airport operator, pilot, V/PD, ATC and regulator) are shown in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8: Airport surface actors 
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2.4 Key Performance Indicators 
Airport performance is measured by means of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for 
corresponding specified Key Performance Areas (KPAs). 
According to the ICAO, “KPAs are a way of categorising performance subjects related 
to high-level ambitions and expectations.”  KPIs are a quantitative measure for “current 
(or) past performance, expected future performance […], as well as actual progress in 
achieving performance objectives” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009d). 
Therefore, KPAs are defined according to an organisation’s objectives (e.g. service-
related, financial) with the quantification of performance enabled through the 
corresponding KPIs. 
The ICAO provides guidance for performance management in ATM and recommends 
eleven KPA’s including capacity, cost-effectiveness, predictability, safety, and security 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2005c). These have been completely or 
partially adopted by multinational cooperative bodies, and national regulators (e.g. Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2012c; Single European Sky ATM Research, 2012). The ICAO 
has also attempted to propose a globally standardised set of metrics and indicators (KPIs). 
It compared the eleven KPAs for two ATM organisations, but failed to identify common 
indicators due to different definitions of terms, fitting criteria (i.e. certain KPIs are only 
applicable to specific locations, times, etc.), normalisation of indicators, and statistical 
derivation (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009d). In general, KPAs and KPIs 
can vary depending on the assessment objectives of an organisation and the system to be 
assessed (e.g. ATM system, airport and airline). 
2.4.1 Airport Performance Measurement 
For airports, the ICAO provides guidance on performance management and 
recommends that airports have a performance management system in place. Whilst the 
ICAO proposes that these systems should address the four KPAs productivity, cost-
effectiveness, safety, and quality of service (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2009b), it has not directly proposed KPIs for airports. However, its ‘Airport Economics 
Manual’ (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006c) proposes means of measuring 
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airport performance and productivity. More specific guidance for airport KPAs and KPIs is 
given by Airports Council International (ACI) (2012b). 
Table 3 presents the main KPAs for airports and the corresponding KPIs for their 
measurement derived from ICAO, ACI and other regulatory bodies as well as safety 
organisations. In addition, the drivers of performance are shown. It should be noted that 
Table 3 is not exhaustive as there are other performance areas, measures, and drivers. 
Section 2.2.4 showed that the implementation of an airport’s components and functions 
varies and as a result, individual airports will find different KPAs and KPIs to be most 
relevant and useful. For instance, privatized airports and non-profit government-owned 
airports are likely to focus on different financial KPIs. In addition, the airport management 
might have different views regarding which KPAs and KPIs are most useful. Whilst one 
manager might see a small set of closely monitored KPIs as the most effective 
performance management tool, others might prefer a larger set of KPIs with a wider focus. 
The KPAs and KPIs are also not static and can change over time as new issues arise 
(Airports Council International, 2012b). 
The KPAs are not isolated areas; they either complement or contradict one another. For 
instance, airport core measures such as total number of passengers and aircraft movements 
influence the airport’s revenue. On the other hand, safety / security and cost-effectiveness 
can be contradictory objectives, as effective safety solutions may increase airport operating 
costs.  
Understanding these interdependencies is important to support decisions. For instance, 
airports must define their core KPIs and safety objectives and must balance these KPIs 
with acceptable safety risks. An airport might want to support its core KPA through an 
investment, for example, a taxiway lighting control system that provides guidance for 
aircraft from the runway to the apron by illuminating their particular taxi route. Decision 
making in this case requires assessing the trade-off between the value added by the system 
and the safety risks involved. If the investment is too high in order to make the system 
safe, it becomes unprofitable. On the other hand, an excess allocation of resources (i.e. 
money) to improve the airport’s core KPIs at the expense of protection can have an impact 
on the airport’s safety performance and lead to an accident. Therefore, understanding the 
interdependencies between safety, airport core measures and cost-effectiveness is vital and 
a prerequisite for decision making processes (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2009e). 
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Table 3: Airport KPAs, KPIs, and drivers 
 
KPA 
 
 
KPI 
 
Driver 
Airport core • Total number of passengers 
• Total number of aircraft movements 
• Freight / mail loaded / unloaded 
• Demand 
• Airline route planning and pricing 
• Competing airports in the same 
area 
• Capacity 
Service quality • Capacity 
  - Terminal capacity 
  - Gate capacity 
  - Runway capacity 
• Aircraft turnaround time 
• Taxi time per aircraft 
• Delay 
      - Percentage of delayed flights 
  - Average aircraft delay 
      - Gate departure delay 
• Customer satisfaction 
  - Baggage delivery time 
  - Percentage of lost luggage 
  - Security clearing time 
  - Border control clearing time 
  - Connecting times 
• Airport infrastructure 
• Staffing level and efficiency 
• Air traffic system restrictions 
• Weather and terrain 
• Network effects 
• Procedures 
• Aircraft type and mix 
• Airline scheduling practices 
Productivity / cost-
effectiveness 
• Passengers per employee 
• Aircraft movements per employee 
• Cost per passenger 
• Cost per movement 
• Cost per ton of cargo 
• Cost per work load unit (WLU) 
• Range of services provided by the 
airport 
• Extent of outsourcing 
• Passenger volume 
• Mix of air services provided 
(e.g. international, domestic) 
• Mix of carrier services provided 
(e.g. network vs. low cost carrier) 
• Airport operating costs 
• Management decisions 
Financial / 
commercial 
• Airport revenue 
• Revenue per passenger 
• Revenue per movement 
• Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) per passenger 
• Rate making methodology 
• Costs for providing aeronautical 
facilities and services 
• Capital structure and spending 
• Demand 
• Airline route planning and pricing 
Safety and security • Number of accidents 
• Number of incidents 
• Public injuries 
• Occupational injuries 
• Lost work time from employee due to 
accident / incident 
• Airport surface design 
• Operations and maintenance 
• Meteorological conditions 
• Operator errors 
• Unsafe working conditions 
• Lack of safety culture 
Environment • Airport carbon footprint 
• Emissions per aircraft 
• Noise quota 
• Number of noise level infringements 
• Utilised energy 
• Emissions 
• Power usage 
• Noise restrictions 
• Management actions 
Sources: Airports Council International (2012b); ERAT Environmentally Responsible Air Transport (2008); 
Federal Aviation Administration (2012c); International Civil Aviation Organization (2005c, 2006c); The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (2009) 
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2.4.2 The Importance of Safety 
One key performance area for airport operations is safety, the subject of this thesis. It is 
one (in addition to security and environmental protection and sustainable development of 
air transport) of the ICAO’s strategic objectives “to foster a global civil aviation system 
that consistently and uniformly operates at peak efficiency and provides optimum safety, 
security and sustainability” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2012). The ICAO 
defines safety as “the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property 
damage is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing 
process of hazard identification and safety risk management” (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2009e). 
The concept of safety involves different connotations, such as: 
• Zero accidents or serious incidents; 
• Freedom from hazards, i.e. those factors that cause or are likely to cause harm; 
• Attitudes of employees of aviation organisations towards unsafe acts and 
conditions; 
• Error avoidance; and 
• Regulatory compliance (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e). 
Independent of the connotation, however, safety is the most fundamental strategic 
objective in aviation (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2011a). The previous 
section 2.4.1 highlighted that safety objectives interact with other KPAs. However, before 
these trade-offs can be considered, the fundamentals of safety need to be understood. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on the safety assessment of airport operations, and in 
particular the operations on the airport surface. 
2.5 Airport Surface Safety 
Section 2.3 introduced the central role of surface operations. Because of the complexity 
of aircraft and the associated complex system of activities of stakeholders, airport surface 
operations are vulnerable to safety lapses. 
In this thesis, and in line with the ICAO’s general definition, airport surface safety 
refers to a prevailing situation on the airport surface that does not cause any harm or injury 
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to both the property (e.g. aircraft, vehicles, airport infrastructure) and people (aircraft 
occupants, vehicle drivers, pedestrian) directly involved in surface movements, and any 
third parties (people and property outside the manoeuvring area) and property (e.g. 
terminal, residential areas) outside the manoeuvring area. A situation in which safety is 
compromised is referred to as a safety occurrence.  
Airport surface safety occurrences can take various forms. Examples include situations 
where an aircraft, vehicle or person infringes onto a runway that already has another 
aircraft waiting to take-off or moving towards its stand at the terminal; in effect, a near-
collision between aircraft and another object on the ground. Other surface related safety 
occurrences are runway excursions where an aircraft exits the end or side of the runway 
surface; wildlife hazards such as bird strikes; or foreign object damage (FOD). A major 
feature of airport surface safety is that the key drivers of such safety, e.g. airport geometry, 
weather and human factors, interact in a complicated manner. 
The need for safety mitigation measures has been increasingly recognised over recent 
years, leading to a steady stream of initiatives and action plans. Previous initiatives have 
addressed the topic of surface safety from different viewpoints including technological 
interventions, regulations and actions that target the improvement of human performance, 
e.g. advanced training programmes or awareness campaigns. These initiatives operate at 
different levels and involve a variety of organisations and industries, including regulators 
(e.g. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007), ANSPs (e.g. Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010d), airport operators (e.g. BAA Heathrow, et al., Year not specified), 
multinational aviation safety organisations (e.g. Flight Safety Foundation, 2009; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2011), research institutions 
(e.g. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) (Bluck, et al., 2001)) and 
aircraft manufacturers (e.g. Airbus, 2009). 
The current approach to surface safety, however, is ad-hoc and piecemeal and its 
limitations have been highlighted in Chapter 1. These are: 
• The focus on single accident / incident types, often particular scenarios; 
• The representation of single stakeholder perspectives; and  
• Methodological limitations including ambiguous or missing definitions, insufficient 
specification of safety data and data quality concerns (e.g. data accuracy), and 
unspecified analysis methodologies. 
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Although the current focused approach is understandable given the different 
responsibilities and interests of the involved stakeholders, it cannot be sufficient, since the 
safety enhancement strategies that are developed through this approach are inevitably 
biased or limited by the particular perspective of the particular stakeholder. There is an 
urgent need for a holistic and robust safety assessment of airport surface operations that 
integrates the viewpoints of all relevant aviation stakeholders in the context of surface 
safety (regulator, airport authority, pilot, ATC, ground handling) and this thesis seeks to 
address this need. 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter has developed a descriptive model of the airport architecture including its 
components, functions and stakeholders and identified its variability. In addition, key 
performance areas and indicators have been defined and the importance of safety 
highlighted. In particular, the central role of surface operations and safety implications 
have been emphasised and the vulnerability associated with the complexity of 
infrastructure and operations, discussed.  In order to ensure the safety of surface operations 
and to contribute to the mitigation of accidents and incidents, this thesis develops a 
framework for a holistic assessment of airport surface safety.  
The principal conclusion of the review and analysis conducted in this chapter and 
contribution is that while the physical architecture of airports and their functionality is 
always the same, the implementation of these components and activities varies. With this, 
the first research objective has been achieved.  
After having defined the static architecture of airports, the next chapter addresses the 
dynamics of its operations and develops a process model of airport surface operations. 
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3 Airport Surface Operations 
The previous chapter defined the static architecture of airports and highlighted the 
central role of surface operations and their vulnerability. Building upon this architecture, 
the current chapter models the airport’s dynamics, i.e. the process of its operations. A 
detailed understanding of the airport surface operations, including its complexities, is 
essential before its safety can be analysed. Therefore, and to address the second research 
objective, a 4-dimensional process model of airport surface operations is developed. This 
model will guide the development of the airport SMS in this thesis. 
The chapter starts with a high-level description of the methodology for model 
development highlighting the objectives and assumptions, and introduces the concept of 
Business Process Modelling. This method is used in this thesis as the framework for 
analysing and improving the process of surface operations. Subsequently, the method for 
derivation and implementation of the Business Process Model (BPM) is elucidated in 
detail. Individual models are developed for the physical airport surface infrastructure, the 
airport operator, pilot, V/PD, ATC, and the regulator. Furthermore, the interfaces between 
the individual parties are highlighted. The components are then integrated in a high-level 
architecture of the overall airport surface system, which is a necessary prerequisite for 
SMS development. Finally, the effect of time on the process of surface operations is 
analysed and time variant and invariant characteristics of such processes derived. 
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3.1 Methodology 
In order to develop an initial process model (PM) of normal operations, it is necessary 
to outline what is meant by normal. In this thesis ‘normal operations’ refer to airport 
surface operations that satisfy the following: 
• Aircraft, vehicles and ATC equipment are not subject to malfunctions; 
• The aeronautical infrastructure (including airport surface infrastructure) that is 
needed for normal operations is not subject to malfunctions; 
• There are actors (i.e. pilot, V/PD, ATC) that interact for successful operations; 
• The actors have the adequate level of training and are fit to carry out their work;  
• Environmental conditions do not exceed the capabilities of the airport and its 
actors; and 
• Airport operations are operations undertaken to an acceptable level of safety. 
The PM of normal airport surface operations is developed using the conceptual 
framework of Business Process Modelling as outlined below. To develop the Business 
Process Model (BPM) the Unified Modelling Language (UML) is applied and individual 
models that describe the physical surface infrastructure and the operations of the five main 
stakeholders, as well as their interfaces are developed. To establish the UML model, 
Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), a systematic method of describing the tasks an operator 
needs to carry out to complete his / her operation (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992), is 
applied. HTA requires the input of several data sources and, therefore, a hybrid 
methodology that combines the literature with an analysis of operations manuals and 
procedures, together with observations and structured communications with airport 
operational personnel is applied. The individual models are then integrated resulting in the 
high-level architecture of the airport surface system, which is finally validated through 
Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). 
3.1.1 Business Process Modelling  
Business Process Modelling is a management tool for improving organisational 
efficiency and quality. The Business Process Model (BPM), whose central features is 
diagrams and an appropriate modelling language, is used to model, analyse, and identify 
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deficiencies and improve or optimise business processes (Havey, 2005; Holt, 2009; White 
and Miers, 2008). It is a graphical representation of the business process, also known as 
‘notation’. In the broadest sense, a BPM is one or more diagrams representing a sequence 
of activities underlying organisational processes. These activities can be modelled at 
different levels of detail and, depending on the modelling objectives and model 
requirements may include, actors, events, activities, associations and information flows 
(Havey, 2005; Holt, 2009; White and Miers, 2008). 
Business Process Modelling can be applied to all types of organisations and industries 
(e.g. clinical research (Leu and Huang, 2011; Scheuerlein, et al., 2012)) and has been 
successfully employed in aviation (e.g. airline business process models (Ploesser, et al., 
2009), passenger check-in models at airports (Lincoln, et al., 2010)). 
In this thesis, Business Process Modelling is employed to model, analyse and improve 
the safety of airport surface operations. The first step in this process is to develop a BPM 
of normal surface operations, which can subsequently be analysed for process failures. 
Effective safety enhancement strategies can then be proposed based on this initial model. 
To develop the BPM, a modelling language needs to be applied and the Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) was used in this research as outlined below. 
3.1.2 Unified Modelling Language 
Unified Modelling Language (UML) is a visual modelling language that is used to 
create a model of a system. It has its roots in object-oriented software engineering and is 
mainly used for system (e.g. software) development. System development is a drawn-out 
process involving the definition of requirements, an in-depth analysis of existing business 
processes, design, development and deployment. UML supports this process by providing 
a toolkit that allows the various elements of the current system to be visualised, the 
requirements for the system to be developed, and associations between the different 
elements to be made. Although UML was developed for the Information Technology (IT) 
industry, it has been applied to various areas, including the analysis of conventional 
business processes (Schmuller, 2009). 
In addition to UML, there are numerous languages for process modelling. Whilst most 
of them represent processes as a series of steps, they emphasize different aspects of the 
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process, such as activities, products, or document and information flows. Hence, they are 
suited for different types of processes.  
The aim of this chapter is to describe the physical architecture of the airport surface as 
well as the operations of the stakeholders, i.e. the tasks each actor needs to carry out to 
complete his / her operation. Therefore, a modelling language that focuses on the flow of 
activities is required. Three examples often used in Business Process Modelling, which 
support activity modelling, are the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN), UML, 
and the System Modelling Language (SysML). These have been developed for different 
applications and BPMN is mainly used for business analysis, UML for software 
development, and SysML for system engineering. Irrespective of their proposed 
applications, the execution of the activity diagrams in the notations is very similar and 
differs mainly in their terminology and graphics (Bock, 2006; International Business 
Machines Corporation, 2013; Schmuller, 2009; White, Year not specified). For example, 
Figure 9 shows the notation used in the three languages to model activity flows. 
 
 
Figure 9: UML, BPMN, SysML notations for activity flows 
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The basic feature of UML is diagrams. A UML diagram consists of a number of 
graphical elements linked according specific rules. The purpose of these diagrams is to 
represent multiple viewpoints of a system. The set of UML diagrams that represent 
multiple views of a system is called a model and four main categories of diagrams for 
model development can be distinguished: structure modelling, use case modelling, 
behavioural modelling, and architectural modelling. These are introduced in Appendix I in 
detail as outlined in Schnuller (2009).  
3.1.3 Method for Derivation of a Business Process Model 
The method to develop the BPM comprises the introduction of the terminology using a 
class diagram and, subsequently, the development of individual models for all relevant 
classes as follows: 
• Model of the physical infrastructure of the airport surface; 
• Model of the role of the airport operator; 
• Model of normal pilot operations; 
• Model of normal V/PD operations; 
• Model of normal ATC operations; 
• Model of the role of the regulator; and 
• Model of interfaces. 
These models are then integrated in a high-level architecture showing the overall airport 
surface system. 
Firstly, the physical airport surface infrastructure is modelled using a class diagram in 
aggregation form, which is used to represent hierarchies of classes. A class is “ a category 
or group of things that have similar attributes and common behaviours” (Schmuller, 2009). 
In the second step, the role of the airport authority in managing and maintaining the 
airport surface is defined. Only the responsibilities of the airport authority are introduced. 
Since airport authority personnel operate on the airport surface in the form of vehicles and 
pedestrians, details of how these responsibilities are executed (i.e. a detailed account of the 
elements and subtasks involved) can be seen in the model of V/PD operations, which is 
developed subsequently. The role of the airport authority is summarised using a package 
diagram. This type of diagram is designed to group elements (e.g. classes). 
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In the third step, the operations of the three stakeholders that directly act and interact 
on the airport surface (i.e. pilot, V/PD, ATC) are modelled. The aim is to understand the 
tasks and sub-tasks that the stakeholders must perform as part of their operations.  
To develop the UML, Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) is applied. As specified, e.g. 
in Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992), this is a systematic method of describing how work is 
organised in order to meet the objective of the operation. It is a top-down approach, which 
starts by identifying the overall goal of the operation (objective). This operation is 
subsequently broken down into sub-operations (phases), which are accomplished through a 
series of tasks. In addition, the necessary resources for task accomplishment (i.e. actors 
that are required for task accomplishment) are defined.  
To achieve a detailed understanding of the tasks the stakeholders perform it is desirable 
to incorporate as many sources of information as possible. This includes documentation, 
manuals for maintenance and operating procedures, the opinion of experts, operators, 
instructors and managers, as well as observations. When carried out correctly, HTA 
provides an exhaustive analysis of the problem addressed. This systematic deconstruction 
of the operation provides a picture of the tasks undertaken by each of the actors in normal 
conditions, and can be continued until the desired level of detail is reached. A further 
advantage of HTA is that it is a generic method adaptable to a wide range of purposes, and 
indeed, has been successfully applied in aviation research (e.g. Nascimento, 2011; 
Soekkha, 1997; Walker, et al., 2005). One difficulty though is that HTA is both resource 
and time intensive, requiring a variety of data collection methods. In addition, the full 
collaboration of the relevant stakeholders is necessary (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992; 
Stanton, et al., 2005). 
Alternatives to HTA that can be used to analyse what an operator is required to do to 
achieve a goal include, for example, charting and networking techniques, decomposition 
methods, operational sequence analysis and timeline analysis. Flow charts and network 
diagrams are graphical representations of tasks. An important aspect of these techniques is 
that many of them represent not only human tasks, but also system elements (e.g. 
equipment involved, material flows) and, therefore, they are mainly used for displaying the 
human role embedded within the system context.  
Decomposition methods are used to systematically expand upon the basic description 
of activities undertaken by a stakeholder. Thus, they are a structured way of expanding the 
information produced, e.g. by HTA, into a series of more detailed statements. For each task 
element that is of particular interest to an analyst, further information about specific 
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aspects of the tasks (e.g. the time taken for that task element to be completed, the nature of 
the equipment that is used) is gathered and then presented for each task element. This 
allows the decomposition of tasks into a series of statements about limited aspects of the 
tasks. 
In their simplest form, operational sequence diagrams are flow diagrams that link the 
various tasks in the order they are normally carried out. The disadvantage of these 
diagrams is that they can become confusing when used for complex tasks. Finally, timeline 
analysis requires the analysis of both the functional and temporal requirements that a 
human operator needs in order to complete a task. Timelines are representational 
techniques and heavily reliant on input from other techniques for gathering the basic input 
information, e.g. HTA to break down an operation into tasks and sub-tasks, before 
assigning the time scales. As they consider temporal relationships, they are primarily used 
to aid in allocating tasks between operators, or operators and machines (Stanton, et al., 
2005). 
After considering the advantages and disadvantages of the above techniques in relation 
to the aim of modelling the tasks stakeholders must perform, as well their historical 
applications, HTA was evaluated as being the most suitable. 
Using HTA, separate models for each of the three actors (pilot, V/PD, ATC) are 
developed. This is necessary given that any single model would always take on a specific 
viewpoint. A high-level task analysis is carried out for each of the three actors in order to 
deconstruct their operations into meaningful phases and the tasks which need to be carried 
out in each of these phases are defined. In order to keep the model to a manageable size 
limits for task deconstruction are defined in relation to: 
• Aircraft model; 
• Procedures at a company level (airline, airport, ANSP); and 
• Tasks of V/PD allowed on the airport surface. 
Whenever further task deconstruction would require analysis of sub-tasks such as tasks 
specifically applicable to a single aircraft model, a specific task of V/PD, or to reflect the 
procedures of a given company deconstruction would stop. 
Subsequently, the actors that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks in each 
phase are identified. Two types of actors could be distinguished: direct actors and indirect 
actors. This distinction is based on Reason’s concept of active failures and latent 
conditions (Reason, 1997). Reason describes active failures as unsafe acts that “are likely 
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to have a direct impact on the safety of the system”. Active failures are errors or violations 
committed by people directly involved in the operations (e.g. pilots, ATC). Latent 
conditions (e.g. poor design, undetected manufacturing detects, gaps in supervision), on 
the other hand, are factors that lie dormant in the system and which may be present for 
many years before they facilitate, or contribute to an occurrence (e.g. design failure). 
The corresponding UML notation used state diagrams to model the task-
deconstruction. State diagrams reflect the state of single objects and allow for the 
modelling of all the changes the object goes through. The detailed task analysis for pilots 
and V/PD is subsequently represented using activity diagrams. Activity diagrams are 
chosen because they show the steps, i.e. activities, in an operation and this chapter aims to 
model the process of tasks necessary for the successful completion of an operation. To this 
end, the concept of swimlanes that are used to dissect an activity diagram into parallel 
lanes showing the activities for each actor is adapted. Here, swimlanes were used to 
highlight the geographical location in which the tasks are accomplished. This consideration 
of spatial effects will later help to identify how failures in the process of one actor’s 
operation can affect the operations of the other stakeholders. Finally, the actors that 
influence the operations are summarised using class diagrams.  
The UML notation for ATC operations is slightly different to that described above. 
Since ATC operations are multi-tasking operations, the activities cannot always be 
modelled in a pre-defined sequence. Activity diagrams showing the sequence of tasks 
seemed inappropriate and, consequently, a package diagram is employed. As above, 
however, the actors influencing ATC are summarised using a class diagram. 
After having developed detailed operational models for the three actors directly 
involved in surface operations (i.e. pilot, V/PD, ATC), the role of the regulator is defined 
in the fourth step. A package diagram summarises the regulator’s responsibilities. 
Fifth, the interfaces between the actors are highlighted using interface diagrams. 
Finally, based on the developed models; the high-level integrated architecture of surface 
operations, i.e. the airport surface system, is derived. The model is unique, as it is the first 
integrated airport surface operations model to represent the interaction of all relevant 
stakeholders and the physical airport surface infrastructure. 
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3.1.4 Implementation of the Method 
Since HTA requires the input of various sources of information, a hybrid methodology 
has been applied to develop the initial process model in four steps: 
1) Review of the relevant literature and existing airport models (e.g. Ashford, et al., 
1997; deNeufville and Odoni, 2003; Dupuy, 2012; Horonjeff and McKelvey, 1994; 
Institution of Civil Engineers, 1967; Janic, 2008; Kazda and Caves, 2000; Subotic, 
2007; Wells, 1996); and 
2) Analysis of operations manuals (e.g. easyJet plc, 2010a, c), standards and procedures 
(e.g. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001a, 2004a, b, 2005a, b, 2006b, e). 
Based on the review of the literature and the analysis of operations manuals initial 
UML models were developed for each stakeholder. These models were subsequently 
refined using observations and structured communications with operational personnel 
as outlined below. 
3) Observations and structured communications: 
• Three pairs of pilots were observed during six jump seat flights (i.e. outbound and 
inbound flight per pair of pilots). The initial model of pilot operations was used as a 
baseline and it was observed whether the pilots acted according to the model 
proposed. The first flight (i.e. outbound) was used each time purely to observe the 
pilots. During the second flight (i.e. inbound) the pilots were questioned as to when 
and why they did a certain task. In addition, the pilots explained more general issues 
(e.g. instruments and computer systems in the cockpit, documentation on board) that 
helped to clarify their operations and responsibilities. Based on these inputs the initial 
process model was refined (e.g. tasks were added, task sequence was changed). 
• Likewise, pairs of ATC Tower controllers were observed at Gatwick Airport, Boston 
Logan International Airport and Oslo Lufthavn. The choice of these airports is 
explained in the next paragraph. Each position (i.e. planning and tactical controller) 
was observed for 15 minutes. The initial ATC model was used as a reference and it 
was observed whether the ATC operations conform to the proposed model. 
Subsequently, the tower supervisors at each airport explained in detail the tasks of 
ATC and the initial UML was refined using these inputs.   
• Finally, observations at Heathrow Airport, Gatwick Airport, Boston Logan 
International Airport, Manchester Boston Regional Airport, Oslo Lufthavn and 
structured communication with airport authority operational personnel were 
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conducted. These included airfield tours and structured communications with Airfield 
Superintendents (i.e. supervisors) that followed the same methodology introduced in 
Chapter 2 section 2.2.4. In addition, other operational personnel were questioned on an 
ad-hoc basis about their tasks and responsibilities (e.g. construction workers, wildlife 
management personnel) in order to better ascertain the functionality of general airport 
operations. At Heathrow Airport the turn-around processes of several aircraft were 
observed and the Safety Manager of a ground handling company explained in detail 
the tasks of the various parties involved. Ad-hoc communications with operational 
personnel on the apron helped further to understand the role of ground handling. The 
observations spanned over a whole day at each airport in order to cover both, peak and 
non-peak, hours. 
• The airports used as inputs for the model development were chosen to fulfil the 
following criteria:  
o Mixture of airports in North America and Europe building on Chapter 2’s 
indication of operational differences, and 
o Medium to large airports in terms of movements and passenger boarding to ensure 
that a sufficient number of operations take place during the observation period 
(e.g. small airports may only have very few and isolated operations per day). The 
model fit was later tested on small airports. 
Following the model development the UMLs were validated internally as described below. 
4) Internal validation of the developed UML models with Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs): 
• Airfield Operations Shift Supervisor of a U.S. airport operator, 
• FAA Line Manager / Tower Supervisor,  
• Chief Pilot of a U.S.-based airline. 
The SMEs were located at the airports used for the model development. All SMEs had at 
least 15 years of relevant experience in their particular area and were in senior positions. 
The experts were asked to systematically assess the UMLs and to comment on their 
validity. This process led to small corrections, such as the re-ordering of tasks.   
The initial PM is developed further in Chapter 8, where safety data is used to define the 
stochastic elements in the model. Furthermore, to assess the model fit, the PM is validated 
externally and the details are specified in Chapter 9. Chapter 9 also contains the final 
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model. Figure 10 summarises the methodology underlying the development of the process 
model. 
 
 
Figure 10: Methodology for the development of a process model of airport surface 
operations !!!!!
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3.2 Process Model of Normal Airport Surface Operations 
The following sections introduce the initial process model developed based on the 
methodology specified in sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4. 
3.2.1 Terminology 
To provide an overview of the subject matter a class diagram (Figure 11) has been 
developed. Since the airport surface is a complex environment with numerous associations, 
the class diagram aims to introduce the terminology, i.e. classes, only. Associations 
between the classes are derived subsequently. 
 
 
Figure 11: Airport surface operations - terminology 
!"
* The airport authority can be a direct and an indirect actor. As direct actor the airport authority appears in form of vehicle drivers and 
pedestrians on the airport surface. As operator of the airport in general terms it acts as indirect actor. 
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3.2.2 Physical Infrastructure 
The physical airport surface infrastructure comprises the runways and taxiways and 
associated safety areas, other surface areas (e.g. grassland that separates the surfaces), 
electronic and visual navigational aids (NAVAIDS) that assist aircraft in determining their 
position, data collection devices (e.g. weather), radio transmission devices and other 
surface infrastructure. 
Basic elements, such as the runways and taxiways and their associated lights, signs and 
markings, can be found at all airports. The configuration of electronic NAVAIDS on the 
other hand is runway specific and dependent on the approach category and applicable 
flight rules. Two types of flight rules can be distinguished: Visual Flight Rules (VFR) and 
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). VFR apply in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) 
that are “meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, 
and ceiling, equal to or better than specified minima” (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2005b). IFR apply in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), i.e. 
“meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and 
ceiling, less than the minima specified for visual meteorological conditions” (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2005b). 
Based on the flight rules, three types of approach can be distinguished as follows: 
• Visual approach: “An approach when either part or all of an instrument approach 
procedure1 is not completed and the approach is executed with visual reference to 
the terrain” (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
SKYbrary, 2012d); 
• Non-precision approach: “An instrument approach which utilises lateral guidance 
but does not utilise vertical guidance” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2005b); and 
• Precision approach: “An instrument approach using precision lateral and vertical 
guidance with minima as determined by the category of operation” (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2005b). There are five categories of precision 
approach and landing operations: CAT I, CAT II, CAT IIIA, CAT IIIB, and CAT 
IIIC. They are defined according to the applicable decision height (DH), runway !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Instrument approach procedure: “A series of predetermined maneuvers for the orderly transfer of an aircraft 
under instrument flight conditions from the beginning of the initial approach to a landing or to a point from 
which a landing may be made visually” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012d) 
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visual range (RVR), and visibility (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation SKYbrary, 2012a). 
While visual approaches do not utilise electronic NAVAIDs, instrument approaches 
utilize non-precision approach systems (e.g. Very High Frequency (VHF) Omnidirectional 
Range (VOR), Nondirectional Beacon (NDB)) and precision systems (e.g. Instrument 
Landing System (ILS), Microwave Landing System (MLS)) providing lateral, and / or 
vertical guidance.  
Electronic NAVAIDs are complemented by visual NAVAIDs. Approach Lighting 
Systems (ALS), for instance, are lighting systems that provide visual guidance for landing 
aircraft and typically serve runways operating instrument approach procedures. The 
configuration of the ALS is dependent on the instrument approach category. Likewise, 
different Visual Glide Slope Indicator (VGSI) systems exist (e.g. Visual Approach Slope 
Indicator (VASI), Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)) and provide visual descent 
guidance to help landing aircraft maintain the glide path during their approach to the 
runway. Other visual NAVAIDs such as Runway Status Lights (RWSL) or Final Approach 
Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) can also be found on the airport surface.  
Finally, other surface infrastructure, such as radar, Engineered Material Arresting 
Systems (EMAS), ship radar, or automated FOD detection systems, may be present at 
some airports. The physical infrastructure can be modelled using a class diagram in 
aggregation form as outlined in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: Airport surface infrastructure
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To highlight possible differences in the surface infrastructure, the three case studies 
from Chapter 2 are extended following the same methodology as introduced in section 
2.2.4. Using the airport surface infrastructure model shown in Figure 12 as a reference, 
Table 4 compares the surface infrastructure of LAX, LPL, and BOO. 
 
Table 4: Case study – airport surface infrastructure 
 
Surface infrastructure 
 
 
LAX 
 
LPL 
 
BOO 
Number of runways 4 1 1 
Number of taxiways 51 6 12 
Electronic NAVAIDs 
   - Highest RWY category* Precision Cat IIIa Precision Cat II Precision Cat I 
Visual NAVAIDs 
   - ALS configuration Precision Cat IIIa Precision Cat II Precision Cat I 
   - RWY/TWY lights According to regulatory requirements 
   - RWY/TWY signs According to regulatory requirements 
   - RWY/TWY markings According to regulatory requirements 
   - Other Runway Status Lights - - 
Data collection devices (weather) ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Radio transmission devices ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Other surface infrastructure 
Airport Surface 
Detection Equipment 
– Model X 
(ASDE-X)** 
- Overrun cable to 
stop military 
aircraft in case of 
an overshoot 
   * For airports with multiple runways the highest runway category is considered. 
   ** ASDE-X is a safety tool that enables ATC to detect possible runway conflicts. 
 
Table 4 highlights that the level of equipment and the complexity of the airport surface, 
in terms of runway and taxiway numbers, can vary significantly between airports. 
3.2.3 Airport Authority Model 
The airport authority’s role is the management and maintenance of the airport surface, 
i.e. the provision of the infrastructure in a working condition. The airport authority’s 
operations therefore include the inspection and maintenance of the manoeuvring area (e.g. 
foreign object debris (FO) inspections, runway / taxiway pavement maintenance) and the 
maintenance of the visual and electronic NAVAIDs. In addition, it is the airport operator’s 
responsibility to close surfaces, for instance, during maintenance and construction periods. 
Construction management that includes the control of works and site management are also 
part of the authority’s operations, as well as grass cutting, snow removal, wildlife control, 
and the initiation of preventive measures (e.g. spraying for bugs, wheat). In UML notation 
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the airport authority’s tasks can be summarised using a package diagram as shown in 
Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13: Tasks airport authority !
Chapter 2 indicated that infrastructural components and activities may be sub-
contracted. In such cases, the above listed tasks might fall to another stakeholder. For 
example, in Europe, electronic NAVAIDs are typically owned and maintained by the 
airport authority, whereas in the U.S. they are owned and maintained by the FAA, which is 
both, the ANSP and the regulatory body.   
The airport authority operates on the manoeuvring area in the form of vehicles and / or 
pedestrians and the details on how V/PDs accomplish their tasks are described in section 
3.2.5. 
3.2.4 Pilot Model 
The airport surface is used primarily for taxiing, landing and take-off. Incoming flights 
land on a runway and then use the runway and taxiway system to taxi to their assigned 
ramp at the apron, where ground handling (e.g. loading, refuelling, passenger boarding) 
takes place. Departure flights use the manoeuvring area to taxi from their ramp at the apron 
to an assigned runway for take-off. 
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3.2.4.1 High-level Task Analysis 
The objective for a pilot’s operation is the safe and efficient conduct of flights. A 
pilot’s operation (flight operation) can be deconstructed into nine flight phases, as shown 
in Figure 14. These flight phases are derived from the ICAO’s Accident / Incident Data 
Reporting (ADREP) system (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006a). 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Flight phases 
 
In the pre-flight phase the flight (i.e. pilots) and cabin crew board the aircraft with the 
intention to fly. The flight crew accepts the aircraft as airworthy and conducts the 
necessary pre-flight preparations. Subsequently, the aircraft is manoeuvred from the apron 
/ ramp to its assigned runway, where it departs its origin and becomes airborne. The 
aircraft ascends in the Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA) until it reaches its flight level 
and then cruises en-route. Once the destination is reached, the aircraft leaves its flight level 
and starts its descent. After touchdown at its destination airport, the pilots manoeuvre the 
aircraft from the runway to its assigned ramp at the apron and carry out the necessary post-
flight inspections, before leaving the aircraft. The corresponding UML notation is shown 
in Figure 15. The state diagram highlights the state of the aircraft during the different flight 
phases. 
 
 
Figure 15: Aircraft state diagram 
Airport surface 
Pre-flight Post-flight Taxiing Taxiing 
Takeoff Landing 
Cruise 
Climb Descent 
Airport surface Airspace TMA TMA 
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3.2.4.2 Hierarchical Task Analysis 
The nine flight phases can be further deconstructed into tasks. To present the model of 
normal pilot operations in a more concise manner, only a high-level activity diagram is 
provided. Figure 16 indicates the tasks to be carried out in each phase of flight. In addition, 
spatial effects are shown, i.e. the location on the airport surface and the airspace, in which 
the tasks are carried out. Table 5 subsequently sets out a detailed outline of pilot 
operations, indicating the phase of flight and the tasks to be performed during each phase. 
In addition, the physical location of the aircraft during the flight operation, as well as 
spatial transition points (e.g. transition from taxiway to runway) are highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 16: Outline activity model - pilot
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Table 5: Task analysis – Pilot model 
 
Flight phase  
 
Tasks to be performed 
 
 
Spatial 
transition 
points 
 
Pre-flight  • Flight preparation (e.g. weather briefing, Notice to Airman (NOTAM) briefing (e.g. RWY / TWY 
closure), cabin crew briefing) 
• Check of aircraft maintenance records and acceptance of the aircraft as airworthy  
• Cockpit preparation (e.g. FMGS data insertion, calculations) 
• Exterior inspection (walk-around) 
• Take-off briefing (commander / first officer) 
• Weight and balance calculations 
• Before start checklist 
• Communication with ATC for clearance to push-back and start engine 
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic 
• Pushback 
• Engine start 
• After start checklist 
Apron 
 
Taxiing  • Communication with ATC for clearance to taxi and assignment of the next stopping point (can be an 
iterative process) 
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic (can be an iterative process) 
• Command aircraft movement (can be an iterative process) 
• Before take-off checklist  
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
• Communication with ATC for clearance to enter the runway 
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic 
• Enter runway 
 
 
 
Apron -> TWY 
 
 
 
 
TWY -> RWY 
Take-off • Communicate with ATC for clearance to take-off 
• Finish before take-off checklist  
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• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic 
• Take-off 
• Monitor power margins and instruments, monitor speed increase, adjust flight profile accordingly* 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
 
RWY -> TMA 
Climb • Communicate with ATC for climb profile instructions (can be an iterative process) 
• Adjust speed as required, monitor power margins (can be an iterative process) 
• Gear up 
• Flaps up 
• After take-off checklist (~1,000 – 1,500 ft.) 
• Decide when to turn on the autopilot (depending on personal preference from 400 ft. to 10,000 ft.) 
• Monitor flight profile execution as instructed, adjust flight profile accordingly* 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
 
Cruise  • Communicate with ATC for cruise flight profile instructions (can be an iterative process) 
• Adjust flight profile and instruments accordingly (e.g. altitude, speed, heading) (can be an iterative 
process) 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
• Cruise checklist or cruise briefing 
• Briefing (for approach / landing) 
TMA -> en-
route 
Descent  • Communicate with ATC for clearance to initiate decent 
• Monitor flight profile execution as instructed, adjust flight profile accordingly* 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
• Approach checklist (~18,000 ft., ~10 min before landing) 
• Landing checklist (to be completed within the last 2,000 ft.) 
• Stable approach (for IFR 1,000 ft., for VFR 500 ft.) 
• Disable autopilot, assume manual control of the aircraft 
En-route -> 
TMA 
Landing  • Landing 
• Leave Runway 
• After landing actions 
• After landing checklist 
TMA -> RWY 
RWY -> TWY 
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Taxiing  • Communicate with ATC for clearance to taxi and assignment of the next stopping point (can be an 
iterative process) 
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic (can be an iterative process) 
• Command aircraft movement (can be an iterative process) 
• Shut engines down (e.g. aircraft with 2 engines shuts one down) 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic 
 
 
 
TWY -> apron 
Post-flight  • Parking 
• Engines – off 
• Parking checklist 
• Securing the aircraft checklist 
 
 
 
Apron 
* Monitoring is a permanent process. 
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3.2.4.3 Actors 
Figure 17 defines the actors directly and indirectly involved in the safe and efficient 
conduction of flight. 
 
 
Figure 17: Actors in contact with pilots 
 
The flight crew is in direct contact with the cabin crew, the engineer responsible for 
aircraft maintenance as well as the dispatcher responsible for loading and unloading the 
aircraft. The dispatcher is the connector between the aircraft / pilot and the ground 
handling personnel, as well as the gate agent (i.e. personnel responsible for boarding 
operations). In addition, the pilot is in contact with V/PD (e.g. V/PD personnel initiating 
the pushback). 
3.2.5 Vehicle Driver / Pedestrian Model 
Besides aircraft, V/PD also use the runway and taxiway system. The majority of 
vehicles and associated airport personnel, such as ground handling vehicles and equipment 
(e.g. fuel, catering, baggage), operate on the apron. Certain vehicles, however, are allowed 
to enter the manoeuvring area. These include tugs for towing aircraft, cars for runway 
condition checks, maintenance vehicles for, e.g., grass-cutting, vehicles involved in 
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construction work, or snow removal equipment in wintertime. In addition, pedestrians are 
also on the manoeuvring area, such as construction workers or maintenance personnel.  
3.2.5.1 High-level Task Analysis 
The overall objective of V/PDs is the safe and efficient conduction of a specific task. 
The operational phases are defined on a high level so as to fit the model to any V/PD 
operation on the manoeuvring area. V/PD operations can be summarised into five distinct 
phases: pre-task, taxi-out, task accomplishment, taxi-in, and post-task, which are outlined 
in Figure 18. 
 
 
Figure 18: V/PD operational phases 
 
The vehicle driver boards the vehicle with the intention to carry out a task. If 
applicable, he / she also carries out the necessary preparations for the operation, for 
instance, getting the snow removal equipment ready. Subsequently, the vehicle moves 
from its parking position (point A) to a point B on the airport surface, where it 
accomplishes its task (e.g. snow removal, runway inspection). Some task may require 
parking the vehicle on the manoeuvring, for instance, when the driver leaves the vehicle to 
inspect the infrastructure. Once the task has been carried out the driver manoeuvres the 
vehicle from point B back into its parking position. If required, post-operation tasks are 
carried out (e.g. getting the snow removal equipment ready for its next use), before the 
driver leaves the vehicle. The corresponding UML notation, shown in Figure 19, highlights 
the state of a vehicle during the different phases of operation. 
 
Pre-task Taxiing 
Task 
accomplishment Taxiing Post-task 
Airport surface 
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Figure 19: V/PD state diagram 
3.2.5.2 Hierarchical Task Analysis 
The five phases of V/PD operations may be further deconstructed. Figure 20 indicates 
the activities for each phase using a high-level activity diagram. Spatial effects are 
considered and a detailed outline of V/PD tasks is given subsequently in Table 6. 
 
 
 Figure 20: Outline activity model –V/PD 
!"
* Specific tasks may require the parking of the vehicle during task accomplishment.  
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Table 6: Task analysis – V/PD model 
 
Phase 
 
Tasks to be performed 
 
Spatial 
transition 
points 
 
Pre-task • If applicable, execution of necessary preparations for task accomplishment (e.g. get snow removal 
equipment ready) 
• Command surface movement on the apron 
• Communication with ATC to get clearance to enter the manoeuvring area 
• Command surface movement 
Apron 
 
 
 
Apron -> TWY  
Taxiing • Communication with ATC for clearance to taxi and assignment of the next stopping point  
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic  
• Command surface movement  
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
• Report clear once the requested runway / taxiway has been cleared  
 
[Taxi operations can be in iterative process] 
 
 
(Depending on 
the tasks:  a 
transition from 
TWY to RWY 
can take place) 
Task 
accomplishment 
• Accomplish task (e.g. runway inspection) 
• Communication with ATC for surface movement instructions necessary for task accomplishment and 
adjust movements accordingly 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic 
 
[Communication with ATC (i.e. request for clearance, clearance confirmation, surface movement, report 
clear of runway / taxiway) can be an iterative process e.g. for each runway entry during the inspection] 
 
 
Taxiing • Communication with ATC for clearance to taxi and assignment of the next stopping point 
• Check area clear of obstacles and other traffic 
• Command surface movement 
• Monitor clearance from obstacles and other traffic* 
 
[Taxi operations can be in iterative process] 
• Report clear of manoeuvring area 
(Depending on 
the tasks:  a 
transition from 
RWY to TWY 
can take place) 
 
TWY -> Apron 
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Post-task • Parking 
• If applicable, execution of necessary post-task-processing 
 
Apron 
* Monitoring is a permanent process. 
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Note that there may be differences in operational practices between airports, depending 
on the underlying procedures. For instance, typically, a V/PD needs to contact ATC and 
ask for clearance to enter the manoeuvring area. Some airports, however, have ‘free-range’ 
procedures: in these circumstances V/PD are allowed to enter the manoeuvring area 
without contacting ATC for clearance, except to access an active runway. This reduces the 
amount of ATC communication.  
3.2.5.3 Actors 
Figure 21 provides an overview on the actors involved in V/PD surface operations. 
 
 
Figure 21: Actors in contact with V/PD 
 
V/PD are in contact with ATC, pilots, and possibly also with other V/PD (e.g. if they 
work together). 
 
The V/PD model has been developed on a high level, as it allows applicability of the 
model to all vehicle drivers and pedestrians that might be present on the airport surface. 
The following paragraph provides an overview on the various parties that are involved in 
ground handling. Ground handling takes place on the ramp / apron and is hence not within 
the scope of this research. Ground handling, however, illustrates very well the complexity 
of the airport system and the interactions of various stakeholders. Although ramp / apron 
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occurrences are not the subject of this research, all of the following V/PD’s have the 
potential to compromise the safety of surface operations when infringing onto the 
manoeuvring area. 
During ground handling the aircraft is in contact with the signalman for leading the 
aircraft into position and his / her co-workers for chocking and protecting the aircraft. In 
addition, an operator is needed for connecting the aircraft to the ground power unit (GPU), 
air conditioning unit (ACU), and air starter unit (ASU). Furthermore, there are the 
passenger boarding bridge, buses for passenger transportation, and medical staff for 
assisting disabled people to embark and disembark the aircraft. Luggage and cargo is 
transported to the aircraft using a tractor or carts and a conveyer belt allows access to the 
bulk hold. Operators then (un)load the aircraft. To (un)load pallets a loader can be used. In 
addition, there are catering vehicles and personnel, cabin servicing (i.e. cleaners), and a 
lavatory vehicle and potable water vehicle to prepare the aircraft for its next flight. A 
fuelling tanker as well as a tanker with anti-icing product for de-icing on the ramp are also 
part of the turn-around of an aircraft. If required, aircraft maintenance personnel is 
available to carry out first level repair and maintenance. Finally, a tug and potentially a tow 
bar, a tug driver, an operator for handling the tow bar, an operator for radio 
communications with the flight crew, and two operators to visualize the tips of the wings 
are needed for the pushback operations. As each of these ground handling operations can 
be carried out by a different service provider (i.e. company) there can be up to 40 operators 
in vehicles on the ramp servicing one aircraft at any given time.  
Similarly, various vehicles, and operators with different tasks (e.g. airport operator, 
external stakeholders such as construction workers) may be present on the airport surface. 
Figure 22 summarises the actors involved in ground handling operations in a class 
diagram. 
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Figure 22: Ground handling actors 
3.2.6 ATC Model  
Besides pilots and V/PD, ATC plays a significant role in the safe flow of ground-
movements. ATC provides three services: area control, approach control and the air traffic 
control tower, discussed in detail below. 
 
• Area Control 
 
The Area Control Centre (ACC), as defined by the ICAO, or Air Route Traffic Control 
Center (ARTCC) as defined in the U.S. by the FAA, is responsible for the en-route phase 
of flight. The main function of controllers during this flight phase is the provision of 
separation between aircraft. To do so, controllers monitor the progress of flights and 
intervene when conflicts arise. In addition, they provide instructions, clearances and advice 
regarding flight conditions (Cook, 2007; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001b; 
Subotic, 2007).  
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Typically, two controllers, a planning and a tactical controller, are in charge of each 
ATC sector. While they work as a team and are equally responsible for the safe, orderly 
and efficient handling of air traffic, they have clearly defined roles. The planning controller 
is responsible for the strategic planning of the traffic in a sector. He / she has to coordinate 
the entry and exit of flights into the sector, manage the flight progress strips, make flight 
data corrections in the Flight Data Processor (FDP), plan the traffic flow in such a manner 
as to minimise conflicts, and monitor emergency frequencies. The tactical controller is in 
direct contact with the aircraft. It is his / her role to communicate with the pilots, to accept 
aircraft into a sector, monitor their progress, and to detect and solve arising conflicts 
(Cook, 2007). 
 
• Approach Control 
 
The Approach Control unit (APP), as defined by ICAO, or Terminal Radar Approach 
CONtrol (TRACON) as defined in the U.S. by the FAA is the ATC unit that provides 
services for the approach and departure phase. Its services extend from the runways until 
the aircraft is airborne or clear of the airport. Approach controllers are responsible for 
providing separation between aircraft in the climb and descent phase of flight (Cook, 2007; 
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001b; Subotic, 2007). 
 
• Aerodrome Control 
 
The Aerodrome Control Tower (TWR), as defined by ICAO, or Air Traffic Control 
Tower (ATCT) as defined in the U.S. by the FAA provides ATC services for the 
aerodrome, extending over runways, taxiways, aprons and airport stands. Its main 
responsibility is the management of the runways and the provision of a safe and efficient 
traffic flow on the ground. This includes aircraft as well as V/PD operating on the 
manoeuvring area. In addition, the TWR assists the Approach Control with take-offs and 
landings of aircraft and is responsible for circuit traffic. At busy airports in the U.S. the 
surface movement control or ground control provides supplementary services to aerodrome 
control. It provides ATC services for movements from the parking position to the 
departure end of the runway. In less busy airports, ground and aerodrome control are 
combined (Cook, 2007; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001b; Subotic, 2007).  
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3.2.6.1 High-level Task Analysis 
When mapping ATC’s services to the flight phases introduced in section 3.2.4.1 seven 
ATC phases can be derived from the subject matter literature (e.g. Cook, 2007; 
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001b; Subotic, 2007), as outlined in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23: ATC operational phases 
3.2.6.2 Hierarchical Task Analysis 
Air traffic control operations are multi-tasking operations. A controller may handle 
multiple aircraft and / or vehicles simultaneously and, although tasks can be defined for 
ATC operations, no order can be assigned to them, since several tasks may be 
accomplished at the same time. For example, ATC can monitor ground movements, while 
communicating with a pilot using radiotelephony.  
ATC tasks can be summarised using a package diagram (Figure 24). The tasks are the 
same for each ATC type (i.e. ground control, aerodrome control, approach control, area 
control). 
 
Ground control 
Area control Approach 
control 
Approach 
control 
Aerodrome 
control 
Aerodrome 
control 
Ground control 
Airport surface Airport surface 
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Figure 24: Normal ATC operations 
 
When considering spatial effects, the controller itself does not change his / her physical 
location. It is the aircraft and the vehicles that change their state, i.e. physical location, as 
outlined in sections 3.2.4.2 and 3.2.5.2. 
3.2.6.3 Actors 
Figure 25 provides an overview on the actors involved in ATC operations. 
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Figure 25: Actors ATC 
3.2.7 Regulatory Model 
The acceptable certification, licensing and operating procedures have to be developed 
and implemented by the regulatory body. The regulator also has to oversee that all 
stakeholders comply with the established regulations. The regulator’s task was described in 
detail in Chapter 2 section 2.2.3.6 and can be summarised by the package diagram in 
Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26: Tasks regulator 
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3.2.8 Interfaces 
The previous sections have introduced the operations and tasks for each of the main 
actors in isolation. In reality though the stakeholders interact. The interface between the 
three stakeholders that interact directly on the airport surface (i.e. pilot, ATC, V/PD) is 
communication (i.e. information and data) as shown in Figure 27. 
 
 
Figure 27: Interfaces 
3.2.9 The Airport Surface System 
Based on the models developed for each of the aviation stakeholders and their 
interfaces (section 3.2.2 - 3.2.8) the airport surface system can be derived. The airport 
surface system comprises various components. Firstly, the aircraft operators, i.e. the flight 
(pilots) and cabin crews that work for an airline and follow the airline’s procedures and 
regulations. Secondly, the vehicle operators and pedestrians (V/PD) who are employed by 
an operating company, for instance ground handling company, and follow the procedures 
and regulations set by this company. Third, the system comprises air traffic service 
providers that are controllers who work for an ANSP and follow the ANSPs procedures 
and regulations. The technical infrastructure to support flight, V/PD and ATC operations 
are the aircraft, vehicles and ATC equipment. Aircraft manufacturers, car manufacturers 
and original equipment manufacturers (OEM) provide this infrastructure and maintenance 
engineers ensure that it is maintained in a working condition. In addition, the airport 
surface system comprises ATM, the airport and airspace, the natural environment, external 
stakeholders, customers, and the regulatory system. Figure 28 illustrates the airport surface 
system architecture and the interactions between its stakeholders and components in 
summary.         
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Figure 28: Airport surface system architecture 
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Figure 28, illustrates that three operators (i.e. pilots, V/PD, ATC) interact directly with 
each other on the airport surface. The airport authority is responsible for the provision of 
the infrastructure in working conditions. The corresponding service providers (airport 
operator, airline, ANSP, V/PD service provider) influence the surface operations directly, 
for instance through procedures. In addition, there is an interface (double arrows  ) 
between the airport surface and its surrounding infrastructure (apron) and the operations on 
both sides of the line that separates the manoeuvring area from the apron influence each 
other (e.g. pilot operations start at the apron and transfer to the manoeuvring area during 
taxi). The service providers also interact with one another, for example, to negotiate 
contractual arrangements for service provision between handling companies and airlines. 
In addition, the service providers are influenced by the customers (e.g. customer demand 
influences the services that are offered) and other external stakeholders (e.g. noise 
complaints / negotiations between local communities and airport operators). However, 
customers and external stakeholders do not have a direct influence on airport surface 
operations. Finally, the regulator oversees the whole system in order to ensure the 
provision of safe and efficient operations. 
3.3 Time Effects 
After having developed a process model of normal airport surface operations, this 
section analyses the impact of time on the operations, i.e. how different events in time, or 
characteristics of time, affect the operations and or tasks (operations / tasks). For instance, 
a flight cancellation (i.e. event in time) makes the operation of a pilot, i.e. flying from point 
A to point B, unneeded. Similar, it needs to be analysed whether the process model applies 
to different time periods (i.e. characteristics of time), such as peak vs. non-peak operations, 
or daytime vs. nighttime operations. The aim is to identify the time variant and invariant 
elements in the operations / tasks of the stakeholders.  
This analysis focuses on external influences, i.e. events in time, or characteristics of 
time, that can influence the operations / tasks. The consequences of failures within the 
process (e.g. incorrect cockpit preparation due to human error) are considered in Chapters 
5 to 9. 
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3.3.1 Methodology  
To begin with, a list of criteria that define the characteristics of operations and tasks 
was developed (e.g. start time, duration, end time). Afterwards, the airport surface system 
in section 3.2.9, Figure 28, was used to define a time effect to be used for this analysis. As 
introduced above, this analysis focused on the impact of external influences. When 
analysing the airport surface system one significant external factor, i.e. the airport 
environment, and in particular the weather, became apparent. Weather is an external 
environmental factor that impacts on all airport surface operations and associated actors in 
a manner that is random and cannot be influenced.  
The impact of weather on the process model was subsequently assessed, i.e. it was 
systematically assessed how this time effect impacts on each of the criteria that define the 
operations and tasks of the stakeholders. Based upon this, it was determined whether these 
criteria are time variant or invariant. The analysis focused on the actors directly involved in 
airport surface operations and considered pilot, V/PD and ATC operations. In the case of 
V/PD operations, two scenarios were chosen. First, the impact of time effects on the 
operations / tasks of the airport authority were analysed and, second, the influence of time 
effects on ground handling was assessed. The scenarios were chosen as these two parties 
operate daily on the airport surface. Other V/PD, such as construction vehicles, were 
excluded since they only operate on the manoeuvring area when needed. To verify the 
results, other time effects (e.g. demand changes, delay) were derived from the KPIs and 
drivers (see Chapter 2 section 2.4.1) and their impact systematically assessed. 
To identify system effects, interactions between the operations / tasks of different 
actors were analysed in a final step. The analysis focused on direct interactions, i.e. parties 
that are in direct contact with each other during an operation. The definition of direct 
actors in contact with pilots, V/PD and ATC, respectively (sections 3.2.4.3, 3.2.5.3, 
3.2.6.3) helped to identify the following six scenarios: 
• Impact of pilot operations on ATC operations / tasks 
• Impact of pilot operations on V/PD operations / tasks (case ground handling) 
• Impact of V/PD operations on pilot operations / tasks (case ground handling) 
• Impact of V/PD operations on ATC operations / tasks (case airport authority) 
• Impact of ATC operations on pilot operations / tasks 
• Impact of ATC operations on V/PD operations / tasks (case airport authority). 
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The results were validated with the following SMEs following the methodology described 
in section 3.1.3: 
• Airfield Operations Shift Supervisor of a U.S. airport operator, 
• FAA Line Manager / Tower Supervisor, and  
• Chief Pilot of a U.S.-based airline. 
3.3.2 Results 
Ten criteria were identified in relation to operations / tasks that can be influenced by 
time effects: 
• Subject of the operation, i.e. the ability of time effects to change the subject of 
normal operations as defined in the process model (e.g. requirement of a new 
operation to accommodate time effects); 
• Seasonal requirements of an operation, i.e. operations are only required during 
specific time periods (e.g. winter operations); 
• Occurrence of an operation, i.e. whether an operation takes place or not; 
• Scheduled start, and / or end time of operations;  
• Operation processing time, i.e. the period of time that is needed to complete an 
operation; 
• Frequency of operations, i.e. how many times an operation takes place; 
• Subject of the tasks, i.e. the ability of time effects to change the tasks that are 
necessary to complete an operation as defined in the process model (e.g. new tasks 
needed) 
• Task sequence, i.e. the sequence in which tasks are to be completed; 
• Occurrence of individual tasks, i.e. whether all tasks are carried out during the 
operation; 
• Frequencies of tasks, i.e. how many times the individual tasks are carried out. %&'()!$ summarises time variant and time invariant factors in relation to these ten criteria 
for pilots, V/PD and ATC. 
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Table 7: Time variant and invariant operations and tasks 
 
Impact of time effects on 
 
Pilot 
 
V/PD 
(Airport 
authority) 
 
 
V/PD 
(Ground 
handling) 
 
ATC 
Operations 
Subject of the operation Invariant Variant Invariant Invariant 
Seasonal requirement of 
an operation Invariant Variant Variant Invariant 
Occurrence  Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Scheduled start, and, or 
end time Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Operation processing time Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Frequency of operations Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Tasks 
Subject of the tasks 
 Invariant Variant Invariant Invariant 
Task sequence 
 Invariant Variant Invariant Variant 
Occurrence Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Frequencies of tasks 
 Variant - - Variant 
  Variant: Time effects can influence this factor. 
  Invariant: Time effects cannot influence this factor. 
  -: Process model is not detailed enough to draw conclusions (i.e. detailed models of each V/PD task would  
  be required). 
3.3.2.1 Pilot Model 
The subject of a pilot’s operation is the safe and efficient conduct of flights, i.e. flying 
an aircraft from point A to point B and time effects cannot change this. In addition, this 
operation is an all the year round operation and not dependent on the season. The job of a 
pilot is, therefore, always flying an aircraft. Time effects can influence the occurrence of 
the operation, e.g., weather-related problems can lead to flight cancellations. In this case 
the whole operation is cancelled. Other reasons for flight cancellations include strikes and 
the expiry of the flight crew duty time caused by prior delays.  
External factors can not only compromise the entire operation, but also impact on its 
scheduled start and end time. For example, flight delays caused by severe weather may 
delay an operation. Similarly, the operation processing time can vary: flights might be 
ahead of schedule (e.g. through preferential wind conditions), or delayed (e.g. severe 
weather causes holding of aircraft in the air or diversions from the anticipated route). The 
latter case might lead to safety compromising situations when, for instance, delays at 
congested airports lead to flight crews feeling pressured not to lose their slots (Airbus, 
2004c). 
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 Moreover, the frequency of operations is time variant. For instance, bad weather 
causes an aircraft to divert to land at a destination other than that scheduled. In this case, 
the pilot has in fact flown the aircraft from point A to point C and, as a result, the aircraft is 
in the wrong position and an additional operation is needed to fly the aircraft to point B. 
Considering the tasks of a pilot, the tasks and their sequence are invariant and do not 
change. The occurrence of the individual tasks is dependent on the occurrence of the 
operation, i.e. when the operation takes place all tasks will take place as well. If an 
operation is cancelled no tasks are carried out. The frequencies of individual tasks can 
increase, however. For instance, holding an aircraft in the air, or diverting its route due to 
bad weather, will lead to an increased communication with ATC and an increased amount 
of times instruments in the cockpit need to be adjusted. It is important to point out that the 
frequencies of tasks can only increase. When an operation takes place, all tasks must be 
carried out since any omission would compromise safety. 
3.3.2.2 Vehicle Driver / Pedestrian Model  – Airport Authority 
Section 3.2.3 defined the operations of the airport authority. To recap, it is the airport 
authority’s responsibility to provide the infrastructure in working conditions, including 
operations such as manoeuvring area inspection and maintenance, surface closures, and 
wildlife control. These operations are time variant, i.e. new operations may be needed. For 
example, in a circumstance where a diverted aircraft lands at an airport where it was not 
expected it can be the airport authority’s responsibility to coordinate the servicing and 
future operations for that aircraft. In addition, the operations of the airport authority are 
highly influenced by seasonal requirements (e.g. snow removal, grass cutting). Just as for 
pilots, the occurrence of an operation, its scheduled start and end time, as well as the 
operation processing time, are time variant and can be influenced by various factors (e.g. 
bad weather, peak times, traffic volume to be handled). Also, the frequency of operations 
can increase due to time effects. For instance, every airport has a minimum requirement for 
how many runway condition checks need to be carried out per day (e.g. once per shift / 
every eight hours) but sometimes more checks might be necessary (e.g. wind blew debris 
on the manoeuvring area). 
The process model for V/PD was developed on a high-level so as to accommodate all 
kinds of vehicle drivers, pedestrians, and their operations. Thus, if new operations and 
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tasks become necessary the process model will still fit. This high-level modelling, 
however, does not allow for a detailed analysis of the frequencies of individual tasks, 
although it can be assumed that only an increase in frequency is possible, since any 
omission of tasks will always lead to situations that compromise safety.  
3.3.2.3 Vehicle Driver / Pedestrian Model – Ground Handling 
The findings for the operations / tasks of ground handling are identical to those for the 
airport authority, with one exception. It was shown that in some cases time effects could 
create new operations and tasks for the airport authority. This is not true for the individual 
parties involved in ground handling. For instance, the operation of a fuel tanker and its 
operator will always be fuelling the aircraft. 
3.3.2.4 ATC Model 
The operations of ATC, i.e. controlling the traffic, are time invariant: traffic control is 
not in itself dependent on seasonal effects. However, there are events in time (e.g. ATC 
strike) that can make ATC operations redundant. The time taken to process an aircraft, as 
well as the start and end time of the operation, are more flexible than the operations of 
pilots and V/PD, and are dependent on the current traffic situation. Hence, the operations 
are time variant. Also, the frequency of operations is flexible since new aircraft can enter a 
sector (e.g. through re-routing due to bad weather) and create more workload for ATC. 
If ATC operations take place, their tasks are invariant. In contrast to pilots and V/PD 
(ground handling), however, the task sequence can change because air traffic control is a 
multi-task job. The frequency of individual tasks can also increase depending on the traffic 
situation.  
3.3.2.5 Duration of Time Effects 
The high-level architecture of time effects developed here illustrates whether or not an 
impact on surface operations exists. This impact can vary in its duration. For instance, a 
local thunderstorm might disrupt the operations for an interval of an hour, whereas a strike 
might disturb the operations for several days. In extreme cases, e.g. after an earthquake the 
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operations may not resume for several months. Nonetheless, the high-level architecture 
remains true independent of the time interval. 
3.3.2.6 System Effects 
After having analysed the impact of time effects on the operations of individual actors, 
system effects were analysed. Tables 8 to 10 show the results. The tables aim to highlight 
whether the operations / tasks of one party can impact the operations / tasks of another 
party in direct contact. Note that the effect does not necessarily have to affect the same 
criteria (e.g. the increase of actor A’s task frequency can influence the start time of actor 
B’s operation). Thus, Tables 8 to 10 highlight for each criteria only whether a system 
effect exists or not. Grey shaded cells represent time variant criteria. 
 
Table 8: System effects pilot model 
 
V/PD 
(Ground handling) 
 
  Pilot  
 
ATC 
Operations 
No effect  
 
Subject of the operation 
 
 No effect 
No effect  
 
Seasonal requirement of an operation 
 
 No effect 
Effect (e.g. no handling 
needed) ! Occurrence of operations " 
Effect (e.g. no ATC 
control needed) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Scheduled start, and, or end time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Operation processing time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. more V/PD 
operations needed) ! Frequency of operations " 
Effect (e.g. more ATC 
operations needed) 
Tasks 
No effect  
 
Subject of the tasks 
 
 No effect 
No effect  
 
Tasks sequence 
 
 No effect 
Effect (e.g. no handling 
needed) ! Occurrence of tasks " 
Effect (e.g. no ATC 
control needed) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Frequencies of tasks " 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC 
tasks, e.g. 
communication) 
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Table 9: System effects airport authority model 
 
ATC* 
 
  V/PD  
 
Pilot** 
Operations 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC tasks 
e.g. communication)  
! Subject of the operation " 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of pilot tasks 
e.g. communication) 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC 
operations) 
! Seasonal requirement of an operation " 
Effect (e.g. on 
happening/occurrence 
of operations) 
Effect (e.g. no ATC 
control needed) ! Occurrence of operations " 
Effect (e.g. no flight 
possible) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Scheduled start, and, or end time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Operation processing time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC 
operations) 
! Frequency of operations " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Tasks 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC tasks 
e.g. communication) 
 
! 
 
Subject of the tasks 
 
 
" 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of pilot tasks 
e.g. communication) 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC tasks 
e.g. communication) 
 
! 
 
Tasks sequence 
 
 
" 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of pilot tasks 
e.g. communication) 
Effect (e.g. no ATC 
control needed) ! Occurrence of tasks " 
Effect (e.g. no flight 
possible) 
  * V/PD impact on ATC mainly if they operate in form of the airport authority. 
  ** V/PD impact on pilots mainly if they operate as ground handling V/PD. 
 
As set out above, the influence of V/PD is analysed using two case studies, airport 
authority and ground handling. The model of direct actors showed that airport authority 
V/PD are in direct contact with ATC (e.g. ATC clearance is required for V/PD operations 
on the manoeuvring area), whereas ground handling is directly linked to the aircraft and its 
associated operations (e.g. ground handling operators provide the servicing for aircraft). 
 For example, in a situation where the subject of operations for V/PD has changed due 
to an incoming diverted aircraft, the airport authority is required to take over a 
coordinating role. This new operational role and its associated tasks can influence both 
ATC and the pilot, since it increases specific tasks (e.g. communication). Similarly, 
seasonal requirements influence the direct links. Snow removal operations increase ATC’s 
operations and aircraft de-icing is a prerequisite for flight operations. The occurrence of 
V/PD operations influences the occurrence of ATC and flight operations (e.g. if the airport 
authority strikes, the infrastructure cannot be maintained in a working condition and hence 
the conduct of flights might not be safe). The start, end, and processing times of V/PD 
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operations directly influence the start, end, and processing times of ATC and pilot 
operations. If no V/PD tasks take place, the operations of ATC and pilots cannot take place 
as well (e.g. unserviced aircraft cannot fly and hence no air traffic control is needed). 
 
Table 10: System effects ATC model 
 
Pilot 
 
  ATC  
 
V/PD 
(Airport authority) 
 
Operations 
No effect  
 
Subject of the operation 
 
 No effect 
No effect  
 
Seasonal requirement of an operation 
 
 No effect 
Effect (e.g. no flights 
possible) ! Occurrence of operations " 
Effect (e.g. no V/PD 
operations possible) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Scheduled start, and, or end time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Operation processing time " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Frequency of operations " 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Tasks 
No effect  
 
Subject of the tasks 
 
 No effect 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
 
! Tasks sequence 
 
" 
Effect (e.g. on start, 
end, processing time of 
operations) 
Effect (e.g. no flights 
possible) ! Occurrence of tasks " 
Effect (e.g. no V/PD 
operations possible) 
Effect (e.g. on start, end, 
processing time of 
operations) 
! Frequencies of tasks " 
Effect (e.g. on 
frequency of ATC 
tasks, e.g. 
communication) 
 
In summary, system effects were found for direct actors. It was identified that the 
operations / tasks of one actor do not need to influence the same criteria of another actor. 
Indeed, often, other criteria are affected (e.g. actor A’s task frequency can influence the 
start time of actor B’s operation) and multiple effects can be induced (e.g. a delayed end 
time of actor A’s operation influences the start time of actor B’s operation and, potentially, 
its processing time since the disruption to the schedule may occasion additional tasks to 
accommodate the new timings).  
Effects do not only occur between direct actors: in fact, an action of one actor can 
affect the whole system. For example, although ground handling personnel are not in direct 
contact with ATC they can impact on air traffic control indirectly, e.g. if no ground 
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handling takes place the aircraft cannot fly, which in turn means that ATC does not need to 
control that aircraft. Often, a time effect can start a chain of events involving all relevant 
actors at an airport.  
Furthermore, it was identified that only time variant factors influence another party’s 
operations / tasks. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter has contributed to the second research objective by developing an initial 
process model of normal airport surface operations. Individual models were developed to 
represent the activities of, and define the interfaces between the five main stakeholders 
(airport authority, pilot, V/PD, ATC, regulator). A state-of-the-art high-level integrated 
architecture of the airport surface system was then derived from these individual models. 
This is the first such model of airport surface operations to represent the interactions of all 
relevant stakeholders and the physical airport infrastructure. In addition, spatial and 
temporal effects were highlighted. A profound understanding of surface operations is 
necessary before the safety of the system can be analysed and, therefore, the developed 
system architecture serves as an initial reference model to guide the development of airport 
SMS. 
The main characteristics of airport surface operations, as identified in this chapter, are: 
complexity, multiple actors, interactions and dependencies, and dynamics. In addition, it 
was indicated that there are factors that can compromise the safety of the system and that 
the assumption of ‘normality’ may not always be fulfilled in reality. To manage such 
situations, organisations, including airports, are required to implement Safety Management 
Systems (SMS). Therefore, the next chapter introduces the concept of safety and SMS in 
detail. 
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4 Airport Safety Management 
The previous chapters have captured the architecture and operational aspects of 
airports, culminating in the development of a model of the airport surface system used to 
underpin the research in the rest of this thesis. In order to complete the contextual aspect of 
this thesis, this chapter addresses the fundamentals of safety and Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) in six parts. 
The first part introduces the concept of safety and the second part is concerned with its 
measurement and the safety management at a national level. Subsequently, the concept of 
SMS, its cornerstones, and requirements at the organisational level are introduced. The 
state of implementation of airport SMS is discussed in the fourth section before part five 
introduces airport surface safety measures. Finally, part six concludes this chapter.   
4.1 Fundamentals of Safety Management 
This section discusses in detail safety, within the context of the aviation industry and 
highlights the necessity of an effective Safety Management System (SMS). The ICAO’s 
Safety Management Manual (SMM) (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e) is 
used as the source for globally accepted definitions related to this safety section (4.1), 
unless otherwise indicated. 
In Chapter 3 airport surface operations were modelled as a socio-technical system, in 
which people actively interact with technology in order to achieve production goals 
through the delivery of services. A major characteristic of socio-technical systems is that 
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hazards, i.e. “condition(s) or object(s) with the potential to cause injuries to personnel, 
damage to equipment or structures, loss of material, or reduction of ability to perform a 
prescribed function”, are a normal part of their operation.  
Hazards are not necessarily damaging, but have the potential to be safety critical. 
Therefore, their potential effects should be assessed and controlled, for example, by 
preventing their occurrence in the first place, or by mitigating their consequences. As long 
as safety risks are kept under a reasonable degree of control the system is considered to be 
safe. Safety is therefore a concept that encompasses relatives rather than absolutes, i.e. 
hazards are an integral part of inherently safe systems, and safety risks are acceptable as 
long as they are controlled.  
Hazards can be found in any part of a system and include those associated with design 
factors (e.g. physical airport surface infrastructure, aircraft, ATC equipment), procedures 
and operational practices (e.g. inadequacy of procedures for the actual operating 
conditions), human performance and the work environment (e.g. physical ability to carry 
out the work, noise, temperature, lighting), and organisational factors (e.g. compatibility of 
production and safety goals).  
Every hazard has a consequence, defined as “the potential outcome (or outcomes) of a 
hazard.” These consequences can be damaging and present a risk to safety. In order to 
prioritise the allocation of resources (e.g. to channel hazard mitigation efforts) it is 
necessary to evaluate and measure (i.e. quantify) the consequences of hazards. This 
measure is referred to as safety risk and “ is defined as the assessment, expressed in terms 
of predicted probability (i.e. “the likelihood that an unsafe event or condition might 
occur”) and severity (i.e. “the possible consequences of an unsafe event or condition, 
taking as a reference the worst foreseeable situation”), of the consequences of a hazard.” 
Examples of ICAO’s probability and severity classification are given in Tables 11 and 12. 
After the safety risk (i.e. the product of probability and severity) of the consequence of 
a hazard has been determined, the tolerability of safety risks (i.e. “the tolerability of the 
consequences of hazards”) is assessed. This can be determined using a safety risk 
assessment matrix and subsequently evaluated by means of a safety risk tolerability matrix. 
Examples of ICAO’s safety risk assessment and tolerability matrices are given in Tables 
13 and 14. If safety risks are considered to be intolerable, they must be mitigated.  
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Table 11: Probability classification 
 
Frequency 
 
Meaning 
 
 
Value 
Frequent Likely to occur many 
times (has occurred 
frequently) 
5 
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes 
(has occurred infrequently) 
4 
Remote Unlikely to occur, but 
possible (has occurred 
rarely) 
3 
Improbable Very unlikely to occur (not 
known to have occurred) 
2 
Extremely 
improbable 
Almost inconceivable that 
the event will occur 
1 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Severity classification 
 
Severity of 
occurrence 
 
 
Meaning 
 
Value 
Catastrophic - Equipment destroyed 
- Multiple deaths 
A 
Hazardous - A large reduction in 
safety margins, physical 
distress or a workload 
such that the operator 
cannot be relied upon to 
perform their tasks 
accurately or completely 
- Serious injury 
- Major equipment 
damage 
B 
Major - A significant reduction 
in safety margins, a 
reduction in the ability 
of the operators to cope 
with adverse operating 
conditions as a result of 
increase in workload, or 
as a result of conditions 
impairing their 
efficiency 
- Serious incident 
- Injury to person 
C 
Minor - Nuisance 
- Operating limitations 
- Use of emergency 
procedures 
- Minor incident 
D 
Negligible - Little consequences E 
 
 
Table 13: Safety risk assessment matrix 
Risk probability 
 
Risk severity 
 
Catastrophic 
A 
Hazardous 
B 
Major 
C 
Minor 
D 
Negligible 
E 
Frequent 5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 
Occasional 4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 
Remote 3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 
Improbable 2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 
Extremely 
improbable 1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 
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Table 14: Safety risk tolerability matrix 
 
Suggested criteria 
 
 
Assessment risk index 
 
Suggested criteria 
 
5A, 5B, 5C, 
4A, 4B, 3A 
Unacceptable under the existing 
circumstances. 
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 
4E, 3B, 3C, 3D, 
2A, 2B, 2C 
Acceptable based on risk 
mitigation. It may require 
management decision. 
3E, 2D, 2E, 1A 
1B, 1C, 1D, 1E Acceptable. 
 
The following example illustrates the terms. A wind blowing at 15 knots across a 
runway is a hazard. One of the consequences of this hazard is a runway excursion, an 
occurrence whereby an aircraft leaves the paved runway surface, because the pilot is not 
able to control the aircraft in crosswinds. Runway excursions have occurred occasionally 
(risk probability) in the past and, at their extreme, can lead to catastrophic accidents (risk 
severity) with major loss of life and damage to property (Flight safety Foundation, 2009). 
Therefore, their safety risk is intolerable (ICAO safety risk index category 4A) and runway 
excursions are unacceptable under the existing circumstances. 
In order to bring the safety risks of the consequences of hazards under control, safety 
risk mitigation strategies must be employed. The words control and safety risk mitigation 
are used interchangeably in this thesis and refer to measures for mitigating unacceptable 
levels of safety risk (i.e. achieving an acceptable level of safety - ALoS). Intolerable risks 
must thereby be prioritised. ALoS is defined as “the minimum degree of safety that has 
been established by the State and must be assured by a State Safety Program (SSP).” 
Therefore, a system is safe as long as the level of risk is within the ALoS. 
To summarise, safety risk assessment and mitigation should follow a four-step process: 
1. Identification of hazards, 
2. Identification of the consequences of hazards, 
3. Assessment of the consequences of hazards in terms of probability and severity (the 
product of probability and severity is the safety risk), and 
4. Mitigation of safety risks through the development and implementation of safety 
risk mitigation strategies. 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the safety of airport surface operations and to propose 
a framework for a holistic airport safety management. The current chapter contributes to 
Intolerable region 
Tolerable region 
Acceptable 
region 
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this aim by defining the consequences of hazards to surface operations. At the highest level 
these are accidents and incidents and this chapter introduces the five main types 
(excursions (EX), ground collisions (COL), incursions (IN), Foreign Object Damage 
(FOD), and wildlife strikes (WS)) that can occur on the airport surface. Subsequently, 
Chapters 5 to 9 determine the hazards (i.e. causal factors) that can lead to these 
occurrences. As will be shown in Chapter 7, these five accident / incident types occur 
frequently and, therefore, this thesis focuses on modelling their severity only. The 
relationship between the severity of occurrences and their underlying causal factors 
(hazards) is modelled in Chapter 11 and based upon the results, safety risk mitigation 
strategies are proposed. 
This section has introduced the concept of safety and the next addresses the 
management of safety at a national level, before the subsequent paragraphs introduce the 
cornerstones of a SMS at the organisational level. 
4.2 State Safety Programme  
Under the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, Annexes 1, 6, 8, 11, 13, and 14, 
States are required to establish a State Safety Programme (SSP) in order to achieve an 
ALoS. A SSP is an integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety, 
i.e. a system for safety management by the State (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2009e).  
4.2.1 Safety Measures 
To determine whether a system operates at the ALoS measures and the corresponding 
targets are required. The measurement of safety involves KPIs together with concrete 
(quantified) objectives for these KPIs. Once KPIs and safety targets have been defined, the 
level of safety of a State’s aviation system can be established. To do so, values must be 
attached to the ALoS (e.g. a maximum of five accidents per year and a reduction of 
incidents by 20.0% within two years) and it is the Sate’s responsibility to define the ALoS. 
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In this context it must be stressed that the notion of ALoS refers to national objectives that 
are to be achieved through a SSP (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e). 
4.2.2 Accidents and Incidents 
At the State-level, safety measures in aviation are typically KPIs related to accidents 
and incidents. Common KPIs for airport surface operations include the number of 
accidents and incidents on the airport surface, such as excursions and incursions (UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2011c). These are discussed in detail in section 4.5. 
Accidents and incidents are best defined by ICAO in Annex 13 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation. These definitions (reproduced below) are standard in the 
aviation industry and are used throughout this thesis as follows (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2001c):  
An accident is defined as “an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft 
which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of 
flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: 
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured […]; or 
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure […]; or 
c) the aircraft is missing or completely inaccessible.” 
An incident is “an occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of 
an aircraft which affects or could affect the safety of operation.” According to the ICAO, 
both accidents and incidents are safety occurrences.  
The common features of accidents and incidents are that they are both unexpected and 
result in unwanted outcomes. The main difference lies in the characterisation of the 
outcome. While accidents result in physical damage (or disappearance) of person(s) or 
infrastructure, incidents refer to situations where the safety of the operations has been 
affected, but no physical damage was observed (Dupuy, 2012). Thus, the difference lies in 
the degree of injury sustained by persons, and / or the degree of damage sustained by the 
aircraft, i.e. the severity of the occurrence. 
This assumes a causal chain between accidents and incidents. The concept of the 
common cause hypothesis was first introduced by Heinrich in the 1930s. Based upon a 
review of industrial accident reports, Heinrich correlated the occurrence of unsafe acts to 
the occurrence of accidents with minor injuries, and to those with major injuries. He 
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concluded that 300 unsafe acts lead to 29 accidents with minor injuries and over time to 
one accident with major injuries. This implies that unsafe acts, accidents with minor 
injuries and accidents with major injuries, each have the same causes (Heinrich, 1931). 
Generalising this concept, it can be said that accidents and incidents share the same causes 
and that a large number of incidents will lead over time to a smaller number of accidents. 
A ratio between accidents and incidents for ATM operations has not been proposed, 
although, some studies indicate that in systems with robust safety defences, such as 
aviation, dozens of incidents occur for every accident (Phimister, et al., 2004). In order to 
establish a ratio between accidents and incidents their frequencies must be known. Reliable 
numbers on the frequency of accidents can be gathered from national Accident 
Investigation Boards. Determining the number of incidents for a country would require a 
holistic data set that combines the perspectives of all relevant aviation stakeholders. 
Chapter 6 discusses whether such databases exist, and in particular section 6.5.4.3, 
addresses the question whether a ratio between accidents and incidents in ATM operations 
can be calculated. 
It follows from the discussion above that the mitigation of the causes underlying safety 
occurrences will serve likewise to mitigate both incidents and accidents. This research, 
therefore, considers both. According to Heinrich, this assumes that there is a significant 
relationship between accidents and incidents and Chapter 11 (section 11.2.2.1) will test 
whether this assumption holds true. 
4.3 Safety Management Systems  
Part of the State’s SSP requires aviation organisations, including approved training 
organisations, international aircraft operators, approved maintenance organisations, 
organisations responsible for type design and / or manufacture of aircraft, air traffic service 
providers and certified aerodromes, to implement a Safety Management System (SMS). 
The SMS is a tool for the management of safety at the organisational level and the 
following paragraphs present its concept (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2009e). 
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4.3.1 Concept and Regulatory Anchoring 
The legislative framework for the implementation of SMS is set by the ICAO (Annexes 
1, 6, 8, 11, 13 and 14), multi-national safety organisations (e.g. EUROCONTROL Safety 
Regulatory Requirement (ESARR) 3 – Use of Safety Management Systems by ATM 
Service Providers), and national regulatory bodies (e.g. FAA Advisory Circular 120-92A 
Safety Management Systems for Aviation Service Providers) (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010a; International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e; The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010c). 
The requirement for aviation safety organisations to implement a SMS, together with 
the importance of the public’s perception of aviation safety, necessitates the management 
of safety as a core business function for aviation service providers, and thus the 
implementation of a dedicated Safety Management System. A SMS is a systematic 
approach to managing and improving safety, including policies and objectives, operational 
risk management and adequate control mechanisms. It is a framework that provides an 
organisation with the tools necessary to ensure that any drift by the organisation towards a 
lower safety performance is prevented (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e).  
 
 
     Figure adapted from International Civil Aviation Organization (2009e) 
Figure 29: Relationship between SSP and SMS 
 
An SMS derives from an SSP: it is the State’s responsibility to develop and implement 
a SSP with the objective of achieving an ALoS. As part of the activities of the SSP, the 
State is responsible for approving and overseeing the development, implementation and 
State Safety 
Programme 
(SSP) 
Safety 
Management 
System (SMS) 
Objective: 
Establishment of an acceptable level of safety in 
civil aviation 
Objective: 
Safety management to support the production 
goals and delivery of services of an organisation 
State 
Aviation 
service 
provider 
-  Acceptance 
-  Compliance oversight 
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operational performance of SMS for aviation service providers (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2009d). Figure 29 summarises the relationship between safety 
management at the State and service provider level, while the next section introduces the 
ICAO’s SMS framework in detail. 
4.3.2 ICAO SMS Framework 
A SMS provides the toolbox for an effective safety management at the organisational 
level. It provides the tools to control the safety risks of the consequences of hazards that 
aviation organisations face during their operations. The design of a SMS must be 
organisation-specific and must reflect the needs of the individual service provider.  
SMS is a systematic approach to safety that strives to assess and continuously improve 
the safety of an entire system. It therefore requires the assessment of all system 
components and their interactions for hazards and associated safety risks. The management 
of safety comprises two core operational processes or activities: safety risk management, 
and safety assurance. A SMS consists of four components that represent the two core 
operational processes and their supporting organisational arrangements. The four SMS 
cornerstones contain a total of twelve elements in the areas of planning, achievement, 
assurance and promotion. Together, they comprise the ICAO SMS framework 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e) as shown in Figure 30. 
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     Figure derived from International Civil Aviation Organization (2009e) 
Figure 30: ICAO SMS framework !
Whilst the SMS realisation in the U.S. maps 100.0% to the ICAO framework described 
above, there are variations in the realisation of the SMS in other jurisdictions. For example, 
the SMS standard developed by EUROCONTROL and the Civil Air Navigation Service 
Organisation (CANSO), a global association of ANSPs working on the improvement of air 
navigation services, contains four components with only ten elements. In addition, a 
central role is given to safety culture as a ‘system enabler’ (The European Organisation for 
the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2012c). 
Although components and elements may be classified differently, the basic concept 
remains the same. A “SMS results in the design and implementation of organisational 
processes and procedures to identify safety hazards and their consequences and bring the 
1.  Safety policy and 
      objectives 
2. Safety risk management 
 
3. Safety assurance 
4. Safety promotion 
•  Hazard identification 
•  Risk assessment and mitigation 
•  Safety performance 
monitoring and measurement 
•  The management of change 
•  Continuous improvement of 
the SMS 
•  Training and education 
•  Safety communication 
•  Management commitment  
      and responsibility 
•  Safety accountabilities 
•  Appointment of key safety 
personnel 
•  Coordination of emergency 
response planning 
•  SMS documentation 
 4 Airport Safety Management 
! "#$!
associated safety risks in aviation operations under the control of the organisation” 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e). 
In this thesis the global SMS standard, as defined in the ICAO’s Safety Management 
Manual (SMM), is adopted and used as a reference to introduce the SMS and its 
cornerstones (sections 4.3.2.1 – 4.3.2.6). The following sections expand on the details of 
this framework. 
4.3.2.1 SMS Prerequisites 
Given its systematic nature, the first prerequisite for the development of a SMS is the 
system description in terms of its components and their interactions (in this case the airport 
system model developed in Chapter 3). Such a baseline system can then be used to identify 
the vulnerabilities of human actors, other components and their interfaces.  
4.3.2.2 Safety Policy and Objectives 
The management of safety is a top-down approach, in which the senior management of 
the organisation is responsible for the development, implementation and compliance of the 
SMS. The safety management commitment and responsibility function is therefore 
essential for the success of every SMS. It starts with the development of the safety policy 
and objectives of the organisation by its senior management. The Accountable Executive, 
who has the final responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of the 
organisation’s SMS and ultimate accountability, must sign the policy. The safety policy 
should reflect the organisation’s commitment regarding safety and should contain a clear 
statement about the provision of the necessary resources for its implementation. This 
includes, for example, safety reporting procedures, or types of operational behaviour that 
are considered unacceptable. Most importantly, the safety policy must be communicated 
throughout the organisation.  
The organisation should also identify the accountabilities of all management members 
and employees with respect to the safety performance of the SMS. Responsibilities, 
accountabilities and authorities (e.g. to make decisions regarding the safety risk 
tolerability) should be documented and communicated throughout the organisation. In 
addition, the appointment of key safety personnel is crucial for the successful 
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implementation of a SMS. In this context, a safety manager should be the responsible 
individual and focal point for the implementation and maintenance of the SMS. 
After the safety policy has been defined and key safety personnel and accountabilities 
assigned, the organisation develops a SMS implementation plan. This defines the 
organisation’s approach to safety management in a manner that meets the organisation’s 
safety objectives while supporting an effective and efficient delivery of services. 
The process of developing a SMS must be documented clearly. The most important 
piece of the SMS documentation is the SMS manual (SMSM), which is a key instrument 
for communicating the organisation’s approach to safety and should document all aspects 
of the SMS, including the safety policy and objectives, processes and procedures, 
accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities. 
Finally, although the aim is to control safety risks, an organisation needs to be prepared 
for the worst foreseeable situation, i.e. the occurrence of an accident. Therefore, every 
service provider must have an emergency response plan to facilitate the timely and 
appropriate response to occurrences and must coordinate this plan with those organisations 
it interacts with during the provision of its services. 
4.3.2.3 Safety Risk Management 
At the core of a SMS is the safety risk management that supports the development of 
evidence-based measures for the overall safety management process. The aim is to control 
the safety risks of the consequences of hazards in critical activities to a level as low as 
reasonably practicable (ALARP). Safety risk management consists of two distinct 
activities: i) hazard identification, and ii) safety risk assessment and mitigation. In 
practical terms, safety risk management is concerned with reporting and data collection, 
investigation, data analysis and the mitigation of safety risks. 
A mature safety risk management strategy should combine reactive, proactive and 
predictive elements. Reactive methods respond to occurrences that have already happened, 
such as accidents and incidents. Proactive methods on the other hand look actively for the 
identification of hazards and associated safety risks, while predictive methods capture 
system performance as it happens in real-time normal operations to identify potential 
failure problems. 
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Safety risk management must be supported by the routine collection of safety data. 
This includes the collection of historical accident and incident data, the identification of 
hazards, and the collection of operational data on a daily basis in order to feed reactive, 
proactive and predictive methods. The collection of historical occurrence data requires the 
implementation of effective reporting schemes. This needs to be supported by the active 
promotion through the organisation and senior management of an open reporting culture. 
Reporting procedures should be anchored in the organisational safety policy and be easily 
accessible for the whole organisation. The central role and importance of reporting systems 
for SMS is discussed further in section 4.3.2.6. Besides the collection of accident and 
incident data, the organisation must also ensure adequate investigation of both accidents 
and incidents in order to identify the causes underlying their occurrence.  
The identification of hazards in the context of safety risk management uses the 
description of the system. The system’s components and interfaces are analysed for the 
presence of hazards and their potentially damaging consequences identified. In addition, a 
SMS should collect operational data to monitor the performance of real-time operations in 
order to detect deviations from normal as early as possible. 
The collected data are analysed using adequate methodologies and tools (e.g. statistical 
analysis), to allow the prioritisation of safety risks. Based upon this analysis, safety risk 
mitigation strategies are developed and implemented with the objective of controlling 
safety risks to a level ALARP. 
4.3.2.4 Safety Assurance  
Safety risk management requires constant feedback on its performance. This is 
delivered through the safety assurance function of SMS, which includes safety 
performance monitoring and measurement, management of change, and the continuous 
improvement of the SMS.  
The primary task of safety assurance is control, requiring the continuous monitoring 
and evaluation of the performance of the SMS and, in particular, the safety risk 
management. If changes are necessary, their requirements are fed back to the safety risk 
management process. In addition, safety assurance provides stakeholders with an 
indication of system safety performance. 
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In order to monitor and measure the safety performance of an organisation, KPIs and 
targets must be defined and the organisational safety performance must then be verified in 
reference to these. Safety measures should capture the performance of the operational 
safety risk management, including the effectiveness of operational procedures or safety 
risk controls. In addition, the elements falling under the safety policy and objectives 
cornerstone must be monitored. This is to ensure that safety responsibilities and 
accountabilities are assigned and that the SMS is documented as required.  
In addition to the constant monitoring and evaluation of the system’s safety 
performance, an organisation should develop and maintain a formal process to identify 
changes in the organisation that may affect the established processes and services. The 
aviation industry, in particular, is fast moving and service providers experience permanent 
change due to expansion, changes to existing systems, equipment, programmes and 
services, or the introduction of new equipment and procedures. As change can introduce 
new hazards, the appropriateness of existing safety risk management processes and safety 
risk controls must be verified. A formal change management process should identify 
organisational changes and their implications and the organisation must ensure effective 
safety risk controls before, during and after the implementation of these changes. This 
includes the adjustment of safety risk controls to changes in the operational environment 
and the elimination of controls that are no longer needed or effective.  
Finally, an effective SMS must continuously strive for improvement. An organisation 
should develop and maintain processes to identify the causes of substandard performance, 
to determine the implications for its operations of a degraded SMS performance, and to 
eliminate or mitigate such causes.  
4.3.2.5 Safety Promotion 
The safety policy and objectives, safety risk management and safety assurance 
components provide the functional framework of a SMS. However, the strict 
implementation of safety policies, procedures and processes is not enough for the effective 
management of safety. These three components must be supported by a positive 
organisational safety culture that creates an environment of trust and advocates safety on 
all levels (i.e. from senior management to operational personnel).  
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An organisational culture reflects the value system of an organisation. In particular, the 
safety culture reflects the values, beliefs and behaviours of an organisation towards safety. 
A safety culture is created at the organisational level and must be developed top-down. The 
commitment of the senior management and the Accountable Executive to SMS and its 
promotion is key for the establishment of a positive safety culture. The organisation and its 
management are therefore the major determinants of the behaviour employees engage in 
while performing operational activities. The organisational culture can be affected by 
factors such as safety objectives, policies and procedures, employee’s training and 
motivation, and the organisation’s response to unsafe behaviour. For a SMS to be effective 
an organisation should create a just culture in which human deviation is not punished, and 
which aims to encourage an open reporting of incidents. A clear line is drawn, however, 
such that wilful violations are not tolerated (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2009e). Such a culture relies on a high degree of trust and respect between operational 
personnel and management. The staff must believe that they will be supported in any 
decisions they make in regards to safety. Likewise, the staff must understand that 
intentional breaches of safety that jeopardize operations are not tolerated. 
To create a positive safety culture an organisation must actively promote safety. The 
safety promotion cornerstone includes the two key elements of training and education and 
safety communication. To support the former, an organisation should develop and maintain 
a safety training programme that ensures that all personnel are trained and competent to 
perform the SMS duties. The scope of the safety training varies depending on the 
involvement of the individual in the safety management process. The provision of training 
to all staff, regardless of their level in the organisation, is an indication of management 
commitment to safety and SMS. The safety training standards for operational personnel, 
managers and supervisors, as well as senior management and the Accountable Executive 
should be documented in the SMS manual. 
The communication of the importance of safety and its management is a critical 
element for the success of a SMS and the creation of a just culture. The organisation 
should communicate the SMS objectives and procedures to all operational personnel and 
the SMS should be visible in all aspects of an organisation’s operations. The safety 
manager is responsible for communicating the SMS throughout the organisation with the 
aim of actively encouraging operational personnel to identify and report hazards. Safety 
communication, therefore, aims to ensure that all employees are fully aware of the SMS, to 
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convey safety-critical information, to explain why particular actions are taken, and finally 
why safety procedures are introduced or changed.  
4.3.2.6 The Importance of Safety Data 
As introduced in section 4.3.2.3 on safety risk management, SMSs are data-driven and, 
therefore, rely on the collection of safety data. The SMS safety data cycle starts with the 
collection and analysis of data. Based upon this analysis, safety risks are prioritised and 
controlled through mitigation measures. Likewise, the results from the safety data analysis 
can contribute to the development of the organisational safety strategy, e.g. the setting of 
safety targets. Once safety risks are under organisational control, their effective mitigation 
is monitored against the established targets. This is achieved through a continuous process 
of data collection and analysis with the aim of detecting at an early stage any degradation 
of the system’s safety performance. If the system performs at a substandard level, the 
collected data feeds back into the safety risk management process in order to bring the 
identified areas of concern under control. The effective collection of safety data is 
supported by the promotion of an open reporting and positive safety culture. 
 
 
Figure 31: The safety data cycle 
 
Figure 31 summarises the safety data cycle and highlights the central role and 
importance of safety data across the four components of the SMS. The selection of the 
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safety data to be collected based upon definitions for accident / incident types, the data 
collection techniques, methods of investigation, as well as analytical data analysis 
methodologies and tools, are critical elements for a successful SMS. Therefore, the next 
chapter reviews how state-of-the-art efforts for airport surface safety analysis and risk 
mitigation comply with these requirements. 
Although the importance of safety data is emphasised, little guidance on the collection 
of safety data is provided in the SMS framework. The ICAO Annex 13 requires States to 
report and investigate accidents and serious incidents 2  (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2001c). However, “there is no obligation for States to conduct an 
investigation into an incident” (International Civil Aviation Organization, Year not 
specified). The extent to which incidents are reported is up to the individual States and 
aviation service providers. Regulatory bodies at a national level often mandate the 
collection of all occurrences that may or may not affect the level of safety. Therefore, 
when dealing with safety data, it is important to analyse countries that promote the 
reporting of all safety occurrences.  
In addition to national regulations, organisations may define their own reporting 
requirements. The quality of safety data collected at the organisational level is dependent 
on the appropriateness of the reporting system and the organisational safety culture. 
Drivers for effective safety reporting include: 
• Willingness: of operational personnel to report. 
• Information: The training of operational personnel to recognise hazards and to 
understand their consequences. This includes human, technical and organisational 
factors that can challenge the safety of the system.  
• Flexibility: The ability of operational personnel to adapt hazard reporting when 
facing unusual circumstances, thus allowing information to reach the appropriate 
decision-making level quickly. 
• Learning: The competence of operational personnel to draw conclusions from 
safety information systems. 
• Accountability: The encouragement of operational personnel to provide safety 
information related to hazards, but with a clear line that differentiates between 
acceptable and unacceptable operational performance. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Serious incident: “An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred” 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001c) 
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4.4 Airport SMS 
The previous section introduced the ICAO SMS framework that is applicable to all 
aviation stakeholders and the following paragraphs discuss the status of its implementation 
for airports in particular.  
Since November 2005, Annex 14 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
(Annex 14) requires certified aerodromes to have a SMS in operation (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2004b). Although Annex 14 provides the global legislative 
framework, regulations have yet to be established at the State-level. For example, 
currently, there is no regulatory requirement for airport operators in the European Union 
(EU) (i.e. EASA member states that comprise a total of 37 self-regulatory bodies, 27 from 
European countries and nine from non-European countries) and the U.S. to implement a 
SMS.   
EASA is responsible for the regulation and implementation of SMS at the European 
level. The first requirements for aviation service providers (e.g. airlines) to implement a 
SMS were published in 2012 (e.g. Regulation (EC) 290/2012 SMS requirement for flight 
and cabin crew). However, the EU rules for SMS for airport operators are still under 
development. EASA issued the notice of proposed amendment (NPA) 2011-20 ‘Authority, 
Organisation and Operations Requirements for Aerodromes’ in December 2011 for 
consultation with responses to the proposed law closing on in February 2013. The EU 
regulation is expected to be issued by the end of 2013 (European Aviation Safety Agency, 
2013b). 
Likewise, in the U.S., the FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) for 
SMS for certified aerodromes in October 2010. Airports and other service providers were 
given the opportunity to comment on the NPRM up until March 2011. Since the FAA 
received an extensive amount of comments, it decided to modify the proposal and to 
provide another opportunity for public comments. The revised NPRM is now expected to 
be published in December 2013 with a 60-day comment period (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2013c). 
Therefore, the rulemaking for the implementation of SMS for airport operators is yet to 
be finalised. In addition to missing regulations, there is little guidance on how in practice 
to develop and implement a SMS for airport operators. While the ICAO’s Safety 
Management Manual introduces the general concept of SMS and its elements for all 
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service providers, it lacks detailed guidelines on how to design a SMS effectively. To 
support the implementation of SMS, the ICAO is currently developing a new Annex 
(Annex 19) which consolidates Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for safety 
management requirements. This is supposed to be adopted in November 2013 (European 
Aviation Safety Agency, 2013b). 
At the European level, the published NPA 2011-20 is a draft law that specifies the 
requirement for certified aerodromes to implement a SMS, although without providing any 
guidance on how to establish and implement one in practice. However, the European 
Commercial Aviation Safety Team (ECAST), a partnership among EASA, national 
European regulatory bodies and the aviation industry, established a working group to give 
direction on SMS and safety culture. The available materials provide a good introduction 
to the topics of safety culture, organisational structures, hazard identification and 
operational risk management. Nevertheless, they are designed for general SMS and lack 
specific guidance and examples on how to design and implement SMS for airport operators 
(European Commercial Aviation Safety Team, 2011). Regulators at a national level have 
regularly announced the requirement for the future implementation of SMS. In so doing, 
they commonly provide an introduction to SMS and its components, but yet again without 
specifying detailed requirements (e.g. UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2013; Luftfahrt-
Bundesamt, 2008).  
In the U.S., meanwhile, the FAA issued Advisory Circular (AC) 150/5200-37 which 
provides an introduction to SMS for airport operators, but again is limited to the concept of 
SMS and its cornerstones (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007b). However, 30 airports 
to date have developed and implemented a SMS voluntarily. The lessons learned from 
these airport SMS pilot studies are publically available and help to provide feedback on the 
experiences of airport operators and the challenges they faced during implementation. The 
available reports, however, mainly serve to highlight deficiencies in the concept of SMS 
rather than translating them into useful guidance on how to do it right (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011c). In addition, the Transportation Research Board’s (TRB) Airport 
Cooperative Research Program (ACRP) developed a guidebook that explores what 
constitutes an airport SMS. The report outlines in detail the SMS elements, recommended 
practices for their implementation, and provides practical examples on ‘how to do it’ 
(Airport Cooperative Research Program, 2009). 
In summary, SMS is increasingly important and a core business function for future 
airport operations. Although their importance is widely promoted and their general concept 
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understood, the necessary regulations are still to be passed and practical guidance on SMS 
development and implementation is rare. Airport SMS currently seems to be more of a 
conceptual construct rather than a toolbox that is ready for implementation. Therefore, the 
development of robust tools to support the effectiveness of SMS is important and this 
thesis addresses this need. 
4.5 Airport Surface Safety  
The aim of SMS is to manage safety risk to be ALARP and within ALoS. At the 
highest level, this means the avoidance of accidents and incidents. A review of accident / 
incident statistics (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013a) highlighted that five 
occurrence types are a major concern for airport surface operations. Therefore, this thesis 
considers these five types: excursions (EX), ground collisions (COL), incursions (IN), 
Foreign Object Damage (FOD), and wildlife strikes (WS). 
4.5.1 Excursions  
A runway excursion happens when an aircraft exits the runway, either to its side or at 
the end. Excursions can occur during landing as well as take-off. For example, a tyre burst 
during touchdown can lead to a loss of control over the aircraft, which in return may result 
in an excursion. Excursions can also occur on taxiways, e.g. if an aircraft slips off the 
paved surface while turning. 
At their extreme, excursions can lead to damage to aircraft, major injuries or loss of 
life. Such a case occurred on 20 December 2008 at Denver International Airport when 
Continental Airlines flight 1404 departed the left side of runway 34R during take-off 
(Figure 32). The captain and five passengers were seriously injured and the aircraft was 
substantially damaged during the excursion and post-crash fire. During take-off the aircraft 
encountered a strong and gusty crosswind that exceeded the captain’s training and 
experience and the detailed investigation of these causes is given in the National 
Transportation Safety Board (2010a) accident report. 
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            Source: Aviation Safety Network (2013) 
Figure 32: Runway excursion Denver 2008 
 
Excursions can also result in an incident with no injuries and no damage to the aircraft, 
as seen with the excursion that occurred on 3 November 2011 in Munich (Figure 33) 
(Bundesstelle fuer Flugunfalluntersuchung, 2011).  
 
 
             Source: Bundesstelle fuer Flugunfalluntersuchung (2011) 
Figure 33: Runway excursion Munich 2011 
 
A major challenge in the aviation industry is a lack of both standardised and complete 
definitions for different accident and incident types (Table 15).  
Table 15 shows the lack of standardised definitions relating to excursions, across 
regulatory bodies and major aviation safety initiatives. In addition, these definitions are 
incomplete as they do not always consider taxiway excursions. Occurrences on taxiways 
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can equally cause major disruptions to surface operations, e.g. when the surface needs to 
be closed to recover an aircraft that has left the paved surface. For example, on 13 March 
2012, a Delta jet rolled off the taxiway at Atlanta Hartsfield - Jackson International Airport 
(Figure 34). The aircraft had no passengers on board but sustained substantial damage and 
had to be recovered by emergency crews (My Airport Operations, 2012). 
 
 
      Source: My Airport Operations (2012) 
Figure 34: Taxiway excursion Atlanta 2012 
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Table 15: Runway excursion definitions 
 
Organisation 
 
 
Definition 
 
Limitations 
• Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) Reducing the risk of 
runway excursions (Flight Safety Foundation, 2009) 
“Runway Excursion: When an aircraft on the runway 
surface departs the end or the side of the runway 
surface. Runway excursions can occur on take-off or 
landing. They consist of two types of events: 
-Veer Off: A runway excursion in which an aircraft 
departs the side of a runway. 
-Overrun: A runway excursion in which an aircraft 
departs the end of a runway.” 
• Undershoots (i.e. situations in which the aircraft 
undershoots the intended runway threshold) are not 
included 
• Negligence of taxiway occurrences 
• Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) / ICAO 
Common Taxonomies (Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team / International Civil Aviation Organization 
Common Taxonomy Team, 2008b) 
• ICAO ADREP (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2006a)  
• EASA European Coordination Centre for Accident 
and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) 
“A veer off or overrun of the runway surface.” • Undershoots are not included 
• Negligence of taxiway occurrences 
• European Action Plan (The European Organisation 
for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al, 2013) 
referring to ICAO/ECCAIRS 
“A runway excursion is the event in which an aircraft 
veers off or overruns the runway surface during either 
take-off or landing.” 
• Undershoots are not included 
• Negligence of taxiway occurrences 
• International Federation of Airline Pilots’ 
Associations (IFALPA) Runway Safety Manual 
(The International Federation of Air Line Pilots' 
Associations, 2009) 
“A runway excursion is defined as when an aircraft 
departs the runway either by veering off the side or by 
overrunning the runway end.” 
• Undershoots are not included  
• Negligence of taxiway occurrences 
• FSF Approach and Landing Accident Reduction 
(ALAR) toolkit (Flight Safety Foundation, 2000) 
“Runway excursions occur when: i) aircraft veer off the 
runway during the landing roll; and, ii) aircraft veer off 
the runway or taxiway when exiting the runway. 
Runway overruns occur when the aircraft roll-out 
extends beyond the end of the landing runway.” 
• The definition separated between excursions and 
overruns 
• Overruns are considered as separate occurrence 
• Excursions during take-off and undershoots are not 
included 
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The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) currently gives the most complete 
definition for excursions. It defines a runway excursion “as an occurrence (accident or 
incident) where an aircraft on the ground departs from a runway or taxiway. Excursions 
may occur on take-off, taxiing or landing, and can be either intentional or unintentional” 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b). Although this definition encompasses all 
possible excursion scenarios, it is classified as a ‘runway excursion’. This terminology 
seems inappropriate and should be generalised to include excursions from taxiways. 
Therefore, the ATSB definition is adapted in this thesis as follows: 
 
Excursion. An occurrence (accident or incident) where an aircraft on the ground 
departs from a runway or taxiway. Excursions may occur on take-off, taxiing or landing, 
and can be either intentional or unintentional (Definition adapted from Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b).  
 
The ATSB definition does not differentiate between different types of excursions. To allow 
overruns, undershoots and veer-offs to be compared, the following definitions apply:  
• Overrun: An excursion in which the aircraft departs the end of a runway or 
taxiway. 
• Undershoot: An excursion in which the aircraft undershoots the intended runway or 
taxiway threshold. 
• Veer off: An excursion in which an aircraft departs the side of a runway or taxiway 
(Definition adapted from Flight Safety Foundation, 2009). 
4.5.2 Ground Collisions 
Ground collisions happen when two aircraft, an aircraft and a V/PD, or an aircraft and 
another obstacle on the airport surface collide. Well-known examples from history include 
the Tenerife airport disaster in 1977, in which two Boeing 747 aircraft collided on the 
runway resulting in 574 fatalities (Raad Voor De Luchtvaart. Netherlands Aviation Safety 
Board, Year not specified), and the Linate airport disaster in October 2001 (Figures 35 and 
36), in which a Scandinavia Airlines flight collided on take-off with a Cessna business jet 
killing 114 people on board of both aircraft and 4 on the ground (Agenzia Nazionale Per 
La Sicurezza Del Volo, 2004). 
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Source: British Broadcasting Corporation (2001) 
Figure 35: Linate airport disaster 2001 
!
Source: AirDisaster.com (2013) 
Figure 36: Wreckage at Linate airport 2001 !
The definitions used for ground collisions are also ambiguous and Table 16 contains a 
selection of some those commonly used. The most commonly used definition in the 
industry is provided by CAST / ICAO’s Common Taxonomy Team. However, the 
definition is limited in the following respects: 
• It excludes collisions on runways. Such events would be classified as runway 
incursions, which, as shown in the next section, refer to situations involving the 
incorrect presence of either an aircraft, or V/PD on the runway. The runway 
incursion definition does not explicitly include collisions making it difficult to 
classify a collision on a runway using the definitions provided by CAST / ICAO. 
• Occurrences cannot be classified exclusively. For example, the definition for 
ground collisions includes encounters with animals. However, CAST / ICAO 
provides a separate definition for the occurrence category ‘Bird’ that refers to 
‘occurrences involving collisions / near collisions with bird(s) / wildlife’. 
Therefore, it is not clear, which definition to use to classify collisions involving 
wildlife (Commercial Aviation Safety Team / International Civil Aviation 
Organization Common Taxonomy Team, 2008b).  
To avoid ambiguity, ground collisions are defined as follows throughout this thesis: 
 
Ground collision. Collision on the airport surface. The definition refers to collisions 
between aircraft or V/PD with another aircraft or V/PD, obstacle, building, or fixed 
structure while on the airport surface (Definition adapted from Commercial Aviation 
Safety Team / International Civil Aviation Organization Common Taxonomy Team, 
2008b).    
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Table 16: Ground collisions definitions 
 
Organisation 
 
 
Definition 
 
Limitations 
• CAST / ICAO Common Taxonomies  
(Commercial Aviation Safety Team / International 
Civil Aviation Organization Common Taxonomy 
Team, 2008b) 
• ICAO ADREP 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006a) 
• EASA Annual Review referring to CAST/ICAO 
“Collision while taxiing to or from a runway in use. 
Usage notes: Includes collisions with an aircraft, 
person, animal, ground vehicle, obstacle, building, 
structure, etc., while on a surface other than the runway 
used for landing or intended for takeoff.” 
• The definition excludes collisions on runways 
• The definition mixes other occurrence types (e.g. 
wildlife strikes) with ground collisions 
• EUROCONTROL Harmonisation of European 
Incident Definitions Initiative (HEIDI) (The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, 2001b) 
“Ground-ground collision: collision taking place 
between two aircraft, objects, vehicle, persons, animals 
standing or moving on the ground or any combination 
thereof.” 
• The definition mixes other occurrence types (e.g. 
wildlife strikes) with ground collisions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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4.5.3 Incursions 
A runway incursion happens when an aircraft, vehicle, or pedestrian infringes onto the 
runway without obtaining prior clearance. Similarly, taxiway incursions refer to situations 
in which an aircraft or V/PD resides in an incorrect position on a taxiway. The mitigation 
of such incidents is important since, in extreme situations, incursions can result in a ground 
collision leading to major loss of life. Hence, incursions are precursors (i.e. an event in the 
accident chain (Phimister, et al., 2004)) to ground collisions. 
In the past, there were many definitions of what constituted an incursion (e.g. 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004; Federal Aviation Administration, 2004; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2001a). The importance of 
runway incursions and their damaging potential was increasingly recognised in the aviation 
community and the need for a global definition of runway incursions was finally accepted 
at the 11th Air Navigation Conference in Montreal in 2003 (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007). Consequently, on 27 April 2006, the ICAO released the definition of 
a runway incursion as: “any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence 
of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the 
landing and take off of aircraft” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007). 
This new definition was accepted by the industry and aviation stakeholders, and where 
necessary changes have been made to comply with the ICAO standard (e.g. the UK CAA 
adopted the ICAO’s definition on 1 January 2007 (Goodman and Fraser, 2011) and the 
FAA on 1 October 2007 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009c)).  
Nonetherless, the ICAO’s definition is limited. It does not include incidents on 
taxiways, although taxiway collisions occur frequently. Recent examples include e.g. the 
collision of two aircraft at Dulles International Airport in August 2012 (American 
Broadcasting Company News, 2012), the collision of two jets at Boston Logan 
International Airport in July 2011 (CBS Broadcasting. Inc. Boston, 2011), and the collision 
of two planes on a taxiway at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport in April 
2011 (CBS Broadcasting Inc. News, 2011). Furthermore, incursions on taxiways are not 
always acknowledged by the aviation stakeholders and this can be attributed to the lack of 
guidance from the ICAO. However, there are some adhoc definitions including the 
definition of taxiway incursions in EUROCONTROL’s HEIDI taxonomy (The European 
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Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2012) and the definition of surface incidents 
used by the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c).  
As this thesis addresses all occurrence types on the airport surface, an incursion is 
defined as follows: 
 
Incursion. Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an 
aircraft, vehicle or person on the maneuvering area (Definition adapted from International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2007). 
4.5.4 Foreign Object Damage  
The common understanding of Foreign Object Damage (FOD) is less controversial. 
FOD at an airport refers to the damage caused by an object at an inappropriate location at 
the airport.  
 
The most well-known example of 
the consequences of a FOD is the 
crash of the Concorde in July 2000 at 
Charles de Gaulle airport in Paris in 
which 113 people died (Figure 37). 
The accident was caused by a piece of 
titanium debris (a part of a thrust 
reverser that fell from an aircraft four 
minutes earlier) on the runway 
(Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses 
pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile, 
2002). 
 
 
Source: The Wall Street Journal (2012) 
Figure 37: Concorde crash 2000 
 
 
Whilst there is a common understanding of FOD, its definitions in the literature are 
ambiguous and confusing. For example, there is a need to distinguish between Foreign 
Object Debris and Foreign Object Damage, although both are currently referred to as FOD. 
Therefore, this thesis streamlines the definitions as follows: 
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• Foreign Object (FO) or Foreign Object Debris. Any object located in an 
inappropriate location in the airport environment that has the potential to damage 
aircraft, vehicles, persons, equipment, or otherwise diminish safety (Definition 
adapted from Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). !
• Foreign Object Damage (FOD). Any damage attributed to a foreign object that can 
be expressed in physical or economic terms which may or may not degrade the 
product’s required safety and / or performance characteristics (Definition adapted 
from Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). 
 
These definitions have been adapted from the FAA and encompass damage to all 
infrastructure and persons to be found on the airport surface. In addition, the terms Foreign 
Object (FO) and Foreign Object Damage (FOD) are distinguished clearly in order to avoid 
any ambiguity in the classification of occurrences. 
4.5.5 Wildlife Strikes  
Wildlife strikes refer to collisions between aircraft and animals. A major concern for 
aircraft operators is birds. A collision between an aircraft and a bird is known as bird 
strike. Figures 38 and 39 illustrate the extent to which birds can present a safety risk to air 
transport.   
 
 
Source: Smithsonian (2007) 
Figure 38: Bird hazard I 
 
Source: European Cockpit Association (2010) 
Figure 39: Bird hazard II 
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Bird strikes can cause structural damage to aircraft, or engine ingestion which may 
result in an engine failure or loss of control over the aircraft (The European Organisation 
for the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2013a). At their extreme they can result in an 
accident, as occurred on 15 January 2009 in New York. US Airways flight 1549 from 
LaGuardia airport New York to Charlotte / Douglas International Airport struck a flock of 
Canada geese during its initial climb out. The aircraft lost engine power and ditched into 
the Hudson River (Figures 40 and 41). Fortunately, all 155 people on board survived 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2010b). 
 
 
Source: Time Inc. (2009) 
Figure 40: Hudson River crash 2009 I 
 
Source: Time Inc. (2009) 
Figure 41: Hudson River crash 2009 II 
 
Industry initiatives often focus on the control of hazards associated with birds and 
provide a corresponding definition of wildlife strikes as, uniquely, bird strikes (e.g.  
Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008a; EASA (Maragakis, 2009); International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2009a). Wildlife strikes, however, are not limited to birds. In 
particular, strikes involving large animals on the airport surface have the potential to cause 
severe damage. An analysis of safety data conducted in in this thesis (Chapter 7 e.g. 
section 7.3.3) has identified problems associated with animals such as cows, sheep and 
deer. Therefore, this thesis considers wildlife strikes in general.  
Other definitions are ambiguous in their scope and usage. For example, the CAST / 
ICAO’s Common Taxonomy Team provides a definition for the occurrence category 
‘Bird’ and defines them as “occurrences involving collisions / near collisions with bird(s) / 
wildlife”. In addition, CAST / ICAO provide an extra occurrence classification called 
‘Runway Incursion – Animal’, which “includes encounters with wildlife on a runway in 
use” (Commercial Aviation Safety Team / International Civil Aviation Organization 
Common Taxonomy Team, 2008b). The inexplicit and confusing nature of such 
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occurrence classifications makes the analysis and interpretation of wildlife strike data 
difficult. For instance, Transport Canada’s Annual Wildlife Strike report aims to provide 
“a summary of all Canadian wildlife strike statistics in Canadian Airports” (Transport 
Canada, 2010b). However the only definition given in the report refers to bird strikes. 
Mammal strikes are listed, but without the provision of an appropriate definition.  
Given the limitations above and to capture the safety risk of all occurrences associated 
with wildlife, the following definition is used throughout this thesis: 
 
Wildlife strike. A collision between an aircraft and an animal (Definition adapted from 
Krokos and Baker, 2005). 
4.5.6 Interactions  
The accident and incident types introduced in this chapter do not occur in isolation. In 
fact, they interact in a complicated manner and one type of accident / incident can cause 
another. These interactions are captured graphically in Figure 42. 
 
 
Figure 42: Interaction of occurrences 
 
An aircraft infringing onto a runway can cause the excursion of a landing airplane, for 
instance, if the pilot initiates an avoiding manoeuvre. Incursions at their extreme can cause 
a ground collision. Similarly, an aircraft that veers off the surface may collide with another 
aircraft or vehicle on the ground. After a ground collision has occurred, the airport surface 
needs to be checked for FO that may disrupt operations. Debris can also be the remains of 
an excursion or wildlife strike and may result in FOD. The results of an analysis of safety 
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data have revealed a total of 17 interactions between the occurrence types. The details of 
these are discussed further in section 8.2.1 of Chapter 8. In the context of SMS this means 
that all accident / incident types and their interactions should be considered. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has introduced the concept of safety and Safety Management System 
(SMS) and the state of implementation of SMS for airports. It highlighted that airport SMS 
is currently more of a conceptual construct with regulations still under development and 
very little guidance regarding practical deployment and implementation. Therefore, the 
development of robust data-driven tools for the management of airport surface safety is 
essential and will be addressed in this thesis. 
Furthermore, it has been shown that the industry is characterised by definitions that are 
either missing, incomplete, or not standardised. The inadequacy of definitions is 
problematic for SMS that aims to capture all hazards and associated safety risks. If safety 
measures cannot be clearly defined, and thus do not take all possible accident / incident 
types into account, then the basis for a robust SMS does not exist. To overcome these 
limitations, standard definitions for airport surface safety occurrences that will used in the 
rest of this thesis have been developed in this chapter. 
Finally, this chapter highlighted the central role and importance of safety data across 
the four cornerstones of the SMS. The critical elements include accident / incident 
definitions, data collection techniques and methods of investigation and associated the 
quality of the collected data, as well as analytical data analysis methodologies and tools. 
The next chapter moves on to systematically review how state-of-the-art efforts for airport 
surface safety analysis and risk mitigation comply with these requirements. 
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5 Airport Safety Modelling 
The previous chapter completed the contextual aspect of this thesis by introducing the 
fundamentals of safety and Safety Management Systems (SMS) and highlighting the 
requirements for the development of a robust SMS. This chapter systematically reviews the 
state-of-the-art of airport surface safety analysis and risk mitigation efforts and highlights 
the limitations of current approaches in respect to the SMS requirements established in the 
previous chapter. With this, this chapter addresses the third research objective. 
The chapter starts with analysing how the process of surface operations can fail. To 
understand the current status of airport surface safety analysis and risk mitigation, a state-
of-the-art-review is given in the following section. In addition, an initial taxonomy of 
causal factors that underlie failures in the process of surface operations is constructed 
based on the literature findings. Subsequently, the lack and need for an integrated approach 
is highlighted and requirements for a sophisticated airport surface safety analysis 
framework are developed. 
5.1 Failure Modes of Airport Surface Operations 
Chapter 3 has indicated that an omission of tasks within an operation of a stakeholder 
can challenge the safety of the system. The following section builds upon this and analyses 
where the process model (shown in Chapter 3, section 3.2.) can fail.  Figure 43 shows the 
tasks of the airport authority and gives examples how each task can be challenged. 
Subsequently, Figure 44 shows an excerpt of the tasks of a pilot and highlights possible 
failures of the activities within a pilot’s operation. 
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Figure 43: Potential process failures of the airport authority’s operation 
 
•  NAVAIDs not maintained 
•  Inadequate NAVAID maintenance 
•  Grass was not cut 
•  No preventive 
measures have been 
taken 
•  Surface not closed when the 
conditions dictated that it 
should have been closed 
•  Construction V/PD are left unsupervised 
•  Construction V/PD supervised inadequately 
•  Manoeuvring area not inspected 
•  Inspection carried out inadequately 
•  Airport surface not cleared of snow 
•  Inadequate snow clearance 
•  No wildlife inspection carried out 
•  Wildlife control measures not initiated 
•  Ineffective wildlife control measures initiated 
•  Visual aids not maintained 
•  Inadequate visual aid maintenance 
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Figure 44: Potential process failures of the pilot's operation 
 
As can be seen from Figures 43 and 44, each of the activities of both, the airport 
authority and the pilot, can fail in various ways. Similarly, each activity in the operation of 
a V/PD (section 3.2.5.2), ATC (section 3.2.6.2), and the regulator (section 3.2.7) can fail. 
In addition, each element of the airport surface infrastructure shown in section 3.2.2, 
Figure 12, can be subject to a technical failure.  
Overall, it can be concluded that the process model can fail in all of it elements and, 
therefore, it is vital to understand the factors that can lead to a failure of the system. These 
factors are referred to as causal factors and the next section reviews the relevant literature 
to identify them.  
•  Communication not initiated 
•  Failure in the communication process 
•  Area not checked whether it is clear of obstacles / traffic 
•  Area checked insufficiently 
•  Taxi error 
•  Taxi error 
•  Area not checked whether it is clear of obstacles / traffic 
•  Area checked insufficiently 
•  Communication not initiated 
•  Failure in the communication process 
•  Checklist not conducted 
•  Checklist not properly conducted 
•  No monitoring 
•  Insufficient monitoring 
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5.2 Airport Surface Safety Modelling – State-of-the-Art 
5.2.1 Method for Reviewing the Literature 
At its core, safety risk management means identifying, analysing and mitigating the 
causes of occurrences, which are, according to the ICAO, defined as “actions, omissions, 
events, conditions, or a combination thereof, which lead to an accident or incident” 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001c). The literature review, therefore, has 
three aims: 
i) To review the literature on the causal factors that underlie airport surface accidents 
/ incidents and to develop an initial list of these causal factors;  
ii) To identify the deficiencies in the current state-of-the-art of airport surface safety 
analysis with reference to the SMS requirements defined in the previous chapter; 
and  
iii) To identify risk mitigation efforts including technologies, training programs, 
procedures and recommendations for best practices. 
The literature has been consolidated based upon the following factors: 
• Chapter 4 has shown that all occurrence types are relevant and can have fatal 
consequences and, therefore, literature that captures all accident and incident types 
must be reviewed; 
• Chapter 2 highlighted that airports differ in their characteristics across countries 
and for that reason a global review is aspired;  
• Chapter 3 identified five main stakeholders (i.e. airport operator, pilots / airline, 
ATC, ground handling companies, regulators) involved in airport surface 
operations and consequently the review aims to reflect the perspectives of all these 
relevant stakeholders;  
• As a substantial amount of literature and studies has been published in the area of 
airport surface safety, this review focuses on academic literature and major studies 
initiated by the industry. 
A total of 65 studies have been analysed in detail and included in this review. Figure 45 
contains the distribution of the analysed literature per occurrence type.  
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Figure 45: Distribution of literature per occurrence type 
 
 
Figure 46: Publishing bodies 
 
 5 Airport Safety Modelling 
! "#$!
Whilst an extensive number of publications are available for the analysis and 
mitigation of incursions and wildlife strikes, there is little literature available for FOD 
occurrences and the majority of studies and research papers relating to excursions have 
only been published recently.  
The literature included in this review has been sourced worldwide, with the details 
discussed in the following sections for each occurrence type individually. Figure 46 
meanwhile, shows the large distribution of publishing bodies. 
The literature consistently addresses single occurrence types. This structure is retained 
and thus the following sections review each accident / incident type individually. Based on 
the SMS requirements established in Chapter 4, the reviewed studies are evaluated in terms 
of: 
• Scope (i.e. occurrence types that are addressed); 
• Represented stakeholder perspective; 
• Data sources and data quality; 
• Analytical methodologies; 
• Research outcomes; and 
• Proposed risk mitigation measures. 
In each part, the sample characteristics of the reviewed publications are introduced (in 
terms of scope and represented stakeholder perspective) and the causal factors 
summarised. Subsequently, a critical review of the analytical methodologies and a 
discussion of the underlying data sets and their quality are given. An assessment of the 
quality of safety data is essential for any analysis, but in particular, when attempting to 
aggregate databases across organisations. Three aspects of data quality need to be 
considered: external factors (i.e. how accurately does the database reflect occurrences), 
internal factors (i.e. how precise is the data), as well as the reporting level and the details 
of data quality assessments in aviation are discussed in Chapter 6.  
In terms of analytical methodologies, three types have been identified in relation to the 
analysis of airport surface safety studies and Figure 47 summarises their characteristics. 
The safety studies can be categorised in i) review-only studies, ii) qualitative studies, and 
iii) quantitative studies and the reviewed literature will be benchmarked against these 
categories.  
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Figure 47: Analytical methodologies  !
The first type concerns studies that give an overview of the causal factors that underlie 
occurrences, and provide safety recommendations based upon these factors. These reports 
are purely qualitative and the causal factors are typically derived from the findings of the 
data analysis published in other papers / reports.  
The second type of research involves the analysis of data from various sources (e.g. 
safety data, interviews). These studies extract causal factors from the collected data and 
use descriptive statistics (e.g. frequency analyses) to present the findings. Such studies 
result either in the identification of the causal factors or an outline of safety 
recommendations based upon the results.  
The third type refers to quantitative approaches that go beyond descriptive statistics. In 
that respect, it is reviewed how existing studies address the quantification of the safety risk 
(as the product of probability and severity) and whether an acceptable level of safety 
(ALoS) at the State-level, or targets for a safety risk that is as low as reasonable practicable 
(ALARP) at the organisational level have been set. Based on the SMS requirements 
defined in the previous chapter, level 3 of the analytical methodologies is the most 
desirable category as SMS are data driven and require the quantification of safety risks. 
Input: 
!Not data-based 
Output: 
!Causal factors 
!Safety recommenda- 
tions 
Input: 
!Data (e.g. safety 
 data, interviews) 
Output: 
!Causal factors 
!Safety recommenda- 
tions 
Methodology: 
!Often unknown, or  
based on the results  
of other studies 
 
Methodology: 
!Data analysis 
!Descriptive statistics 
Input: 
!Safety and/or 
operational data 
Methodology: 
!Statistical modelling 
Output: 
!Probability models 
Methodological robustness 
1
2
3
Review-only 
Qualitative 
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In addition to the identification of causal factors and the review of analytical 
methodologies, risk mitigation strategies, as proposed in the literature, are outlined for 
each of the reviewed occurrence types. Finally, a review of existing taxonomies is given. 
There results of the review are consolidated into: 
i) An initial taxonomy of causal factors that underlie all airport surface safety 
accidents and incidents; and 
ii) An outline of the limitations of previous research and the requirements for 
future research. 
Figure 48 summarises the methodology for the literature review. 
 
!
Figure 48: Methodology outline for literature review !!!!!!!!!!
Incursions/ 
Collisions 
FOD Excursions Wildlife 
strikes 
Literature overview 
Identification of causal factors 
Review of analytical methodologies 
including datasets and quality assessments 
Outline of safety mitigation strategies 
Initial taxonomy of 
causal factors 
Limitations of 
previous research 
Methodology Outcome 
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5.2.2 Incursions / Ground Collisions 
Incursions are precursors to ground collisions, which can lead at their extreme to 
substantial damage of aircraft and major loss of life. To prevent such accidents from 
happening, incursions have been the centre of attention in the aviation industry for over a 
decade. To identify the state-of-the-art of incursion analysis, modelling and prevention, a 
selection of 21 research papers and safety initiatives (selected according to the criteria 
introduced in section 5.2.1) have been reviewed, representing the main research efforts and 
industry initiatives for the prevention of incursions, and ground collisions, respectively. 
The prevention of incursions has not only been addressed by the stakeholders directly 
involved in such incidents (e.g. airlines, ANSPs), but also by academia and research 
institutes. The relevant entities include aircraft manufacturers (Airbus, 2004c), airline 
representatives (Young and Vlek, 2009), ANSPs (Airservices Australia, 2002), regulators 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2002, 2007c, 2008b, 2009c, 2010d; International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2007; La Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile, 2007; Transport 
Canada, 2000), accident investigation boards (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004; 
National Transportation Safety Board, 1987), safety organisations (The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2008a; The European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation Experimental Centre, 2006), international safety consortia 
(Runway Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team, 2000; Runway Incursion Joint Safety 
Implementation Team, 2002; The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 
et al., 2011), research institutes (e.g. NASA Ames (Hooey and Foyle, 2006), NLR 
(Stroeve, et al., 2009, 2011), VOLPE (Biernbaum and Hagemann, 2012)), and academia 
(Chang and Wong, 2012; Kim and Yang, 2012; Rogerson and Lambert, 2012). In addition, 
there have been action plans at the local airport level (e.g. training and awareness 
campaigns (Zurich Airport Runway Safety Team, 2011)).  
Most studies reviewed here considered incursions on runways, and the majority 
focused on the investigation of incursions that involved infringement of aircraft only. Just 
two studies have addressed incursions or collisions on the airfield (The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation Experimental Centre, 2006; Young and 
Vlek, 2009). Since the introduction of the ICAO’s runway incursion definition in April 
2006, and its adoption by national authorities in the late 2000s (e.g. Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2009c; Goodman and Fraser, 2011) the definition of runway incursions 
has been harmonised. The underlying data are for the most part national datasets, with the 
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main body of the research coming from the U.S. Only two studies used global databases. 
Appendix II Table 1 provides an overview of the reviewed literature and summarises the 
underlying datasets, data quality issues, analytical methodologies and research outcomes. 
In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of each study / initiative are discussed. 
5.2.2.1 Causal Factors 
17 studies determined the factors that can cause incursions. These factors can be 
classified into eight groups, related to the initial process model of airport surface 
operations developed in the previous chapter. These include pilot, ATC, V/PD (including 
V/PD from ground handling companies, the airport operator, and others, e.g. construction 
workers), and regulatory factors, as well as causes that originate from the airport surface 
physical infrastructure and the environment (e.g. weather / visibility). In addition, most 
studies emphasised the central role of communication. Although communication-related 
factors can be attributed to each of the stakeholders, they are often described as a category 
on its own in the literature, and therefore, are treated as such here for the moment. Finally, 
it emerged that traffic characteristics, such as the traffic volume, play a role in the 
occurrence of incursions. For instance, Transport Canada (2000) identified that the 
likelihood of an incursions increases more rapidly when capacity-enhancing procedures are 
in effect. The identified causal factors are summarised in Table 17 
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Table 17: High-level causal factors for incursions 
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The pilot-related factors that can contribute to an incursion include: a lack of pilot 
situational awareness caused by distractions (e.g. flight deck not sterile, head down tasks, 
conversations in the cockpit) or the pilot forgetting e.g. clearances; airport-related factors 
such as unfamiliarity with the airport, or complacency; actions without clearance (e.g. 
entering a runway, crossing the hold line, taking off without clearance, taking off from the 
wrong runway or a taxiway); or communication-related errors that occur for instance 
during the communication process with ATC. In addition, inadequate team operations (e.g. 
improper cross-checking, inadequate supervision of the first officer by the pilot in 
command) and personal and / or competence-related factors such as pressure (e.g. not to 
lose a slot, by being already late), or inexperience are mentioned as causes frequently 
throughout the literature. 
Similarly, common causal factors for ATC are a loss of situational awareness through 
distractions (e.g. through conversations in the tower, head-down time, a restricted view to 
the manoeuvring from the ATC tower) or ATC forgetting about things such as the position 
of an aircraft / VPD, the closure of a runway, or that a clearance has been issued. In 
addition, the issue of an incorrect or inadequate clearance, the misidentification of aircraft / 
V/PD positions, factors in relation to inadequate teamwork (e.g. inadequate controller 
handover, a controller covering more than one position, the absence of a supervisor in the 
tower), as well as competence and experience, are mentioned frequently in the literature. 
Finally, technical failures, such as the failure of the surveillance system (e.g. ground radar) 
are acknowledged contributors to incursions. 
V/PD-related factors that can cause an incursion include, amongst others, a lack of 
situational awareness caused by distractions or unfamiliarity with the airport; inadequate 
training on the airfield and, associated with this, e.g., a lack of knowledge of airport signs 
and markings, or even the absence of any V/PD training. Furthermore, a non-compliance 
with ATC instructions, incorrect position reports to ATC, a failure to obtain ATC 
clearance at all, and the lack of proper communication between V/PD and ATC are each 
mentioned in the literature. Although V/PD account for 21.0% of runway incursions in the 
U.S. (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010d) and 29.0% in Europe (The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2011d), V/PD-related factors are only 
covered in five of the studies. 
Failures in the communication process between stakeholders are emphasised by most 
of the reviewed publications. For pilots, these include the use of non-standard phraseology, 
poorly enunciated, heavily accented, and rapidly spoken language, read back errors (e.g. 
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incorrect or missing read back), and the misunderstanding of controller instructions. 
Similarly, incorrect read back and incorrect phraseology are mentioned as causes for 
incursions involving V/PD. In addition, vehicles that are not equipped with a radio and 
therefore are unable to establish contact with ATC are often involved in an incursion. 
Incorrect / inadequate instructions, the omission of one or more steps in the 
communication process, overlong and complex transmissions, and the use of languages 
other than English are cited failures in the communication process of ATC. 
Besides human-related factors, the airport itself, its infrastructure and the maintenance 
associated with it, are also factors that can contribute to incursions. Thus, a complex 
manoeuvring area layout, inadequate marking, signage and lighting, and a non-normal 
airport configuration caused, for instance, through construction work (e.g. closed surfaces) 
can each contribute to the loss of situational awareness on the part of the stakeholders. 
Similarly, weather-related factors, and in particular visibility (e.g. low visibility conditions 
induced by haze, dust, light or heavy rain, the position of the sun in the pilot’s eyes, snow / 
icing covering airport surface markings, night time operations, ‘Sea of lights’), can hinder 
airport surface operations.  
Finally, inadequate regulations were mentioned by two studies, and the contribution of 
the prevailing traffic (e.g. (hourly) traffic volume, hourly runway entries, percentage of 
GA operations, traffic mix) at an airport was acknowledged by four studies as shown in 
Table 17. 
The factors mentioned in an early study by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(1987) (e.g. communication problems, inadequate markings and signage, ATC forgetting 
about aircrafts / V/PD or the closure of a runway) are still valid today. Overall, the causal 
factors mentioned most frequently in the literature are pilot, ATC and communication-
related factors. Although the interaction of the factors is indicated (e.g. a failure in the 
communication process between pilot and ATC), none of the studies has analysed this 
aspect further to show how the factors interact with each other and which are the most 
frequent interactions. Since most of the studies use national data sets the causal factors are 
typically presented for individual countries. Only the Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
(2004) compares its analysis of Australian runway incursions more widely to Europe and 
U.S. This comparison is limited, however, to trends (i.e. incursion rates) and does not 
cover a geographical comparison of causal factors. Since the majority of studies focus on 
runway-related occurrences, it is also not possible to compare whether the same factors 
underlie incursions on runways and taxiways. 
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5.2.2.2 Analytical Methodologies and Data Quality Issues 
Figure 47 introduced possible analytical methodologies for the analysis of airport 
surface safety occurrences (i.e. review-only, qualitative, quantitative) and all three types of 
studies have been identified in relation to the analysis of incursions. 
First, qualitative studies that derive causal factors from the findings of data analyses 
published in other papers / reports were identified (e.g. Airbus, 2004c; International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 2007; The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 
et al., 2011). 
Second, the review identified a number of studies that analyse data from various 
sources, including safety data (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2004; La Direction 
Générale de l'Aviation Civile, 2007; Young and Vlek, 2009), interviews (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 1987), site visits (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002; 
Transport Canada, 2000), and surveys of SMEs (Airservices Australia, 2002). These 
studies extract causal factors from the collected data and use descriptive statistics (e.g. 
frequency analyses) to present the findings. Such studies result either in the identification 
of the causal factors (Airservices Australia, 2002; Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
2004; La Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile, 2007), or an outline of safety 
recommendations based upon the results (Federal Aviation Administration, 2002, 2007c, 
2008b, 2009c, 2010d; National Transportation Safety Board, 1987; Transport Canada, 
2000; Young and Vlek, 2009). Although various methods for data collection are used in 
previous research, only the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team (2000), the 
National Transportation Safety Board (1987) and Transport Canada (2000) combine some 
of the methods. The combination of research methods allows more detailed insight to be 
attained into the causal factors and to understand more clearly ill-defined areas that may 
not have been captured very well through the primary method of data collection. 
The majority of studies fail to specify how the causal factors have been extracted from 
the data. Possible methods include grounded theory, whereby a theory is developed newly 
from data (Glaser and Strauss, 2009), template analysis that uses an initial template which 
is refined over time (Symon and Cassell, 1998), or data coding according to an existing 
taxonomy.  
Finally, the review identified five quantitative approaches that go beyond descriptive 
statistics. EUROCONTROL’s Integrated Risk Picture (IRP) quantifies the risk for five 
accident scenarios to which ATM can make a significant contribution with the aim to 
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identify safety priorities for ATM. Fault trees are developed for each accident scenario, 
including runway collisions and taxiway collisions, and these are quantified using 
worldwide accident data. The risk of each specified accident category is quantified by 
providing a structured breakdown of their causes together with their probability of 
occurrence. In addition, common causal factors that affect all accident scenarios are 
separately presented in an influence model (The European Organisation for the Safety of 
Air Navigation Experimental Centre, 2006). IRP is limited by modelling mainly the 
contribution of ATC and ATM to accidents. In the context of runway and taxiway 
collisions, this means that IRP does not model pilot or airport-related factors in detail. 
Collisions with V/PD on the airport surface are missing entirely. Fault Tree analysis has 
also been applied by Kim and Yang (2012) to model the contribution of hazards to runway 
incursions, and to identify those hazards that are most critical in terms of their failure 
probability. A disadvantage of Fault Trees is that failure probabilities can only be modelled 
for defined scenarios and are therefore, difficult to establish for complex systems, such as 
airport surface operations, which require the interaction of various actors.  
Another method to prioritise causal factors is the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), 
which has been applied in three of the studies. AHP is a structured technique based on 
expert judgments that derives priorities from a series of pairwise comparisons of factors. 
The factors to be compared can be derived from the literature (Chang and Wong, 2012; 
Kim and Yang, 2012) or can be based on SME opinions (Rogerson and Lambert, 2012). 
Since the pairwise comparisons are done by SMEs, the AHP is reliant on the expertise of 
the SMEs and their judgement. 
AHP prioritises causal factors and the results can be used to channel risk mitigation 
measures. The reverse approach to prioritising the causes is to prioritise the consequences, 
i.e. occurrences. Through the application of regression models the causal factors that 
underlie the most undesired occurrence types can be modelled. For example, a recent study 
by Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) models the impact of contextual factors on runway 
incursion severity using logistic regression models. The authors model the relationship 
between aircraft (e.g. phase of flight, number of aircraft involved), pilot (e.g. foreign pilot, 
pilot hours in make and model), airport (e.g. number of runway intersections, hotspots), 
radar (e.g. presence of airport surface detection equipment (ASDE), ATC (e.g. age, time on 
shift), weather (e.g. temperature, visibility), and other factors (e.g. day vs. night time 
operations) and four runway incursion severity levels. Whilst Biernbaum and Hagemann, 
(2012) provide an extensive overview of the factors that contribute to runway incursions, 
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the study focuses on the investigation of contextual factors, i.e. conditions that have been 
present during the occurrence of a runway incursion, but does not consider the causes of 
the incidents. Modelling the relationship between the causes (which can be extracted from 
occurrence reports) and severity would allow those factors that are most critical for the 
occurrence of high-severity incidents to be identified and addressed. The study is limited, 
however, in that it models only runway-related incursions and neglects V/PD operations 
(i.e. only pilot and ATC-related factors are considered). 
A practical tool to be used for runway incursion risk assessments was developed by the 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (2008). The Aerodrome Runway 
Incursion Assessment (ARIA) tool was developed with the objective of providing a simple 
and easy-to-use computer-based assessment that would facilitate a Local Runway Safety 
Team to identify the possibility of runway incursions occurring at their airport. ARIA 
provides a risk index for each airport that reflects the probability of having a runway 
incursion. The tool takes contributory factors (e.g. partially blocked line of sight from the 
ATC tower, tower staffing problems) as well as runway incursion reduction factors (e.g. 
continued stop bar usage at all runway entries) into account and weights these factors 
based upon historical safety data and SME judgment. The overall risk index is calculated 
through an additive model, however, the appropriateness of such a model for the 
aggregation of factors and possible alternatives are not discussed. Overall, however, the 
considered risk factors and countermeasures offer a good awareness tool for airports.  
Finally, Stroeve, et al. (2009) developed a collision risk model for a specific runway 
incursion scenario, in which an aircraft taxies towards the crossing of an active runway 
while its crew has inappropriate situational awareness. Using Monte Carlo simulations an 
assessment of the risk of a collision between the aircraft taxiing with an aircraft taking-off 
is presented by event probabilities. Stroeve, et al. (2009) provide a systematic approach for 
accident assessments that describes the performance of a system as a whole and takes the 
interactions between multiple agents (i.e. humans and technical systems) into account. The 
disadvantage of their model is that it is computationally intensive and the modelling of a 
very specific runway incursion scenario does not allow for a holistic risk assessment of 
airport surface operations.  
In summary, the depth of the methodologies used for the analysis and modelling of 
runway incursions varies significantly from simple causal factors analysis and descriptive 
statistics to the modelling of accident / incident scenarios. Although the quantitative 
studies claim to model the ’risk’ of incursions, they have predominantly addressed the 
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probability of occurrence (i.e. of having an incursion). Only one study attempted to model 
their severity, but addressed only contextual factors and failed to model the relationship 
between the causes of incursions and their severity. Safety targets in form of an ALoS or 
ALARP have not been proposed based on these calculations. 
 
Among the reviewed literature 13 studies are based upon the analysis of safety data, 
however, only four of them mention data quality. Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012), La 
Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile (2007), and the Runway Incursion Joint Safety 
Analysis Team (2000) describe the limitations of their data, but the discussions are limited 
to the internal quality of the databases (e.g. missing cells). Also, Transport Canada (2000) 
assessed the quality of its data sources and evaluated them as reliable. However, this 
statement is not supported by any further explanations as to how the data was assessed and 
the reliability defined. Overall, data quality is rarely addressed, and if it is, then it is limited 
to internal data quality issues (i.e. precision). None of the studies evaluated the accuracy of 
the data (i.e. whether the data reflects the truth of what happened), even though it is 
important that this should be discussed when dealing with safety data, and in particular, 
when analysing occurrence reports for causal factors. A detailed overview of the reviewed 
studies, their underlying data sets, data quality issues, analytical methodologies and 
research outcomes is given in Appendix II Table 1.  
5.2.2.3 Safety Risk Mitigation Strategies 
The industry has initiated many safety programmes and awareness campaigns to 
address incursion. These are initiated at various levels, ranging from awareness campaigns 
at an organisational level (e.g. airport, airline) to safety programmes established by 
regulatory bodies. Initiatives at the local level include the establishment of Runway Safety 
Action Teams (RSAT); these teams consist of representatives of the relevant stakeholders 
(e.g. airport, airlines, ATC, regulator) and discuss surface operations and safety concerns 
in order to develop action plans (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011d).   
Besides general awareness campaigns, the analysis of causal factors typically leads to 
more targeted recommendations for mitigation measures, best practices, training 
programmes, and guidelines for the prevention of incursions. To reduce runway incursions, 
the industry has also worked on the development of technologies that help to improve 
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situational awareness. These include improved surveillance to support ATC, as well as 
ground-based and on-board pilot / V/PD notification equipment. Currently, the Airport 
Surface Detection Equipment – Model 3 (ASDE-3) and the Airport Surface Detection 
Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X) are employed to improve situational awareness for ATC. 
 ASDE-3 provides radar surveillance of aircraft and vehicles (Airbus, 2004c). The 
succeeding version, Model X, provides high-resolution surveillance information under all 
weather and visibility conditions. Model X is more sophisticated than ASDE-3 and is able 
to integrate data from a variety of sources, including aircraft transponders and 
multilateration sensors. ASDE-X creates a continuously updated map of all airport surface 
operations which ATC can use to monitor the ground traffic (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010f). In addition, the Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS), 
an add-on enhancement to the ASDE-3 radar, provides ATC with aural and visual 
warnings of potential collision risks (Airbus, 2004c). Similarly, the ASDE-X Safety Logic 
(AXSL) uses surveillance information from ASDE-X to determine if current or projected 
positions and movements of aircraft and vehicles present a potential collision situation. 
ASDE-3 / AMASS has been used at major U.S. airports while the new system, ASDE-X, 
has been implemented at 35 U.S. airports (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010f).  
In Europe, the Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (A-
SMGCS) is currently under development and aims to assist ATC by providing four 
functions. Surveillance through display systems showing the position of aircraft and 
vehicles on the ground to ATC forms the core of the system. Building on that, the control 
function provides conflict detection and alerts regarding situations in the movement area 
that could potentially compromise safety. A routing function ensures that the most 
effective route is designated for each aircraft and vehicle, and a guidance function gives 
indications of the assigned route to pilots and vehicle drivers. The fully developed A-
SMGCS will combine facility-based ATC notification equipment with ground-based and 
on-board pilot / V/PD notification equipment. Currently, major European airports are in 
the process of implementing the basic surveillance and control functions. The routing and 
guidance functions are the subject of further research and development (The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010b). Moving Map Displays (air 
navigation devices that display the aircraft’s position on moving film of an aeronautical 
chart) are capable of assisting the guidance function by indicating the course and distance 
to the destination (Jeppesen, 2013).  
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To improve situational awareness in the manoeuvring area, Runway Status Lights 
(RWSL), and the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal (FAROS) have also been 
developed and tested. RWSL identifies any possible conflict with other surface traffic and 
warn pilots when it is unsafe to cross, enter, or begin take-off on a runway via a series of 
red lights embedded in the pavement. FAROS is a technology that provides pilots on final 
approach notification that their identified runway for landing is occupied and uses the 
concept of protected zones on the runway and entrance taxiways. The zones are defined by 
a series of embedded inductive loops at entrance and exit points of the zones. As an aircraft 
or vehicle enters or leaves a zone, the magnetic field around the loops is disturbed, thus 
indicating its presence. FAROS uses the Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) lights 
to give direct notification to the pilots, through a flashing of the lights, that the runway is 
occupied and unsafe for landing (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008b). A good review 
on existing runway incursion avoidance technologies and alerting systems is given by 
Schonefeld and Moller (2012). 
 
The main conclusions from the analysis of incursion literature and safety initiatives are 
summarised as follows: 
• The research is initiated by industry as well as research institutes and academia; 
• The scope of this research is limited (i.e. consideration of only runway incursions 
and focus on aircraft-related incursions); 
• A variety of data collection methods have been identified in the literature but are 
often used in isolation; 
• Most research fails to specify the methodology of how the causal factors have been 
extracted from safety data; 
• Causal factor analyses are predominantly of a qualitative nature with only a few 
studies trying to model the factors; 
• Previous research has focused on modelling the probability of the occurrence of 
incursions or the probability of the occurrence of causal factors leading to 
incursions. A robust approach to modelling the severity of incursions based upon 
their causes is missing; 
• Data quality is rarely addressed and if so, only its internal aspects. None of the 
studies has questioned the external validity of the data, analysed the reporting 
levels, or assessed whether it is valid to aggregate multi-national data sets; 
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• A few studies use safety data from a variety of databases and therefore data with 
potentially differing qualities may have been aggregated; 
• Studies typically reflect the perspective of individual stakeholders (e.g. analysis of 
only regulatory data), and approaches that combine the complementary views of 
the relevant stakeholders do not exist; 
The review identified that incursions have been a ‘hot topic’ in the industry over the 
last decade. Therefore, it is surprising that a robust multi-stakeholder approach that takes 
the complementary viewpoints of all the relevant stakeholders into account has not yet 
been proposed. 
To overcome the limitations outlined above, this thesis addresses airport surface safety 
in a holistic manner by considering all occurrence types, both, on runways and taxiways, 
and from the perspective of all relevant stakeholders. A robust methodology that will be 
outlined at the end of this chapter in section 5.3 ensures the reliability and validity of the 
work. The framework for a holistic airport safety management requires the use of standard 
definitions (developed in Chapter 4) and the collection of a reference data set that fulfils 
the requirements of an integrated approach (Chapter 6). The data must be assessed in terms 
of internal validity, external validity and reporting levels in order to determine whether 
multi-national safety data can be aggregated (Chapter 6). To provide a standard tool for 
data coding and analysis, a taxonomy of causal factors applicable to all stakeholders is 
developed (Chapter 9). In addition, a systematic analysis framework to model the 
functional relationship between the severity of airport surface accidents and incidents and 
their underlying causal factors is proposed (Chapter 11). To achieve triangulation, a 
combination of both, qualitative and quantitative research methods, is used throughout this 
thesis. 
5.2.3 Excursions 
Whilst incursions have been in the spotlight for over a decade, the importance of 
excursions and their prevention has only recently received attention from industry and 
academia.  
A total of 16 major research studies and industry campaigns that address excursions 
and their prevention have been identified and reviewed. The literature emanates from a 
number of entities including aircraft manufacturers (Airbus, 2004b), accident investigation 
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boards (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b, 2009), regulators (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2007a), international safety consortia (Flight Safety Foundation, 2000, 
2009; International Civil Aviation Organization / International Air Transport Association, 
2011; The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d; The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al, 2013; The European Organisation for 
the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2012b), an airline trade group (International Air 
Transport Association, 2011), research institutes (Es, 2005; Es, et al., 2009; Hall, et al., 
2008), and academia (Ale, et al., 2009; Ju, 2011; Valdés, et al., 2011; Ziegler, 2012).  
There have been no studies published by those stakeholders directly involved in 
surface operations (e.g. airlines, ANSPs, airport operators). These parties appear only as 
members of safety consortia (Flight Safety Foundation, 2009; The European Organisation 
for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2013). Overall, the majority of studies are initiated 
by accident investigation boards, safety consortia and academia. In contrast to incursions, 
excursions are rare events with some 417 worldwide accidents involving commercial 
transport aircraft during the 14-year period from 1995 to 2008 (Flight Safety Foundation, 
2009) compared to 951 runway incursions in the fiscal year (FY) 2009 alone in the U.S. 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2010d). As a consequence, stakeholders directly 
involved in surface operations may prioritise other problems such as incursions or wildlife 
strikes.  
Although the split of attention is understandable given the various stakeholder 
responsibilities and resource constraints, structured communications with the safety 
investigators of a major European ANSP have revealed the potential dangers inherent in 
this practice. Experts pointed out that their organisation had focused so much on the 
prevention of incursions that they now experience more excursions (Structured 
communication with Safety Investigatiors Avinor AS ANSP, June 2011). 
All the reviewed studies considered runway-related occurrences alone with none taking 
excursions on taxiways into account. In addition, the studies only analysed accidents, and 
sometimes serious incidents, rather than incidents more generally. Often, analyses focused 
on specific types of excursions and flight phases, such as runway overruns that occurred 
during landing. Only two studies considered all three types of runway excursions (i.e. 
overruns, undershoots and veer-offs). Overall, the scope of the studies varies and 
terminology is often not well defined. These findings reinforce the conclusions drawn from 
the review of airport surface safety occurrence definitions. In addition, the literature 
contains studies on approach and landing accidents that, as well as excursions, also include 
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controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) accidents and various incidents related to the approach 
and landing phases of flight (e.g. altitude deviations). Such studies (e.g. Morrison, et al., 
1993) have been excluded from the assessment, unless the causal factors for excursions 
and their impacts have been specifically addressed (e.g. as in Ale, et al., 2009; Flight 
Safety Foundation, 2000).  
Although the research originates mainly from North America, Europe and Oceania, 
most studies use databases that capture worldwide accidents. Appendix II Table 2 
summarises the data sets, data quality, analytical methodologies and findings of the 
reviewed studies on excursions, and discusses their advantages and disadvantages. 
5.2.3.1 Causal Factors 
A total of 11 studies outline the causal factors that underlie excursions with the 
majority of these coming from within the industry. Research papers from academia are less 
concerned with the analysis of causal factors and tend to focus more on probability 
modelling, as discussed in the next section. The causal factors are classified into nine 
groups as outlined in Table 18. 
Aircraft technical failures include, e.g., degraded engine performance and engine 
failure, damaged landing gears, tire failures, failure of the brakes or the anti-skid system, 
or problems associated with the thrust reverser and asymmetric thrust. Aircraft technical 
failures were mentioned by all studies apart from one that focused on the human-related 
aspects involved in excursions. Handling and maintenance failures are also associated with 
technical factors, although these are only mentioned in one document. 
Besides aircraft technical failures, the main contributors to excursions are humans. The 
most prominent pilot-related factors involved in excursions during the landing phase of 
flight include, amongst others: an unstable approach, go around not conducted / 
considered, an approach path / glide slope deviation, and inadequate pilot technique during 
landing and touch down (e.g. too high, too fast, bouncing, hard, long, short, off-centre). No 
rotation because the rotation speed VR is not reached, a premature rotation (before VR), or 
the loss of directional control are often associated with excursions during the take-off 
phase of flight. In addition, aircraft weight calculation errors, or personal factors such as 
fatigue or stress can contribute to the occurrence of an excursion. Pilot-related factors are 
widely recognised and have been mentioned to various degrees in all of the 11 studies. The 
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impact of airlines, e.g. through the provision of inadequate procedures, has been 
acknowledged twice. 
In addition to pilots, ATC can also contribute to the occurrence of excursions. ATC 
human-related factors include for instance an instruction to reject the take-off at a speed 
greater than the decision speed V1, which is the maximum speed at which a rejected take-
off can be initiated in the event of an emergency (Airbus, 2004b), a failure to descend the 
aircraft appropriately for the approach, a failure to allow the aircraft to fly at the 
appropriate control speed, or the selection of an inappropriate runway for the prevailing 
wind and / or runway surface conditions. Although ATC can have a significant impact on 
the occurrence of excursions, it was only mentioned in three studies.  
On the other hand, the influence of weather and the environment is widely 
acknowledged in the literature. Weather-related factors include crosswinds, tailwinds, and 
other winds, turbulence, snow, ice, slush, and resultant contaminated runways, as well as 
(freezing) rain and aquaplaning. Furthermore, wildlife is an environmental factor that can 
lead to the excursion of an aircraft when a strike occurs. 
Closely associated to the weather and environment are airport-related factors, such as 
the failure to provide timely or accurate runway condition information, an inadequate snow 
and ice control plan, or the non-closure of a runway when the conditions dictate. The 
inadequate clearance of runways that are contaminated (e.g. with FOD, oil, rubber), or of 
construction areas, can also be found as causal factors in the literature. Furthermore, 
airport design factors and infrastructure-related factors, such as a downward sloping 
runway, incorrect or obscured runway markings, and inadequate runway safety areas are 
mentioned in the literature. The majority of the reviewed studies acknowledge the impact 
of airports.  
Aircraft manufacturers can also contribute to the occurrence of excursions, for instance 
through not providing operators with appropriate operational and performance information 
covering the spectrum of runway conditions they might experience.  
Finally, the lack of a regulatory requirement to provide pilots with a consistent format 
for take-off and landing data for all runway conditions was quoted twice. Overall, the 
factors mentioned most frequently in the literature are thrust asymmetry, go-around not 
conducted, late or inaccurate runway condition reports, and wind shear. 
Although almost all studies are based upon an analysis of worldwide excursion data, 
the causal factors are generally presented at an aggregate level. Whilst some studies show 
worldwide excursion trends (e.g. frequency of occurrence) (International Air Transport 
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Association, 2011; The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d), 
the causal factors are not compared across different regions. In addition, occurrences are 
often caused by more than one factor. Only the Flight Safety Foundation analysed factor 
interactions, but did not go beyond descriptive statistics, as discussed in the next section 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2009). 
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Table 18: High-level causal factors for excursions 
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Aircraft technical failure ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Handling / maintenance  !         ! 
Pilot human-related factors ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Airline (e.g. procedures) !      !    ! 
ATC human-related factors     ! !     ! 
Environment / weather ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Airport !  !  ! !  !  ! ! 
Aircraft manufacturer  !    !     ! 
Regulations      !      !!!!!
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5.2.3.2 Analytical Methodologies and Data Quality Issues 
Similar to incursions, the three types of analytical methodologies have also been 
identified for excursions. The first type of studies gives an overview of the causal factors 
that underlie excursions, and provides safety recommendations based upon these factors. 
These reports are purely qualitative and the causal factors are typically derived from the 
findings of data analyses published in other papers / reports (Airbus, 2004b; International 
Civil Aviation Organization / International Air Transport Association, 2011; The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2013). In some cases, however, the 
source of information is not specified at all (Federal Aviation Administration, 2007a; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2012b). 
The second type of research involves the analysis of safety data. These studies extract 
causal factors from occurrence reports and use descriptive statistics (e.g. frequency 
analyses) to summarise the factors. Such studies result either in the identification of the 
causal factors (International Air Transport Association, 2011), or an outline of  safety 
recommendations based upon the results (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b, 
2009; Flight Safety Foundation, 2000, 2009). The quantification of the relationship 
between excursions and their underlying causal factors through statistical modelling is 
missing in the literature. The use of regression models, for instance, could identify those 
factors that are most critical to the occurrence of excursions and thus could guide safety 
risk mitigation efforts more effectively. 
As seen before, the majority of studies fail to specify how the causal factors have been 
extracted from the safety data. Three studies coded the safety data by means of existing 
taxonomies but, failed to discuss and demonstrate the appropriateness of the chosen 
taxonomies (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b; Khatwa and Helmreich, 1999; 
The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d). One study 
summarised their findings in a new taxonomy of causal factors for approach and landing 
incidents (Khatwa and Helmreich and 1999).  
Finally, the review identified six quantitative studies that go beyond descriptive 
statistics to develop models to be applied for the risk assessment of excursions. Two of 
these studies developed risk ratios that represent the relative risk an aircraft operator has 
compared to a reference condition in which all risk factors are absent, e.g. the risk of 
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having an overrun when significant tailwind is present (Es, 2005; Es, et al., 2009; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d). Based upon this 
assessment, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (2010d) provides 
recommendations for the mitigation of the identified risk factors. The second study 
however, stops with the assessment of the risk involved in runway overruns during the 
landing phase of flight. 
Two further studies used regression analysis with the aim of modelling the probability, 
location and consequences of excursions (Hall, et al., 2008; Valdés, et al., 2011). The 
models are proposed to be used for the risk assessment of runway safety areas but are 
limited in their underlying assumptions. For instance, Hall, et al. (2008) model the 
wreckage location in the proximity of the runway threshold. Their model assumes that 
aircraft touch down on the threshold. However, the threshold is normally located at the 
extremity of a runway and aircraft touch down on the aiming points in the touchdown 
zone. Aiming points are located 150 – 400 m from the threshold depending on the length 
of the runway and landing distance available (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2004b).  
To support aviation risk assessments a causal model for air transport safety (CATS) has 
been developed by Ale, et al. (2009). CATS contains detailed event chains for seven 
accident types and 33 scenarios, of which 16 can result in a runway excursion. The aim of 
CATS is to quantify the risk of all possible aviation accidents and to understand their 
causes in order to support the decision making process of aviation stakeholders. The final 
CATS product consists of a number of models and includes Event Sequence Diagrams 
(ESD), Fault Trees (FTs), and Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). The models are 
quantified using mainly ADREP accident data and SME judgments.  
CATS shows the sequences of events that lead to accidents, quantifies the probability 
of failure for each event in the sequence, and finally gives the probability of an accident 
occurring for each of the 33 scenarios. While the model contains detailed event chains for 
excursion scenarios, these are limited to pilot, aircraft technical failures, and weather and 
environmental factors and ignore the influence of, e.g., the airport operator and ATC. 
Similarly, one scenario models the probability of a collision on the runway by taking only 
pilot and ATC factors into account, neglecting the influence of V/PD or airport design 
factors. Overall, CATS has been developed from a flight perspective rather than a wider air 
traffic system perspective. In addition, the failure probabilities are to a large extent based 
on SME judgments due to a lack of safety data. The scenario-based development means 
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that accident probabilities are only valid for each scenario, i.e. CATS contains 16 
probabilities to experience an excursion.  
Finally, the study of Ju (2011) used a fuzzy analytical network process (ANP) to model 
the key risk factors involved in excursions. However, the results are questionable given the 
very poor description of the methodology used. 
In summary, scientific papers and reports published by academia and research 
institutes use predominantly quantitative methods, which are more robust than purely 
qualitative approaches. Their findings are proposed to be of use for the assessment of the 
risk from excursions. The safety risk is defined as the product of probability and severity 
and previous research has once again focused on modelling the probability of excursions 
and neglected the modelling of their severity based upon their causes. On the other hand, 
industry studies are limited to purely qualitative research methods. These studies typically 
identify the causal factors that underlie excursions and translate the results into safety 
mitigation recommendations. A combined approach of qualitative analysis of causal 
factors and robust quantitative modelling of the causes is desirable in order to identify 
those factors that are most critical for the occurrence of excursions. 
 
The sources of data used in the reviewed studies are in the majority of cases from 
accident investigation boards (e.g. ATSB, NTSB), or worldwide accident summary 
databases (e.g. World Aircraft Accident Summary (WAAS), National Aerospace 
Laboratory of the Netherlands (NLR) Air Safety Database). These data sources capture 
accidents and serious incidents. The investigation of accidents and serious incidents is 
regulated in ICAO Annex 13 (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001c) and 
therefore, these occurrences should have been investigated to a common global standard. 
However, national variations may still exist and none of the studies addresses data quality 
issues that emerge from the aggregation of multinational safety data. Although restricted to 
the internal quality of the database (e.g. missing information), only Hall, et al. (2008) 
discuss the limitations of their data. Overall, the research to date on excursions does not 
address data quality issues. 
In addition, the use of data from accident investigation bodies and databases for 
worldwide accidents means that incidents are not considered. Excursion incidents may be 
captured in the safety databases of the stakeholders directly involved in surface operations 
(e.g. airlines, or airports) but the current research fails to take such data into account. !
 5 Airport Safety Modelling 
! "#$!
5.2.3.3 Safety Risk Mitigation Strategies 
Safety mitigation strategies for excursions include preventive risk controls and 
recovery risk controls. Preventive risk controls include technological solutions, and 
recommendations for the different aviation stakeholders based upon the identification of 
causal factors. In addition, training programmes and awareness tools and campaigns are 
offered as preventive measures. 
Technical solutions include on-board equipment, such as Airbus’ Runway Overrun 
Warning (ROW) and Runway Overrun Prevention (ROP) system. ROW / ROP on-board 
the new A380. ROW uses aircraft and airport data to compare, during the final approach, 
the required and actual available landing distance and triggers warnings when runways are 
too short for the aircraft. ROP is a protection system that is activated once the aircraft is on 
the runway. It computes the remaining stopping distance and automatically applies the 
maximum breaking power and reverse thrust required to avoid overruns (Airbus, 2009). 
ROW / ROP assist pilots during the approach and landing phase and helps to prevent pilot-
related errors. Similarly, Boeing has recognised the impact of human-related factors and 
offers a landing distance calculator on electronic flight bags (Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, 2012b). Honeywell has designed a SmartLandingTM system that helps to reduce 
the risk of a runway excursion by providing timely alerts to crew members when the 
aircraft is approaching the runway too high, too fast or is not configured properly 
(Honeywell International Inc., 2013). 
Recommendations derived from the analysis of causal factors fall into two classes: 
general and specific. The former include, for example, the initiation of local runway safety 
awareness campaigns. Specifics include those for:  
• Airport operators (e.g. timely assessment of runway contamination during changing 
runway conditions, clear marking and signage of holding points), 
• ANSPs (e.g. to ensure that the importance of a stabilised approach and final 
approach procedures is included in training and briefings for ATC),  
• Aircraft operators (e.g. to include and monitor aircraft parameters related to 
potential runway excursions in their Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) program),  
• Aircraft manufacturers (e.g. to present take-off and landing performance 
information in similar (common and shared) terminology and to agreed standards), 
and  
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• Regulators (e.g. to confirm that all infrastructure, practices and procedures relating 
to runway operations are in compliance with ICAO provisions) (The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2013).  
In addition, various awareness materials and tools are available in the industry (e.g. Air 
Line Pilots Association Air Safety Team, 2010; The European Organisation for the Safety 
of Air Navigation, 2011c; The International Federation of Air Line Pilots' Associations, 
2009). 
The models developed by academia are designed to be used for risk assessments. Some 
of these studies also provide recommendations for the mitigation of risk factors associated 
with excursions (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d). 
Often, however, the focus is on the development of the statistical models and 
recommendations for their application for risk assessments and not on the proposal of 
mitigation measures (Es, 2005; Es, et al., 2009; Hall, et al., 2008).  
Recovery risk controls on the other hand, aim to mitigate the effect of an excursion and 
act in situations where an aircraft actually experiences an excursion. 
 
Recovery risk controls include 
technological solutions such as 
engineered material arresting 
systems (EMAS), which use a 
light-weight, crushable concrete 
material, placed beyond the end 
of the runway, to stop or greatly 
slow down an aircraft that 
overruns the runway, as shown 
in Figure 49 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008b). 
 
 
Source: Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (2003) 
Figure 49: Engineered materials arresting system 
 
In summary, the following conclusions are drawn from the research to date on 
excursions: 
• Research on excursions is mainly initiated by accident investigation bodies, safety 
consortia and academia, but not by the stakeholders directly involved in excursions; 
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• The research is limited in scope, i.e. runway-related excursions are not considered 
in a holistic manner (i.e. by inclusion of all excursion types) and both incidents and 
taxiway-related occurrences are neglected;  
• The causal factors are aggregated at a global level; 
• The causal factors are always derived from safety data, alternative methodologies 
(e.g. interviews with SMEs) are missing; 
• Methodologies on how the causal factors have been extracted from safety data are 
not specified in the majority of cases;  
• Most studies are of qualitative nature and do not go beyond descriptive statistical 
analysis; 
• There is a lack of robust statistical modelling of causal factors (e.g. the functional 
relationship between causal factors and the severity of excursions) to identify the 
most critical causes in order to guide safety mitigation efforts more effectively;  
• Data of potentially differing qualities is aggregated and data quality issues are not 
addressed. 
The limitations shown above are similar to those identified for incursions and will be 
addressed in this thesis through a holistic (integrated) approach to safety. The detailed 
research outline based on these limitations is presented in section 5.3. 
5.2.4 FOD 
FOD is a multi-million dollar problem in the aviation industry. For instance, a study by 
McCreary (2008) estimated that the top 300 airports (in terms of movements) in the U.S. 
see up to 70,000 FOD incidents per year, which incur direct costs of US$ 1.1 billion to 
airlines (e.g. for engine maintenance, tire replacements, aircraft body damage). If indirect 
cost such as delays, plane changes, or fuel inefficiencies are added then the cost of FOD 
increases to US$ 12 billion per year in the airline industry.  
Although FOD is a costly problem, it is not addressed as extensively in the literature as 
the other safety issues discussed in this chapter. Eight documents have been reviewed to 
identify the possible causes of FO and FOD mitigation measures. Publishing bodies 
included aircraft manufactures (Bachtel, 2010), regulators (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 1996, 2009a, 2010b), airport operators (MBJ Airports, Year not specified), 
consultants (Prather, 2011), aerospace industry consortia (National Aerospace FOD 
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Prevention Inc, Year not specified), safety consortia (The European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2013b, c), and technology companies (Kraus and 
Watson, 2001; The FOD Control Corporation, 2010). In addition, airline FOD prevention 
programmes have been reviewed (e.g. Delta Air Lines, 2011; United Airlines, 2010). Most 
of these documents are not research studies but rather compilations of knowledge in the 
area of FO(D). In fact, there is no academic literature on the analysis and prevention of 
FO(D). Most studies originate in the U.S. and although different terminologies are used, 
they all refer to debris that can lead to damage. Appendix II Table 3 summarises the 
reviewed documents in terms of the data sets, data quality issues, analytical methodologies, 
results, strengths and weaknesses.  
5.2.4.1 Causal Factors 
The majority of documents do not state the causes of FOD. Typically the source of the 
FO is mentioned and examples are given, and therefore, the causal factors can only be 
implied. Table 19 summarises the main sources of FO in eight categories. 
 
Table 19: High-level sources of FOD 
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Airport infrastructure !  ! ! ! ! ! 
Aircraft  ! !  ! ! ! 
Vehicles  ! !  ! ! ! 
Maintenance / construction ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Ground handling !  !  ! ! ! 
Personal belongings ! ! !  ! ! ! 
Environment  ! ! ! ! ! ! 
Weather  ! ! ! ! !  
 
There are various sources of FO. For instance, FO can develop from the airport surface 
infrastructure, e.g. through the deterioration of pavements (e.g. pieces of concrete can 
break loose from holes in the pavement), or runway and taxiway signs and lights. 
Similarly, aircraft and vehicles can generate FO. Nuts and bolts, carbon parts, fuel caps, or 
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other small parts that fall off from aircraft, vehicles, fuelling trucks, construction and 
maintenance equipment, etc. are commonly found on the manoeuvring area. The 
maintenance of surface infrastructure, aircraft and vehicles can also cause FO when, for 
example, tools, bolts or wires are forgotten in an aircraft or vehicle. A further source of FO 
is construction work on the airport surface.  
The operations involved in aircraft handling on the apron can also cause FO, which can 
eventually end up on a taxiway or runway. Common FO sources include refuelling, 
catering supplies, cabin cleaning and garbage, and baggage (e.g. baggage tags). In 
addition, cargo handling can produce broken materials, paper products and plastics. 
Personal belongings from operational personnel are also a common source of FO. These 
include pens, coins, identification badges, hats, soda cans, paperwork, and any other object 
that airport or airline personnel carry and inadvertently leave in an inappropriate location. 
Likewise, personal belongings of passengers can be found on the airfield. Finally, FO can 
be generated by the environment (e.g. stones, sand, pieces of wood, ash) and the weather 
(ice, hail). 
Only Kraus and Watson (2001) explore the causes of FO rather than just the sources. 
The authors refer to the National Aerospace Standards (NAS 412) to suggest that most FO 
is attributable to poor housekeeping, deterioration of facilities, improper maintenance and 
inadequate operational practices. Kraus and Watson also add to these four factors 
management and organisational interaction and support, FOD awareness, FOD training, 
and FOD audits and inspection. Other classifications of FO into FO type (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010b), or the size of FO objects (McCreary, 2010) can also be found in 
the literature. 
5.2.4.2 Analytical Methodologies and Data Quality Issues 
Out of the eight documents reviewed, seven provide a compilation of knowledge and 
are not based on an analysis of data. Often, it remains unknown where this knowledge has 
been compiled from (Bachtel, 2010; MBJ Airports, Year not specified; The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2013b; The FOD Control 
Corporation, 2010). Only three documents reference existing literature and FOD standards 
(Kraus and Watson, 2001; National Aerospace FOD Prevention Inc, Year not specified) or 
research studies (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009a). These documents are purely 
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descriptive and contain the sources of FO, elements of FOD control programmes and / or 
available technologies that support FO detection. These mitigation strategies will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.  
Only Prather (2011) reviews the existing literature and contributes to it with a 
stakeholder survey. The study falls into category 2 of the analytical methodologies 
introduced in Figure 47. The author surveys airports as well as technology companies to 
enquire about current FOD management practices and available technologies for FO 
detection and prevention. The results are presented in response frequencies. 
5.2.4.3 Safety Risk Mitigation Strategies 
A successful FOD control programme consists of several components, and the 
literature describes each of these to varying degrees. Although the number of elements 
differs in the literature, they can be summarised into three cornerstones:  
• Prevention 
• Detection / removal (inspection and detection, removal, evaluation, and 
documentation) 
• Support (management support and FOD awareness; training and education). 
FOD prevention is a proactive approach that aims at avoiding FO and measures include 
FOD containers that can be placed at all gates for the collection of debris, magnetic bars 
that can be suspended beneath vehicles to pick up metallic material, and rumble strips that 
dislodge FO from vehicle undercarriages when driving over them (Bachtel, 2010). 
FO detection and removal is a reactive approach. This includes FO inspections, such as 
airfield inspections that are carried out at regular intervals during the day, and FO detection 
equipment, i.e. continuous monitoring systems to assist FO inspections.  
FOD detection technologies include radar-based, electro-optical, and hybrid systems. 
Radar-based systems use radio transmission data as the primary means to detect FO on the 
airport surface. These systems can be stationary or mobile. Stationary radar detection 
systems use sensors located at the runway edge and are able to detect metallic cylindrical 
objects (3 x 3.8 cm) within one kilometre. Mobile radar detection systems are mounted on 
top of vehicles and scan the surface in front of the vehicle when moving.  
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Electro-optical systems use technology and image processing data to detect FO on the 
manoeuvring area. These systems are able to detect objects that measure at least 2 cm at a 
range of up to about 300 m using only ambient lighting.  
Hybrid systems use a combination of radar and electro-optical data as the primary 
means to detect FO on runways and taxiways. Both radar and electro-optical sensors are 
collocated with the runway edge lights, and the system is able to detect objects that 
measure at least 2 cm (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009a).  
After FO has been detected a critical aspect of a FOD control programme is the actual 
removal of the FO as promptly as possible without undue interference with airport 
operations. It is the airport operator’s duty to ensure that this part of the process is 
conducted in the most professional and conscientious way possible. After the FO has been 
removed it needs to be properly documented and analysed. Keeping track of FO(D) events 
(e.g. type of FO and the location where it was found) is vital in order to monitor trends and 
to perform risk analyses. In this way, problem areas can be identified and countermeasures 
developed (Prather, 2011). 
Finally, a FOD control programme needs a support system that encourages both 
preventive and reactive activities. Management support is key for the development of any 
FOD control programme and should encourage a FO(D) awareness and prevention culture 
throughout the organisation. In addition, all operational personnel should receive FO(D) 
prevention and elimination training in order to increase their awareness of the causes and 
effects of FO(D) (Kraus and Watson, 2001). 
 
In summary, the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the FOD-
related literature: 
• FOD occurrences are the subject of the least literature of all the airport surface 
accidents / incidents; 
• The few documents available are published by the industry, with academic 
literature on FOD occurrences entirely lacking; 
• Publications are mostly of a qualitative nature; 
• The causal factors of FOD are largely unexplored with studies only stating FOD 
sources and examples of FOD, and therefore, robust causal factor assessment 
studies are lacking. 
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Overall, FOD is the occurrence type that is addressed least, although the economic 
costs of FOD are high. There are three possible explanations for the lack of research on 
FOD. Either it is not recognised to be as problematic as other occurrence types (e.g. 
excursions / incursions), or it is dealt with at an organisational level and not published; or 
both.  
5.2.5 Wildlife Strikes 
In contrast to FOD occurrences, the literature on wildlife strikes is extensive, and over 
50 studies and documents have been identified that discuss bird and mammal attractants, 
wildlife control programmes and / or the risk to aviation caused by animals. To provide an 
insight into wildlife mitigation and research for airports, 20 documents were chosen and 
reviewed so as to reflect the initiatives of all the relevant aviation stakeholders. In 
particular, major industry initiatives, and papers that reflect the various strands of 
academic research were selected.  
Studies published by all stakeholders that have an interest in wildlife strikes include 
aircraft manufacturers (Airbus, 2004a), airports (Dao-De, et al., 2010), airport associations 
(Australian Airports Association, 2005), regulators (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 1991; Maragakis, 2009; Transport Canada, 2002, 2010a; UK Civil Aviation 
Authority, 2008a), accident investigation boards (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 
2008a), industry consortia (Cleary, 2007; International Birdstrike Committee, 2006; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2013a), consultants 
(Nikolaidis and Koloka, 2005), research institutes (Allan, 2006; Dennis and Lyle, 2009; 
Manktelow, 2000), and academia (Fennessy, et al., 2005; Hesse, et al., 2010; Soldatini, et 
al., 2010; Steele, 2001). In addition, several dedicated wildlife strike committees (e.g. Bird 
Strike Committee USA, 2013; Deutscher Ausschuss zur Verhuetung von Vogelschlaegen 
im Luftverkehr e.V., 2013; International Bird Strike Committee, 2013) share their 
knowledge with the aim of reducing occurrences involving wildlife. 
The reviewed documents confirm the disagreement in regard to definitions (see section 
4.5.5). Studies refer either to bird strikes only, to wildlife in general, or to ‘bird strikes’ that 
misleadingly include mammals as well as birds. The reviewed studies were published 
worldwide, including North America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia and are shown in 
overview in Appendix II Table 4. 
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5.2.5.1 Causal Factors 
As with FO, for wildlife strikes it is often not possible to identify their direct cause, and 
therefore, most studies refer to wildlife attractants (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2008a), 
risk factors (Soldatini, et al., 2010), variables affecting the incidence of strikes (Steele, 
2001), or circumstantial factors (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008a).; these are 
factors that contribute to the presence of wildlife at airports, i.e. increase their likelihood, 
or define the circumstances under which wildlife strikes occur. These factors are referred 
to as contributing factors throughout this thesis. Overall, the factors discussed above can 
be grouped into eight categories, which include bird and mammal attractants inside the 
airport as well as outside of it. Table 20 summarises the factors identified in 15 of the 
documents that contained contributing factors.  
The most common wildlife attractants mentioned in the literature are shelter and food 
and water sources. Food sources include mice, insects, earthworms, snails, slugs, spiders, 
trees and bushes with fruits and berries, and waste from in-flight or terminal catering areas. 
Open standing water and other water sources include open drainage ditches, ponds and wet 
and waterlogged grass. Shelter can be found in buildings and building structures with 
access holes, hangars, radar towers, as well as in trees and bushes, grass and wooded 
zones. Sources of food, water and shelter outside the airport can likewise attract wildlife. 
The nature of the land use surrounding the airport can also serve to attract wildlife, such as 
coastal areas, moorlands, landfill sites, sewage treatment and disposal facilities, parks and 
picnic areas, reservoirs, lakes and ponds, and agricultural attractants (e.g. crops, livestock). 
Next to food, water and shelter, seasonal and temporal factors (e.g. month, time of the day 
/ visibility, and migration paths of birds), weather (e.g. rainfall and wind) and temperature 
all influence the presence of wildlife at airports. Finally, flight operations (e.g. phase of 
flight, aircraft speed) and airport operational factors (e.g. tranquillity, presence of humans, 
machines and equipment) have been identified in the literature as circumstantial factors 
and wildlife attractants, respectively. 
These eight categories are consistently mentioned in the literature and appear to be 
relevant throughout the different regions of the world. In fact, they were for the most part 
already identified in the early study of Laty (1982) and are still valid today. !
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Table 20: High-level causal factors for wildlife strikes 
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5.2.5.2 Analytical Methodologies and Data Quality Issues 
Five of the reviewed documents are not based on data and are purely descriptive. 
These, therefore, fall into category 1 of the analytical methodologies that were introduced 
in Figure 47. They describe bird / mammal attractants (Laty, 1982), give recommendations 
for wildlife control (Australian Airports Association, 2005; International Birdstrike 
Committee, 2006), or in some cases even both (The European Organisation for the Safety 
of Air Navigation SKYbrary, 2013a; UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2008a).  
The majority of the analysed studies fall into category 2 of the analytical 
methodologies, i.e. studies that are based upon data but which do not go beyond 
descriptive statistical analysis. These studies use historical wildlife strike data or 
observations and bird counts at airports to analyse wildlife strike trends (Fennessy, et al., 
2005; Maragakis, 2009), identify circumstantial and risk factors (Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau, 2008a), or determine the damage wildlife can cause to aircraft (Airbus, 
2004a; Dennis and Lyle, 2009). Some studies also provide recommendations for wildlife 
control and management based upon their results (Hesse, et al., 2010; International Civil 
Aviation Organization, 1991; Nikolaidis and Koloka, 2005; Transport Canada, 2002, 
2010a). 
Rarely, studies go beyond descriptive statistics and use statistical analyses to identify 
the circumstances under which wildlife strikes occur. For instance, Manktelow (2000) and 
Steele (2001) use statistical associations to analyse the influence of weather (e.g. rainfall, 
temperature) on the occurrences of bird strikes.  
Statistical analysis is also used to model the risk associated with wildlife strikes. Allan 
(2006) determines the bird strike risk per bird species at UK airports by estimating the 
strike probability and severity (i.e. safety risk) based on historical strike data. However, 
Fennessy, et al. (2005), showed that the profile of strikes does not closely reflect the 
profile of species present at the airport. Therefore, risk assessments should also take into 
account historical data regarding the risk imposed by birds that are present at an airport 
even if they have not yet been involved in a strike. On the other hand, Dao-De, et al. 
(2010) model the threat of birds to aircraft using observations and bird counts. The authors 
defined 11 risk factors (e.g. bird encounter frequency, population size, residence time) and 
recorded and scored these factors during observations. A risk value was then calculated for 
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each species as the product of the scores of the bird strike risk factors. Subsequently, the 
birds were divided into prevention groups by different risk levels using hierarchical cluster 
analysis. By this means, the authors considered the risk to aviation that is imposed by the 
presence of birds at an airport and their behaviour. A similar approach was adopted by 
Soldatini, et al. (2010), who develop a bird strike risk index (BRI) that describes the risk 
for an airport on the basis of the actual presence of birds. Future research should explore 
the benefits of combining these different approaches. 
Another strand of research is concerned with wildlife damage modelling on 
aeronautical structures in order to improve aeronautical composite structures and to verify 
certification requirements (Ivancevic and Smojver, 2011; Smojver and Ivancevic, 2010, 
2012). Since the focus of this thesis is on the determination of causal factors and their 
mitigation these studies were not reviewed in detail. 
 
Among the 20 documents and studies reviewed only Transport Canada (2010a) 
acknowledges data quality, evaluating their underlying dataset as underreported. The 
absence of discussions on the quality of wildlife strike reporting raises questions about the 
reporting level and quality of data about reported strikes.  
5.2.5.3 Safety Risk Mitigation Strategies 
In order to mitigate wildlife strikes each airport should develop and implement a 
wildlife management programme. Wildlife management and control programmes are based 
on four pillars. The primary objective is to deter wildlife from the airport and its vicinity. 
This includes, in the first instance, the identification and removal of wildlife attractants 
through habitant management and fencing. Habitant management refers to activities aimed 
at removing wildlife attractants, reducing them in quantity, or denying access to them, such 
as vegetation modification, removal of trees and bushes, installation of drainage, and the 
use of netting to exclude wildlife from water bodies and from buildings. If wildlife enters 
the airport effective wildlife control requires that birds / mammals are dispersed as soon as 
possible through e.g. visual methods (e.g. lasers, “eyes”, fake predators) or acoustic 
methods (e.g. radio controlled sound generators, cannons, bangers, pyrotechnic pistols). 
After exclusion or repellent methods have been exhausted wildlife needs to be removed. 
Lethal methods include poisoning, trapping, falconry, and sharp shooting (Dragonas, 2012; 
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Hesse, et al., 2010; International Birdstrike Committee, 2006). It is important that wildlife 
control does not stop within the boundaries of the airport, but is extended to its vicinity, i.e. 
13 km from the aerodrome reference point, so as to ensure the safe approach and ascent of 
aircraft (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2008a). Finally, effective wildlife management 
requires the reporting of wildlife and wildlife strikes and their analysis.  
 
In summary, the following conclusions are drawn from the research to date on wildlife 
strike analysis and prevention: 
• The threat of wildlife to aviation is addressed by all relevant stakeholders from the 
industry as well as by academic research; 
• The majority of published studies focus on bird strikes rather than wildlife in 
general; 
• Wildlife attractants and circumstantial factors have not changed over time and are 
acknowledged worldwide; 
• Two types of data collection methods have been identified for wildlife: historical 
strike data, and observations and bird counts, but these have only been used in 
isolation; 
• The majority of studies are purely descriptive or are based on qualitative data 
analyses (e.g. frequency analysis); 
• Data quality is typically not addressed, and therefore questions concerning the 
appropriateness of wildlife data and the level of reporting have been raised. 
5.2.6 Initial Taxonomy of Causal Factors Underlying Airport Surface Safety 
Occurrences 
The factors identified in the literature are summarised in an initial taxonomy that 
describes the causes and contributors underlying all airport surface safety occurrence 
types. A total of 350 factors were identified based on 65 relevant reports and used to 
construct this initial taxonomy. The factors can be classified into human, technical, airport 
design, environmental and regulatory factors, and are shown in Figure 50.  
The following section analyses whether taxonomies exist to adequately describe the 
context of airport surface safety by capturing the entirety of the factors introduced above. !
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Figure 50: Causal factors identified through literature search 
5.2.7 Taxonomies 
A taxonomy is “a scheme of classification” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013) and, in 
particular, within the context of this research, a classification of causal factors of airport 
surface accidents and incidents. Taxonomies provide terminology for the subject matter 
and a framework for research, and are often used to systematise safety data according to 
pre-defined codes (Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b, 2009; Es, 2005; The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 2010d). Each causal factor within 
the taxonomy is thereby assigned a number (code). The descriptive narrative of occurrence 
reports is analysed and once a cause is identified from the data, the particular code is 
assigned to the occurrence. Coding the data allows for subsequent statistical analysis.  
The literature is inconsistent concerning the terminology. Whereas some studies refer 
to the term taxonomy (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006a; UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2008b), others propose classifications of causal factors (Flight Safety 
Foundation, 2009), or data coding forms (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007; 
Khatwa and Helmreich, 1999). Essentially, however, these terms each refer to the same 
thing, i.e. a classification scheme. Table 21 summarises the major existing taxonomies and 
classification schemes, their advantages and limitations, as well as their scope and 
potential for application to surface safety occurrences. 
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Table 21: Taxonomies 
 
Reference 
 
Potential application 
 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
ADREP Common Taxonomy 
(International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2006a) 
! Generic aviation ! Global ICAO standard 
! Contains event types, descriptive and 
explanatory factors in a great level of 
detail  
 
! Designed for generic aviation safety 
occurrences 
! It captures many factors that do not 
apply for the investigation of surface 
safety occurrences and would therefore 
overcomplicate any analysis 
! Too comprehensive and detailed, e.g. 
causal factors that are hard to capture 
during an incident investigation are 
included (e.g. personality factors) 
CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team 
(CICTT) Aviation Occurrence 
Categories  
(Commercial Aviation Safety Team / 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
Common Taxonomy Team, 2008a) 
! Generic aviation ! Large-scale international effort to 
develop common taxonomies for 
aviation accident and incident reporting 
systems 
! Global standard as it is incorporated in 
other international taxonomies (e.g. 
ICAO ADREP, FAA Aviation Safety 
Information Analysis and Sharing 
(ASIAS)) 
! Limited to standard aviation 
definitions, causal factors are not 
included  
Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS)  
(National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 2010) 
! Generic aviation ! Event types and their contributing 
factors 
 
! Contributing factors to events lack an 
appropriate level of detail and are 
given in too broad categories (e.g. 
‘equipment’, ‘human factors’) 
Accident Analysis Group (AAG) 
Taxonomy  
(UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2008b) 
! Excursions and collisions ! Reasonable classification 
! Taxonomy differentiates between 
causal and circumstantial factors 
! Developed based on a study of 
worldwide fatal accidents, no incidents 
were considered 
! Wildlife strikes and FOD are not 
considered as possible consequences of 
an accident 
! Not encompassing enough as factors 
such as e.g. ‘communication’ are 
missing 
Approach-and-Landing Accident Coding ! Excursions and runway collisions ! Reasonable classification ! It includes factors that do not apply to 
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Form  
(Khatwa and Helmreich, 1999) 
! Taxonomy differentiated between 
causal and circumstantial factors 
the scope of this research as it 
considers approach-and-landing-
occurrences 
! Developed based on a study of 
accidents, no incidents were considered 
Approach-and-Landing Accident 
Reduction (ALAR) Tool Kit 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2000) 
! Excursions ! Reasonable classification ! Only applicable for excursions 
! Reasonable categories are proposed, 
but the tool kit fails to specify them in 
detail 
! The category of ‘system factors’ seems 
to be too broad 
Common Risk Factors in Runway 
Excursion Events  
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2009) 
! Excursions ! Latest industry effort for excursions 
! Reasonable classification with detailed 
causal factors 
! Developed based on a study of 
accidents, no incidents were considered 
! Only applicable for excursions 
! The category of ‘system factors’ seems 
to be too broad 
Risk Analysis Tool (RAT)  
(The European Organisation for the 
Safety of Air Navigation, 2011b) 
! Collisions  ! Latest industry effort for collisions 
! Reasonable classification 
! Fully compliant with ADREP 
! Only applicable for collisions and 
incursions 
! Takes on an ATM perspective and 
therefore factors for e.g. airport 
operations (e.g. vehicle driver / 
pedestrian) are missing 
Runway Incursion Causal Factors 
Identification Form 
(International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007) 
! Runway incursions ! Comprehensive coding form for the 
causal factors that underlie runway 
incursions 
! Reasonable classification 
! Only applicable for runway incursions 
! Focuses mainly on human factors, 
system factors such as e.g. weather are 
missing !!
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Generic aviation taxonomies, such as the ICAO ADREP system, whilst very detailed, 
are inappropriate for this research. ADREP comprises causal factors for all aviation safety 
occurrences and hence, contains numerous aspects that do not apply to the scope of this 
research and thereby would complicate an analysis of surface safety data. 
Classification schemes for single occurrence types suffer from the same limitations as 
highlighted in the previous sections. Firstly, their scope is limited towards the 
consideration of one occurrence type. In addition, the majority of approaches suffer from 
focusing only on runway-related occurrences. Taxonomies for the causal factors of wildlife 
strikes and FOD are missing entirely. Secondly, these classification schemes have been 
developed primarily using just one research method. For instance, the FSF taxonomy 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2009) is based on an analysis of accident data, and the ICAO 
coding form (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007) on a consensus of subject 
matter expertise. Furthermore, these classification schemes fail to capture the different 
perspectives of the stakeholders involved in surface safety occurrences. 
In addition to a theoretical review, the most promising single occurrence taxonomies 
for incursions and excursions that seemed most promising were tested to assess their fit to 
a real data set and their applicability for data analysis. The taxonomies chosen were the 
ICAO Runway Incursion Causal Factors Identification Form (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007) and the FSF Common Risk Factors in Runway Excursion Events 
(Flight Safety Foundation, 2009). The ICAO runway incursion classification scheme was 
chosen, since the literature review identified it to be the most comprehensive scheme for 
incursions, with the best classification structure. It contains communication, pilot, ATC 
and V/PD factor as well as factors related to the airport physical infrastructure and 
regulations, which have been identified as the main drivers to incursions in section 5.2.2.1. 
If the coding form is well developed, it should be applicable to any data set that is 
collected from a country that follows ICAO regulations and applies its definitions.  
To test it, a data set from a representative European ANSP in compliance with ICAO 
regulations and definitions was collected. For sensitivity reasons the identity of the 
organisation cannot be not revealed. Structured communications with a senior SMEs from 
EUROCONTROL confirmed that the organisation is known in the industry for a good 
safety culture and thus the data has been evaluated as reliable (Structured communication 
with EUROCONTROL Head of Safaty Unit and Retired EUROCONTROL Head of Safety 
Regulations, 2010). 
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The data was coded using the classification scheme and the coding form appeared 
inadequate. One example will highlight this. The factor ‘pilot did not contact the ATC in 
the first instance’ was analysed from the data and refers to a situation where an aircraft did 
not initiate any contact to ATC and started moving on the manoeuvring area. In the ICAO 
coding form, causal factors refer to those that can occur after a contact between an aircraft 
and ATC was initiated, such as communication problems, misunderstanding or the misuse 
of clearances. However, the ICAO coding form does not account for a case when no initial 
contact was established between the aircraft and ATC. This example indicates that the 
ICAO coding form is incomplete and does not capture all causal factors that underlie 
airport surface accidents and incidents. In addition, it refers to runway incursions only and 
fails to capture taxiway occurrences. An explanation for the lack of fit between the ICAO 
coding form and the incident database could be that ICAO developed the causal factors 
based upon a consensus of subject matter experts, though without an analysis of real data. 
This highlights that a single analysis method on its own is inadequate to develop a 
taxonomy. 
 Similar conclusions were drawn when testing the Flight Safety Foundation (2009) 
classification scheme of causal factors underlying excursion accidents against a real data 
set. The classification was used to code a dataset of excursions captured by the FAA 
Accident and Incident Data System (AIDS). The AIDS database is publically available and 
contains incident data for all occurrence categories of civil aviation and will be introduced 
in more in detail in Chapter 6 section 6.6.2.  For excursions, the FSF taxonomy was chosen 
for a trial data analysis, as it is the latest industry effort developed on a global basis and 
seems to be the most encompassing classification scheme among those involving 
excursion, i.e. the classification scheme captured the causal factors underlying excursions 
identified in section 5.2.3.1 best. The FSF defines an excursion as either a veer-off or an 
overshoot. The AIDS database captures veer-offs, overshoots and undershoots. As 
undershoots were not considered in the FSF analysis those occurrences were excluded 
from the trial. Again, not all critical factors found in the data could be assigned to a factor 
from the taxonomy. 
In summary, the commonly practiced piecemeal approach fails to capture the full 
context of causal factors. In addition, the lack of an appropriate taxonomy for the causal 
factors of surface safety occurrences inhibits high quality research in safety.  
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5.2.8 Summary of Findings on Surface Safety Modelling 
The two main findings from the review of the literature on surface safety modelling are 
the following. Firstly, studies analyse single accident / incident types and no research 
exists that examines surface safety in an integrated manner. A holistic approach would 
enable the interactions between the occurrence types to be considered. Secondly, studies 
typically reflect the perspective of individual stakeholders (e.g. analysis of regulatory data, 
interviews with pilots only). Approaches that combine the complementary views of the 
relevant stakeholders do not exist. 
In addition, the following limitations were identified in the literature: 
• Aviation stakeholder address the occurrence types that lie within their sphere of 
interest and responsibility (e.g. ATC has no immediate interest in FOD, it is the 
airport operator’s responsibility and in the airline’s interest to keep the surface 
FOD free); 
• There is a strong focus on runway-related occurrences only; 
• Analyses are based upon insufficient and misleading definitions; 
• Causal factor analyses capture the factors mainly from the perspective of one party 
involved in surface safety occurrences (e.g. regulator, pilot, ANSP, airport 
operator). These studies fail to provide an overview of the causal factors from the 
perspective of all aviation stakeholders involved in the subject matter; 
• Studies mainly apply one research method to determine the causal factors (e.g. data 
analysis, interviews, case studies), but lack combined approaches that would enable 
a more complete picture of the subject matter; 
• Analyses of causal factors that are based on safety data lack often a clear and 
scientifically rigorous methodology concerning how the causal factors have been 
extracted; 
• The majority of causal factor analyses are of a qualitative nature and do not go 
beyond descriptive statistical analysis; 
• The identification of causal factors is not accompanied by information such as 
geographical distributions, factor combinations and interactions; 
• Data quality is rarely addressed in the context of airport surface safety; 
• No research has questioned the accuracy of the data; 
• The industry lacks integrated databases; 
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• Databases with potentially differing qualities are aggregated; 
• Underreporting for some data sources (e.g. wildlife) has been indicated; 
• The literature lacks robust statistical modelling of causal factors (e.g. the functional 
relationship between causal factors and severity of occurrences) to identify the 
most critical causes in order to guide risk mitigation efforts more effectively; 
• There are no taxonomies of causal factors covering the various elements of airport 
surface safety. Generic aviation taxonomies are detailed and consider all types of 
aviation safety occurrences and thus contain many aspects that do not apply to 
surface safety and would overcomplicate the analysis. Classification schemes for 
single occurrence types exist only for incursions and excursions. On the basis of 
their methodology, these schemes were evaluated as insufficiently detailed to cover 
the causal factor from all perspectives. 
To conclude, there is a need for a holistic (integrated) approach to airport surface 
safety. To date the safety of the airport surface system has been considered both adhoc and 
piecemeal (i.e. consideration of single occurrence types from the viewpoint of individual 
stakeholders). This is a matter of concern since, as Chapter 3 has shown, the system relies 
on the input of various stakeholders and cannot function without their cooperation. 
Overall, the piecemeal approach that characterises airport surface safety violates the 
principles of SMS, in which it is recognised that the whole system (i.e. all components and 
their interactions) should be assessed for hazards. That runway safety is a multidisciplinary 
problem and requires the cooperation of stakeholders has also been acknowledged by the 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2011c), however, the literature review 
conducted here has shown that, so far, little effort has been put into the realization of this 
aspiration.  
Based on the problems associated with the scope of analysis, definitions, data and 
taxonomies it can be concluded that essential fundamentals of SMS and operational safety 
risk management are missing. This thesis, therefore, addresses the four components of 
SMS and recommends major enhancements as outlined below. 
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5.3 A Holistic Approach Towards Surface Safety 
The industry currently lacks tools and guidelines for a robust airport SMS. To begin to 
address these omissions, the following research requirements have been derived from the 
findings of Chapters 2 to 5: 
• Integrated safety assessment of the airport surface system through: 
o Consideration of all airport surface safety occurrence types (on runways and 
taxiways), and 
o Consideration of all components and relevant stakeholders of the system 
and their interactions; 
• Qualitative and quantitative assessment of the relationship between causal factors 
and airport surface safety occurrences; 
• Combination of different research methods to explore the causal factors in depth; 
• Utilisation of the new definitions proposed in the previous chapter to ensure the 
consideration of all aspects of surface safety; 
• Utilisation of data from organisations that actively promote safety and reporting 
(SMS requires a data-driven approach and the central role of safety data also 
emerged during the literature review); and 
• Assessment of data quality to ensure a high quality of safety data. 
To overcome the limitations of previous research this thesis proposes a framework for 
an integrated assessment of airport surface operations that supports the four cornerstones 
of SMS. In particular, a holistic model of airport surface safety is developed and Figure 51 
outlines the research and its contributions to SMS. 
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Figure 51: Research outline !
Unlike current airport surface safety management practices, the proposed model 
assesses the safety of the operations of all relevant actors. A system architecture, which 
describes the tasks and interactions of the stakeholders and the physical airport surface 
infrastructure, has already been developed in Chapter 3. This forms an initial baseline 
model that will guide the further development of the proposed SMS.  
To manage the safety of surface operations, however, the causes of accidents and 
incidents must be identified and their impacts understood. To this end, Chapter 6 collects a 
reference data set that combines twelve databases from airlines, airport operators, ANSPs, 
ground handling companies and regulators. Prior to its analysis, the data is assessed for its 
quality, and in particular, for its internal validity (i.e. precision), external validity (i.e. 
accuracy) and in terms of reporting levels. A novel external data validation framework is 
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developed and each database is rated with a data quality index (DQI). In addition, 
recommendations for reporting systems and safety policies are given. The causal factors 
are subsequently extracted from the data by analysing the descriptive narrative of each 
occurrence report. Afterwards, the databases are compared across stakeholders and the 
contributions of the individual actors are highlighted (Chapters 7 and 8). The analysis is 
complemented by interviews, observations and statistical analysis, and the results are 
summarised in a new taxonomy (Chapter 9). This taxonomy is applicable to all relevant 
stakeholders and is recommended for their operational safety risk management. In 
addition, the findings from the analysis of causal factors are used to refine the initial 
baseline model and to update the airport surface system architecture.  
After the airport surface operations have been modelled and the drivers to safety 
identified, the results are combined, resulting in a macroscopic scenario tool which 
supports the management of change (i.e. safety assurance), training and education, and 
safety communication (i.e. safety promotion) functions of SMS (Chapter 9). Finally, a 
structured framework to assess the functional relationship between airport surface 
accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors is proposed and the system is 
quantified in terms of safety (Chapter 11). The relevant data is collected through an 
airports survey (Chapter 10). Overall, the holistic approach to surface safety allows 
resources to be directed more effectively towards the development of robust solutions for 
airport surface safety analysis and mitigation. 
5.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an integrated state-of-the-art review regarding the current status 
of airport surface safety analysis and risk mitigation. It identified the limitations in regards 
to causal factor and airport surface safety research in terms of analysis scope, data, 
methodologies, and taxonomies, and highlighted the lack of, and need for, an integrated 
approach. In addition, an initial taxonomy of the causal factors that underlie airport surface 
safety occurrences has been developed. Based upon the findings from Chapters 2 to 5 
research requirements have finally been derived and a framework for an integrated 
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assessment of airport surface operations proposed and outlined. In so doing, this chapter 
has fulfilled the third research objective. 
The next chapter discusses the specification and execution of a data capture scheme, 
for the analysis of the safety of the airport surface system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 Data Collection and Validation 
! "##!
6 Data Collection and Validation 
Chapter 5 identified the limitations of previous research, including the limited scope of 
airport surface safety analysis, and the use of insufficient data and methodologies. This 
chapter addresses these limitations by developing a scheme for the collection of a reference 
dataset, and a framework for the assessment of the quality (i.e. validation) of data. The 
validated data are analysed to determine the causes of accidents and incidents (i.e. causal 
factors).  
This chapter is organised in nine sections. The first derives the data requirements from 
the findings of the previous chapters. The requirements are used in the second section to 
develop a data collection strategy. The third section discusses data availability and data 
collection methods. A summary of the collected data is given in the fourth section, and the 
quality assessment (validation) is dealt with in the fifth section. In particular, the data is 
analysed for its internal validity (i.e. precision), external validity (i.e. accuracy), and in 
terms of reporting levels. A novel external data validation framework is developed and 
each database is rated with a data quality index (DQI). The sixth section introduces the 
databases and describes data pre-processing. The seventh section presents the analysis of 
the data to determine causes of accidents and incidents, and the results are used to refine 
the initial taxonomy based on the literature. The ninth section concludes the chapter.  
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6.1 Data Requirements 
Table 22 presents the requirements for safety data, derived from the findings of 
Chapters 2 to 5. 
!
Table 22: Data requirements 
 
Findings 
 
 
Data requirements 
 
Chapter 2 – Airport system 
 
• The implementation of the airport architecture 
is variable in regards to: $ Physical infrastructure $ Stakeholders $ Stakeholder responsibilities (i.e. 
operations) 
• Large variety of airports, including: $ Airports of different size in terms of 
physical infrastructure and performance 
(e.g. movements, passenger boardings);  $ Representation of different national 
airport systems 
 
Chapter 3 – Airport surface operations 
 
• Airport surface infrastructure is variable • Representation of diverse airport surface 
infrastructures 
• Coordination and interaction of multiple 
stakeholders on the airport surface 
• Dynamic behaviour of actors 
• Data that contains the statements of all 
stakeholders directly (e.g. those involved) and 
indirectly (e.g. witnesses) involved in any 
occurrence 
• Five main stakeholders are primarily involved 
in airport surface operations 
• Ground handling has the potential to infringe 
onto the airport surface  
• Safety data from the main stakeholders: $ Airport authorities $ Airlines $ Ground handling companies $ ANSPs $ Regulators 
• Variability of stakeholder operations (e.g. 
seasonal requirements) 
• Representation of different airport locations 
(i.e. landscapes) and external conditions (i.e. 
meteorological conditions) 
• Surface operations can be affected by 
temporal effects 
• Data covering at least three years of operations 
to establish trends 
• Complexity of the airport surface and its 
operations (i.e. potential of failures within the 
process of normal operations) 
• Collection of all occurrences (i.e. including 
occurrences with no direct safety impact) 
 
Chapter 4 – Airport safety management 
 
• Importance of safety culture • Data from countries and organisations known 
for a good safety culture to ensure a high 
quality of the data 
 
Chapter 5 – Airport Safety Modelling 
 
• Focus of previous research on single 
occurrence types 
• Data for all considered occurrence types (i.e. 
collisions / incursions, excursions, FOD, 
wildlife strikes) 
• Consideration of single perspectives of 
aviation stakeholders in previous research 
• Data representing the perspectives of all 
relevant aviation stakeholders  
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6.2 Data Selection 
The highest priority for selecting safety data is quality. This is because of the direct 
relationship between statistical modelling accuracy and the quality of the data used. 
Research has shown that safety culture (defined as “the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes perceptions, competencies and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to and the style and proficiency of an organisation’s health and safety 
management” (Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations, 1993)) is the 
basis for successful Safety Management Systems (SMS) (Choudhry, et al., 2007). 
Therefore, countries and organisations with a good safety culture are also likely to be a 
good source of good quality data. In addition, the selected data should be representative in 
terms of global air traffic (i.e. traffic volume). The aim overall, therefore, is to identify 
relevant countries in terms of air traffic, known for a good safety culture, that fulfil the 
data requirements in Table 22. 
6.2.1 Traffic Statistics 
Figures 52 and 53 show the forecast for global air traffic from Airbus and Boeing 
respectively. Figure 52 shows the global market forecast and compares revenue passenger 
kilometres (RPK) for 2010 with the predicted RPK for 2030. The three dominant regions 
in 2010 are Asia-Pacific (28.0% of 2010 world RPK), followed by Europe and North 
America (both 27.0% of 2010 world RPK). A significant growth is predicted over the next 
20 years (Airbus, 2011). 
The forecast from Boeing in Figure 53 shows a prediction of the aircraft market for 
2031 compared to 2011. In 2011 North America dominated the market with a fleet of 
6,650 aircraft, followed by the Asia-Pacific region (fleet of 4,710) and Europe (fleet of 
4,440). All three regions are predicted to experience a significant growth of at least 25.0%. 
North America’s fleet is expected to increase by over 30.0%, Europe’s to almost double, 
and the Asia-Pacific region to more than triple its fleet by 2031 (Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, 2012a). 
Both studies agree that the three dominant regions in terms of global air traffic are 
North America, Europe and Asia-Pacific, both currently and in the future. Hence, this 
research will focus on these three regions. 
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               Source: Airbus (2011)              
Figure 52: Global air traffic forecast 2010-2030 – revenue passenger kilometres !
!!!!!!!! !
               Source: Boeing Commercial Airplanes (2012a) 
Figure 53:  Global air traffic forecast 2011-2031 – aircraft fleets 
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6.2.2 Subject Matter Expert Consultation 
In order to identify countries within North America, Europe and the Asia-Pacific 
region that are known in the aviation industry for a good safety culture, Subject Matter 
Experts (SMEs) from EUROCONTROL and the FAA were consulted. EUROCONTROL 
was chosen because of its commitment to ATM safety enhancements through its 
involvement in research and facilitation of safety related rule-making and formulation of 
regulations in European aviation. Similarly, the FAA is the regulatory body responsible to 
ensure safe and efficient operations in the U.S., the busiest country in terms of surface 
operations in North America. Senior experts in aviation safety with a minimum of 15 years 
of international experience were selected for consultation. The following experts were 
consulted: 
• The FAA’s Runway Safety Program Manager; 
• EUROCONTROL’s Head of Safety Unit; 
• EUROCONTROL’s Head of Safety Regulation (retired); 
• EUROCONTROL’s Senior Safety Expert.  
The initial consultation resulted in inclusion of the United States in the analysis. This is 
because the U.S. accounted for 787 billion revenue passenger miles (RPM) (!1,266 
billion RPK) in 2010 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011e) to form the largest air 
traffic market in North America. In addition, the FAA actively promotes safety. 
 Furthermore, in Europe, Scandinavian countries were in particular recommended for 
their safety culture and efforts to promote reporting. In addition, the consultation 
determined that Asian data should be excluded since most Asian countries still execute a 
punitive culture, i.e. a culture in which “those involved in occurrences are fearful of 
management or regulatory authority” (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2008). It 
was advised to include Oceania, which promotes a positive safety culture, instead 
(Structured communication with EUROCONTROL Head of Safety Unit, 2010; 
EUROCONTROL Senior Safety Expert, March 2010; FAA Runway Safety Program 
Manager, January 2010; Retired EUROCONTROL Head of Safety Regulation, December 
2009). This was confirmed by the Assistant Director of one of Asia’s major airports!, 
pointing out that the punitive culture leads to incorrect reporting (Structured 
communication with the Assistant Director of one of Asia's Top 10 airports, June 2010).  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In 2012, the airport was among the top 10 busiest airports in Asia by passenger traffic per year 
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Based on the consultation results, and the focus on good quality data, this thesis 
excludes the Asian market despite its significance in terms of global air traffic. Clearly, 
future research should include Asia once the concept of a just culture has been established 
in this region.  
6.2.3 Matching the Data Requirements 
This section uses the data requirements in Table 22 and the results of the consultation 
of SMEs to select the case studies used in this thesis. An assessment of countries in North 
America, Europe, and Oceania led to the selection of four countries: United States (U.S.), 
United Kingdom (UK), Norway (NO), and New Zealand (NZ). 
6.2.3.1 United States  
The U.S. is a vast country that encompasses an area of almost 10 million km2 and is the 
home of more than 314 million people. The national air traffic system is characterised by 
diverse airport infrastructures, including (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009b):  
• Large hubs: airports with 1.0% or more passenger boardings,  
• Primary nonhubs: airports with more than 10,000 but less than 0.05% annual 
passenger boardings, 
• Nonprimary nonhubs: airports with at least 2,500 and no more than 10,000 annual 
boardings, and 
• Reliever airports designated by the FAA to relieve congestion at commercial 
service airports and to provide improved general aviation access to the overall 
community. 
The U.S. handles a mix of international and domestic (i.e. regional) traffic. Its airspace 
is a combination of very high traffic density (e.g. New England4 with major hubs receiving 
traffic from Europe and distributing it into the mainland) and less busy areas (e.g. 
Northwest Mountain Region5). In addition, the U.S.’s geography is highly variable, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 New England comprises the states of Connecticut (CT), Maine (ME), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire 
(NH), Rhode Island (RI), and Vermont (VT) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2000) 
5 The Northwest Mountain Region comprises Colorado (CO), Idaho (ID), Montana (MT), Oregon (OR), Utah 
(UT), Washington (WA), and Wyoming (WY) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2000)!!
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including mountain ranges in the west, prairies and farmland in the central parts, deserts in 
the south, and coastal areas. Similarly variable is its mix of climate zones, ranging from 
subtropical, or midaltitude desert climates, to alpine and polar climates (United States 
Census Bureau, 2012a, b; United States of America Central Intelligence Agency, 2012c). 
6.2.3.2 United Kingdom  
In Europe, the UK spans an area of some 243,000 km2 and has a population of around 
62 million people (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). The UK combines very dense 
airspace (e.g. London Terminal Area), with medium-sized nonhub airports (e.g. 
Birmingham) and smaller regional airports (e.g. Southampton). According to Eurostat, the 
UK handled 198,532,000 air passengers in 2009. This makes the UK the busiest country in 
Europe (in terms of air passengers) followed by Germany (158,150,000), Spain 
(148,318,000), and France (117,557,000) (European Comission, 2011). In addition, 
London Heathrow is the busiest airport in Europe with 69,433,230 passengers handled in 
2011 (Airports Council International, 2012). The country’s landscape ranges from uphill to 
lowlands and coastland. The maritime climate is influenced by the Atlantic ocean and Gulf 
Stream (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010). 
6.2.3.3 Norway  
As Europe is fragmented in many countries, two case studies were chosen to represent 
this region. Norway is characterised by diverse population centres and large distances 
between these centres. It spans an area of about 325,000 km2 and has a population of five 
million people (Statistisk sentralbyra, 2012). It is part of Scandinavia and is characterised 
by a long and rugged coastline with numerous fjords and small islands. Mountainous 
terrain and valleys in the lowlands dominate large parts of the country. Norway spans 
several climate zones ranging from temperate, alpine and arctic in the north and on the 
mountains, to a continental and coastal climate. Because of Norway’s high latitude there 
are large seasonal variations in daylight (i.e. in summer the sun does not descend beneath 
the horizon and in winter it does not rise above the horizon in the areas north of the Arctic 
Circle) (Statistisk sentralbyra, 2012; United States of America Central Intelligence 
Agency, 2012b). Norway’s only hub airport is Oslo although, in addition, it has three 
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medium-sized airport! (Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger) and a variety of small regional 
airports. Due to the terrain and meteorological conditions, in certain areas, air transport is 
the only means of transportation possible. 
6.2.3.4 New Zealand  
New Zealand ranges over 268,000 km2 and has a population of around 4.4 million. It 
consists of two main islands and a large number of smaller ones. The country has a varied 
topography including glaciers and fjords, mountains, tropical forests and coastline (United 
States of America Central Intelligence Agency, 2012a). Its airport infrastructure is 
characterised by a combination of three main airports (two hubs: Auckland and 
Christchurch, and a major nonhub: Wellington) and a large number of very small regional 
airports. It is typified by a mild and temperate maritime climate. 
6.2.3.5 Data Choice and Quality 
The selected sample of countries allows for the comparison of different operations in 
different countries with diverse underlying air traffic movement characteristics and 
topographies. To validate the quality of data likely to be derived from this choice of 
countries, the ICAO’s Lack of Effective Implementation indicator (LEI) is used. LEI is a 
compliance measure of a state’s safety oversight capabilities. Figure 54 shows the LEI 
against the traffic volume for all States audited under ICAO’s Universal Safety Oversight 
Audit Programme (USOAP). A LEI percentage under 30.0% corresponds to the most 
favourable USOAP result (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009c). The four 
countries selected for this research meet this criterion, each having a LEI below 20.0%.  
"
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Between 57,912 and 103,183 annual civil aircraft movements (Avinor AS, 2012a) 
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     Most favourable – includes States having LEIs of 30.0% or below 
     Moderate – includes States having LEIs between 30.0% and 50.0% 
     Least favourable – includes States having LEI above 50.0%       
     Source: International Civil Aviation Organization (2009c) 
Figure 54: Lack of effective implementation indicator vs. traffic 
6.3 Data Availability and Collection 
In order to achieve the goal of an integrated management of surface safety, a data 
requirement is the representation of all the relevant stakeholders in each country (airport 
authority, airline, ground handling company, ANSP and regulator). This section discusses 
the national data collection systems of the four chosen countries, data availability, and the 
efforts made to collect the required data. As in Chapter 3, V/PD are considered in the form 
of the airport authority and ground handling.  
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6.3.1 United States 
In the U.S., there is no centralised database capturing all safety related occurrences. 
Instead, airport surface accident and incident types are captured in different databases at 
the regulatory level. Currently, the U.S. focuses on the mitigation of incursions and adopts 
associated data collection mechanisms. There is no regulatory requirement to report 
excursions and FOD occurrences, unless they meet the definition of an accident. Wildlife 
strike reporting is voluntary (Structured communication with FAA Runway Safety Office 
Analysts, August 2011). The lack of integrated safety databases and focus on single 
occurrence types corresponds to the limitations identified in the literature review as 
outlined in Chapter 5. 
The FAA Runway Safety Office in Washington, D.C. keeps an internal database of 
incursions that is not publically available. The FAA is the regulatory body in the U.S. and 
provides in addition ATC services for 504 controlled airports (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008b). Hence, the incursion database reflects both, the regulatory and the 
ANSP viewpoint. The airport operators typically report incursions to the FAA and do not 
keep a separate database locally (Structured communication with Airfield Operations 
Manager Boston Logan International Airport; Airfield Operations Manager Manchester 
Boston Regional Airport, September 2011). Excursion and FOD data is publically 
available from the FAA’s Accident / Incident Data System (AIDS). The FAA Wildlife 
Strike Database is likewise publically available. Airlines and ground handling companies 
keep their own safety databases. 
 
The FAA was approached and the internal incursion database from the Runway Safety 
Office obtained. In addition, excursion and FOD data was downloaded from AIDS 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2012a). Since wildlife strike reporting is voluntary in 
the U.S. it cannot be determined what percentage of wildlife strikes is represented in the 
Wildlife Strike Database. Hence, the results of any analysis may be significantly biased 
and it was therefore decided to exclude this data. 
Airports typically do not keep their own databases and report into the FAA system, 
hence, their viewpoint is also reflected in the FAA databases. To obtain airline data two 
U.S.-based airlines were approached, but without success. The airlines, one of the top five 
in terms of passengers and a major low-cost carrier, were chosen because of their positive 
reputation for their safety efforts in the U.S. aviation industry (Structured communication 
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with Airfield Operations Manager Boston Logan International Airport, FAA Regional 
Runway Safety Manager, September 2011). Both stated that they do not share any safety-
related data with third parties (Structured communication with two U.S.-based Airline 
Safety Managers, September 2011). This was confirmed through structured 
communications with the FAA, where senior safety experts confirmed that U.S. airlines do 
not share their internal safety databases (Structured communication with FAA Runway 
Safety Office Analysts, August 2011). To capture the viewpoint of U.S. pilots, interviews 
were conducted and the details are discussed in Chapter 7. Finally, a database from a 
ground handling company, Signature Flight Support (Signature), was obtained under a 
confidentiality agreement. Signature operates at 63 locations in the U.S. including large 
hubs and primary nonhubs and is therefore representative for the U.S. (Signature Flight 
Support, 2011). 
6.3.2 United Kingdom 
The UK’s regulatory body, the UK Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA), keeps a 
centralised database that captures all occurrence types. The ANSPs keep their own safety 
databases. A structured communication with a major UK airport authority revealed that, 
similar to the U.S., they do not keep their own safety databases. Occurrences are reported 
into the regulatory reporting system and no additional data could be obtained from the 
airport authority itself (Structured communication with Head of Policy Standards of a 
major UK airport authority, 2011). Airlines and ground handling companies maintain their 
own reporting systems. 
 
The UKCAA was addressed and its data for all relevant occurrence types obtained 
under a confidentiality agreement. In addition, a major UK ANSP was approached, 
however, a confidentiality agreement could not be signed and therefore no data could be 
gathered and no interviews with their staff were allowed. Likewise in the U.S., the 
viewpoint of the approached major airport authority is reflected in the regulatory database. 
To capture the airline perspective, easyJet plc (easyJet) was approached and its data 
obtained under a confidentiality agreement. easyJet was chosen since it is known in the 
industry for its safety efforts. The search for ground handling data turned out to be 
difficult. Structured communications with two major handling companies revealed that 
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ground handling companies typically collect only data regarding occurrences on the apron 
(e.g. personal injuries, damage of property) (Structured communication with two Safety 
Managers of major ground handling companies in Europe, 2011). Occurrences that involve 
ground handling personnel on the manoeuvring area were said to be collected by the 
ANSP, the airline, or the airport operator, but would not be reported to the handler’s 
database. Finally, access to the data of a U.S.-based ground handling company (Signature) 
was granted: since Signature operates worldwide, their database contains also occurrences 
from major UK airports. 
6.3.3 Norway 
In Norway each stakeholder keeps its own database capturing all occurrence types. 
Confidentiality agreements were signed and safety data obtained from the regulator (Civil 
Aviation Authority – Norway (CAA Norway)), the ANSP (Avinor AS – ANSP Division 
(Avinor ANSP)), the airport authority (Avinor AS – Airports Division (Avinor Airports)) 
and Oslo Lufthavn AS (OSL), as well as two airlines (Norwegian Airshuttle ASA 
(Norwegian) and Widerøe Flyveselskap AS (Widerøe)). According to the SMEs consulted 
from EUROCONTROL, all these organisations have an excellent reputation for their 
safety culture. In Norway, both ANSP and airport authority services are provided by 
Avinor. However, these are managed and operated by different divisions that maintain 
their own safety databases. Avinor’s airports’ division holds the safety data for the airports 
with one exception: Oslo Lufthavn. OSL is a privatised company and maintains its own 
safety data collection system. The search for ground handling data proved to be difficult, 
since ground handling typically does not collect data of occurrences on the manoeuvring 
area. In addition, due to language constraints interviews proved to be difficult. It was 
therefore decided to exclude the ground handling perspective, since the UK data allowed 
already an insight into European handling practices. 
6.3.4 New Zealand 
Similar to Norway, each stakeholder in New Zealand also collects its own safety data. 
Due to resource and time constraints it was not possible to address all the different 
stakeholders within the limits of this research. Nonetheless it was decided to provide an 
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overview on New Zealand’s surface safety occurrences. To do so, the CAA was 
approached. The Civil Aviation Authority New Zealand (CAA NZ) was chosen because 
regulatory bodies typically comprise occurrence reports from all aviation stakeholders.  
 
Table 23 summarises the data collection methods. 
!
Table 23: Data availability and collection 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
United States 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Norway 
 
New Zealand 
Regulator Data Data Data Data 
ANSP Data - Data - 
Airport authority Data* Data* Data - 
Airline Interviews Data Data - 
Ground Handling Data Data - - 
  * Data indirectly available over other stakeholders 
6.4 Data Overview 
Table 24 summarises the collected data. The dataset combines databases from all 
relevant stakeholders in the context of airport surface safety and, in addition, allows for 
multi-national comparisons. With these unique characteristics the collected data overcomes 
the limitations of previous research and serves as a reference data set for the statistical 
analyses in Chapters 7 to 11. 
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Table 24: Data overview 
 
Database 
 
 
Organisation 
 
Stakeholder 
 
United States 
 
FAA Runway Safety Office Runway Incursion 
(RI) Database (Federal Aviation Administration 
Runway Safety Office, 2010) 
Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) 
Regulator & ANSP 
Accident / Incident Data System (AIDS) 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2012a) 
Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) 
Regulator & ANSP 
Safety, Health, Environment, BBA (SHEBBA) 
(Signature Flight Support, 2012) 
Signature Flight 
Support (Signature) 
Ground Handling 
 
United Kingdom 
 
Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme 
(MORS) (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2011b) 
UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (UK CAA) 
Regulator 
Aviation Safety Database (AQD) (easyJet plc, 
2010b) 
easyJet plc (easyjet) Airline 
Safety, Heath, Environment, BBA (SHEBBA) 
(Signature Flight Support, 2012) 
Signature Flight 
Support (Signature) 
Ground Handling 
 
Norway 
 
European Coordination Centre for Accident and 
Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS) (Civil 
Aviation Authority - Norway, 2011) 
Civil Aviation 
Authority – Norway 
(CAA Norway) 
Regulator 
MessageSystem (MESYS) (Avinor AS - ANSP 
Division, 2011) 
Avinor AS – ANSP 
Division (Avinor 
ANSP) 
ANSP Division 
MessageSystem (MESYS) (Avinor AS - 
Airports Division, 2011a, b) 
Avinor AS – Airports 
Division (Avinor 
Airports) 
Airports Division 
Industrial and Financial Systems (IFS) Database 
(Oslo Lufthavn AS, 2011b) 
Oslo Lufthavn AS 
(OSL) 
Airport operator 
Aviation Safety Database (AQD) (Norwegian 
Air Shuttle ASA, 2011a) 
Norwegian Air Shuttle 
ASA (Norwegian) 
Airline 
Sentinel Safety Information Management System 
(Sentinel) (Widerøe Flyveselskap AS, 2012) 
Widerøe Flyveselskap 
AS (Widerøe) 
Airline 
 
New Zealand 
 
Aviation Safety Monitoring System (ASMS) 
(Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, 
2010a) 
Civil Aviation 
Authority of New 
Zealand (CAA NZ) 
Regulator 
 
Before analysing this data, the following sections conduct a thorough data quality 
assessment. 
6.5 Data Quality Assessment 
The quality of data analysis and modelling is dependent on its inputs, i.e. the quality of 
the underlying data sets. In particular, when aggregating safety databases, differences in 
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data quality have to be addressed and corrected, since variable data quality has a negative 
impact on the risk assessment within an organisation (Commercial Aviation Safety Team / 
International Civil Aviation Organization Common Taxonomy Team, 2006). Three aspects 
of data quality should to be considered: external factors (i.e. how accurately does the 
database reflect occurrences), internal factors (i.e. how precise is the data), and the 
reporting level. This section assesses the quality of the safety data and the results are then 
used to decide whether the databases can be aggregated. 
6.5.1 Data Quality Issues 
Chapters 4 and 5 identified the factors that can affect the quality of safety data. The 
main limitations of the literature on data quality are: 
• The scope of the collected data, i.e. which occurrence types are collected and by 
whom. The scope of the reporting system and different underlying definitions can 
lead to differences in the reporting level; 
• The use of insufficient and ambiguous definitions; 
• A lack of a reliable methodology for data analysis (e.g. coding). Data can be biased 
by the analysis that has been performed on it, e.g. through an inappropriate 
taxonomy used for data coding;  
• In most cases, the relevant literature does not specify its data sources in enough 
detail to evaluate its quality; 
• If data from different sources is aggregated, data quality is not taken into account; 
• There is no information on the assessment of the data accuracy. 
 
The impact of data quality is acknowledged in generic as well as aviation research. 
Research on the management of data quality in a variety of industries has identified 
numerous data quality dimensions, including relevance, completeness, consistency, 
interpretability, accuracy, timeliness and accessibility. These dimensions have been cited 
in various published studies relevant to the requirements of good data quality for generic 
systems or for statistical agencies (e.g. Lee, et al., 2006; Wang and Strong, 1996). 
A recent study by Dupuy (2012) addresses data quality issues for aviation safety 
databases by developing a framework for the analysis of loss of separation related 
incidents. Dupuy analyses five safety databases and develops a data quality assessment 
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framework in order to provide an indicator for the suitability of databases for certain types 
of analysis. Based on the analysis of incident data three reasons are highlighted that 
account for data quality concerns: 
1. The reporting scheme, in particular the data collection process and reporting form; 
2. The data coding process and the resulting database structure; and 
3. The reporting level, which refers to two aspects. First, whether everything is 
reported and, second, the relevance and quality of the reported information.  
A study by Van der Schaaf and Kanse (2004) addresses extensively the latter aspect of 
the reporting level. The authors look at the level of reported events involving recovery 
from self-made errors in a study with chemical plant operators, identifying six reasons for 
not reporting (e.g. afraid / ashamed, recovery, no learning). 
In addition to the studies above, data quality issues have been discussed by a range of 
national and multinational organisations. The impact of a just culture on the reporting level 
is addressed for instance by the EUROCONTROL Data Reporting & Data Flow 
(SAFREP) task force (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, 
2008b).  
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) has addressed problems 
with importing data from external data sources. The GAO pointed out the need to obtain 
information from various data sources, the need for standardisation to overcome data 
inconsistencies, and problems associated with data integration (e.g. translating data) and 
data loading (e.g. importing data) (United States Government Accountability Office, 
2010).  
The Commercial Aviation Safety Team / International Civil Aviation Organization 
(CAST/ICAO) Common Taxonomy Team acknowledges problems associated with 
aviation nomenclature (e.g. anomalies in definitions), in particular problems with 
analysing, integrating and sharing data from multiple sources systems. Problems such as 
duplicate or multiple entries are also associated with this (Commercial Aviation Safety 
Team / International Civil Aviation Organization Common Taxonomy Team, 2006). The 
integration of different data systems is further addressed by the Global Aviation 
Information Network (GAIN). GAIN considers data quality to be crucial when 
implementing data sharing systems and stresses the importance of completeness, 
consistency, validity and accuracy for data in such systems (Global Aviation Information 
Network, 2003).  
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The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed safety recommendations 
concerning data quality for transportation safety databases. The identified 
recommendations fall into five groups: the development of a new database to collect data 
that fits to a particular study scope; the modification of existing databases and or reporting 
forms; the improvement of data accuracy, currency, or completeness; addressing the 
problems of underreporting; and the improvement of data analysis and dissemination 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2002).  
The factors mentioned in the literature, as summarised above, can be classified into 
three categories. The first concerns factors relating to the reporting system and its quality 
(i.e. external factors). The second category relates to the quality of the data itself (i.e. 
internal factors). Finally, the importance of the reporting level has been stressed. The 
following sections propose a framework for a holistic data quality assessment that takes all 
three of these dimensions into account. 
6.5.2 Definitions 
Based on the discussion in the section above this research assumes the following 
definitions: 
 
External data validation refers to accuracy, i.e. how accurately the data reflects the 
truth of what happened, or how accurately the reporting and investigation process captures 
any occurrence. 
 
Internal data validation refers to precision, i.e. whether a database has been 
constructed and pre-processed consistently. 
 
The reporting level is determined by the reporting scope, the underlying definitions for 
accident and incident types, and the consistency of the reporting system, i.e. whether the 
reporting scope and definitions changed over time.  
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6.5.3 Data Quality Assessment in Aviation Research 
Although acknowledged in aviation research, previous models for aviation safety fail 
to account for data quality issues. This section focuses particularly on EUROCONTROL’s 
IRP and NLR’s CATS, both of which were discussed in the literature review as models 
which quantify the risk of aviation occurrences. IRP represents the risk of aviation 
accidents with a particular emphasis on ATM contributions, whereas CATS quantifies the 
risk for 33 separate accident scenarios. The IRP makes use of a total of 137 worldwide 
accidents involving large Western commercial jets between 1990 and 2002 as well as a 
selection of incidents involving commercial aircraft between 1998 and 2004 (The 
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation Experimental Centre, 2006). 
NLR’s model, meanwhile, is based on Airclaims and ICAO’s Accident / Incident Data 
Reporting (ADREP) system accident data between 1990 and 2003. In addition, original 
accident investigation reports and other data sources (e.g. Flight Safety Foundation) as 
well as incident reports have also been used where available (Ale, et al., 2009).  
Both models, CATS and IRP, take accident and incident reports into account. As 
introduced in Chapter 4, ICAO Annex 13 requires States to report “information on all 
aircraft accidents which involve aircraft of a maximum certificated take-off mass of over 
2,250 kg” (International Civil Aviation Organization, Year not specified). However, “there 
is no obligation for States to conduct an investigation into an incident” (International Civil 
Aviation Organization, Year not specified). The extent to which incidents are reported is 
therefore up to the individual aviation stakeholders. This implies that both the rates of 
incidents and the quality of incident reports may vary significantly and, therefore, a data 
quality assessment is particularly important when working with incident data and when 
combining data from different sources. In this respect, while both models aggregate multi-
national data from different sources, they do not account for differences in data quality.  
6.5.4 Data Validation Framework 
To address the importance of data quality, this section develops a data validation 
framework in three steps. The objective is to identify differences in data quality between 
the databases. The data quality assessment framework by Dupuy (2012) considers the four 
metrics of relevance, completeness, consistency and accessibility. Thus, it allows 
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assessment of the quality of the data itself (i.e. internal validation). Factors related to ‘trust’ 
(whether the data reflects the truth of what happened) are excluded. 
Dupuy’s framework for internal data validation is applied and the need for an external 
data validation framework justified. A novel external data validation framework is 
subsequently proposed, which assigns a data quality index (DQI) to each database. Finally, 
reporting levels are analysed, prior to the conclusion of whether airport surface safety data 
can be aggregated. Figure 55 outlines the high-level methodology. 
 
 
Figure 55: High-level methodology data quality assessment 
6.5.4.1 Internal Data Validation 
Internal validation refers to precision and does not challenge the accuracy of the data 
(i.e. whether the data reflects the truth of what happened during an occurrence); rather it 
evaluates the quality of the data set for subsequent analysis. Internal validation assesses 
whether the data is good enough for statistical analysis and ultimately whether any 
statistical model based upon the data can predict the data well.  
The following paragraphs check the twelve databases for internal validity using 
Dupuy’s framework (Dupuy, 2012).  
 
• Relevance!
 
Relevance refers to the extent to which information is applicable for the task at hand. It 
refers to the question of how many data fields within a database are relevant for the 
Internal data validation 
Dupuy (2012) 
External data validation Analysis of reporting levels Re-consider data choice 
Data Quality Index (DQI) 
Decision whether the data can be aggregated 
Data internally valid? 
Yes No 
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anticipated analysis. Relevance is measured as the ratio of available variables (i.e. total 
number of variables in a database) to required variables (i.e. data fields useful for the 
anticipated analysis) (Dupuy, 2012).  
The relevance criterion is useful when assessing the quality of a whole database for a 
certain type of analysis. For the purpose of this research specific information on surface 
safety occurrences was requested from the organisations. Thus, most datasets include only 
information relevant to this research (e.g. date, location, descriptive narrative). Only 
Avinor ANSP, Avinor Airports Division, and OSL provided their full databases with 
additional information.  
An assessment for relevance would be biased as the data providers were not asked for 
their full databases. In addition, the relevance of data fields is not of particular interest, as 
this research is not trying to assess which analysis could be done with a database. This 
research analyses the descriptive narrative of accident / incident reports and develops a 
model of airport surface safety based upon it. Hence, it is more important to assess the 
relevance and quality of information given in the narratives. To do so, the quality of the 
underlying reporting system needs to be evaluated. 
 
• Completeness!
 
Data completeness is directly related to the quantity of reported variable values for 
each required data field. It is an indicator of the presence of missing values and is 
measured as the ratio of missing values per required variables (Dupuy, 2012).  
Three variables are important in the context of this research: occurrence date, 
occurrence location (airport), and the descriptive narrative to extract the causal factors. The 
term descriptive narrative refers to the text that describes the occurrence, which can 
originate from different sources (e.g. reporter, investigator, analyst). The completeness 
score (1) is calculated as follows: 
 
Completeness = 100 - arithmetic average of percentage of missing values per variable (1) 
 
Table 25 summarises the results of the completeness assessment for the twelve safety 
databases. 
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Table 25: Completeness of relevant data fields within the occurrence databases 
 
Database 
 
 
Missing data 
‘Date’ 
 
Missing data 
‘Location’ 
 
Missing data 
‘Descriptive 
narrative’ 
 
 
Overall 
completeness 
indicator 
FAA RI database 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
FAA AIDS 0.0% 2.1% 0.0% 99.3% 
Signature SHEBBA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
UK CAA MORS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
easyjet AQD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
CAA Norway ECCAIRS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Avinor ANSP MESYS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Avinor Airports MESYS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
OSL IFS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Norwegian A/S AQD 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
Wideroe Sentinel 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
CAA NZ ASMS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
 
The completeness indicator shows 100.0% completeness for eleven databases. Only the 
FAA AIDS database lacks information concerning the location in 2.1%of cases. A 
descriptive narrative was available for all occurrence reports. Therefore, all databases are 
evaluated as internally complete. However, in practice, when reading the descriptive 
narratives of the different databases, differences become apparent. Some databases, such as 
the FAA RI database, seem to contain high-level descriptions of the occurrences, whereas 
other databases (e.g. airlines) contain more detail as to why an accident / incident occurred. 
Thus, a simple analysis of the existence of a narrative is insufficient. It is more important 
to assess the quality of the narrative, i.e. whether the description is sufficient to describe 
what really happened. For these reasons external data validation is needed. 
 
• Consistency!
 
Data consistency evaluates whether variable values are coherent and compatible with 
one another within their corresponding data field. The principle of consistency is used to 
assess the quality of categorical and numerical data. Consistent data is presented in the 
same format and is compatible with previous data. Consistency can be evaluated based on 
the extent to which the original taxonomy / scale used to create a categorical / numerical 
variable is sufficient. When a fixed number of descriptors is applied to a categorical 
variable over time, or a numerical variable applies a consistent measure (e.g. scale) the 
variable is evaluated as ‘consistent’. When the number of categories is underdetermined 
and / or the values within one variable are not consistent with one another, a variable is 
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rated as ‘inconsistent’. This can be the case, for instance, when descriptors are added over 
the course of time in circumstances where the underlying taxonomy has proved 
insufficient. In addition, it is possible that some data fields lack coding (Dupuy, 2012). 
This research is based on an analysis of the descriptive narrative of occurrences for 
causal factors. This analysis is done by the researcher for each of the databases according 
to the same principles, and hence can be evaluated as consistent. The details on data coding 
will be introduced in section 6.7. In the context of this research it is in addition important 
to consider the consistency of the underlying data, e.g. whether the reporting system, and 
hence the way of collecting the data, changed over time (e.g. underlying definitions), but 
this is a matter of external validation. 
 
• Accessibility!
 
Data accessibility refers to the ease with which the data is obtained. Data can be 
explicitly, implicitly, or it may be inferred. Explicit data refers to data that is provided in 
its final format and is directly accessible in the database (e.g. date, location). Implicit data 
refers to data values that can be derived from another data field or in the descriptive 
narrative (e.g. causal factors extracted through analysis of the descriptive narrative). 
Inferred data values are derived or computed from other reported data values (e.g. the 
phase of flight can be deduced from issued clearance details) (Dupuy, 2012). 
This research is based on implicit data, i.e. the extraction of causal factors from the 
descriptive narrative. This is the case for all of the twelve databases. Thus, there is no 
difference in internal accessibility, and hence quality, between the databases.  
Accessibility is also an important aspect of external validation, however. The 
accessibility of different parts of the reporting system (e.g. original report, investigation 
findings, analyst’s summary) is important when inferring the external quality of the data. 
For instance, if the researcher only has access to a secondary source summary, quality 
information might have got lost during the course of data collection. In addition, it cannot 
be verified whether this summary conforms to the original report.  
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• Discussion!!
In conclusion, the twelve databases are evaluated as internally valid. However, this 
research is heavily reliant on textual information (i.e. descriptive narrative). In this context, 
it has been shown that it is more important to assess the external quality of the data, i.e. 
whether the data reflects the truth of what happened. The following section proposes a 
novel external data validation framework and derives a DQI reflecting differences in 
quality of the underlying reporting systems. 
6.5.4.2 External Data Validation  
External validation refers to accuracy, i.e. how close is the data to the truth, or how 
accurately does the data collection and investigation process (reporting system) capture 
any occurrence. In order to validate the reporting systems underlying the twelve considered 
databases an external data validation framework is proposed.  
 
Methodology!!
The proposed external data validation framework is based on Multi-Criteria Decision 
Analysis (MCDA), which is a technique that supports decision making by simplifying 
complex problems with several options assessed on multiple criteria. Different options 
(alternatives) are evaluated as possible solutions. Depending on the decision problem and 
objective of the study different types of solutions may be required. Some decision 
problems need to identify the best option (choice), or classify alternatives into groups 
(classification). Other problem situations require a ranking of options (ranking) or a simple 
description (description). The options are assessed on criteria, i.e. attributes against which 
the alternatives will be measured. These criteria may have different impacts (weights) to 
the solution (Koen, 2008). 
MCDA follows an 8-step process (Garoufalia, 2007; Hwang and Yoon, 1981): 
1) Definition of the decision context (study objective); 
2) Identification of options; 
3) Identification of criteria on which the options will be assessed; 
4) Scoring of the options on the criteria; 
5) Weighting of criteria according to their relative importance to the decision; 
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6) Aggregation of scores and weights; 
7) Examination of results; and 
8) Sensitivity analysis. 
Different MCDA techniques are available but all follow this 8-step process. However, 
the techniques differ in their aggregation method. Different techniques are also available 
for scoring and weighting. The choice of a technique is dependent on the data input, the 
underlying assumptions and the required output. 
 
• Definition of the decision context (study objective)!
 
The objective is to weight safety databases representing the viewpoints of all relevant 
aviation stakeholders in the context of airport surface safety based on the quality of their 
underlying data collection and investigation processes. 
 
• Identification of options!
 
This research considers twelve safety databases (i.e. options). 
 
• Identification of criteria!
 
Step 3 refers to the identification of criteria by which the twelve options will be 
evaluated. A review of the subject matter literature did not reveal criteria that define the 
quality of the data collection and investigation processes.  
In order to derive the criteria by which to assess the options, an ideal data collection 
and investigation process has been modelled, based upon an understanding of reporting 
systems and official ICAO documentation (e.g. International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2005d, 2009e). The ideal reporting system was validated with a senior safety expert from 
EUROCONTROL (Retired Head of Safety Regulation) who assessed its attributes in a 
systematic manner and commented on their validity. 
a. In an ideal reporting system, any occurrence, including low severity incidents or 
occurrences with no safety impact, are reported immediately after the accident / incident 
occurred. 
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b. The occurrence should be reported by multiple parties, i.e. by every person directly 
involved in the accident / incident or witnesses of the occurrence.  
c. Reports are made using an electronic reporting form that feeds any report directly into a 
primary database. Once the occurrence report is submitted, it is pre-processed by a 
safety analyst, who undertakes a high-level analysis of the occurrence and assigns an 
appropriate investigator. Every accident / incident report is investigated using various 
methods (e.g. documentation, interviews, simulations), depending on the severity of the 
occurrence.  
d. The investigation will identify the cause and hazards that led to the accident / incident. 
The investigation results are used to develop recommendations for safety actions in 
order to mitigate or eliminate risk factors. Recommendations and actions are followed-
up regularly until completion.  
e. Results of any investigation and the subsequent recommendations are fed back to those 
that reported it.  
f. All data is stored in a primary database and used on an aggregated level for data 
analysis. Data analysis results are used to develop safety recommendations and actions 
to improve or eliminate risk factors. Safety statistics are published and shared within the 
organisational safety department, the management, the whole organisation, external 
aviation stakeholders, and the public. The database itself is shared with other aviation 
stakeholders.  
g. An ideal reporting system assumes no bias (e.g. reporter bias, investigator bias) and that 
no errors are made. 
h. The data collection and investigation process is consistent over time. 
 
Eleven criteria for assessing the quality of organisational databases could be derived 
from the ideal reporting system. The criteria account for factors in relation to possible error 
sources during data gathering (e.g. timeliness of report, level of investigation) and data 
pre-processing (e.g. form of reporting and data pre-processing), organisational safety 
culture (e.g. safety publications, data sharing), data accessibility (database type, source of 
descriptive narrative), and the consistency of the reporting system over time. These criteria 
are summarised in Table 26. The chosen criteria are not an exhaustive list of the factors 
affecting the quality of reporting systems. Indeed, the quality of safety data can be 
influenced by various moderating and confounding effects (e.g. size of the organisation 
and available staff for accident / incident reporting and investigation, cost-benefits). 
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Criteria relating to the reporting level are not considered at this stage, since the proposed 
external data validation framework aims to assess the quality of the collected data rather 
than its amount. Data quality issues in relation to the reporting level are discussed 
subsequently. 
 
Table 26: Criteria scores 
 
Criteria 
 
 
Possible outcome 
 
Score 
Time of report On the day of occurrence Percentage of occurrences reported on the day 
of occurrence 
Later / Unknown 0 
Major form of reporting Electronic reporting system 1 
Mixed: electronic reporting system & email, post, 
telephone 
0.5 
Email, post, telephone 0 
Level of investigation All occurrences 1 
Most occurrences (>20 / year) 0.67 
Less than 20 / year (only high-severity occurrences) 0.33 
None 0 
Bias a No bias 1 
1 type of bias 0.86 
2 types of bias 0.71 
3 types of bias 0.57 
4 types of bias 0.43 
5 types of bias 0.29 
6 types of bias 0.14 
All 7 types of bias 0 
Database translation required b No 1 
Yes 0 
Feedback given to the reporter Yes 1 
No 0 
Publication of statistics / safety reports c All 5 types of publications 1 
4 types of publications 0.8 
3 types of publications 0.6 
2 types of publications 0.4 
1 type of publication 0.2 
None 0 
Data sharing with other stakeholders apart from 
regulatory requirements 
Yes 1 
No 0 
Data accessibility Original report 1 
Primary database 0.75 
Report written by the primary organisation 0.5 
Secondary database 0.25 
Tertiary database 0 
Source of descriptive narrative Reporter + primary investigator 1 
Reporter + primary analyst 0.875 
Reporter + secondary investigator 0.75 
Reporter + secondary analyst 0.625 
Primary investigator 0.5 
Primary analyst 0.375 
Secondary investigator 0.25 
Secondary analyst 0.125 
No narrative 0 
Consistency of the reporting system over time Consistent 1 
Inconsistent 0 
a Seven types of bias are considered: reporter bias, reporting form bias, analysts / commenter bias, investigator bias, and database bias. Analyst / 
commenter bias and investigator bias may occur twice in secondary systems. For instance, investigator bias may occur in the primary 
organisation. Investigation findings are then transferred to a secondary organisation, which may decide to investigate the occurrence again. 
b Certain databases require a translation into English language by the analyst. 
c Five types of publications are considered: publication to the organisational safety department, Board / Management, whole organisation, other 
aviation stakeholders, and the public. !!
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• Scoring of the options on the criteria!
 
After evaluation criteria have been identified, the options are scored against the 
criteria. The most common method is direct scoring using relative preference scales. The 
most preferred option (best option) is identified and assigned a weight of 1. Similarly, the 
least preferred option (worst option) is identified and weighted 0. The remaining options 
are scored in between 0 and 1 based on their importance in relation to the best and worst 
option (Hwang and Yoon, 1981).  
The scoring of options based on the best and worst reporting system implies that the 
options are scored in relation to each other. However, to establish meaningful weights the 
reporting systems should be scored in relation to an ideal system and a non-ideal system. 
In this case, 1 is assigned to the ideal system and 0 to the non-ideal system. Subsequently, 
the twelve databases are scored in between 1 and 0 with reference to the ideal and non-
ideal system. For this purpose, two new reporting systems, an ideal and a non-ideal system, 
are introduced. The ideal reporting system equates to the system introduced in the previous 
section. A reporting system with an overall score of 0.9 would mean that the system is 
lacking 10.0% of quality compared to the ideal one in relation to the evaluated criteria.  
The scales for the criteria have been defined based on the possible outcomes. Table 26 
summarises the criteria, possible outcomes of the criteria and assigned scores. For 
example, the major form of reporting in an ideal case is electronic (weight: 1), since every 
report is fed directly into a database with no loss of information. On the contrary, some 
organisations receive reports e.g. by post or telephone. This form of reporting significantly 
impacts on the time of data pre-processing (e.g. reports are manually entered into the 
database). In addition, errors may occur due to bad handwriting, typing mistakes, and the 
transfer of incorrect or incomplete information, etc. (weight: 0). A mixed form of reporting 
is assigned a weight of 0.5. The underlying distribution of the weights is linear and the 
impacts of this are discussed further in the next section. 
The relevant data has been collected using a survey methodology, in which the 
providers of the safety databases were interviewed. Interview partners were senior analysts 
and investigators in the safety departments of the organisations. A semi-structured 
interview approach was applied for seven organisations. The interviews covered a list of 
themes and questions related to the evaluation criteria. A semi-structured approach was 
chosen in order to allow for some degree of flexibility, since the different aviation 
stakeholders employ different data collection and investigation processes, meaning that it 
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was sometimes necessary to query certain details in depth (Saunders, et al., 2007). For five 
organisations, the survey was conducted via email, with a follow-up email or telephone 
call to clarify unclear responses. Where available, official documentation was used to 
verify the information given (e.g. The European Parliament and the Council of the 
European Union, 2003; UK Civil Aviation Authority Safety Regulation Group, 2011). The 
interview questions are shown in Appendix III. 
Based on the data collected through the survey, the reporting systems were scored 
against the criteria. An example of the logic of scoring for the databases is given below. 
The FAA keeps two databases for runway / taxiway incursion occurrences. Once an 
incident occurs, a report is filed to the Air Traffic Quality Assurance (ATQA) database 
with most of reports received being from air traffic controllers. Depending on the nature of 
the incident, different people investigate, e.g. for pilot deviations the Flight Standards 
District Office investigates. The original report is kept in ATQA until any investigation is 
completed and then replaced by the investigation findings. The data collection and 
investigation in ATQA is a primary process.  
Each day, an analyst in the FAA Washington Operations Centre (WOC) compiles a list 
of incursion occurrences, called the Administrator’s Daily Alert Bulletin (ADAB). The 
ADAB provides an overview of recent occurrences to FAA Executives. A safety analyst in 
the Runway Safety Office receives the ATQA and ADAB electronically (major form of 
reporting scoring: 1) and creates a new database. This secondary database is used in this 
research (data accessibility scoring: 0.25). Thus, the FAA Runway Safety Office is treated 
as a secondary organisation receiving their data from a primary process (i.e. ATQA data 
collection and investigation process). The database kept by the Runway Safety Office 
includes the times and locations of the occurrences and a summary of the incidents. This 
summary is written by the runway safety analyst (source of descriptive narrative scoring: 
0.125), based on the original reports and investigation findings from ATQA and the daily 
bulletin ADAB. The database contains the day of occurrence, although no information as 
to when the incident was reported (time of report scoring: 0). The time between occurrence 
and reporting is important, as critical information can get lost (e.g. the reporter may not 
remember all details if the report is not made immediately). The runway safety analyst 
does a severity assessment. The Runway Safety Office does not investigate (level of 
investigation scoring: 0). The investigation was done through the primary process to which 
this research does not have access. The Runway Safety Office incursion database is used to 
produce monthly reports. In addition, the data feeds into a performance matrix to assess 
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whether organisational targets are met. All the statistics are available to other aviation 
stakeholders and the public (publications scoring: 1). In addition, the data is used for 
research purposes and ad-hoc safety mitigation actions. The Runway Safety Office does 
not give feedback to the person who reported the incident (feedback given to the reporter 
scoring: 0). The database itself is not shared with other aviation stakeholders (scoring: 0). 
The reporting system did not change over the considered time period (scoring: 1).  
The scoring of the fourteen reporting systems is summarised in Table 27. Given that 
the ideal system is shown in Table 27 the table also highlights how an organisation could 
improve and make their reporting systems more comparable to an ideal system.  
To validate the scoring, the agreement rate between two qualified raters is computed. 
Ideally, Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater reliability should be calculated. This computes the 
extent of agreement between two raters, taking into account the possibility of the 
agreement occurring by chance. The scoring can be accepted as reliable if the agreement 
rate is at least 0.70. Cohen’s Kappa needs to be computed for 25.0% of the data (Fleiss, et 
al., 2003). Another qualified rater was asked to score 5 reporting systems. For this 
exercise, the five systems for which the data was received by email were chosen, since this 
allowed direct use of the written statements from the organisations. The agreement rate is 
81.3% and the scoring is therefore evaluated as reliable. Inter-rater reliability could not be 
computed due to the small sample size and the heavily skewed distributions towards 
particular outcomes. 
 
• Weighting of criteria!
 
After the criteria have been defined and options scored on the criteria, they need to be 
rated according to their relative importance to the decision. A review of the relevant 
literature reveals no research on the quality of data collection and investigation processes. 
No justifications could be identified as to why particular criteria should have a higher 
weight than others. Therefore, weights cannot be derived from the literature. Weights 
could alternatively be derived using the input of SMEs, i.e. SMEs could be asked to weight 
the criteria. However, this has several problems. Firstly, although SMEs may be able to 
rank the criteria in relation to their importance, it could be difficult for them to assign 
quantitative values, as the aggregation of multi-organisational datasets accounting for data 
quality aspects has not been applied. This leads to the second problem, the choice of 
SMEs. SMEs for national databases and reporting systems exist, whilst experts with 
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experience in data quality concerning data aggregation are rare. In addition, such an 
approach is time and resource consuming, since a large number of relevant SMEs would 
need to be identified and addressed in order to derive robust weights. 
The ‘equal weights method’ (Wang, et al., 2009) is applied due to the lack of factual 
evidence on why weights should be assigned in a particular manner, as well as resource 
and time connected with a SME approach. 
 This method assumes an equal impact of the criteria on the final decision. Thus, the 
weight assigned to each criterion is 1. The implications of this decision will be discussed 
later in this section during the ‘sensitivity analysis’. 
 
• Aggregation of scores and weights!
 
The choice of the aggregation method depends on the data input, the required data 
output, and the underlying assumptions. These can be defined as follows (Hwang and 
Yoon, 1981; Wang, et al., 2009): 
a) Data input: 
• Qualitative data, 
• Finite amount of options, 
• Predefined set of options, 
• No conflicting criteria, 
• Independence of criteria; 
b) Required output:  
• Quantitative ranking of options, 
• Solution for all options required; 
c) Assumptions:  
• Static preferences, 
• No hierarchy of criteria and equal importance of all criteria, 
• Compensation allowed (i.e. a bad score on one criterion can be compensated by a 
good score on another criterion), 
• Certainty about the data input, i.e. it is assumed that all information given by the 
database providers regarding their underlying reporting systems is correct. 
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Based on these criteria, different MCDA methods were evaluated. The suitability of 
different MCDA methods to the current problem is summarised in Appendix IV.  
The Weighted Sum Method (WSM), the most common approach in MCDA 
applications, was chosen as the most appropriate method. The overall value of an option si 
is calculated as a linear additive model as shown in equation (2) 
 
  !! ! ! !!!!"!!!! !!!!!! ! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
 
where xij is the scoring of the ith option on the jth criterion and wj the weight of the jth 
criterion. After the overall scores for each option are calculated the values are normalised 
so that each value falls between 0 and 1. The absolute normalisation is calculated as 
outlined in equation (3). 
 
  !!!!"#$%&'()* ! !!!!!"#!!"#!!!"# !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!                
 
Table 27 contains the scoring of the twelve considered reporting systems on the 
criteria, the aggregated score, the DQI, and the final ranking.  
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Table 27: Scoring and ranking 
!
Sources: Avinor AS, 2011b, c; easyJet plc, 2009; Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c, 2011b, d, 2012a; Luftfartstilsynet, Accident Investigation Board Norway, 2010; National Transportation Safety Board, 2011; 
New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority, 2011; Norwegian, 2011; Oslo Lufthavn AS, 2011a; Structured communication with easyJet plc Safety Analysts and Investigatiors, July 2011; Structured communication with 
FAA Runway Safety Office Analysts, August 2011; Structured communication with Flight Safety Manager Norwegian, June 2011; Structured communication with Health Safety Environment Manager Signature, June 
2012; Structured communication with Oslo Lufthavn AS Risk Manager, June 2011; Structured communication with Safety Analyst Avinor AS Airports, January 2012; Structured communication with Safety Analyst 
UK CAA, January 2012; Structured communication with Safety Department CAA NZ, December 2011; Structured communication with Safety Department Wideroe, June 2012; Structured communication with Safety 
Investigatiors Avinor AS ANSP, June 2011; Structured communication with Senior Advisor Analysis CAA-Norway, December 2011; The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003; UK Civil 
Aviation Authority Safety Regulation Group, 2002, 2011 
!
"#$%&'()*!
+,+'#-!
.(
-
#!
%/
!
&#
$%
&'
!
0
12
%&
!/%
&-
!%
/!
&#
$%
&'
()
*!
3#
4#
5!%
/!
()
4#
+'
(*
1'
(%
)!
6(
1+
!
7
1'
18
1+
#!
'&
1)
+5
1'
(%
)!
&#
9:
(&
#;
!
<#
#;
81
=>
!
*(
4#
)!
'%
!'?
#!
&#
$%
&'
#&
!
@:
85
(=
1'
(%
)+
!
%/
!+
'1
'(
+'
(=
+!
A!
+1
/#
',
!&
#$
%&
'+
!
7
1'
1!
+?
1&
()
*!
7
1'
1!
1=
=#
++
(8
(5(
',
!
B%
:&
=#
!%
/!
;#
+=
&(
$'
(4
#!
)1
&&
1'
(4
#!
C%
)+
(+
'#
)=
,!
%/
!'?
#!
&#
$%
&'
D!
+,
+'
#-
!
E
4#
&1
55!
B=
%&
#!
FG
B0
H!
I
%&
-
15
(J
#;
!
%4
#&
15
5!+
=%
&#
!
F7
K
LH
!
"1
)>
!

 6 Data Collection and Validation 
! "#$!
• Examination of results 
 
The overall ranking of the reporting systems in relation to an ideal system are shown in 
Figure 56. !
!!
Figure 56: Final ranking !
The data collection and investigation process of Avinor’s ANSP Division scored 
highest with a DQI of 0.696, meaning that this reporting system lacks 30.4% of quality 
compared to an ideal system in relation to the evaluated criteria. The lack of quality results 
from possible biases, the translation of the data required by the analyst into the English 
language and the lack of a feedback process to the original reporter.  
The lowest ranked is the FAA’s AIDS database with a DQI of 0.341, which results 
mainly from the fact that AIDS is not a primary data collection system but a tertiary 
database that compiles occurrence reports from secondary databases. Original reports as 
well as analyses and investigation findings from the primary organisations are inaccessible. 
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AIDS contains a high possibility of bias because multiple organisations are involved in the 
data collection and investigation process. The data is publically available but is not used 
for statistics or safety promotion actions.  
The ranking, as shown in Table 27 and Figure 56, highlights that the quality of 
regulatory data collection and investigation processes tends to be lower than that of the 
primary systems. Primary systems are ranked higher due to better data accessibility (e.g. 
primary databases), the source of the descriptive narrative being at the beginning of the 
data collection process (e.g. access to the original report), and less potential of bias since 
the data collection is completed within one organisation. A lower weight may not be 
important for the regulators themselves, however. Most regulators execute only a 
monitoring function (e.g. Norway) and the data they keep is good enough for this purpose. 
Due to the limited number of cases, no conclusions can be drawn as to whether a certain 
stakeholder (ANSPs, airport operators, airlines, ground handling companies) performs 
better among the primary organisations. 
The final ranking shows a tendency of reporting systems from the same country to be 
ranked closely together (e.g. rank 1-3: Avinor ANSP Division, Avinor Airports Division, 
Norwegian; rank 6-7: UK CAA, easyJet; rank 10 and 12: FAA Runway Incursion 
Database, FAA AIDS). However, this is not due to similarities in the scoring, since the 
options score differently among the criteria. Possible explanations could be the overall 
safety culture of a country or its history, i.e. how systems are set up within a particular 
country.  
 
• Sensitivity analysis!
 
The derived weights and rankings are sensitive to the scoring of the options for each 
criterion and thus to the data collected through the stakeholder survey (i.e. interviews). The 
assumption of certainty about the data input (data collection and investigation processes) is 
vital and hence comprises the main limitation. This research uses the data collection and 
investigation processes to validate the quality of safety data. Future research should 
validate the reporting systems, i.e. to assess whether the information gathered through the 
SME survey is valid.  
Furthermore, the weights and rankings are sensitive to the weights assigned to each 
criterion. Since an external data validation framework is a novel approach, this study did 
not consider weights due to the lack of factual evidence and access to appropriate SMEs. 
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Ideally the criteria should be modelled in a hierarchical manner and weighted according to 
their relative importance to the overall decision. Weighting of the criteria may result in a 
change in the overall scores for each of the options and in the subsequent ranking.  
Finally, the definition of an ideal and non-ideal system and the derived scales used 
during scoring influence the overall scores of the options. In order to check for accuracy, 
the ideal and non-ideal systems and scales were validated with an independent SME from 
EUROCONTROL (Retired Head of Safety Regulations). The SME had more than 20 years 
experience in aviation safety. In addition, linear scales were assumed for the criteria. In 
reality, the scales may have another form (e.g. exponential). For instance, the quality of 
narratives may not degrade linearly from the original report to the narratives given in 
secondary or primary databases. Future research should address the underlying 
distributions of the scales.  
 
Application!!
To understand better the practical application of the DQI, the developed index was 
correlated to the causal factors extracted from each of the databases (the details of this 
extraction process are discussed in section 6.7, later in this chapter).  
For this correlation the data was first checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test 
for samples smaller than 50. The data proved to be significantly different from a normal 
distribution (p < .05) and therefore non-parametric techniques were required. To test the 
data for correlations between the DQI and the causal factors Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient (rs), a standardized measure of the strength of relationship between two 
variables that does not rely on the assumptions of a parametric test, was applied. 
Spearman’s test works by ranking the data points in ascending order and then applying the 
parametric Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r), the standardized measure of the strength of 
relationship between two normal distributed variables, to those ranks. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient is computed by dividing the covariance of two variables (covxy) by the product 
of the standard deviation of these two variables (sxsy): 
 ! ! ! !"#!"!!!! ! !!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!                                                           (4) 
 
The covariance is calculated as the sum of the deviation of observed values (xi) of one 
variable x from its mean value (!) multiplied by the corresponding deviation of the 
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observed valued (yi) of a second variable y from its mean (!). To get the average value of 
the combined deviations for the two variables the sum of the multiplied deviations is 
divided by the number of observations (N-1). To standardise the covariance it is then 
divided by the product of the multiplied standard deviations (sxsy). Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient can take on values between -1, which indicates a perfect negative correlation 
between two variables, and +1, which indicates that the two variables are perfectly 
positively correlated. A coefficient of 0 indicates no relationship between the variables 
(Field, 2009).  
To test further whether the distribution of the DQI differs across stakeholders the 
Kruskal-Wallis test was applied. The Kruskal-Wallis procedure is a non-parametric test of 
whether more than two independent groups differ, and tests the null hypothesis that the 
distributions of DQIs across k experimental conditions (i.e. types of stakeholders) are the 
same. The Kruskal-Wallis is based on ranked data. The observations are first ranked and 
then sorted into groups. For each group, the sum of ranks (Ri) and the number of 
observations ni is subsequently obtained. Once Ri and ni have been calculated for each 
group, the test statistic, H, is computed as: 
 ! ! !"!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!! ! !!! ! !!                                                    (5) 
 
The null hypothesis (i.e. observations are the same across groups) can be accepted if the 
test statistic is not significant (p > .05). In case of a significant test statistic (p < .05) the 
null hypothesis can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted (i.e. observations 
differ across categories) (Field, 2009). 
Two scenarios were analysed. First, the DQI was correlated to the total number of 
causal factors extracted from each database, i.e. the overall number of different causal 
factors found in each data set. To account for differences in database size the number of 
different causal factors was normalised by the total number of incidents captured in each 
database.  
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Figure 57: Correlation DQI vs. normalised number of different causal factors extracted 
per database 
 
There is a relationship between the DQI and the normalised number of different causal 
factors extracted per database (rs = .570, p < .05). Figure 57 illustrates this relationship 
graphically. The distribution of the DQI was the same across stakeholder categories (H(4) 
= .697, p > .05). The results indicate that databases with a higher DQI tend to capture 
causal factors in greater detail. There was no association between stakeholders and the 
DQI. 
Subsequently, the DQI was correlated to the average number of causal factors extracted 
from each report. There was no relationship between the two variables (rs = .522, p > .05). 
Also, the average number of causal factors extracted per report did not differ across the 
categories of stakeholders (H(4) = .474, p > 0.5). The results suggest that the DQI is not 
associated with the number of causal factors that can be extracted for each report. A 
possible explanation for this is that the number of causal factors extracted for each report is 
associated with the occurrence types collected by each of the stakeholders. The next 
chapter will analyse and quantify the relationships between stakeholders, occurrence types, 
and underlying causal factors in more detail. 
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Overall, the developed DQI is an indicator as to what extent a database captures the 
causal factors (i.e. the variety of causal factors) underlying airport surface safety 
occurrences. 
The proposed external data quality assessment provides a robust indication of the 
quality of safety databases. A validation of the descriptive narrative itself is also possible 
through technical means. Automatic recording systems, such as airport ground radar tracks 
and voice recorders from aircraft and air traffic could be used to validate the accuracy of 
descriptive narratives. In this way, the different stakeholders could work together to 
provide a validation of occurrences. This would require considerable resources and 
coordination and future research should address both the requirements for such technical 
validation as well as the means to achieve this in a resource efficient manner. 
6.5.4.3 Reporting Level 
In a third step the reporting levels for each organisation were analysed. Three aspects 
were considered: the reporting scope (the collection of only high-severity occurrences vs. 
any situation that may or may not affect safety), the underlying definitions and the 
consistency of the reporting system over time.  
The three chosen criteria are not an exhaustive list of the factors affecting the reporting 
level. Indeed, reporting levels can be influenced by various moderating and confounding 
effects (e.g. safety and reporting culture). The three aspects of reporting scope, underlying 
definitions, and their consistency were chosen because they are factual. Any organisation 
should have clear guidelines about which safety data to collect and its underlying 
definitions. Consistency was addressed in a stakeholder survey and the details were 
covered in section 6.5.4.2. 
 
Methodology!!
First, the reporting scope of the twelve databases was evaluated. Subsequently, the 
definitions underlying the twelve reporting systems were compared to the definitions used 
in this thesis (refer to Chapter 4 section 4.5). The method of data collection was described 
in section 6.5.4.2. Table 28 summarises the reporting scope and comparability of 
definitions in the twelve reporting systems. The consistency of the reporting systems over 
time is discussed subsequently. 
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Table 28: Reporting level 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%!&'(!%)%*+%,+(!-%.%,%/(!0%1.23(/!45+6!*5023/*45!400233(50(/7!,!&'(!%)%*+%,+(!-%.%,%/(!0%1.23(/!45+6!(8023/*45/9!04++*/*45/9!*5023/*45/9!%5-!,*3-!/.3*:(/7!0!&'(!%)%*+%,+(!-%.%,%/(!0%1.23(/!45+6!04++*/*45/!%5-!*5023/*45/7!
 
Sources: Avinor AS, 2011b, c; easyJet plc, 2009; Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c, 2011b, d, 2012a; Luftfartstilsynet, Accident 
Investigation Board Norway, 2010; National Transportation Safety Board, 2011; New Zealand Civil Aviation Authority, 2011; 
Norwegian, 2011; Oslo Lufthavn AS, 2011a; Structured communication with easyJet plc Safety Analysts and Investigatiors, July 2011; 
Structured communication with FAA Runway Safety Office Analysts, August 2011; Structured communication with Flight Safety 
Manager Norwegian, June 2011; Structured communication with Health Safety Environment Manager Signature, June 2012; Structured 
communication with Oslo Lufthavn AS Risk Manager, June 2011; Structured communication with Safety Analyst Avinor AS Airports, 
January 2012; Structured communication with Safety Analyst UK CAA, January 2012; Structured communication with Safety 
Department CAA NZ, December 2011; Structured communication with Safety Department Wideroe, June 2012; Structured 
communication with Safety Investigatiors Avinor AS ANSP, June 2011; Structured communication with Senior Advisor Analysis CAA-
Norway, December 2011; The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2003; UK Civil Aviation Authority Safety 
Regulation Group, 2002, 2011 
 !
Results !!
The analysis of the reporting scope identified that the FAA AIDS database 
underreports issues relevant to airport surface safety. There is currently no regulatory 
requirement to report excursion and FOD incidents in the U.S. (Structured communication 
with FAA Runway Safety Office Analysts, August 2011). The AIDS database claims to 
contain accidents and incidents (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013a); however, with, 
for example, only 35 relevant FOD occurrences reported from 1979 to 2009 this data 
appears underreported. Hence, the FAA excursions and FOD data should only be used with 
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UK CAA 
MORS ! !! "! ! !! ! !! !! !
Unkn
own ! !! ! ! ! !! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! !!
CAA NZ 
ASMS ! !! ! ! !! !! ! "! "!
Unkn
own ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! "! "! "!
CAA Norway 
ECCAIRS ! !! !! ! !! ! !! !! !
Unkn
own ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! !!
FAA  
RI databasea "! "! "! ! !! "! "! "! "! - "! "! "! "! "! "! !! ! ! "! "! "! "! "! "!
FAA  
AIDS ! !! "! "! "! ! !! "! "!
- ! !! ! "! "! "! "! "! "! ! ! !! "! "! "!
Signature Flight Support  
SHEBBA  !! !! ! !!  !! !! !
Unkn
own !  !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! !!
Avinor ATC 
MESYS ! !! !! ! !! ! !! !! !
Unkn
own ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! !! !
Avinor Airports 
MESYS ! !! !! ! !! ! !! !! !
Unkn
own ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! !! !
Oslo Lufthavn 
IFS ! !! !! ! !! ! !! !! !
Unkn
own ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !!
Norwegian A/S 
AQDb ! !! !! ! !! ! "! "! !!
Unkn
own 
 
! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! "! "! "! ! ! !!
Widerøe 
Sentinelc "! " " ! ! "! " "! " 
- "! "! " "! "! " !! !  "! "! " "! "! " 
easyJet 
AQD ! !! "! ! !! ! !! ! !! A ! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! !! ! !! ! ! ! !!!
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the notation of underreporting. In addition, the U.S. government has raised concerns about 
the accuracy of the FAA’s Runway Incursion database. It is expected that an additional 
300 to 600 incidents daily in which planes get too close to each other would be revealed if 
automatic tracking software were used (Halsey, 2013). This in turn justifies the need for a 
technical validation of the descriptive narratives of occurrences. 
In order to make the reported number of surface safety occurrences comparable across 
countries and organisations, the level of underreporting would need to be estimated. In 
order to do this, the ratio between accidents and incidents would have to be determined. 
Although reliable numbers on the frequency of accidents can be gathered from the national 
Accident Investigation Boards, the estimation of a ratio between accidents and incidents in 
ATM operations is difficult, and a method for doing this has not yet been proposed.  
General studies in systems with robust safety defences, such as aviation, however, 
indicate that for every accident dozens of incidents occur (Phimister, et al., 2004) but, in 
aviation, a ratio could only be proposed based on a holistic data set that combines the 
viewpoints of all relevant stakeholders. In order to aggregate data sets, however, the 
underlying quality needs to be taken into account, which results in a ‘chicken and egg 
problem’. Even if one could aggregate the data of a country in which every stakeholder 
seems to collect every occurrence, such as Norway, the transferability of this to another 
system (e.g. country) is questionable.  
Subsequently, the definitions in terms of surface safety used by the considered 
organisations were analysed. Among the twelve organisations, four do not have any formal 
definitions in place for accident and incident types. Another six organisations only had 
definitions for specific occurrence types. Only the FAA Runway Incursion Database and 
Wideroe’s database had definitions for the occurrence types captured in their database. The 
FAA’s reporting system, however, is specifically designed for incursions and does not 
capture any other occurrence type. Likewise, only data for incursions was available from 
Wideroe for this research. Hence, current reporting systems do not allow for comparison of 
their underlying definitions and, therefore, it cannot be determined whether all databases 
collect the same data. That the data is comparable in relation to its underlying definitions 
has to be a major assumption when aggregating such data, and leads again to the 
conclusion that the fundamentals upon which the industry and Safety Management 
Systems are based are rather weak: the safety data which is currently being used for safety 
mitigation strategies cannot be clearly defined. 
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Concerning the consistency of reporting systems the data was evaluated overall as 
being consistent. The safety data providers stated that there have been no major changes in 
the reporting systems over the period the data considered in this research has been 
collected. Some organisations employed different or no data systems in the past (e.g. 
easyJet, Norwegian). However, if available, such data was not considered in the current 
study. In addition, some safety data providers (e.g. easyJet) are changing their reporting 
system due to the perceived limitations of their current system. The CAA – Norway 
acknowledged that the introduction of electronic reporting along with more comprehensive 
report obligations coming from the EU directive led to an increase in reports in 2011. The 
CAA Norway’s data considered in this research, however, covers the years 2008 to 2010 
and is not affected by this change. 
Regarding the definitions, a major change influenced the industry. Most states have 
adopted the ICAO’s definition of runway incursions7 over the last five years. This change 
of definitions has influenced the number of reports in some countries (e.g. U.S. Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2008b). The current research considers incursions in general, i.e. 
any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or 
person on the manoeuvring area and hence this change does not influence the number of 
reports. The FAA AIDS database, meanwhile, dates back to 1978 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2013a) and it is not known whether the reporting system and or definitions 
may have changed over this period of time. 
6.5.4.4 Discussion 
To summarise, the first part of the data quality assessment evaluated all databases to be 
internally valid. In fact, no differences were identified between the data sets in terms of 
internal quality. However, it was evident that there was a need for external data quality 
assessment. Consequently, a data quality index reflecting differences in the quality of 
reporting systems in comparison to an ideal reporting system was developed. This DQI 
gives an indication as to the extent to which a database is able to capture the causal factors 
underlying airport surface safety occurrences. Part three analysed each organisation for its 
reporting levels. It was identified that, overall, the fundamentals of SMS are weak and that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!%!Runway incursion: “Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle 
or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft” (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2007)!
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safety data cannot be clearly defined. In addition, an indication of the level of 
underreporting of certain databases was given. The following paragraphs use these 
findings to conclude whether the databases can be aggregated. 
 
Three types of data analysis are possible using airport surface safety data: i) an analysis 
of occurrence rates, ii) an analysis of causal factors for taxonomic purposes, and iii) an 
analysis of causal factors in order to develop a statistical model. These are considered in 
turn. 
 
i) Based on the analysis of reporting levels it can be concluded that occurrence rates 
should not be compared among organisations due to the level of underreporting and the 
unclear scope of data collection. Only accidents and runway incursions can be compared, 
as the ICAO sets clear definitions for these occurrences and they are routinely reported 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2001c, 2005d). It may be possible to analyse 
trends, as shown in Figure 58.  
 
 
Figure 58: Number of reported incursions per 100,000 movements !
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Figure 58 shows the normalised number of reported incursions for four of the data sets. 
Whilst the number of occurrences remained fairly stable in one of the databases, it 
increased significantly for two organisations, and decreased slightly for another one. 
However, comparing these trends is misleading as there are good reasons why fluctuations 
might exist among the countries. In the case of organisation A, the increase in occurrences 
is largely due to the organisation’s efforts to promote a just culture and improve its 
reporting culture through training and awareness campaigns for their staff. Furthermore, a 
younger generation of safety-educated individuals is now employed in management 
positions. This has led to a change in the mind-set and safety culture in the organisation, 
leading to an increase in reporting. Therefore, occurrence rates cannot easily be compared 
between organisations.  
 
ii) Data quality really comes into its own when analysing causal factors. In terms of 
airport surface safety, it was highlighted that the currently practiced piecemeal approach is 
insufficient and that a holistic approach requires the aggregation of databases reflecting the 
different stakeholder viewpoints. Section 6.5.4.2 proved that different databases capture 
the causal factors to a different level of detail. Thus, data reflecting different stakeholder 
perspectives needs to be aggregated for taxonomic purposes, i.e. to get a full understanding 
as to why airport surface accidents / incidents occur. A detailed cross-stakeholder 
comparison is shown in the next two chapters. Any analysis, however, should be 
interpreted in light of the developed DQI. For instance, when interpreting the causal factors 
extracted from one database in isolation, the DQI provides a robust indication of the extent 
to which the causal factors are captured. 
 
iii) Finally, causal factors data can be used to develop statistical models that quantify 
the relationship between occurrences and their underlying causal factors. It has been 
concluded, above, that occurrence rates should not be compared between organisations due 
to the level of underreporting and the unclear scope of data collection. The difference in 
reporting levels also influences the modelling of causal factors. If the causal factors were 
aggregated, any statistical model would be biased by the different reporting levels in 
favour of the stakeholder with the better reporting culture. Thus, causal factors data should 
not be aggregated for modelling purposes.  
 
Figure 59 summarises the data quality assessment framework and its major findings. 
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Figure 59: Summary data quality assessment framework 
Internal validation  
(Dupuy, 2012) 
Analysis for: 
•  Relevance, 
•  Completeness, 
•  Consistency, 
•  Accessibility. 
Novel external data validation framework based on 
MCDA 
•  Data is internally valid, 
•  No difference between the databases in terms of 
internal quality was identified, 
•  External data validation framework that accounts for 
the specific characteristics of airport surface safety 
data is needed. 
Analysis of factors in relation to: 
•  Possible error sources during data gathering and 
data pre-processing, 
•  Organisational safety culture, 
•  Data accessibility, 
•  Consistency of the reporting system over time. 
Analysis of reporting levels 
•  Weak fundamentals of SMS, 
•  Safety data cannot be clearly defined, 
•  Underreporting of databases. 
•  Databases capture causal factors to various levels of 
detail, 
•  A DQI reflecting differences in quality of reporting 
systems indicates to what extent an organisation 
captures the causal factors. 
•  Occurrence rates are 
not comparable 
between organisations. 
•  Causal factors data 
cannot be aggregated 
for modelling purposes, 
as different reporting 
levels bias any analysis 
in favour of the 
organisation with the 
better reporting culture. 
•  Causal factors data 
needs to be aggregated 
for taxonomic purposes. 
Any analysis should be 
accompanied by the 
developed DQI. 
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6.5.5 Conclusions Data Quality Assessment 
The nature of airport surface safety is such that there is a need to account for data from 
a number of stakeholders. These stakeholders may possess databases differing in quality, 
and aggregate this data for subsequent analysis so as to provide robust safety assessment 
and risk mitigation. To address the data quality problem arising from the aggregation of 
multi-organisational databases, this thesis has developed a framework for a holistic data 
quality assessment. To account for the specific characteristics of airport surface safety data 
a novel external data validation framework has been developed. Quantitative weights were 
derived for twelve safety databases. The developed DQI indicated that databases with a 
higher DQI are able to capture the causal factors underlying airport surface occurrences in 
greater detail. Hence, it is worth investing in good quality safety data and its collection. 
These weights combined with an internal data quality assessment and an indication of the 
reporting level of an organisation can give a robust indication of the quality of a database.  
The analysis also highlighted the deficiencies of current reporting systems in such 
fundamental aspects as the definition of occurrences. Sustainable risk management needs 
to be stronger in a number of fundamental areas. Organisations need to introduce formal 
definitions for the data they collect in order to guide the data collection process, both for 
their own sake and also for inter-organisational comparisons. To achieve the required 
future cooperation of aviation stakeholders such definitions should be standardised. The 
CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team, for instance, attempts to create a standardised 
industry language (Commercial Aviation Safety Team / International Civil Aviation 
Organization Common Taxonomy Team, 2008b). In terms of airport surface safety, 
however, the given definitions seem insufficient and, in any case, are not applied in any of 
the analysed organisations. Overall, such common taxonomies are a move in the right 
direction, but need improvement and promotion. Also, policies at the global and national 
level need to address these limitations and provide robust guidelines for SMS and data 
collection systems. 
There are on-going attempts to collect and compare safety data at a multi-national 
level. The European Coordination Centre for Aviation Incident Reporting System 
(ECCAIRS) collects and analyses safety data from EU States with the objective to improve 
transport safety. As shown in this research, however, such systems combine and compare 
data of different quality. Even if reporting states collect data to a ‘common standard’ the 
data will still vary in quality due to various moderating and confounding factors. The lack 
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of common taxonomies and reporting systems is a barrier for the required incorporation of 
the stakeholders. The fundamentals of the industry have to be clearly defined and a 
common industry language needs to be applied, since otherwise there is a danger that 
incomparable data is aggregated. This in turn would lead to inaccuracies in risk 
assessments and the mitigation strategies that are based upon them. 
The conclusion that safety data is currently not comparable across organisations also 
raises the question whether other aviation data is comparable. For example, new 
technologies such as A-SMGCS are currently being developed and introduced at major 
European airports (e.g. London Heathrow, Frankfurt Airport, Zurich Airport) and it is 
questionable whether all airports have a common understanding about what it is, what it 
includes, and how its performance is measured. Future research, therefore, should address 
the comparability of aviation KPIs. 
Overall, on-going promotion of safety is required to improve reporting levels. This 
includes operational staff ‘on the ground’, management and regulators. Stakeholders need 
to go beyond their current thinking by analysing the bigger picture and collecting 
occurrence data that reflects the safety of the whole system rather than their particular area 
of responsibility. Only through such a change in the mind-set within organisations will it 
be possible to collect comprehensive and comparable datasets to conduct robust safety 
analysis and develop effective risk mitigation methods. 
The external data validation framework developed in this research (in section 6.5.4.2) 
is recommended for use by both practitioners and researchers in data quality assessment in 
aviation safety. The basics of the framework are such that it is transferrable to safety 
databases in other modes of transport, with several operators e.g. railways. Furthermore, 
the technique is sufficiently flexible for further development to provide quality measures at 
different levels, e.g. through technical validation greater granularity in the validation can 
be provided. 
6.6 Database Introduction and Data Pre-Processing 
This section presents the twelve databases in more detail. Where applicable, the 
necessary data pre-processing and its output are described also. 
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6.6.1 FAA RI Database 
The data provided by the FAA Runway Safety Office contained 5,274 occurrences for 
the period 2005 to 2009. The available data fields are: 
• Event date; 
• Incident type (possible categories: Vehicle / Pedestrian Deviation (V/PD), Pilot 
Deviation (PD), Operational Deviation (OD)); 
• Runway Incursion (RI) (possible categories: yes, no); 
• Category Rank, i.e. the severity (this information is only given for runway 
incursions (RI)); 
• Airport and IATA airport reference code; 
• Aircraft types involved; 
• Descriptive narrative; 
• Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC)8 (possible categories: yes, no); 
• Day (possible categories: yes, no). 
Due to the large amount of data available, a sample of four representative regions was 
chosen, consistent with the data requirement of diversity. The FAA assisted in the selection 
of the sample by recommending regions that meet the data requirements in Table 22 
(Structured communication with FAA Regional Runway Safety Manager, September 
2011). The following regions were chosen: 
• Northeast (NE): New England Region9 and Mid-Atlantic10: 572 occurrences 
• Southwest (SW)11: 559 occurrences 
• Northwest Mountain Region (NMR)12: 490 occurrences 
• Western-Pacific (WP)13: 1254 occurrences. 
!
The FAA also provided a database containing normalisation data, i.e. number of 
movements per airport per year (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010g). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Meteorological conditions expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, equal or better 
than specified minima (International Civil Aviation Orgnanization, 2005b) 
9 Connecticut (CT), Maine (ME), Massachusetts (MA), New Hampshire (NH), Rhode Island (RI), Vermont 
(VT) 
10 New Jersey (NJ), New York (NY), Pennsylvania (PA) 
11 Arkansas (AR), Louisiana (LA), Texas (TX), New Mexico (NM), Oklahoma (OK) 
12 Colorado (CO), Idaho (ID), Montana (MT), Oregon (OR), Utah (UT), Washington (WA), Wyoming (WY) 
13 California (CA), Nevada (NV), Arizona (AZ), Hawaii (HI) 
(9-13 Federal Aviation Administration, 2000)!
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6.6.2 FAA AIDS  
The FAA AIDS database contains incident data for all occurrence categories of civil 
aviation. The data is for the period from 1978 to date (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2013a). In order to extract the relevant data for excursions and FOD occurrences a 
keyword search for the following terms was conducted: 
• Excursion 
• Overshoot 
• Overrun 
• Undershoot 
• Underrun 
• Veer(-)off 
• FOD 
• Foreign Object(s) 
• Foreign Object Damage  
• Foreign Object Debris 
 
The data extraction was validated with two Safety Analysts from the FAA’s Runway 
Safety Office, whereby the SMEs were asked to systematically assess the list of keywords 
and to comment on their completeness. 396 excursions were found for the whole U.S. 
spanning a time period from 1978 to 2009. For FOD, 35 occurrences were identified. 
These numbers refer to relevant excursions and FOD occurrences only, i.e. accidents / 
incidents that comply with the definitions of airport surface safety introduced in Chapter 4. 
For example, the key term search identified approach incidents listed as excursions, or 
FOD occurrences outside the manoeuvring area. Such data was excluded from the analysis. 
The database provides for each occurrence location information, operator information, 
narrative findings14, weather / environmental information, and pilot information. 
6.6.3 Signature SHEBBA  
Signature’s database contained 10,198 occurrences for the period from 2007 to April 
2012. The ground handling data contained mainly accidents / incidents that occurred on the 
apron (e.g. personal injuries during handling, damaged equipment), which is outside the 
scope of this research. To identify the relevant occurrences a keyword search was 
conducted for the first 1,000 occurrences. This was checked by reading all 1,000 reports to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Full narratives are provided on all incident reports with an active event date of January 1, 1995 or greater 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2012a) 
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check whether the keyword filter identified all relevant incidents. This led to the 
refinement of the keywords resulting in the following terms: 
• Runway / RWY 
• Taxi(-)way / TWY 
• Taxilane 
• Incursion 
• Collision 
• Near miss 
• Movement area 
• Manoeuvring area 
• Airfield 
• Double(-)white line 
• Double(-)yellow line 
• Hold line 
• Towing 
• Infringement 
• Excursion 
• Overshoot 
• Overrun 
• Undershoot 
• Underrun 
• Veer(-)off 
• FOD 
• Foreign Object(s) 
• Foreign Object Damage  
• Foreign Object Debris 
• Different animals (including e.g. 
birds, deer, rabbit) 
The rest of the data was filtered using the keywords. 103 relevant incidents were 
identified (32 U.S., 71 UK). Signature’s database contains the date of occurrence, the 
airport and a description of the incident.  
 
Normalisation data, i.e. number of ground handling operations per airport per year, was 
not available. 
6.6.4 UK CAA MORS  
A data request was sent to the UK CAA to provide excursion, incursion, FOD, and 
wildlife strike data that occurred on both runways and taxiways. In contrast to Signature’s 
SHEBBA database, the UK CAA’s data, for example, contains only the requested 
occurrence types and not all accidents and incidents that occurred in the UK air traffic 
system. Two years of data (2009-2010) were available. Two transformations were 
necessary. Data screening revealed that the data contained all FOD occurrences reported at 
airports. The FOD data was analysed and the occurrences that happened on runways / 
taxiways were extracted. FOD occurrences on the apron were excluded. In addition, the 
data contained reports of accidents / incidents outside the UK. The data was filtered 
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according to locations and only UK-based occurrences considered. In addition, double 
entries were removed from the database. After data pre-processing, the database contained 
1,038 entries (279 excursions, 539 incursions, 66 FOD, 154 wildlife strikes). The database 
provides information on:  
• Date and time of occurrence; 
• Descriptive narrative; 
• Event descriptions (i.e. causal factors); 
• Flight details (e.g. aircraft type, weight group). 
 
The number of movements per airport per year were used to normalise the data. These 
airport statistics are publically available from the UK CAA (UK Civil Aviation Authority, 
2011d). 
6.6.5 easyJet AQD  
Data was requested from easyJet for incursions, excursions, FOD and wildlife strikes 
that occurred on both runways and taxiways. It was problematic to extract the data in a 
suitable format from the AQD data system. Therefore, incursion, excursion and FOD data 
was provided in a combination of Microsoft® Excel® and Word® format. A total of 168 
accident / incident reports were provided. The data in Excel® format contained the date 
and location (i.e. airport) of the occurrence, an incident classification (i.e. incident type), 
an internal severity factor and risk code, the aircraft model and call sign, and a descriptive 
narrative of the occurrence.  
When extracting the data from AQD it was not possible to extract all available 
information to Excel®, as the system automatically cut-off every cell after 250 characters. 
The full occurrence report could only be extracted to a Word® format. The Word® report 
also contained operational details (e.g. duty day, sector, pilot age), event descriptors (i.e. 
causal factors), and investigation findings where available. Data pre-processing was 
needed to combine both files (Excel® and Word®). In addition, a high-level analysis, 
whereby the descriptive narratives of the occurrence reports were read, identified a small 
number of occurrences labelled as incursions which actually happened on the apron. These 
occurrences were excluded from any further analysis. The final database after data pre-
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processing contained all available details for 145 relevant occurrences (69 incursion, 1 
excursion, 75 FOD) that occurred between 2005 and 2010.  
Wildlife strike data was provided separately in a text file, which contained next to 
wildlife strikes other incidents that happened during the landing and take-off phases of 
flight. This file contained over 6,000 additional occurrences. An analysis of the descriptive 
narratives of 100 randomly selected wildlife strike reports revealed that this data did not 
contain any details as to why wildlife strikes occurred. Due to the limited amount of 
information to be extracted from these occurrences, this data was not considered for further 
analysis. 
 
easyJet also provided an internal database with the number of the airline’s operations 
per airport per year (easyJet plc, 2010d). 
6.6.6 CAA Norway ECCAIRS 
Data for all relevant surface safety occurrence types was requested from the CAA 
Norway. Each occurrence type was supplied in a separate Excel® file: 
• Runway incursions (460 oc.) 
• Taxiway incursions (143 oc.) 
• Ground collisions (36 oc.) 
• Runway excursions (140 oc.) 
• FOD (173 oc.) 
• Wildlife strikes (120 oc.) 
• Bird strikes (1715 oc.) 
 
In addition, data in relation to aerodrome markings (186 occurrences), and runway 
conditions (137 occurrences) was provided. The data captured occurrences from 2008 to 
2010 and provided information on: 
• Date, time, and location (i.e. airport) of the occurrence, phase of flight; 
• Occurrence category (i.e. incident type); 
• One descriptive factor (i.e. causal factor on the highest level) and the injury level; 
• Occurrence summary written by the CAA Norway; 
• Original reports from pilots, ATC and the airport. 
The data required three forms of data cleaning: 
1) The data contained multiple double entries of incidents. In some cases different 
stakeholder reports (i.e. pilot, ATC, airport) were represented in multiple rows. In 
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this case the statements were combined in one row so that one accident / incident is 
represented in one row. Others were simply duplicates and had to be removed.  
2) Occurrences that did not fall into the scope of this research were removed (e.g. 
FOD on the apron). 
3) Occurrences at non-Norwegian airports were excluded. 
In addition, a high-level analysis of the bird strike data revealed that these reports did 
not contain causal factors. Due to the limited amount of information to be extracted from 
these occurrences, this data was not considered for further analysis. Finally, a master file 
was created containing a total of 600 relevant occurrences (6 collisions, 332 incursions, 29 
excursions, 125 FOD, 108 wildlife strikes). 
6.6.7 Avinor ANSP MESYS 
Avinor ANSP provided their complete database of aviation accidents / incidents from 
2008 to 2010, a total of 4,799 occurrences. A substantial amount of data pre-processing 
was required. Firstly, the database had to be translated into English, since Avinor keeps its 
data in Norwegian. Secondly, the relevant occurrences had to be extracted. In order to do 
so the column ‘occurrence type’ was used. Overall, 105 occurrence categories were 
identified in the database and translated into English using Google Translate. Data that was 
clearly relevant to this project was extracted, such as: 
i. Entry of the runway without clearance; 
ii. Unauthorised traffic on the manoeuvring area; 
iii. Aircraft, vehicles, people or animals moving on the manoeuvring area without 
clearance; 
iv. Aircraft, vehicles, people or animals moving on runway without clearance; 
v. Aircraft, vehicles, people or animals moving on taxiway area without clearance. 
The analysis of the occurrence categories showed that occurrences could be classified 
in several ways. For example, an incursion on a runway could be classified as i, ii, iii, and 
iv. Thus, this thesis could not rely on the given classification to identify the relevant 
occurrences. A simple keyword search, as done for the SHEBBA database, also proved 
difficult, since the database was kept in Norwegian. To extract the relevant accidents and 
incidents, all occurrence categories that could contain relevant accidents / incidents were 
extracted, including categories such as: 
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i. Failure to comply with the relevant procedures; 
ii. Aircraft does not comply with the relevant ATM procedures; 
iii. Violations of traffic regulations. 
A total of 46 categories were considered as potentially relevant. These occurrences 
were translated using Google Translate followed by reading all of them to identify the 
relevant ones. Using Google Translate brings the risk of mistranslations and can influence 
the data’s accuracy. Therefore, databases that require translations have been down-
weighted in the data quality assessment. In case a translation did not make sense, a native 
speaker was asked for clarification. The final database contained 552 surface safety 
occurrences (2008-2010) to be considered in this research (361 incursions, 18 excursions, 
10 FOD, 163 wildlife strikes). 
Avinor ANSP’s database is the most comprehensive of those studied here, showing 
amongst other things: 
• Occurrence details (e.g. date, time, IATA code, airport, location of occurrence on 
the airport); 
• Details of aircrafts involved (e.g. call sign, registration, aircraft model, flight 
phase); 
• Weather information (e.g. weather report, light conditions); 
• Runway details (e.g. breaking action, contamination); 
• ATC details (e.g. sector, traffic density, workload, airspace details); 
• Descriptive narrative of the occurrence; 
• Investigation report. 
6.6.8 Avinor Airports MESYS 
Avinor’s Airports division also uses the MESYS system. A special feature is that 
Avinor Airports keeps two separate databases, one for the three medium-sized airports, i.e. 
Bergen, Stavanger, Trondheim (458 occurrences), and one for all other airports in the 
country, except OSL (706 occurrences). To capture all safety occurrences from the 
airport’s perspective both databases should be combined. Since these two databases are 
also based on MESYS, they contain the same data fields as the ANSP database described 
in the previous section. Avinor Airports provided both databases. Again, the databases 
contained all aviation accidents / incidents from 2008-2010 and were kept in Norwegian. 
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To begin with, both databases were combined. Subsequently, the relevant occurrences 
were extracted following the same methodology as described for the Avinor ANSP 
database (section 6.6.7). This time the database contained 56 different occurrence 
classifications, out of which 28 were considered as possibly relevant and thus further 
analysed. The final database after pre-processing contained 759 relevant occurrences (7 
collisions, 69 incursions, 9 excursions, 163 FOD, 511 wildlife strikes).   
!
The number of movements per airport per year is publically available from Avinor’s 
homepage and has been used to normalise the number of occurrences from the CAA 
Norway and Avinor (Avinor AS, 2011d). 
6.6.9 OSL IFS 
OSL is a subsidiary company of Avinor. Its database is similar to Avinor’s but contains 
less data fields. OSL also provided a full safety database capturing all aviation occurrences 
from 2008-2010. The database is kept in Norwegian and contained 4,621 accidents / 
incidents. To extract the relevant occurrences the data was filtered using the same 
methodology as described for the MESYS system. The data was filtered for possibly 
relevant occurrences using OSL’s occurrence classification. The database contained 98 
different occurrence classifications out of which 20 were evaluated as possibly relevant. 
These were extracted, translated using Google Translate, and analysed. After this pre-
processing, the database contained 223 relevant occurrences (4 collisions, 155 incursions, 
4 excursions, 41 FOD, 19 wildlife strikes). The IFS database provides information on: 
• Occurrence details (e.g. date, time, location of the occurrence at the airport); 
• Internal severity assessment and priority to handle the occurrence; 
• Descriptive narrative, investigation findings and comments on the occurrence. 
 
Movement data to normalise the number of incidents (i.e. per airport per year) was 
taken from Avinor as described in the previous section (Avinor AS, 2011d). 
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6.6.10 Norwegian AQD 
The data from Norwegian was supplied in two formats, Microsoft® Excel® and 
Word®. Separate files were provided for the following occurrence types in relation to 
landing, take-off and ground operations: 
• Aborted take-offs (97 oc.) 
• Airspace / ATC incidents (378 
oc.) 
• Approach incidents (199 oc.) 
• Birds (270 oc.) 
• Communications (45 oc.) 
• Excursions (2 oc.) 
• Incursions (7 oc.) 
• Landing incidents (47 oc.) 
• Missed approaches (179 oc.) 
• Weather-related incidents (124 oc.) 
The data was for the period from 2007 to October 2011. Some occurrence types are 
directly relevant to this research (e.g. incursions). Others (e.g. landing incidents) appear 
not directly related, however, may still contain relevant accidents / incidents. Hence, all 
occurrences were read and the relevant ones extracted. For this, the Excel® file was used. 
Similar to easyJet, the Norwegian’s AQD database also cut-off every cell after 250 
characters. In case information was missing, the Word® files were used. For relevant 
occurrences, all information was transferred into the Excel® files. As Norwegian’s pilots 
report in English translation was unnecessary. Relevant occurrences were found in the data 
files for aborted take-off, airspace / ATC incident, communications, excursions, incursions 
and landing incidents. Finally, a master file was created combining all relevant occurrences 
(310 occurrences: 39 incursions, 2 excursions, 269 wildlife strikes). The database contains: 
• Date, time, location (airport) of occurrence; 
• Occurrence title, descriptive narrative and investigation findings, if available; and 
• Aircraft type and registration. 
 
Movement data to normalise the number of incidents (per airport per year) could not be 
obtained from Norwegian. The organisation regarded this data as confidential. 
6.6.11 Wideroe Sentinel 
Wideroe provided only data for 27 incursions / collisions (2007- June 2012). In 
addition, the company stated that they have had no excursion reported since 2007. FOD 
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and wildlife strike data is not available for this research. As the data is kept in Norwegian, 
Google Translate was used. The database contains the date and airport of occurrence, the 
incident title and descriptive narrative, as well as safety actions to be taken. 
 
Normalisation (i.e. movement) data is not available for Wideroe. 
6.6.12 CAA NZ ASMS 
NZ CAA’s database contains all accidents / incidents that occurred in the flight phases: 
parking, taxiing, take-off, and landing from 2000 to 2009. The database contains two 
spread-sheets. The first contains accidents / incidents with findings (2,204 occurrences). 
These are occurrences that have been investigated and the causal factors identified. The 
second spread-sheet contains 16,257 occurrences without causal factors (e.g. bird strikes). 
Both spread-sheets together comprise the full database.  
Due to resource and time constraints, the analysis of the data in this thesis aims only to 
provide an insight into the practices in New Zealand. Therefore, it was decided to consider 
only the occurrences with findings, since these are the ones that could potentially provide 
the best overview of causal factors. This spread-sheet was read and the relevant 
occurrences that complied with the definitions used in this research were extracted. The 
final database contained 220 occurrences (9 collisions, 148 incursions, 62 excursions, 1 
FOD) and provided information on: 
• Date, time, flight phase, and location (i.e. airport) of occurrence; 
• Descriptive narrative of the occurrence; and 
• Findings and causes. 
 
The NZ CAA also provided an internal database with normalisation data, i.e. number 
of movements per airport per month (Civil Aviation Authority of New Zealand, 2010b). 
From this, the number of movements per airport per year was calculated. 
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6.7 Data Coding and Validation 
After the databases have been pre-processed, the occurrences were analysed for their 
underlying causal factors. Taxonomies can be used to analyse qualitative data, in 
particular, to code such data. When using taxonomies for data coding, the descriptive 
narrative is read, the causal factors are identified, and one or more corresponding codes 
from a chosen taxonomy are assigned. Subsequently, the data is analysed.  
Chapter 5 (section 5.2.7) highlighted the lack of integrated taxonomies for the causal 
factors of airport surface safety occurrences. Therefore, template analysis was chosen as 
the most appropriate method for the qualitative analysis of the data. The consultation with 
SMEs (as described in section 6.2.2) revealed that approaches such as grounded theory, 
whereby a theory is developed straight from data (Glaser and Strauss, 2009), are not 
advisable for this research since many factors or groups of factors are already known. 
Template analysis involves the use of an initial template that is refined over time. Such a 
template can be developed based on the literature, personal experience, case studies, or 
subject matter interviews, for instance, and the initial template is refined by the 
incorporation of new material. New codes can be added if a subject is not captured in the 
template, those that are not used can be deleted, and the ones that have been initially 
defined on a lower level can be put at a higher level and vice versa (Symon and Cassell, 
1998).  
The list of causal factors extracted from the literature (Chapter 5 section 5.2.6) was 
used as the initial template. To refine this template, the descriptive narrative of each 
occurrence was read and a code assigned. Multiple accident / incident causation theory was 
assumed, which states that multiple factors combined in a random fashion can cause an 
occurrence (Hollnagel, et al., 2006). If multiple causal factors were identified, all factors 
were coded, and, as far as possible, arranged in a chronological order. If the data did not 
match any existing codes, new codes were added to the initial template. Note that template 
analysis is an iterative process, and once a new code is added, the previous analysis has to 
be re-checked for its applicability.  
Some databases (e.g. UK CAA MORS) already contained event descriptors, i.e. an 
analyst had already identified the causal factors. These descriptors were not taken into 
account during the analysis. To code the data the descriptive narrative was used and, if 
provided, the investigation findings. 
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The following example illustrates the process of data analysis. For sensitivity reasons 
the incident is anonymised. 
 
Example 1: 
“Ground Control 1 (GC1) failed to coordinate with Local Control and cleared aircraft 
(a/c) 1 to cross Runway 27 at Taxiway November (departure end) which conflicted with an 
a/c 2 on a one half (.50) mile final same runway. Local Control immediately issued a go 
around to the a/c 2 to avoid loss of separation.”    
 
Two pieces of information can be extracted from this incident: i) there was an 
insufficient coordination between two control units, and in consequence ii) conflicting 
clearances were issued. The incident does not provide the detail on why GC 1 failed to 
coordinate. The incident was coded as follows: 
• ATC team operations: inadequate coordination, 
• ATC: issue of conflicting clearances. 
 
The data coding is based on factual information. That is, only facts that are written in 
the narratives are taken into account. The following two examples clarify this issue: 
 
Example 2: 
“An a/c 1 was taxied to Runway 19 and instructed to hold short, which pilot read back 
correctly. The a/c 1 taxied across Runway 19 hold lines at approach end without 
authorisation and conflicted with an a/c 2 on final same runway. The a/c 2 was issued a go 
around at one (1) mile final. No loss of separation reported.” 
 
The incident was coded as follows: 
• Pilot: correct read back, followed by an unauthorised manoeuvre, 
• Pilot: not stopping at the required position in from of a runway (hold line). 
 
Example 3: 
“An a/c 1 crossed the hold short line for Runway 1 at approach end without clearance 
and conflicted with an a/c 2 on final same runway. The a/c 2 was issued a go around 
between 1.5 and 2 miles.”  
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The incident was coded as follows: 
• Pilot, not stopping at the required position in from of a runway (hold line). 
 
In contrast to Example 2, the report in Example 3 does not mention that the pilot read 
back. It is unknown whether the pilot did read back or not, and whether this read-back was 
correct or not. The coding takes only the information that is clearly stated in the report into 
account, i.e. crossing of the hold line.   
 
In accordance with previous research (Jarvis and Harris, 2008; Nascimento, et al., 
2012; Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003) Cohen’s Kappa inert-rater reliability test was 
applied to validate the data coding. Cohen’s Kappa computes the extent of agreement 
between two raters, taking into account the agreement occurring by chance. Three other 
independent qualified raters were asked to code 300 randomly selected occurrences each. 
The coding is accepted as reliable if the agreement rate is at least 0.70 (Fleiss, et al., 2003). 
The reliability checks have been accepted as reliable and the details are discussed in 
Chapter 9 section 9.2.2, which deals with validity and reliability checks. 
6.8 Refined Taxonomy of Causal Factors Underlying Airport Surface 
Safety Occurrences 
The causal factors extracted from the safety data were used to refine the initial 
taxonomy based on the literature. The refined taxonomy is divided into the five categories 
of aircraft operations, air traffic control, airport operations, environment, and regulatory 
system. 
Figure 60 shows the first three levels of the refined taxonomy. The second taxonomy 
level comprises aircraft operations and ATC, split into either technical (e.g. aircraft 
malfunction) or human-related factors (e.g. pilot-related factors). Airport operations are 
split into technical (e.g. vehicle malfunction), human (V/PD-related factors), and physical 
(e.g. airfield layout and infrastructure such as markings, lighting and signage) factors. The 
environment contains the five sub-categories of weather, geological disturbances, night-
time operations, wildlife, and external factors. The regulatory system is split into non-
existent, inadequate, and existent but not implemented.  
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Figure 60: Refined taxonomy after safety data analysis 
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6.9 Summary  
This chapter developed a strategy for the collection of safety data accounting for the 
limitations of previous research and the specific characteristics of airports. A reference 
data set combining a total of twelve databases was collected. The databases were 
introduced and evaluated for their quality. It was found that according to the data 
requirements defined in Chapter 4, the current safety data are non-compliant in certain 
aspects (e.g. reporting scope, underlying definitions) and that safety data is currently not 
comparable across organisations and should therefore not be aggregated (except for 
taxonomic purposes). 
To address the data quality problems arising from the aggregation of multi-
organisational databases, a framework for data quality assessment was proposed and 
applied to the data. In particular, the need to assess the quality of the underlying reporting 
systems was highlighted and led to the development of a novel external data validation 
framework. Using the framework, a data quality score was assigned to each database, 
indicating the extent to which the database captures the causal factors in the context of 
airport surface safety. The current chapter, therefore, fulfils the fourth research objective 
and the developed framework is recommended for data quality assessments in aviation 
safety. 
Furthermore, the databases were pre-processed and the methodology for data analysis 
(i.e. coding) specified. The next two chapters present the findings. The causal factors are 
presented according to the structure of the refined taxonomy in Figure 60. 
 
 !!!
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7 Analysis of Causal Factors 
Chapter 6 presented a reference data set used in this thesis to assess the safety of the 
airport surface system. The data has been assessed for quality, pre-processed, and analysed 
to extract the factors that caused the accidents and incidents. This chapter presents the 
results of the causal factor analysis and compares the factors across stakeholders. With 
this, the chapter addresses the fifth research objective. 
The analysis of causal factors is presented in two parts. Whilst Chapter 7 presents the 
analysis at the State-level, Chapter 8 explores the differences in the causal factors at the 
cross-State level. 
7.1 Methodology  
The twelve databases introduced in Chapter 6 have been analysed to determine the 
causal factors in five parts. The methodology used for the analysis of the data is detailed 
below.   
 
1) Data overview 
 
To begin with, the datasets are summarised in overview specifying: 
• The stakeholder and database,  
• The number and type of occurrences that have been analysed,  
• The geographical location and number of airports at which the accidents / incidents 
occurred, and  
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• The considered time period. 
 
2) Occurrence rates 
 
Subsequently, the data is analysed for trends. Chapter 6 concluded that accident / 
incident rates should not be compared across organisations and, therefore, occurrence 
trends are shown for each organisation individually. The data was normalised by the 
number of movements per airport per year. 
 
3) Frequency analysis 
 
Afterwards, the frequencies of the causal factors are presented, including: 
• The number of causal factors extracted from each database, 
• The distribution of causal factors on the first three taxonomy levels (that were 
shown in Chapter 6 section 6.8), 
• The top 10 causal factors per database, 
• Factor combinations (i.e. the percentage of occurrences to which at least two 
stakeholders / system components contributed, and the specification of the causal 
factors involved in these interactions), and 
• A wildlife analysis (i.e. specification of animals involved in wildlife strikes and 
analysis of the causes underlying these occurrences). 
 
4) Comparison of stakeholder viewpoints 
 
In order to identify whether different stakeholders capture accidents / incidents from 
different viewpoints, the reports of the different databases are subsequently overlapped 
where possible. To do so, each database was ordered chronologically and the reports were 
matched based on the date of occurrence and the location (i.e. airport). The analysis 
includes the following: 
• The distribution of reported occurrences per stakeholder (i.e. who reports what), 
• The causal factors captured by the different stakeholders in a country, and 
• A comparison of multiple reports (i.e. analysis as to whether reports concerning the 
same accident / incident are complementary). 
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5) Examination of relationships 
 
Finally, the data is analysed for relationships between occurrence types, causal factors, 
and stakeholders. Since most variables are categorical, associations (i.e. interactions 
between the variables) can be analysed by cross tabulation. The Pearson’s Chi-Square test 
of independence is the typical test used to assess whether any association is taking place 
between two categorical variables and to explain the frequencies expressed in a 
contingency table. The test compares the actual frequencies observed in certain categories 
to the frequencies that might be expected in those categories by chance and can be 
calculated as follows: 
 
     !! ! ! !!!"!!!"!!!!"                                                                                  (6) 
 
where !!" and !!" are the observed and expected frequencies, and i and j represent rows 
and columns in the contingency tables, respectively. In addition, Cramer’s V is a measure 
for the strength of an association between two categorical variables and is used as a post 
hoc test as shown in equation (7). Cramer’s V is computed by taking the square root of the 
qui-squared statistic (X2) divided by the sample size (N) and the length of the minimum 
dimension (k is the smaller of the number of rows or columns) (Agresti, 2007; Field, 
2009). 
 
     !! ! ! !!!!!!!!                                                                                    (7) 
 
The data was analysed for relationships between: 
• Occurrence types and stakeholders, 
• Causal factors and stakeholders, 
• Occurrence types and causal factors, and 
• Causal factors and airports. 
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Where necessary other methods (e.g. interviews) were used to complement the data 
analysis, to gain detailed insight into the causal factors, and to enhance the understanding 
of certain fuzzy areas (e.g. the impact of U.S.-based pilots). 
The following sections present the results of the causal factor analysis. This chapter 
applies the methodology at the State-level and the next chapter at the cross-State level. 
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7.2 United States 
7.2.1 Data Overview  
Three databases were analysed for the U.S.: Signature SHEBBA, FAA AIDS, and four 
regions of the FAA RI database (U.S. Northeast, Southwest, Northwest Mountain Region, 
Western-Pacific). The data reflects the ground handling, and regulatory / ANSP 
perspectives, respectively. Table 29 provides an overview of the analysed data. 
 
Table 29: Data overview occurrences U.S. 
 
Stakeholder / 
database 
 
Geographical 
location 
 
Number of occurrences 
 
 
Number 
of airports 
involved 
 
 
Considered 
time period  
IN 
 
 
EX 
 
FO(D) 
 
WL 
 
Total 
Regulator / 
ANSP / 
RI Database 
 
AIDS  
U.S. NE 572 - - - 572 55 
2005 - 2009 U.S. SW 559 - - - 559 59 U.S. NMR 490 - - - 490 48 
U.S. WP 1254 - - - 1254 78 
U.S. - 396 35 - 431 354 1978 - 2009 
Ground 
handling / 
SHEBBA 
 
U.S. 
 
24 
 
0 
 
7 
 
1 
 
32 
 
15 2007 – April 2012 
 
A total of 2,875 incursions from the RI database spanning over a five-year time period 
from 2005 to 2009 were analysed. The AIDS database contained a total of 396 excursions 
and 35 FO(D) occurrences (1978 - 2009). FO(D) occurrences capture both situations where 
a FO was found on the surface, and occurrences where actual damage was sustained. In 
addition, 32 surface accidents / incidents were analysed from the SHEBBA database. 
7.2.2 Occurrence Rates 
Initially, the data was analysed for trends. The incursions captured in the RI database 
were normalised by the number of movements per airport per year, and Figure 61 shows 
their trend. The AIDS and SHEBBA occurrences could not be normalised due to missing 
movement data. 
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Figure 61: FAA reported number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) 
 %&'()*! #+ shows that the total number of reported incursions (per 100,000 
movements) increased over the time period considered in the four analysed regions. In 
particular, the rise of occurrences from 2007 to 2008 stands out. This trend is in line with 
the development of runway incursions in the U.S. (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2010d). 
The increase in incursions might be linked to the adoption of the global definition 
of runway incursions by the FAA beginning of the fiscal year (FY) 2008 (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2009c). The new definition is broader and classifies more occurrences as 
runway incursions than had previously been the case, e.g. taxiway incursions are now 
classified as runway incursions. This thesis considers occurrences on both runways and 
taxiways. Therefore, the change in the runway incursion definition should have no impact 
on the overall number of incursions on the manoeuvring area. Indeed, it affects only their 
severity assessment. 
The increase in incursions, therefore, might reflect a change in the safety culture 
and greater awareness of incursions. In 2007, the FAA together with more than 40 aviation 
leaders from airlines, airports, ATC, pilot unions and aerospace manufacturers initiated the 
“Call to Action” in order to reduce the number of incursions. This initiative included an 
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upgrade of airport markings, airport recurrent training, airport surface analysis of 20 
selected airports, pilot training and safety risk analysis of ATC procedures (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2008b). In addition, the FAA and the National Air Traffic 
Controllers Association (NATCA) signed an agreement in March 2008 to create an Air 
Traffic Safety Action Program (ATSAP), designed to foster a voluntary, cooperative, non-
punitive environment for the open reporting of flight safety concerns by ATC (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2008a). The increased number of reported incursions, therefore, 
might only be a reflection of an improved reporting culture. 
The occurrence rates were studied further at the airport level and the five airports 
with the highest occurrence rates were identified for each region. Additional analysis 
revealed that the majority of these airports handle traffic (i.e. movements) below the 
national average. This indicates that the less busy airports in terms of traffic movements 
experience a higher rate of incursions. On the other hand it may be that rather than having 
more incidents in reality, reporting is better at such airports with much less traffic and 
more time to report. Appendix V Tables 1 and 2 shows the top five airports for each 
region, their normalised number of incursions, their total movements (2005-2009) and 
summary movement statistics for each of the four regions. 
7.2.3 Frequency Analysis 
This section analyses the causal factors that have been extracted from each of the three 
databases. The single wildlife strike that had been identified in the SHEBBA database was 
excluded from the analysis. A total of 5,838 causal factors were extracted from the 
occurrence reports, and Table 30 shows their distribution across the databases. Again, as 
shown in Chapter 6, the results of a causal factor analysis should always be interpreted in 
conjunction with the DQI that has been developed for this research. 
 
Table 30: Data overview causal factors U.S. 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Database 
 
Number of 
occurrences 
analysed 
 
Number of 
causal factors 
extracted 
 
Number of 
different causal 
factors extracted 
from each 
database 
 
FAA RI Database 2875 5235 237 
FAA AIDS 431 550 88 
Signature SHEBBA 31 53 25 
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Figures 62 and 63 show the distribution of causal factors on the first (Level 1), and 
second (Level 2) taxonomy level, respectively, and highlight the different causes of the 
occurrence types. 
 
 
Figure 62: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type U.S. !
!
Figure 63: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type U.S. 
 7 Analysis of Causal Factors 
! "#$!
Figures 62 and 63 indicate that excursions are mostly caused by aircraft technical 
failures, pilot-related factors, airport physical characteristics and weather. While similar 
factors were identified for FO(D) occurrences, their distribution however differs, with the 
category of airport physical characteristics tending to dominate. For the majority of FO(D) 
occurrences, the reports stated only the type of FO that was found on the manoeuvring 
area, but not its source. Thus, these occurrences are coded as objects that were present on 
the surface. Whereas technical and environmental factors cause the occurrence of 
excursions and FO(D), incursions mainly arise from human-related factors, i.e. pilot, ATC, 
and V/PD. The identified factors summarised at a high level correspond overall to those 
identified during the literature search. 
Comparisons of causal factors at the stakeholder level are difficult, because databases 
from only two different stakeholders (regulator / ANSP and ground handling company) 
were collected for the U.S. In addition, the SHEBBA database is limited to a sample of 
only 32 relevant U.S. occurrences. 
Figures 64 and 65 compare the causal factors across databases and indicate that the 
stakeholders capture different parts of the taxonomy template.  
 
 
Figure 64: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type per database U.S. 
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Figure 65: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type per database U.S. !
For FO(D) occurrences, SHEBBA captures only airport related factors, whereas AIDS 
identifies, in addition, aircraft technical failures, pilot-related factors and weather. 
Similarly, incursions captured in the ground handling data (SHEBBA) are (at over 90.0%) 
predominantly caused by V/PD, whereas the RI database also identifies pilot and ATC-
human related factors. These variations are a result of the stakeholder perspective captured 
by the owner of the database. Ground handling personnel are V/PD who if they report i) 
are involved in an occurrence, or ii) observe a situation that might challenge safety while 
they carry out their work, mostly on the apron. In these situations they are surrounded by 
other V/PD and, therefore, are for example, unaware of ATC failures. 
Although the amount of available data is limited, it indicates that, in general, the 
various stakeholders capture different occurrence scenarios and associated causal factors. 
This depends on their responsibilities / tasks at the airport. 
When analysing the data at the third taxonomy level, the RI database, which captures 
incursions only, shows pilot human-reliability related factors as being the most frequent 
cause of occurrences (45.9%). This is followed by V/PD human-reliability related factors 
(20.1%). The AIDS database, used to analyse excursions and FO(D), also shows pilot 
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human-reliability as the most frequent causal factor category (41.3%), followed by aircraft 
technical failures (28.0%). SHEBBA on the other hand, captures predominantly V/PD 
human-reliability related factors (64.1%). In addition, 13.2% of SHEBBA’s factors capture 
causes related to surface conditions. As introduced in Chapter 3, it is the airport operator’s 
responsibility to maintain the surface and, thus, such data is of interest for the airports. 
These figures highlight the impact of humans on the occurrence of accidents and incidents, 
especially human-reliability related factors. The detailed analysis of the causal factors 
summarised on the third level of the taxonomy is shown in Appendix V Table 3. The 
analysis also identifies the stakeholder responsible for each of the causal factor categories. 
Table 31 shows the causes identified most frequently for each database and the 
percentage of accidents / incidents according to the particular causal factor.  
 
Table 31: Top 10 causal factors per database U.S. 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Database 
 
Top 10 causal factors  
FAA RI 
Database 
!" Pilot entering runway without authorisation (39.4%); 
#" Pilot correct readback, followed by an unauthorised manoeuvre 
(28.5%); 
$" V/PD entering runway without authorisation (19.1%); 
%" Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a runway (hold 
line) (18.9%); 
&" Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (15.5%); 
'" V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (15.5%); 
(" Pilot not stopping at the required position on the manoeuvring area 
(12.8%); 
)" Pilot took off without clearance (8.8%); 
*" Pedestrian unauthorised on the manoeuvring area (7.5%); 
!+" Pilot landed or departed on the wrong / closed runway (7.5%) 
FAA AIDS !" Aircraft technical failure (9.1%); 
#" Aircraft engine failure (8.6%); 
Aircraft brakes failure (8.6%); 
%" Long landing (7.7%); 
&" Pilot loss of control over the aircraft while on the runway (6.3%); 
'" Runway contamination (6.0%); 
(" Aircraft landing gear malfunction (5.3%); 
)" Pilot allowed the aircraft to veer off the runway (4.9%); 
*" Aircraft tires / wheels malfunction (4.6%); 
Short landing (4.6%) 
Signature SHEBBA !" V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (43.8%); 
#" Pedestrian unauthorised on the manoeuvring area (25.0%); 
$" V/PD inattention (9.4%); 
Other FOD / debris on a taxiway (9.4%); 
V/PD entering runway without authorisation (9.4%); 
6. Cargo dollies, baggage carts, etc. breaking loss and start rolling 
(6.3%); 
V/PD not stopping at the required position on the manoeuvring area 
(6.3%) 
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Following the analysis of individual causal factors, the subsequent paragraphs examine 
those occurrences for which two causal factors were extracted from the occurrence reports. 
This was the case for a total of 1,100 accidents / incidents. 
Figure 66 shows that the majority of factor combinations are within the same class of 
causal factors. This includes situations where, for example, a pilot makes two mistakes 
(e.g. correct read back followed by an unauthorised manoeuvre, followed by not stopping 
at the required position in front of a runway (hold line)). Only 6.8% of occurrences showed 
an interaction between stakeholders and / or components of the airport surface system (e.g. 
physical infrastructure, environment - weather). 
 
 
Figure 66: Factor combinations – stakeholder / component interaction U.S. !
The most frequent stakeholder / component interaction occurred between pilots and 
ATC, followed by the influence of the environment on pilot performance. Ranked third is 
an interaction between pilots and V/PD. Overall, the results show that occurrences do 
result from interactions between stakeholders and / or other components of the airport 
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surface system. Therefore, it is important to assess all components of the airport surface 
system and their interactions as required by the SMS. Figure 67 summarises the results. !
!
Figure 67: Factor combinations (Level 2) U.S.  
7.2.4 Comparison of Stakeholder Viewpoints 
The occurrences reported by both Signature and the FAA were compared to determine 
whether their descriptive narratives convey the same information. Most occurrences in 
Signature’s SHEBBA database were reported between 2010 and 2012. Since no data from 
the FAA was available for this time period, only the reports from 2007 to 2009 could be 
used for the comparison. Just one incident reported in 2007 was identified in the Signature 
database, whereby a refueler became disorientated while driving on the ramp and infringed 
onto a taxiway. Although this was a surface incident, it was not captured in the FAA 
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database. Therefore, no conclusions can be drawn from the U.S. data on whether different 
stakeholders represent different viewpoints. 
7.2.5 Examination of Relationships 
The analysis presented in the previous sections has indicated the possibility of 
relationships between occurrence types, causal factors, and stakeholders. Therefore, the 
data was tested for associations between the type of stakeholder and the occurrence types 
(Figure 68). There was a significant association between stakeholder and occurrence type 
X2 (2) = 117.061, p < .001. However, Chi-Square assumes that the expected frequencies 
should be greater than five, although it is acceptable in large contingency tables to have up 
to 20.0% of expected frequencies below five (Field, 2009). With 33.3% of cells having an 
expected count less than five the test assumptions are not satisfied. In addition, Cramer’s V 
= .187, p < .001 indicates only a weak relationship between stakeholder and occurrence 
type (Fletcher, 2008). Since the results violate the test assumptions, they are invalid and 
cannot be relied upon.  
 
 
Figure 68: Occurrence type per stakeholder U.S. 
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Subsequently, the data was tested for associations between stakeholder type and the 
causal factors extracted from the occurrence reports of each database (Figure 69).  
 
 
Figure 69: Causal factors (Level 1) per stakeholder U.S. !
There was a significant association between the type of stakeholder and the causal 
factors on the first taxonomy level X2 (3) = 178.206, p < .001. However, the Chi-Square 
test assumptions were again not fulfilled, with 25.0% of cells having an expected count 
less than five. Again, Cramer’s V = .175, p < .001, indicates only a weak relationship 
between stakeholders and causal factors. Hence, the test results are invalid. 
The data was also analysed for interactions between occurrence type and causal factors 
(Figure 70). There was a significant association between the occurrence type and the 
causal factors at the first taxonomy level X2 (6) = 714.004, p < .001 and Cramer’s V = 
.247, p < .001 indicates a moderate strength to this relationship. 
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Figure 70: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type U.S. 
 
The associations between causal factors and airports were analysed using the example 
of the RI database. This database was chosen since the number of occurrences captured in 
AIDS and SHEBBA at the airport level were too low to be used for statistical analysis.  
The results indicate a significant association X2 (717) = 1660.223, p < .001. However, 
with 74.2% of cells having an expected count less than five the assumptions of the Chi-
Square test are violated. When excluding the causal factors category with the lowest 
frequency, i.e. environment (0.1% of causal factors), the test assumptions are not fulfilled 
(X2 (38) = 1498.454, p < .001, with 65.6% of cells having an expected count of less than 
five). Finally, the data of the top 20 airports that reported the highest number of incursions 
(per 100,000 movements) was used to repeat the test, but nevertheless the data remained 
insufficient to support such analysis (X2 (38) = 158.775, p < .001, with 46.7% of cells 
having an expected count of less than five). 
In conclusion, it is not possible to test whether there is an association between airports 
and causal factors. The number of reported incidents (and therefore causal factors) is too 
low to support an analysis at the airport level. 
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7.2.6 Interviews 
Interviews with pilots were conducted to complement the safety data analysis and to 
get an insight into the causal factors from the pilot perspective in North America. This was 
due to the problems to collect data from a U.S.-based airline as discussed in Chapter 6 
section 6.3.1. 
 
• Method 
 
The aim was to explore the causal factors underlying airport surface safety occurrences 
from the perspective of U.S. pilots. A semi-structured interview approach using open-
ended questions was chosen. Semi-structured interviews cover a list of themes and 
questions, which may be varied from interview to interview. Questions can be omitted 
during the flow of conversation or additional questions can emerge. This approach is 
flexible and useful for exploratory analysis and thus suitable for this research. The 
interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis (Saunders, et al., 2007). 
To introduce the research context, pilots were given a short overview on the research 
topic and the objective of identifying the causal factors to airport surface safety 
occurrences. To fulfil the fifth research objective (i.e. to identify the causal factors 
underlying airport surface safety occurrences) it was necessary to ask only one question: 
What, from your perspective, are the reasons why occurrences on the airport surface 
may happen? 
In a first round of data collection four chief pilots were interviewed during a Runway 
Safety Action Team (RSAT) meeting at a major U.S. airport. Chief pilots are senior 
persons responsible for ensuring that an airline’s operations are conducted in compliance 
with the regulations. Therefore, these pilots had a sufficient level of experience to guide 
the further interviews. 
 To collect more data the FAA and a major U.S. airport authority were asked to 
recommend airlines known for a good safety culture that could be approached. The SMEs 
advised contact with a major low-cost carrier known for its efforts to promote safety in the 
industry. This airline operates flights to over 80 destinations in the U.S and allowed access 
to its crew room under a condition of confidentiality and anonymity. Interviews were 
conducted randomly on an ad-hoc basis, i.e. every pilot who entered the crew room was 
approached and notes of each interview were taken and later analysed.  
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• Results 
 
In total, twenty pilots were interviewed, including five chief pilots and one training 
pilot, to explore the causal factors underlying airport surface safety occurrences from the 
perspective of U.S. pilots. Pilots were interviewed on a one-to-one basis; although, in one 
case, two pilots were interviewed together. In total, there were 18 individual interviews, 
and one with two participants. The pilots’ age ranged from 32 to 61 with an average of 
46.1 years. Table 32 contains the causal factors stated by the pilots and the frequency they 
were mentioned. In addition, Table 32 compares the causal factors to the literature and the 
analysis of safety data presented in this chapter. The new factors identified through the 
interviews are highlighted in grey. 
The interviews revealed causal factors mainly in relation to the manoeuvring area 
layout, pilot-related factors, ATC human-related factors, communication issues between 
pilots and ATC, and weather and visibility. The main factors possibly leading to accidents 
/ incidents for the pilots were distraction and periods of high workload. 
One issue became apparent during the interviews: when U.S. pilots were asked about 
causal factors underlying airport surface safety occurrences they immediately associate this 
with incursions. Even though a brief of the research and its objectives was given, all 
conversations drifted towards a discussion of causal factors underlying incursions. Overall, 
incursions seemed to be the main concern in the U.S aviation sector. 
Comparing the factors gathered during the interviews to those from the literature and 
from the safety data analysis, new ones emerged. These are: 
• Multi-tasking job; 
• Daydreaming / taking personal problems to work; 
• Runway configurations that require frequent communication with ATC; 
• Risk mitigation strategies complicate the operations; 
• Technology in the aircraft is ten years behind; and 
• New technology is not available to commercial pilots. 
In particular the third factor, i.e. runway configurations that require frequent 
communication with ATC, was mentioned by 30.0% of the pilots. This causal factor 
implies that several runways need to be crossed to reach the final runway. For each 
crossing the pilot needs to hold short and contact ATC to obtain a crossing clearance. This 
increases the amount of communication and leads to frequency congestion. When 
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enquiring whether this is a causal factor specific to the home base airport of the pilots, it 
was confirmed that this problem can be generalised to U.S. airports. This factor 
furthermore, indicates that the physical layout of the airport surface impacts on the 
occurrence of accidents and incidents and this aspect will be addressed further in Chapters 
10 and 11. 
 
Table 32: Causal factors based on interviews with U.S. pilots 
 
Causal factor 
 
Frequency 
 
Captured through 
 
 
Literature 
 
 
Safety data 
Manoeuvring area design and complexity 4 ! ! 
Improper taxiway signage 1 ! ! 
Loss of situational awareness 4 ! ! 
Unfamiliarity with the airport 5 ! ! 
Multi-tasking job 1 - - 
Periods of high workload in the cockpit 6 ! ! 
Time pressure 1 ! ! 
Rushed behaviour from last-minute runway changes 1 ! ! 
Distraction 11 ! ! 
Inattention 1 ! ! 
Daydreaming / Taking personal problems to work 1 - - 
Complacency 2 ! ! 
Confusion about what to do 1 ! ! 
Misunderstanding ATC instructions 1 ! ! 
Communication 3 ! ! 
Overlong and complex transmissions 1 ! ! 
Runway configurations require frequent communication 
with ATC* 6 - - 
Blocked transmissions 1 ! ! 
Language barriers 1 ! ! 
ATC instructions badly enunciated 1 ! ! 
ATC instructions too fast 2 ! ! 
Different accents from ATC across the states 1 ! - 
Confusing ATC terminology / instructions  3 ! ! 
Improper clearances given by ATC 2 ! ! 
ATC giving instructions during high workload periods (e.g. 
on short final) 1 ! ! 
Improper handling of stop bar lights from ATC 1 - ! 
Weather 1 ! ! 
Visibility 3 ! ! 
Noise 1 ! - 
Risk mitigation strategies complicate the operations 1 - - 
Technology in the aircraft is ten years behind 1 - - 
Technology not available to pilots 1 - - 
* For instance, pilots need to cross three runways to get to their final runway. Before crossing each runway 
they need to hold short and get clearance from ATC. This significantly increases the amount of 
communications. 
Key: Factors identified newly through interviews are highlighted in grew. 
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When comparing the results from the interviews to the causal factors extracted from 
the European data, national differences become apparent. Whereas the European pilots 
complained about the physical infrastructure of airports, such as markings, lighting, 
signage (e.g. 3.0% of causal factors reported for incursions by easyJet), U.S. pilots did not 
perceive this to be a problem. There may be several explanations for this. The U.S. might 
have better regulations and in fact a better physical airport infrastructure. On the other 
hand, the infrastructure may be problematic, but because pilots have been trained in this 
environment, they do not perceive it as a problem.  
 
• Observations 
 
To investigate this further, three European flight crews (i.e. six pilots) were asked 
during six jump seat flights (as introduced in Chapter 3 section 3.1.4) the reasons, from 
their perspective, for the occurrence of accidents and incidents on the airport surface. The 
flights on the jump seat in addition provided the opportunity to observe the problems 
directly, as pointed out by the pilots. The main concerns of the pilots were: 
• Situational awareness; 
• Inappropriate, ambiguous, and missing markings and signage; 
• The problems associated to markings and signage are intensified in winter, 
darkness, rain and other low visibility conditions; 
• ATC either does not explain taxi routes properly or too quickly; 
• Taxi routes and stands are only known after touch down leaving no time to brief the 
taxi route upfront; 
• The airport and ATC give pilots a hard time if they request marshalls, as this causes 
delays on the manoeuvring area; 
• The airport does not provide the pilots with the correct surface condition 
information; 
• Lack of familiarity with the airport / experience; 
• Language barriers; and 
• ATC behaviour in certain countries. 
Particular problems observed by the author during the six flights were:  
• ATC did not descend the aircraft appropriately in one flight; 
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• The ILS was not calibrated properly at one airport. In the opinion of the flight crew 
there was a mismatch of about 3°; 
• Ambiguous signage at the stands of one airport. The assigned parking position was 
not clear; 
• Inappropriate and missing signs for taxiways at one airport; and 
• Taxi error at one airport with a very complex layout and a young, inexperienced 
pilot. No conflict with other aircraft tough. 
 
• Limitations 
 
The results of the interviews are limited by the sample of just 20 pilots of which 16 
were from the same airline, and therefore work to the same airline procedures. In 
particular, low-cost carriers operate a tight schedule with short turn-around times and pilots 
need to comply with the associated company procedures. In addition, all 20 pilots had their 
home base at the same airport, which meant they were also used to the same ATC 
operating procedures at their home base. However, there are 64 direct connections to other 
airports from this home base and hence, the pilots should be exposed to differing 
operational scenarios at various airports. Nonetheless, future research should interview 
pilots from different airlines in various locations. Therefore, the list of causal factors is not 
an exhaustive list of factors; it rather aims to provide an initial insight into the topic from a 
U.S. pilot perspective. 
7.2.7 Wildlife Analysis 
The literature review in Chapter 5 showed that the causes for wildlife strikes could 
only be determined in rare circumstances. In order to investigate wildlife-related 
occurrences further, the impact of airport location and surrounding land use on wildlife 
strikes is analysed. The literature review has shown that certain land uses surrounding 
airports, such as coastline, moorlands, landfills, or land used for agricultural activities, 
serve as wildlife attractants. However, quantitative studies on the effect of land uses 
surrounding airports are lacking (Blackwell, et al., 2009). 
Data on land use surrounding airports was, therefore, collected using Google Earth. A 
radius of 13 km around the airports was considered, as this equals an airport’s wildlife 
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control zone (International Civil Aviation Organization, 1991). Data for a total of seven 
variables derived from the literature (see Chapter 5 section 5.2.5.1, Table 20) were 
collected, including: 
• Presence of sea within 13 km (yes / no);  
• Presence of a lake / fjord within 13 km (yes / no); 
• Presence of a river within 13 km (yes / no); 
• Presence of forested land within 13 km (yes / no); 
• Presence of mountainous terrain within 13 km (yes / no); 
• Presence of fields within 13 km (yes / no); and 
• Presence of residential areas within 13 km (yes / no). 
The data was coded as binary variables (0, 1) reflecting the presence, or absence of 
each land use characteristic. Other variables identified in the literature as possibly 
influencing wildlife activities at airports (e.g. presence of industry, parks, entertainment 
facilities) were excluded, as it was not possible to collect reliable data over Google Earth. 
To limit the amount of data, the analysis was carried out for the U.S. Northeast only. 
The U.S. Northeast was chosen as it is characterised by its coastline and a mixture of very 
dense urban areas and rural areas. Data for 55 airports was extracted from the FAA 
Wildlife Strike Database (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012b). As wildlife strike 
reporting is voluntary in the U.S., the percentage of wildlife strikes represented in this 
database cannot be determined. 
Relationships between a continuous variable (i.e. normalised number of wildlife 
strikes) and a discrete, or true, dichotomous variable (i.e. presence of airport surrounding 
land use) can be analysed using the point-biserial correlation coefficient (rpb). A 
dichotomous variable is a categorical variable with only two categories. A discrete, or true, 
dichotomy is one for which there is no underlying continuum between the categories, for 
example, a specific surrounding land use is present or not. The point-biserial correlation 
coefficient is calculated using the Pearson’s correlation with the dichotomous variable 
coded as 0 and 1 (Field, 2009).  
A one-tailed test was chosen for the analysis, since it was assumed that the presence of 
a certain type of land use increased the normalised number of reported wildlife strikes. 
However, in order to see whether this assumption is correct, the analysis was also carried 
out using two-tailed tests. Table 33 shows the point-biserial correlation coefficients for the 
U.S Northeast. 
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Table 33: Correlation coefficients wildlife strike analysis U.S. Northeast 
 
Variable 
 
U.S. Northeast 
n = 55 
 
Presence of sea rpb = -.170; Sig. (2-tailed) .197; rpb =  -.170; Sig. (1-tailed) .099 
Presence of lake rpb = -.208; Sig. (2-tailed) .113; rpb = -.208; Sig. (1-tailed) .057 
Presence of river rpb = -.122; Sig. (2-tailed) .357; rpb = -.122; Sig. (1-tailed) .178 
Presence of forest rpb = .152; Sig. (2-tailed) .251; rpb = .152; Sig. (1-tailed) .125 
Presence of mountains 
 
Variable is a constant 
 
Presence of field rpb = -.061; Sig. (2-tailed) .645; rpb = .061; Sig. (1-tailed) .322 
Presence of residential area 
 
Variable is a constant 
 
 
No correlations were identified between the land use surrounding the airport and the 
normalised number of reported wildlife strikes. However, to conclude from this that there 
is no relationship between the airport surroundings and wildlife occurrences could be 
misleading. The possible reasons for not identifying significant relationships include: 
• The wildlife data is likely to be underreported; 
• The analysis considered only strike data, however, strikes are a random 
phenomenon, therefore an analysis using bird count data might come to different 
conclusions; and 
• The analysis considered only risk factors, but did not take control measures 
initiated by the airports into account (i.e. airports may be aware of their wildlife 
risk and have therefore put mitigation measures into place). 
Future research should address these issues.  
7.2.8 Conclusions United States 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the U.S. data: 
• Occurrence rates may be influenced by safety campaigns that promote safety 
awareness and a just culture; 
• The occurrence types have different causal factors associated with them; 
 7 Analysis of Causal Factors 
! "#$!
• The percentage of reported accidents / incidents where stakeholders and / or system 
components interact is low, but sufficient to show that occurrences can be caused 
by such interactions. Therefore, all system components and their interactions need 
to be assessed following the concept of SMS; 
• There is an indication that the stakeholders collect different occurrence types. 
However, the results need to be confirmed through further statistical testing; 
• Similarly, there is an indication that the stakeholders capture different causal 
factors, but again further testing is needed to confirm these results;  
• Stakeholders capture causal factors that lie within the responsibility of other 
parties, and which therefore might be useful for these parties. 
7.3 United Kingdom 
7.3.1 Data Overview 
For the UK three databases, representing the regulatory (UK CAA MORS), airline 
(easyJet AQD), and ground handling (Signature SHEBBA) perspectives were analysed. 
Table 34 shows the data in overview. 
 
Table 34: Data overview occurrences UK 
 
Stakeholder / 
database 
 
Geographical 
location 
 
Number of occurrences 
 
 
Number 
of airports 
involved 
 
 
Considered 
time period  
IN 
 
 
EX 
 
FOD 
 
WL 
 
Total 
Regulator / 
MORS UK 539 279 66 154 1038 255 2009 - 2010 
Airline / 
AQD Europe 69 1 75 -* 145 46 2005 - 2010 
Signature / 
SHEBBA UK 37 0 31 3 71 11 
2007 – 
April 2012 
* The wildlife data was excluded from further analysis for reasons explained in Chapter 6 Section 6.6.5. 
7.3.2 Occurrence Rates 
For the data provided by the UK CAA, normalisation data (i.e. movements per airport 
per year) was available only for the 50 biggest airports in the UK. For 205 mainly smaller 
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regional airfields no movement data was available. Nevertheless, a total of 327 accidents / 
incidents (i.e. 31.5%) occurred at these smaller airports and some experienced a very high 
number of accidents / incidents, with up to 15 occurrences within two years. Furthermore, 
with only two years of data available, a trend could not be established. For these reasons, 
occurrence rates from the MORS database are not shown. 
Among the 50 airports for which normalisation data was available the highest number 
of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) happened at airports with movements below the 
national average. Occurrences in this context refer to the total of incursions, excursions and 
FOD. The wildlife data has not been considered since, at 154 occurrences, the number of 
wildlife strikes seems low. Overall, the findings confirm the results from the analysis of 
the U.S. data, that less busy airports in terms of traffic movements experience a higher rate 
of occurrences. 
Figure 71 shows the reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) for 
easyJet. The figure shows the occurrence of incursions, excursions and FOD from 2005 to 
2009.  
 
 
Figure 71: easyJet reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements)  
 
As can be seen, the trend increased over the time period considered with the total 
number of occurrences tripling. This is due to the airline’s business expansion. easyJet was 
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established in 1995 and grew to a fleet of 189 aircraft servicing over 130 destinations by 
2013 (easyJet plc, 2013). Structured communications with the safety data providers 
revealed further explanations for this picture. Fluctuations in the number of occurrences 
are not only associated to easyJet’s expansion, but also to the opening of new routes to 
destinations in countries that are not always compliant with the International Air Transport 
Association’s (IATA) recommendations. In addition, more operations to seasonal airports 
were offered. These airports tend to invest less in infrastructure and operations due to the 
seasonal nature of their business and, consequently, limited profit opportunities (Structured 
communication with easyJet plc Safety Analysts and Investigatiors, July 2011). In 
addition, the company actively promotes a culture of open reporting of occurrences, which 
may have impacted the reporting level over time. 
For the airline, the highest number of occurrences was reported for destinations to 
which the airline has flown irregularly in the past. Therefore, the normalised number of 
occurrences is heavily influenced by the small number of movements and should not be 
generalised. The top five airports with the highest number of occurrences are shown in 
Appendix V (Tables 4 and 5) for each database, including the total number of movements 
per airport and their normalised number of occurrences.  
Structured communications with safety experts working at a major UK airport revealed 
that a fluctuation in terms of number of occurrences is also considerably influenced by the 
underlying procedures and operational practices. For example, a vehicle driver at a major 
UK airport, who does not use the airport surface on a regular basis, i.e. daily, has to book 
him / herself a slot on the manoeuvring area with the ATC tower. Once the vehicle is 
cleared, the clearance is valid for a whole day and the vehicle driver is free to go 
everywhere (except active runways). Vehicles that use the airport surface on a daily basis 
are automatically cleared. In contrast, vehicle drivers at other airports have to be cleared 
for every single movement they undertake on the airport surface. This concept of ‘free-
range’ implies that incidents such as a vehicle driver being on the taxiway without 
clearance barely exist at some airports. This influences the number of reports (Structured 
communication with Safety Manager of a major ground handling company at Heathrow 
Airport, 2011). Free range operations are practiced worldwide. 
There was no operational data available to normalise the safety data from Signature. 
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7.3.3 Frequency Analysis 
This section presents the results of the analysis of causal factors. The findings refer to 
incursions, excursions and FO(D) occurrences. Wildlife strikes are analysed subsequently. 
A total of 2,260 causal factors were extracted from the safety data and Table 35 shows 
their distribution across the three databases. Figures 72 and 73 show the distribution of 
causal factors across occurrence types summarised on the first and second levels of the 
taxonomy, respectively. 
 
Table 35: Data overview causal factors UK 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Database 
 
Number of 
occurrences 
analysed 
 
Number of 
critical factors 
extracted 
 
Number of 
different critical 
factors extracted 
from each 
database 
 
UK CAA MORS 884 1936 294 
easyJet AQD 145 226 92 
Signature SHEBBA 68 98 34 
 
As seen before, Figures 72 and 73 highlight that the different occurrence types have 
different causes. Comparing the results to the U.S., the UK data shows that environmental 
factors (e.g. poor visibility, adverse weather, reflecting sun) can lead to an incursion. Such 
factors were not captured in the U.S. databases. In addition, airport physical characteristics, 
such as inadequate markings, lighting and signage, were reported causes for incursions. 
Again, the U.S. FAA data did not record these factors. The causal factors underlying 
excursions and FOD are, to a large extent, the same as those reported in the U.S., though 
they differ in terms of their frequencies. For FO(D) occurrences, the UK data shows that 
V/PD human-related factors contribute to occurrences. This was not possible with the U.S. 
data as they were not recorded. 
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Figure 72: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type UK !
 
Figure 73: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type UK 
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Analysing the data by stakeholder (Figures 74 and 75), it can be seen that the regulator 
captured environmental factors as causes for incursions. This shows that stakeholders of 
the same type (in this case, regulators) can capture different causal factors. Similarly, the 
regulatory database in the UK (MORS) showed V/PD human-related factors as causes for 
FO(D), which were not present in the U.S. FAA data. 
There may be two explanations for the variation of causal factors across countries. The 
variations may be caused by national or geographical differences, or the reporting system. 
In this case, the latter is more probable as environmental factors, such as reflecting sun and 
low visibility conditions, exist in both countries. This indicates that the level of detail 
captured in occurrence reports varies, which in turn influences the causal factors. In fact, 
the database with the higher DQI (MORS) captured the greater variety of causal factors. 
This again supports the statement made in Chapter 6, i.e. that it is worth investing into high 
quality data. 
 
 
Figure 74: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type per database UK 
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Figure 75: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type per database UK !
The V/PD human-related factors were in addition identified as causes for FO(D) in the 
SHEBBA ground handling databases. Comparing these factors to the U.S. findings allows 
conclusions to be drawn on a lower causal level. That is, the causal factors differ across the 
countries even within one organisation (i.e. Signature), which could be a result of the 
reasons stated above (i.e. national or geographic differences). 
Comparing the data across the three stakeholders (i.e. regulator, airline and ground 
handling company), it can be seen that the various parties capture different causal factors. 
For example, the airline data does not capture environmental factors as causes for FOD, 
whereas the regulator identifies the impact of wildlife, and the ground handling company 
the contribution of weather. Likewise for incursions, the different stakeholders capture 
diverse perspectives. Whereas the airline and regulator capture predominantly pilot-related 
factors, ground handling captures mainly V/PD human-related factors, which indicates the 
different scope of the reporting systems depending on the interests and responsibilities of 
the concerned stakeholders. Therefore, an airline is predominantly concerned with 
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occurrences that involve pilots, while ground handling companies mainly collect data that 
relates to occurrences caused by V/PD. 
The highest number of causal factors identified from the MORS database at the third 
level of the taxonomy are classified as pilot human-reliability related factors (49.2% of 
causal factors). The analysis is shown in Appendix V Table 6. The most frequent causal 
factors for the airline fall into the category of runway / taxiway conditions (33.7%), 
followed by pilot human-reliability related factors (29.2%).  
Table 36 shows the most frequent causes at the factors level. The percentages given in 
the table show the percentage of occurrences to which a particular factor contributed.  
 
Table 36: Top 10 causal factors per database UK 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Database 
 
Top 10 causal factors  
UK CAA MORS 1. Pilot entering runway without authorisation (27.5%) 
2. Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (14.1%) 
3. V/PD entering runway without authorisation (12.1%) 
4. Pilot loss of control over the aircraft while on the runway 
(10.1%) 
5. Pilot non-compliance with ATC instructions (7.9%) 
6. Pilot readback not conform to the issued clearance (6.3%) 
7. Wind shear, gusts, other winds (5.9%) 
8. Pilot inexperience / student pilot (5.2%) 
9. Aircraft landing gear failure (5.0%) 
10. Hard landing (4.9%) 
easyJet AQD !" Other FOD / debris on the runway (19.3%) 
#" Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a 
runway (hold line) (18.6%) 
$" Wildlife remains on the runway (13.8%) 
%" Other FOD / debris on the taxiway (4.8%) 
&" Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (4.8%) 
'" Pilot not stopping at the required position on a taxiway 
(4.8%) 
(" Pilot entering runway without authorisation (4.1%) 
)" Pilot landing without clearance (3.5%) 
Signature SHEBBA !" V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (32.4%) 
#" V/PD failed to comply with traffic rules and to give way to 
preceding traffic (11.7%) 
$" Other FOD / debris on the taxiway (8.8%) 
%" Garbage / rubbish on the taxiway (7.4%) 
Cargo equipment (e.g. ULD container, palettes) on the 
taxiway (7.4%) 
'" Winds (5.9%) 
Environmental FOD (e.g. gravel, sand, stones) on the 
taxiway (5.9%) 
)" Blocked stand (4.4%) 
Parking on the double-white / double-yellow line (4.4%) 
Pedestrian wilful penetration of the manoeuvring area (4.4%) 
Pedestrian on the manoeuvring area (4.4%) 
FOD from an aircraft on the taxiway (4.4%) 
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It was possible to extract two causal factors for 456 accidents / incidents (i.e. 41.6%), 
see Figure 76. Of these, 94 occurrences showed an interaction between stakeholders and / 
or components of the airport surface system. 
 
 
Figure 76: Factor combinations – stakeholder / component interaction UK 
 
The three combinations of interactions between stakeholder and / or other components 
of the surface system with the highest frequencies are: the influence of weather on pilots, 
the interaction between ATC and pilots, and V/PD - pilot interactions. These are identical 
to those identified in the U.S. In addition, situations where aircraft technical failures lead to 
pilot-human related factors were identified. Figure 77 visualizes the results. 
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Figure 77: Factor combinations (Level 2) UK 
 
In a next step, the UK CAA wildlife data was analysed. However, for the majority of 
reports it was not possible to determine why an animal was present at an airport. Only one 
report out of 154 allowed the extraction of a causal factor. This report referred to a 
situation where a deer was present on the manoeuvring area due to a hole in the perimeter 
fence. For the remaining wildlife occurrences, it was only possible to identify the kind of 
animal that was involved in the occurrence (Table 37). 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Firstly, the data analysis confirms 
the findings from the literature review, which showed that it is not possible to identify the 
causes for why birds and mammals are present at airports. Secondly, the analysis has 
shown that other animals apart from birds, which have been addressed almost exclusively 
in the literature, can be present at an airport and can create a hazard. Therefore, more effort 
should be devoted to recording why animals are present as all mammals have the potential 
to challenge the safety of surface operations. Thus, an airport surface risk assessment 
should address all types of wildlife. 
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Table 37: Wildlife occurrences UK 
 
Animal 
 
 
Frequency 
Bird 139 
Cow 1 
Deer 7 
Dog 2 
Fox 2 
Rabbit 1 
Sheep 2 
 
The same analysis was done using a random sample of 100 occurrences classified as 
bird strikes in the easyJet data. Again, no causal factors could be extracted from the data. 
Due to the limited amount of information to be extracted from these occurrences, this data 
was not analysed further. Also, the three wildlife reports in the SHEBBA database did not 
contain information regarding their causes.  
7.3.4 Comparison of Stakeholder Viewpoints 
There was some overlap in the reporting between the three databases, raising the 
possibility of being able to identify how different stakeholders capture accidents / incidents 
from different viewpoints. To match the time periods, the AQD and SHEBBA data were 
first filtered for those occurrences that happened in 2009 and 2010. The reports captured in 
AQD and SHEBBA were subsequently matched to the MORS data based on the date and 
location of occurrence. For this analysis the whole MORS database was considered, 
including accidents / incidents that happened outside the UK. 
SHEBBA contains 25 UK occurrences for 2009 / 2010. None of these was found in the 
regulatory MORS database. Moreover, one of the Signature reports explicitly stated that an 
easyJet aircraft committed a taxi error. However, this was not captured in the airline data, 
which indicates underreporting in the airline and regulatory databases. 
easyJet’s AQD database captured 67 occurrences in 2009 / 2010 of which 15 (i.e. 
22.7%) were found in the regulatory MORS database. The wording of the descriptive 
narratives was not identical in the two databases, since the UK CAA provides its own 
summary for each occurrence. This CAA summary, however, in general reflected the 
original report from easyJet very well. In only three out of the 15 cases did the airline 
provide additional information, representing 20.0% of reports, although one needs to bear 
in mind the low sample size. The example below shows this. 
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For instance, a UK CAA report contains the following description: “ATC cleared a/c 1 
to vacate RWY onto TWY C and hold at C2 due to a/c 2 pushing back from freight apron 
onto TWY C. ATC then observed that a/c 1 had passed C2. Action taken to resolve 
situation.” This narrative allows for the extraction of ‘pilot not stopping at the required 
position on a taxiway’ as a causal factor. 
The airline report states: “On taxi-in we were cleared to 'C2' to hold. On arriving at the 
point where we thought the 'C2' holding point was, we had actually crossed the holding 
point by a short distance. At night the 'C2' holding point is not clear. It is not illuminated 
and with the ground being wet any markings were invisible.” This report allows for the 
identification of the reasons for crossing the holding point, namely, night-time operations, 
a wet surface and a lack of lighting. 
Overall, the UK CAA data reflects the facts of single reports well. However, there is a 
large number of occurrences that are not reported into MORS, as the examples from the 
airline (AQD) and ground handling (SHEBBA) databases show. This underreporting is an 
important finding, since the UK CAA claims to collect all safety challenging situations. In 
addition, it has implications for the validity of data collection systems on a multi-national 
level.  
As introduced in Chapter 6, ECCAIRS, for example, collects and analyses safety data 
from EU States with the objective of improving transport safety. The current analysis has 
shown that, at a national level, the aviation stakeholders report different percentages of 
their actual occurrences into the regulatory database, which leads to imbalances. In 
addition, the analysis indicated that some of the stakeholders fail to report all occurrences, 
i.e. operational personnel do not report everything. Of the reports that are filed, therefore, 
only a certain percentage goes into the regulatory database, although the regulator claims 
that its database contains all situations that might affect safety. This regulatory database is 
then aggregated on the EU level with other national databases that probably suffer from the 
same problems. 
7.3.5 Examination of Relationships 
Following the descriptive analysis the UK data is analysed for relationships between 
the variables. Firstly, the data was tested for associations between stakeholder and 
occurrence types (Figure 78). To make the analysis comparable between the three 
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stakeholders wildlife strikes were excluded. There was a significant association between 
the type of stakeholder and the type of occurrence X2 (4) = 266.031, p < .001. Cramer’s V 
= .0348, p < .001 indicates in addition, that this is a strong relationship. 
 
 
Figure 78: Occurrence type per stakeholder UK 
 
Subsequently the data was analysed for associations between stakeholders and causal 
factors (Figure 79). In this analysis the causal factors that related to inadequate regulations 
were excluded because of their low frequency. There was a significant association between 
the type of stakeholder and the causal factors X2 = 365.135 (6), p < .001. The Chi-Square 
test assumptions were fulfilled and Cramer’s V indicated a moderately strong relationship 
with a value of .284, p < .001. 
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Figure 79: Causal factors (Level 1) per stakeholder UK 
 
Next, the association between occurrence types and the causal factors at the first 
taxonomy level was analysed (Figure 80), with the results showing a significant 
association between the variables X2 (6) = 578.340, p < .001. Cramer’s V indicates a very 
strong relationship with a value of .358, p < .001. 
 
 
Figure 80: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type UK 
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In addition, each database was tested individually for associations between occurrence 
types and causal factors. A significant association was found for the UK CAA MORS data 
(X2 (6) = 289.578, p <. 001, Cramer’s V = .274, p < .001 – moderately strong relationship). 
Similar results were obtained using easyJet’s data (X2 (6) = 145.135, p < .001) and the data 
provided by Signature (X2 (2) = 7.947, p < .001). However, with 58.3% of cells having an 
expected count of less than five for the easyJet data, and 66.7% for the Signature data, 
these two tests violated the assumptions of the Chi-Square test and are, therefore, invalid. 
When testing the data at the airport level, i.e. for associations between the causal 
factors and airports, the same problem as was encountered during the analysis of the U.S. 
data was identified. The Chi-Square test assumptions were significantly violated because 
most of the causal factor categories at the first taxonomy level were very infrequently 
populated. In order to reduce the number of airports, and hence, the number of cells in the 
contingency table, the analysis was repeated for each database separately. However, this 
only marginally improved the test results. Overall, associations between causal factors and 
airports would require a much higher number of occurrences at the airport level. 
7.3.6 Conclusions United Kingdom 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the UK data: 
• Small airports (i.e. airports with movements below the national average) seem to 
have more occurrences reported; 
• Different stakeholders capture different occurrence types and causal factors; 
• There is an association between occurrence types and causal factors; 
• Stakeholders from different countries but of the same type (e.g. regulator) can pick 
up different causal factors. Therefore, the distribution of causal factors varies 
across stakeholders of the same type; 
• Causal factors underlying wildlife strikes can only rarely be determined; 
• There is an underreporting of aviation safety data; 
• The aviation stakeholders do not report all occurrences into the regulatory database. 
The regulatory database is imbalanced due to the varying degrees of reporting; 
• The regulatory database does not always contain all available information as to 
why an accident / incident occurred. In these cases, the complementary airline 
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report revealed further details, allowing the extraction of more causal factors and a 
better understanding of what happened and why. 
7.4 Norway 
7.4.1 Data Overview 
Six databases were available for the analysis of the safety of airport surface operations 
in Norway. The data was provided by the regulator (CAA-Norway ECCAIRS), the ANSP 
(Avinor-ANSP MESYS), the airport operators (Avinor-Airports MESYS, OSL IFS), and 
two airlines (Norwegian AQD, Wideroe Sentinel). Therefore, it was possible to overlap the 
perspectives of four different types of stakeholders. Table 38 shows the data in overview. 
In contrast to the U.S. and UK, most organisations in Norway (i.e. Avinor-ANSP and 
Airports, OSL) provided their full database. When pre-processing this data and filtering for 
relevant occurrences, a small number of collisions was found and included in the analysis. 
 
Table 38: Data overview occurrences NO 
 
Stakeholder 
/ database 
 
Geographical 
location 
  
Number of occurrences 
 
 
Number 
of airports 
involved 
 
 
Considered 
time period  
COL 
 
IN 
 
 
EX 
 
FOD 
 
WL 
 
Total 
Regulator / 
ECCAIRS Norway 6 332 29 125 108 600 54 2008 - 2010 
ANSP / 
MESYS Norway 0 361 18 10 163 552 21 2008 - 2010 
Airport OPR 
/  MESYS Norway 7 69 9 163 511 759 41 2008 - 2010 
Airport OPR 
/ IFS Oslo 4 155 4 41 19 223 1 2008 - 2010 
Airline / 
AQD Europe 0 39 2 - 269 310 16 
2007 – Oct. 
2011 
Airline / 
Sentinel Scandinavia 1 27 0 - - 28 15 
2008 – June 
2012 
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7.4.2 Occurrence Rates 
The number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) is shown for each database 
individually. Figure 81 contains the accident / incident trends for the CAA-Norway and 
Figure 82 for the Norwegian ANSP, Avinor. 
The regulatory data reflects a fourfold increase in occurrences from 2008 to 2010. The 
ANSP data also shows an increase in the number of reported accidents / incidents. In the 
case of the ANSP, structured communications with the data providers revealed that this is 
related to safety culture initiatives over recent years and the active promotion of open 
reporting. In addition, there has been a change in the management with younger people 
who had safety as part of their education being promoted into key positions. It is argued 
that this has led to a change in the mind-set in the whole organisation (Structured 
communication with Safety Investigatiors Avinor AS ANSP, June 2011). As all ANSP-
reports are automatically forwarded to the regulator, this development has also influenced 
the number of reports at the regulatory level. 
 
 
Figure 81: CAA-Norway reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) 
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Figure 82: Avinor-ANSP reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) 
 
A similar increasing trend can be observed from the data provided by the Avinor-
Airports division (Figure 83). For OSL, the airport operator of Oslo Airport, as shown in 
Figure 84, the overall trend was a decrease from 2008 to 2010. However, the data shows a 
50.0% increase of incursions from 2009 to 2010, which is related to construction work of a 
new terminal that commenced in 2010. 
No normalisation data was available for the two airlines due to sensitivity concerns on 
their part. 
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Figure 83: Avinor-Airports reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) 
 
 
Figure 84: OSL reported number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) 
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At the airport level, the regulatory data showed the highest number of occurrences at 
airports with movements below the national average. This analysis excludes wildlife 
strikes in order to make it comparable to the other databases. Also, Avinor-ANSP recorded 
the highest number of occurrences at small regional aerodromes with movements below 
the national average. Among the top five airports in the Avinor-Airports database, four 
showed movements below the national average. The analysis is shown in Appendix V 
Tables 7 and 8. All three databases point to the same problematic airports and structured 
communications with the safety data providers identified the reasons why small airfields 
experience a high number of occurrences. The SMEs indicated the following possible 
explanations for this (Structured communication with Safety Investigatiors Avinor AS 
ANSP, June 2011):  
• The number of general aviation (GA) movements is relatively high at these 
airports; 
• The small number of aircraft movements at these airports leads to inexperience in 
traffic handling; 
• Airport personnel have more time to report than at large and busy airports;  
• Some of these airports have a manager with a very strong safety culture and 
therefore report any situation that deviated from the normal operations;  
• There are military activities at some of these airports; and 
• A flying school was operating at one of the airports.  
7.4.3 Frequency Analysis 
This section analyses the underlying causes of occurrences. As before, the analysis of 
causal factors excludes wildlife strikes, which are assessed subsequently separately. Table 
39 provides an overview of the data. 
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Table 39: Data overview causal factors NO 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Database 
 
Number of 
occurrences 
 
Number of 
critical factors 
extracted 
 
Number of 
different critical 
factors extracted 
from the 
database 
 
CAA-Norway ECCAIRS 492 770 199 
Avinor-ANSP MESYS 389 626 183 
Avinor-Airports MESYS 248 402 144 
OSL IFS 204 290 77 
Norwegian AQD 41 96 58 
Wideroe Sentinel 28 52 26 
 
Figures 85 and 86 show the causal factors of each occurrence type, aggregated for the 
whole country on the first and second level of the taxonomy. Again it can be seen that 
adding new databases allows the identification of causal factors that are not accessible 
when fewer datasets are used. For example, the U.S. and UK databases failed to identify 
ATC-related factors as causes for excursions. On the other hand, the Norwegian data 
indicates that 2.8% of factors leading to excursions refer to ATC contributions. 
 
 
Figure 85: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type NO 
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Figure 86: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type NO 
 
The identified collisions were caused by a combination of human-related factors (pilot, 
ATC, V/PD), and airport physical characteristics, as well as weather. Overall, the causal 
factors are similar to those identified in the U.S. and UK analyses, but differ in terms of 
their frequencies. The causes reported for excursions include aircraft technical failure, 
human factors (pilot, ATC, V/PD), airport physical characteristics, and weather. The 
causes of FO(D) were identified as aircraft technical failures, pilot and V/PD contributions, 
airport physical characteristics, and environmental factors (i.e. weather, wildlife, others). 
The incursions were predominantly due to human-related factors (pilot, ATC, V/PD). In 
addition, aircraft and airport technical failures, airport physical characteristics and 
environmental factors contributed to some of the occurrences. 
Analysing the data by stakeholder (Figures 87 and 88), it becomes apparent that the 
ATC contributions to excursions that have been newly identified in the data were for the 
most part reported by the airline. 
Whilst mostly the same causal factors are reported for each occurrence type, their 
distribution differs across the stakeholders. For example, the airport operator Avinor shows 
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predominantly V/PD-human factors as causes for incursions, whereas the airlines 
identified mainly pilot-related factors, and ATC (i.e. Avinor-ANSP) and the regulator (i.e. 
CAA-Norway) show an approximately equal split between V/PD and pilot-related factors. 
Furthermore, the distribution of the causal factors captured by the two airport operators 
varies, indicating that the causal factors differ at the airport level. 
The different frequency distributions of causal factors are a result of the different focus 
of stakeholders and the nature of their operations. For example, wildlife remains on the 
surface are the responsibility of the airport operator, but are not a major concern for ATC, 
unless they cause a disruption to the operations. Thus, certain causal factors are more 
relevant for the tasks of specific stakeholders. Therefore, they are more likely to be found 
in the corresponding databases. The distribution of causal factors at the third taxonomy 
level is shown in Appendix V Table 9. 
 
 
Figure 87: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type per organisation NO !
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Figure 88: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type per organisation NO !
The different focus of stakeholders is also reflected when analysing the data at the level 
of factors. Table 40 shows the top 10 most frequently identified causal factors for each 
database. The quantities given reflect the percentage of occurrences caused by a particular 
factor. 
 
Table 40: Top 10 causal factors per database NO 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Database 
 
Top 10 causal factors  
CAA-Norway ECCAIRS 1. V/PD entering runway without authorisation (12.8%); 
2. V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (10.4%); 
3. Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (9.4%); 
4. Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a 
runway (hold line)  (9.2%); 
5. Pilot entering runway without authorisation (7.3%); 
6. Maintenance / construction work taking place on the airport 
surface (6.7%); 
FOD – Environmental (gravel, sand, stones, etc.) on the 
runway (6.7%); 
8. V/PD no contact to ATC in the first instance to ask for 
clearance (3.9%); 
Other FOD / debris on the runway (3.9%); 
10. Snow removal operations (3.8%) 
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Avinor-ANSP MESYS !" Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (22.9%); 
#" V/PD entering runway without authorisation (10.5%); 
$" Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a 
runway (hold line)  (9.8%); 
%" Pilot took off without clearance (9.0%); 
&" V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (6.9%); 
'" Pilot entering runway without authorisation (6.2%); 
(" V/PD no contact to ATC in the first instance to ask for 
clearance (5.9%); 
)" Pilot correct read back, followed by an unauthorised 
manoeuvre (4.9%); 
*" V/PD entering the manoeuvring area without authorisation 
(3.1%); 
!+" Pilot not stopping at the required position on the 
manoeuvring area (2.6%) 
Avinor-Airports MESYS 1. FOD – Environmental (gravel, sand, stones, etc.) on the 
runway (13.3%); 
2. V/PD entering runway without authorisation (8.9%); 
3. FOD - Tools / small parts on the taxiway (6.9%); 
Other FOD / debris on the runway (6.9%); 
5. FOD – Concrete, asphalt (pavements) on the runway (4.8%); 
6. V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (4.4%); 
7. V/PD no contact to ATC in the first instance to ask for 
clearance (4.0%); 
Deterioration of infrastructure (4.0%); 
Other FOD / debris on the taxiway (4.0%); 
10. Snow removal operations (3.6%) 
OSL IFS !" Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (31.4%); 
#" V/PD entering taxiway without authorisation (16.7%); 
$" Pilot not stopping at the required position on the 
manoeuvring area (13.7%); 
%" Construction area (3.9%); 
V/PD entering runway without authorisation (3.9%); 
FOD – Concrete, asphalt (pavements) on the runway (3.9%); 
(" FOD – Environmental (gravel, sand, stones, etc.) on the 
taxiway (3.4%); 
ATC forgetting to switch off stop bar lights (3.4%); 
*" Snow removal operations (2.9%); 
Other FOD / debris on the taxiway (2.9%) 
Norwegian AQD 1. Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (19.5%); 
Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a 
runway (hold line)  (19.5%); 
3. Pilot took off without clearance (14.6%); 
4. Pilot entering runway without authorisation (9.8%); 
5. Pilot turned down the volume on VHF/Radio (7.3%); 
ATC issuing conflicting clearances (7.3%); 
Pilot landing without clearance (7.3%); 
Pilot not stopping at the required position on a taxiway 
(7.3%) 
Wideroe Sentinel 1. Pilot took off without clearance (32.1%); 
2. Pilot entering runway without authorisation (17.9%); 
3. Pilot misperception concerning a clearance (17.9%); 
4. Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (14.3%); 
5. Pilot misapplication of procedures (10.7%); 
6. Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a 
runway (hold line) (10.7%) 
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The analysis further identified a total of 432 reports (excluding wildlife), i.e. 30.8% 
that contained two causal factors. Most of these interactions refer to the same causal factor 
category. Only 24.8% of the 432 occurrences showed an interaction between the 
stakeholders and / or other components of the airport surface system (Figure 89). 
Occurrence reports with stakeholder interactions were, however, found within all databases 
and Figure 90 presents their frequencies. 
 
 
Figure 89: Factor combinations – stakeholder / component interaction NO !
The analysis of stakeholder / component interactions reveals national differences. In 
contrast to the U.S. and UK that have a similar picture, Norway shows the influence of 
airport physical characteristics on pilot performance as being the highest category of 
stakeholder / component interactions (26.2%). This figure is approximately 20.0% higher 
than in the U.S. and UK. These national variations could have several explanations. Firstly, 
national reporting systems might have failed to capture some of the factors and 
interactions. Secondly, a particular combination might not exist in another country. Some 
factors reported for airport physical characteristics are inadequate marking, lighting, and 
signage. Such infrastructure might not be a problem in other countries. The U.S. pilots for 
example reported (in section 7.2.6) that they perceived the marking, lighting, and signage 
at U.S. airports as being adequate.  
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Figure 90: Factor combinations (Level 2) NO !
With respect to Norway’s wildlife strike data, Table 41 shows the type of animals 
involved in the reported occurrences for each database. As is the case in the other 
countries, it was generally not possible to extract a causal factor from most wildlife 
occurrence reports. The Avinor-Airports data, however, did allow the identification of the 
causes of wildlife strikes in ten cases. The causes identified were: 
• Animals coming through a hole under the fence; 
• Animals coming through a hole in the fence; 
• Animals jumping over the fence; 
• Person feeding birds; and 
• Fishing industry next to the airport attracts birds. 
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Table 41: Wildlife occurrences NO 
 
Animal 
 
Organisation 
 
 
Total 
 
Avinor-
Airports 
 
 
Avinor-
ANSP 
 
CAA-
Norway 
 
Norwegian 
 
OSL 
Bird 441 148 3 296 17 878 
Cat 1 - 1 - - 2 
Cow 1 - 1 - - 2 
Deer 26 4 18 - - 48 
Dog - 1 3 - 2 6 
Elk - - 8 - - 8 
Fox 10 5 19 - - 34 
Lamb 3 - 3 - - 6 
Moose 16 3 8 - - 27 
Otter 1 - - - - 1 
Rabbit 7 2 - - - 18 
Sheep 5 - 6 - - 11 
Unknown - - 29 - - 29 
Total 511 163 108 296 19 1070 !!
The ANSP collected the highest number of wildlife strikes and, therefore, its data for 
21 airports was used to analyse relationships with airport location and surrounding land 
use.  Table 42 shows the Point-Biseial Correlation Coefficients (rpb ). 
 
Table 42: Correlation coefficients wildlife strike analysis NO 
 
Variable 
 
Norway 
n = 21 
 
Presence of sea rpb  = -.219; Sig. (2-tailed) .340; rpb = -.219; Sig. (1-tailed) .170 
Presence of lake 
 
Variable is a constant 
 
Presence of river rpb = .036; Sig. (2-tailed) .877; rpb = .036; Sig. (1-tailed) .439 
Presence of forest 
 
Variable is a constant 
 
Presence of mountains 
 
No data available* 
 
Presence of field rpb = -.158; Sig. (2-tailed) .494; rpb = -.158; Sig. (1-tailed) .247 
Presence of residential area rpb = -.159; Sig. (2-tailed) .492; rpb = -.159; Sig. (1-tailed) .246 
                     * The images from Google Earth were not clear enough to extract reliable data. 
 
Similarly to the U.S. Northeast, no correlations were identified between the land use 
surrounding the airport and the normalised number of reported wildlife strikes in Norway.  
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7.4.4 Comparison of Stakeholder Viewpoints 
After having analysed each database for causal factors, the reports of the different 
databases were matched to see whether the stakeholders capture accidents / incidents from 
different perspectives. To match the occurrence reports from the various databases each 
database was ordered chronologically. Data from 2008 to 2010 was considered for this 
analysis and wildlife data excluded. Subsequently, the reports were matched based on the 
occurrence date, time and location (i.e. airport). In case several occurrences happened on 
the same day at the same airport, the descriptive narratives were read in order to make sure 
that reports referring to the same occurrence were matched. 
The results of the analysis were validated with senior safety investigators from Avinor 
ANSP in face-to-face interviews (Structured communication with Safety Investigatiors 
Avinor AS ANSP, June 2011). The results were presented and the SMEs were asked to 
comment on their validity. 
 
• Distribution of reports across stakeholders 
 
A total of 990 airport surface safety occurrences were identified over the time period 
considered. Figure 91 shows the number of parties that reported these accidents / incidents 
in overview and Table 43 shows the distribution of reports per stakeholder.  
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Table 43: Distribution of reports per stakeholder NO 
 
Stakeholder / combination of stakeholders who reported 
 
Percentage of 
occurrences reported by 
only one stakeholder 
 
 
Percentage of 
occurrences reported 
by two stakeholders 
 
Percentage of 
occurrences reported 
by three stakeholders 
 
Percentage of 
occurrences reported 
by four stakeholders 
CAA_Norway 29.2%    
Avinor-ANSP 29.4%    
OSL 21.2%    
Avinor-Airports  16.7%    
Norwegian 1.9%    
Wideroe 1.6%    
Total 100.0%    
CAA-Norway / Avinor-ANSP  42.9%   
CAA-Norway / Avinor-Airports  41.9%   
Avinor-ANSP / OSL  5.7%   
CAA-Norway / OSL  4.4%   
Avinor-ANSP / Avinor-Airports  1.3%   
Avinor-ANSP / Wideroe  1.3%   
CAA-Norway / Wideroe  1.0%   
CAA-Norway / Norwegian  0.6%   
Avinor-ANSP / Norwegian  0.6%   
OSL / Wideroe  0.3%   
Total  100.0%   
CAA-Norway / Avinor-ANSP / OSL   77.0%  
CAA-Norway / Avinor-ANSP / Avinor-Airports   7.7%  
CAA-Norway / Avinor-ANSP / Norwegian   5.1%  
CAA-Norway / Avinor ANSP / Wideroe   5.1%  
Avinor-ANSP / OSL / Norwegian   5.1%  
Total   100.0%  
CAA-Norway / Avinor-ANSP / OSL / Norwegian    100.0% 
 
 7 Analysis of Causal Factors 
! "#"!
The analysis in Figure 91 and Table 43 shows that the majority of occurrences (i.e. 
64.0%) were only captured by a single stakeholder. CAA reports that have no matching 
entries in another database are most probably occurrences reported by other airlines (i.e. 
not Norwegian or Wideroe). A total of 220 occurrences were found only in either the 
Avinor-ANSP or Avinor-Airports databases. However, the validation of the results with 
SMEs revealed that this is incorrect. The SMEs pointed out that both Avinor-ANSP and 
Avinor-Airports have an automated reporting process to the CAA-Norway. That is, as soon 
as a report is received a copy is sent to the regulator and, therefore, each occurrence 
captured in the Avinor-ASNP and Airports data should have a matching entry in the 
regulatory database. 
To verify the results the analysis was repeated as described above, and the initial 
results were confirmed. In addition, the regulatory data was searched for reports that were 
only found in the Avinor-ANSP and Airports databases (i.e. by date, descriptive narrative, 
and key words such as aircraft call sign). However, no matching reports could be 
identified. 
For this research Avinor-ANSP and Airports’ entire databases were available and the 
relevant occurrences were extracted manually. On the other hand, the CAA-Norway 
provided only data for requested occurrence types (i.e. runway incursions, taxiway 
incursions, ground collisions, excursions, FOD, wildlife strikes, bird strikes). Assuming 
that all ANSP and Airport reports go to the regulator, a possible explanation for the loss of 
information could be found in the occurrence classification. For example, incursions 
identified only in the Avinor-ANSP and Airports databases showed various classifications 
(e.g. aircraft deviated from the cleared route; NULL – i.e. no classification assigned; 
aircraft, vehicle, people or animals moving on the runway without clearance; unauthorised 
traffic on the manoeuvring area, etc.). Manual sorting allowed for the identification of 
these occurrences relevant to the context of surface safety. Accidents / incidents identified 
as relevant in the ANSP and Airports data might, however, not be classified as runway / 
taxiway occurrences in the regulatory database and, therefore, might not have been 
captured during the data query. The problem of inadequate / misleading occurrence 
classifications has already been raised during the data pre-processing in Chapter 6. 
This loss of information in the system has implications, since analyses on a national 
level might be based on incomplete data. Chapter 4 highlighted that it is the State’s 
responsibility to define an acceptable level of safety (ALoS) and to set safety targets at the 
national level. The current analysis, however, showed that the data used for such 
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assessments could be insufficient. Chapter 5 noted that the quality of reports varies 
depending on the quality of the reporting system that is used by the stakeholders. In 
addition, the current analysis showed that some of the stakeholders in Norway do not 
report all occurrences to the regulator. The percentages of occurrences reported to the 
CAA by the primary stakeholders vary. Furthermore, the analysis indicated that there is a 
problem in the system that leads to the loss of a large amount of information. Therefore, 
national data can vary on three different levels: occurrence report, primary stakeholder and 
regulator. The use of such data to define an ALoS is therefore questionable. 
If combined with safety data from other countries that may have a different safety / 
reporting culture, a fourth factor that challenges the equality of safety data is introduced. 
This has implications for multi-national reporting systems such as ECCAIRS. On a 
European level such data is used for safety reviews and to monitor the safety of the 
aviation system. Based on the findings of this research, the effectiveness of such practices 
must be questioned.  
The analysis of the Norwegian data also indicated that there is underreporting in some 
of the databases. For instance, one report of an occurrence whereby an aircraft committed a 
taxi error at a certain intersection in one of the airport operator’s databases stated: “I will in 
general admit that I do not always report a taxi error on taxiway S vs. T. This taxi error 
happens quite often and it happens that this incident is forgotten / downplayed.” 
 
• Causal factors captured by stakeholders 
 
In the next step, the reports that were captured by only a single stakeholder were 
analysed further. The occurrences were analysed for their causes in order to see into which 
stakeholder’s responsibility the extracted causal factors fall. Table 44 shows the factors in 
overview. 
 Table 44 shows that all of the stakeholders do keep data that falls into the 
responsibility of other parties. For example, 18.8% of all occurrences were only found in 
the database of the Norwegian ANSP. Of the extracted causal factors only 10.0% refer to 
ATC-related failures and, therefore, 90.0% of causes fall into the responsibility of another 
stakeholder. The results highlight that the stakeholders would benefit from sharing aviation 
safety data. 
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Table 44: Causal factors (Level 1) per stakeholder NO 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Aircraft operations 
 
ATC 
 
Airport 
operations 
 
Environment 
Regulator (CAA-
Norway) 
43.6% 7.2% 45.6% 3.6% 
ANSP (Avinor) 55.0% 10.0% 34.6% 0.4% 
Airport (Avinor) 82.0% 4.5% 11.2% 2.3% 
Airport (OSL) 32.5% 7.3% 58.6% 1.6% 
Airline (Norwegian) 74.1% 14.8% 11.1% 0.0% 
Airline (Wideroe) 89.7% 10.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
• Reporting structure  
 
After analysing the occurrences only captured by one party, the following section 
analyses the accidents / incidents captured by multiple parties. A total of 356 occurrences 
(i.e. 36.0% of the total data) were reported by at least two stakeholders. 
In fact, 95.5% of those reports were identical, i.e. written by one stakeholder and 
forwarded to another one who just kept a copy. Different reports were identified for just 
4.5% of occurrences. Of these, 1.4% came to the same conclusions. However, in 3.1% of 
cases the reports were complementary and by combining them it was possible to gain a 
more detailed understanding of why the occurrence happened. This indicates once again 
that multiple reports have the potential to be beneficial, and conforms to the findings from 
the analysis of the UK data. Figure 92 summarises the reporting structure in Norway as 
derived from the data and validated through SMEs. 
 
 
Figure 92: National reporting system NO !
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The airports, ATC and airlines report to the CAA-Norway and the regulator keeps a 
copy of the original reports in their database. However, the investigation findings that are 
added later to the reports in the primary databases are not passed on to the regulator. In 
addition, the ANSP forwards a copy of their reports to the airport operator OSL who keeps 
these copies in its database. If the same occurrence is reported by an airline and ATC the 
reports differ. Similarly, the airlines and airports each write their own reports for accidents 
/ incidents, and also, the reports between ANSP and Avinor-Airports differ. Hence, in 
order to capture multiple perspectives each occurrence should ideally be captured by the 
airports, airlines and ATC. The regulator on the other hand aggregates this information 
only for monitoring purposes. 
7.4.5 Examination of Relationships 
In the final part of the analysis the data was tested for associations between the 
variables. As the number of collisions was too low to be used for statistical analysis, these 
accidents were aggregated with the incursion data. In addition, the wildlife data was 
excluded in order to make the analysis comparable to the U.S. and UK. 
The analysis showed a significant association between the type of stakeholder and the 
occurrence types X2 (6) = 235.125, p < .001. Cramer’s V = .290, p < .001 indicates a 
moderately strong relationship (Figure 93). 
There was also a significant association between the type of stakeholder and the causal 
factors on the first level of the taxonomy X2 (9) = 304.026, p < .001. With a value of .213, 
p < .001 Cramer’s V indicates a moderately strong relationship (Figure 94). 
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Figure 93: Occurrence type per stakeholder NO 
 
 
Figure 94: Causal factors (Level 1) per stakeholder NO 
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Subsequently, the data was tested for associations between occurrence types and causal 
factors (Level 1) with the analysis revealing a significant association between the two 
variables (Level 1) X2 (6) = 491.029, p < .001. Cramer’s V indicates a strong relationship 
with a value of .331, p < .001 (Figure 95). 
 
 
Figure 95: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type NO !
In addition to testing the data on an aggregated level, the relationship between the 
occurrence types and the causal factors was tested for each database individually. Table 45 
contains the results. An analysis for the Wideroe data was not possible because the 
Sentinel data contained only incursions. 
 
Table 45: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type per stakeholder NO 
 
Database 
 
Test statistics Chi-Square test 
 
 
X2 
 
 
Sign. 
 
Test assumptions 
CAA-Norway ECCAIRS 195.948 P < .001 Violated  
Avinor-ANSP MESYS 35.441 P < ..001 Violated  
Avinor-Airports MESYS 131.677 P < ..001 Violated  
OSLIFS 42.697 P < ..001 Violated  
Norwegian AQD 6.144 P > .05 Violated  
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Table 45 shows that all test statistics violated the assumptions of the Chi-Square test, 
and that the data samples from the individual organisations are not large enough for 
statistical analysis. 
A further analysis considered whether an association exists between airports and the 
causal factors. To test this relationship the example of the Avinor-ANSP MESY database 
was used since this database refers to only a small number of airports (21 airports). The 
results show a significant association X2 (60) = 164.783, p. < 001. However, the test 
assumptions are violated with 60.7% of cells having an expected count of less than five. 
Also, when excluding the lowest populated category of causal factors (i.e. environment) 
the results improved only marginally (X2 (40) = 134.877, p < .001; 47.6% of cells having 
an expected count of less than five). Therefore, the results are invalid, and more data is 
needed for statistically rigorous analysis. 
7.4.6 Conclusions Norway 
The following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the Norwegian data: 
• An active promotion of a safety culture can influence the number of reports;  
• The normalised number of reported occurrences is higher at small regional airports;  
• An analysis of new data sets can bring so far unknown causal factors to light; 
• The analysis indicated that not all causal factors are relevant for all parties, and that 
the stakeholders’ operations (i.e. tasks) influence the factors that are reflected in the 
databases; 
• National variations for the causal factors were identified and possible reasons 
discussed; 
• There are statistical associations between stakeholders and occurrence types, 
stakeholders and causal factors, and occurrence types and causal factors. 
• The quality of safety data varies on four levels: i) the individual report, ii) the 
reporting system of the primary stakeholder, iii) the regulatory reporting system, 
and iv) the national safety / reporting culture. 
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7.5 New Zealand 
7.5.1 Data Overview 
The ASMS database provided by the regulatory body of New Zealand, the NZ CAA, 
was assessed. A total of 220 occurrences were analysed over a period of ten years and 
Table 46 shows the data in overview. 
 
Table 46: Data overview occurrences NZ 
 
Stakeholder / 
database 
 
Geographical 
location 
  
Number of occurrences 
 
 
Number 
of airports 
involved 
 
 
Considered 
time period  
COL 
 
IN 
 
 
EX 
 
FOD 
 
WL 
 
Total 
Regulator / 
ASMS NZ 9 148 62 1 0 220 60 2000 - 2009 
7.5.2 Occurrence Rates 
There is no regulatory requirement for airports to report their movements in New 
Zealand and, consequently, normalisation data was only available for 20 of the 60 airports. 
The airports without data are mainly small regional airfields that accounted for 25.5% of 
all occurrences. Missing data means it is not sensible to show the trend of occurrences, as 
this might be misleading. 
7.5.3 Frequency Analysis 
A total of 484 causal factors were extracted from the data (Table 47) and their 
distribution at the first and second taxonomy level are shown in Figures 96 and 97. 
 
Table 47: Data overview causal factors NZ 
 
Stakeholder 
 
Database 
 
Number of 
occurrences 
 
Number of 
critical factors 
extracted 
 
Number of 
different critical 
factors extracted 
from the 
database 
 
NZ CAA ASMS 220 484 169 
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Figure 96: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type NZ !
 
Figure 97: Causal factors (Level 2) per occurrence type NZ 
 7 Analysis of Causal Factors 
! "##!
The majority of reported occurrences are incursions and excursions. At a high level, the 
NZ CAA captures similar factors as seen in the other countries. Aircraft technical failures, 
pilot-related factors, airport physical characteristics and weather are reported causes of 
excursions. Incursions are caused predominantly by human-related factors (i.e. pilot, ATC, 
V/PD).  
Although, at a high level, the causal factors are similar to those reported in other 
countries, they vary in terms of their frequency and detail. This becomes apparent when 
analysing the data at the level of factors. The NZ CAA captures a large variety of factors 
with a total of 169 different causal factors. In comparison to the other countries, ATC 
technical factors, airport technical factors, and factors in relation to the regulatory system 
are not captured in New Zealand’s ASMS database. 
The causal factors most frequently extracted from the occurrence reports are shown in 
Table 48. The quantities indicate the percentage of occurrences that had a particular factor 
underlying them. The top causal factor contributing to 15.5% of accidents / incidents 
relates to ATC issuing conflicting clearances. Unlike the other countries, ATC has an 
important role at New Zealand’s airports. 
 
Table 48: Top 10 causal factors NZ 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Database 
 
Top 10 causal factors  
NZ CAA ASMS 1. ATC issuing conflicting clearances (15.5%); 
Pilot entering runway without authorisation (15.5%); 
3. Loss of control over the aircraft while on the runway (12.3%); 
4. Pilot took off without clearance (8.2%); 
5. Pilot landed or departed on the wrong / closed runway (5.5%); 
Pilot not stopping at the required position in front of a runway 
(hold line) (5.5%); 
7. ATC mishandling of flight strips (5.0%); 
Pilot entering taxiway without authorisation (5.0%); 
9. Wind shear, gusts, other winds (4.6%); 
10. Pilot inexperience / student pilot (4.1%); 
Pilot correct read back, followed by an unauthorised manoeuvre 
(4.1%); 
Short landing (4.1%) 
 
For 91 occurrences, i.e. 41.4% of the total number, it was possible to extract two causal 
factors from the occurrence reports. As seen before, only the minority of occurrences 
(19.8%) showed an interaction between stakeholders and / or components of the airport 
surface system. Similar to Norway, interactions between pilots and airport physical 
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characteristics occurred most frequently (six times). In addition, the influence of weather 
on pilot performance caused six of the accidents / incidents. 
7.5.4 Examination of Relationships 
Finally, the data was analysed for associations between occurrence types and causal 
factors (Figure 98). As collisions are rare they were aggregated with incursions. 
Additionally, the single FOD occurrence was excluded from the analysis.  
There was a significant association between the occurrence type and the causal factors 
at the first taxonomy level X2 (4) = 93.011, p < .001. Cramer’s V indicates an extremely 
good relationship (4.39, p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 98: Causal factors (Level 1) per occurrence type NZ !
In addition, the relationship between airports and causal factors was tested. Again, the 
occurrence categories of incursions and collisions were combined and the FOD occurrence 
excluded from the analysis. There was a significant association between airports and causal 
factors (X2 (87) = 144.214, p < .001). However, with 85.0% of cells having an expected 
count less than 5 the test assumptions are violated invalidating the results. 
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7.5.5 Wildlife Analysis 
To understand the causes of wildlife strikes better the data was correlated to 
characteristics of the airport location and airport surrounding land use. Section 6.6.12 
discussed that New Zealand’s database contains two spread-sheets (i.e. with investigation 
findings, without investigation). The wildlife strike data was extracted from the spread-
sheet without investigation findings. The analysis was limited to the 20 airports for which 
normalisation data was available. All wildlife strike data has been normalised using the 
number of movements per airport per year.  
Table 49 shows the Point-Biseial Correlation Coefficients (rpb ). 
 
Table 49: Correlation coefficients wildlife strike analysis NZ 
 
Variable 
 
New Zealand 
n = 20 
 
Presence of sea rpb = -.001; Sig. (2-tailed) .998; rpb = -.001; Sig. (1-tailed) .499 
Presence of lake rpb = -.275; Sig. (2-tailed) .174; rpb = -.275; Sig. (1-tailed) .087 
Presence of river rpb = -.103; Sig. (2-tailed) .617; rpb = -.103; Sig. (1-tailed) .308 
Presence of forest rpb = .035; Sig. (2-tailed) .865; rpb = .035; Sig. (1-tailed) .432 
Presence of mountains rpb = -.107; Sig. (2-tailed) .603; rpb = -.107; Sig. (1-tailed) .302 
Presence of field rpb = -.178; Sig. (2-tailed) .386; rpb = -.178; Sig. (1-tailed) .193 
Presence of residential area rpb = -.185; Sig. (2-tailed) .365 rpb = -.185; Sig. (1-tailed) .183 
 
No correlations were identified between the land use surrounding the airport and the 
normalised number of reported wildlife strikes and possible reasons were discussed in 
section 7.2.7. 
7.5.6 Conclusions New Zealand 
The analysis of the data gathered from New Zealand confirmed the findings from the 
other countries and similar causal factors were identified to those seen previously. 
However, the factors varied in frequency and detail. Furthermore, an association between 
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occurrence types and causal factors was found. As only regulatory data was available for 
New Zealand, the impact of the stakeholders on occurrences and causal factors could not 
be analysed. 
7.6 Discussion 
This section concludes the analysis of causal factors at the State-level and summarises 
the findings concerning occurrence rates, causal factors, reporting and data quality, and 
analytical methodologies. The main results of the analysis of causal factors are summarised 
in Table 50, which shows the percentage of occurrence types and causal factors per 
organisation.  
The rates of reported occurrences differ considerable between the databases and the 
various reasons for this have been discussed throughout this chapter. Apart from data 
quality issues, this chapter has identified other strong reasons as to why occurrence rates 
differ (e.g. operating procedures, active safety promotion) across organisations and, 
therefore, why such data cannot be compared. In most countries it was the smaller airports 
that showed the highest number of reported occurrences (per 100,000 movements). 
The analysis showed that the various stakeholders capture different occurrence types 
and underlying causal factors in their databases. Significant associations between the type 
of stakeholder and the occurrence type, as well as the type of stakeholder and the causal 
factors were found. In addition, the data showed variations in the distribution of the causal 
factors as captured through the stakeholders, i.e. the stakeholders capture the causal factors 
in different frequencies. The analysis further identified situations in which the stakeholders 
capture causal factors that fall into the responsibility of another actor. In addition, 
situations were found in which a stakeholder failed to capture factors that are critical for 
their own operations. This points to an inadequacy in their system, either through not 
realising that there was a problem, or inadequate reporting practices. In both cases, data 
sharing would be beneficial. 
A minority of occurrence reports captured interactions between different causal factor 
groups. This proves, however, that occurrences can be caused by an interaction between 
stakeholders and / or other system components and that safety risk assessments must 
address all components of a system and their interactions. 
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Table 50: Summary causal factor analysis 
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Occurrence Type             
Incursions / collisions ! ! ! !  ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !! ! ! ! !! ! ! !! 
Excursions  ! ! ! ! !! ! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! !  ! ! ! 
FOD  ! !  !! !! ! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !   ! 
Taxonomy Level 1 and 2             
Aircraft operations             
        Aircraft - Technical ! !!!  !!  ! ! ! ! !  ! 
        Pilot - Human !!!! !!! ! !!! !!! !!! !!! ! ! !!! !!!! !!!! !!!! 
ATC             
        ATC Technical !   ! !  ! !     
        ATC – Human !! !  ! !! !! !! ! !! !! !! !! 
Airport operations             
        Airport - Technical !   ! ! ! ! ! !    
        V/PD – Human !!  !!!! !! ! !!! !!! ! ! ! !!! !  !! 
        Airport Physical ! !! !!! !! !!! !! !! ! ! ! !! !  ! 
Environment             
        Weather ! !! ! !! ! ! ! ! ! !  ! 
        Other ! ! ! !  !  !     
Regulatory system             
Top 3 Taxonomy Level 3 1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. RWY / 
TWY 
conditions 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. RWY / 
TWY 
conditions 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
1. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
 2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. Aircraft – 
technical 
failure 
2. RWY / 
TWY 
conditions 
2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. Pilot – 
Human 
reliability 
2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. V/PD – 
Human 
reliability 
2. Pilot 
situational 
awareness 
2. Pilot – 
Communi-
cations 
2. ATC 
human 
reliability 
 3. Pilot – 
Communi-
cations 
3. Winds 3. Weather 3. Pilot – 
Communi-
cations 
3. Pilot 
situational 
awareness 
3. RWY / 
TWY 
conditions 
3. Pilot – 
Communi-
cations 
3. Aerodrome 
operations 
3. RWY / 
TWY 
conditions 
3. Pilot 
resources 
3. ATC 
communi-
cations 
3. Pilot 
situational 
awareness 
Note: wildlife strikes have been excluded from this analysis. 
!: Causal factors accounted for less than 5.0% of all causal factors, !!: Causal factors accounted for 5.01% to 25.0 % of all causal factors, !!!: Causal factors accounted 
for 25.01 % to 50.0% of all causal factors, !!!!: Causal factors accounted for more than 50.0% of all causal factors
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Where it was possible to compare the occurrence reports from different stakeholders 
they were often found to be complementary. In particular, airline data provided additional 
information as to why occurrences happened which was not captured in e.g. ATC or 
regulatory databases. Therefore, ‘real multi-reporting’, i.e. the reporting of an occurrence 
by several stakeholders, seems beneficial. 
The hybrid methodology (i.e. safety data, interviews, observations, statistical analysis) 
that has been employed in this chapter enabled a detailed understanding of the causal 
factors. Indeed, interviews and observations provided additional information to the 
analysis of safety data and revealed further national differences between the stakeholders. 
Concerning the quality of the safety data, it was found that this can vary on four levels: 
i) the individual report, ii) the reporting system of the primary stakeholder, iii) the 
regulatory reporting system, and iv) the national safety / reporting culture. The 
implications of this for e.g. the definition of ALoS at the State-level and multi-national 
reporting systems were discussed. In addition, the analysis also indicated that some 
databases are underreported. 
7.7 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the causal factors of airport surface accidents and incidents 
captured in twelve safety databases. To enhance the understanding of certain fuzzy areas 
the analysis was complemented by interviews and observations, and statistical analysis. By 
using this hybrid methodology a holistic understanding of the causes for airport surface 
safety occurrences was achieved. With this, the analysis contributed to the fifth research 
objective and closed major gaps in the literature.  
Whilst this chapter analysed the causal factors at the State-level, the next moves on to 
analysing the factors at the cross-State level. !!!!!
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8 Cross-State Analysis 
The previous chapter has introduced a methodology to analyse the causal factors of 
airport surface safety occurrences and applied it at the State-level. This chapter applies the 
methodology in part to the cross-State level. It explores the differences in the causal factors 
and their drivers across stakeholders in order to understand the unique contribution of each 
of the stakeholder to the safety of surface operations. In addition, this chapter analyses the 
relationships between the different occurrences types and their common causes. The results 
of the data analysis are used to update the airport surface system architecture and to refine 
the initial process model developed in Chapter 3. 
8.1 Cross-Stakeholder Comparison 
The previous chapter compared the causal factors across stakeholders for each of the 
countries individually. This section aims to highlight the differences between stakeholders 
at the cross-State level. To do so, the twelve databases are aggregated per stakeholder type 
and Table 51 shows the stakeholders in overview. 
Most reports that are captured in the RI database are received by ATC (Structured 
communication with FAA Runway Safety Office Analysts, August 2011). It is for this 
reason that the RI database was classified as reflecting the ANSP perspective. The FAA 
AIDS database, on the other hand, is a compilation of accident and serious incident reports 
populated primarily from National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reports. The 
NTSB is an independent federal agency responsible for investigating civil aviation 
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accidents in the U.S. (Federal Aviation Administration, 2013a). These reports therefore, 
represent the regulatory perspective. 
 
Table 51: Stakeholder overview 
 
Database 
 
 
Stakeholder perspective 
FAA AIDS 
Regulator UK CAA MORS CAA - Norway ECCAIRS 
NZ CAA ASMS 
FAA RI Database ANSP Avinor – ANSP MESYS 
Avinor – Airports MESYS Airport operator OSL IFS 
easyJet AQD 
Airline Norwegian AQD 
Wideroe Sentinel 
Signature SHEBBA Ground handling company 
 
Comparing the causal factors across stakeholders has four steps. To begin with, the 
analysis correlates the stakeholders to the relevant parts of the taxonomy. In addition, 
Chapter 6 analysed the variety of causal factors captured in each of the databases in 
relation to data quality. That analysis concluded that the normalised number of different 
causal factors is correlated to the quality of the data (i.e. DQI). To complement that 
analysis, the data is tested for associations between the normalised number of different 
causal factors and the type of stakeholder. Subsequently, the contribution of the individual 
stakeholders is shown and the causal factors that are unique for each stakeholder 
determined. This is followed by an examination of relationships between occurrence types, 
causal factors and stakeholders. !
8.1.1 Frequency Analysis 
 
The analysis was carried out for each occurrence type separately and Table 52 shows 
the distribution of causal factors across stakeholders at the second taxonomy level. 
For incursions / collisions, the regulatory and ANSP data show a similar distribution of 
causal factors. Pilot-related factors were collected most frequently, followed by V/PD 
human-related factors, and ATC human-related factors third. However, the regulators 
capture a greater variety of factors, including e.g. environmental factors. The reason for 
this is that the regulatory databases combine reports made by all aviation stakeholders. The 
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airport operators capture around 47.0% of V/PD human-related factors while the airlines 
predominantly capture pilot-related factors (75.6%). Ground handling, meanwhile, 
captures mainly V/PD human-related factors (88.8%). 
In contrast to incursions / collisions, the excursion data shows a very different 
distribution of causal factors across the stakeholders. Regulators capture mainly pilot-
related factors and aircraft technical issues, followed by the contribution of weather. The 
ANSP on the other hand, shows predominantly pilot-related factors and problems 
associated with airport physical characteristics. In contrast, in the regulatory database, 
airport physical characteristics accounted for only 5.2% of all causal factors, indicating 
that risk mitigation strategies developed by different stakeholders based on their own 
accident / incident data would probably focus on different aspects of surface safety. 
Interestingly, the airport operators do not capture problems associated with the physical 
surface infrastructure. This indicates that the airport operators are either unaware of such 
problems, or do not report them. The first scenario might cause problems to other 
stakeholders, since e.g. pilots are reliant on well-maintained surfaces and correct surface 
condition reports, and ATC are responsible for providing this information. 
This is confirmed by the airline data, which shows 16.7% of causal factors related to 
airport-physical characteristics. Indeed, structured communications with two Norwegian 
pilots revealed that pilots suffer from airports giving them incorrect information (e.g. 
surface conditions, breaking coefficient) (Structured communication with Norwegian 
pilots, 2012). There are three possible reasons for this: i) the airports fail to realise that 
there is a problem, ii) the airports do realise the problem, but fail to act upon it, iii) the 
airports do realise the problem and take action, but fail to report it. The implications of 
these scenarios are, in the first case, that the airports would benefit from the safety data 
kept by the other stakeholders. In the second case, there would clearly be a safety-
challenging situation, while the third case would suggest inadequacies in the reporting 
system. 
The FOD data also shows very different distributions of causal factors across the 
stakeholders. Only in one aspect do the databases conform: that is they all show airport 
physical characteristics as being the most frequently extracted category of causal factors. 
The greatest variety of causal factors is captured by the regulators and airport operators. 
Overall, the analysis highlights that the various stakeholders have a different scope of data 
collection and therefore capture different causal factors.  
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Table 52: Causal factors (Level 2) per stakeholder per occurrence type 
 
Causal factors (Level 2) 
 
Regulator 
 
ANSP 
 
Airport operator 
 
Airline 
 
Ground handling 
company 
 
 
Incursions / collisions 
 
Aircraft - Technical 2.8% 0.6% 0.3% - - 
Pilot – Human 59.2% 66.3% 32.5% 75.6% 1.9% 
ATC – Technical 0.1% 0.1% - 0.4% - 
ATC – Human 9.3% 8.8% 8.1% 9.3% - 
Airport - Technical 0.6% 0.3% 1.0% 0.4% - 
V/PD - Human 21.0% 22.8% 47.0% 7.1% 88.8% 
Airport - Physical 2.7% 0.9% 10.6% 6.2% 7.5% 
Environment – Weather 3.8% 0.2% 0.5% 1.0% 0.9% 
Environment – Geological disturbances 0.1% - - - - 
Environment - Wildlife - - - - 0.9% 
Environment – Other 0.3% - - - - 
Regulations - Inadequate 0.1% - - - - 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
Excursions 
 
Aircraft - Technical 22.6% 12.5% 15.8% - - 
Pilot – Human 58.4% 41.7% 63.2% 50.0% - 
ATC – Technical - - - - - 
ATC – Human 0.3% - 5.3% 33.3% - 
Airport - Technical - - - - - 
V/PD - Human 0.1% 4.2% - - - 
Airport - Physical 5.2% 33.3% - 16.7% - 
Environment – Weather 13.3% 8.3% 15.7% - - 
Environment – Wildlife 0.1% - - - - 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% - 
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Causal factors (Level 2) 
 
Regulator 
 
ANSP 
 
Airport operator 
 
Airline 
 
Ground handling 
company 
 
 
FOD 
 
Aircraft - Technical 7.3% - 1.5% - - 
Pilot – Human 5.5% 16.6% 2.2% 2.5% - 
ATC – Technical - - - - - 
ATC – Human - - - - - 
Airport - Technical - - - - - 
V/PD - Human 4.8% 41.7% 13.8% 1.3% 4.5% 
Airport - Physical 79.1% 41.7% 78.4% 96.2% 86.4% 
Environment – Weather 2.9% - 0.8% - 9.1% 
Environment – Wildlife - - 2.9% - - 
Environment – Other 0.4% - 0.4% - - 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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8.1.2 Data Detail 
 
The distribution of the number of different causal factors (as normalised) is the same 
across categories of stakeholders (H(4) = 6.14, p (2-tailed) > .05). This indicates that the 
detail of the databases is independent of the stakeholder perspective and depends on the 
quality of the underlying reporting system and hence of the collected data.  
 
8.1.3 Contribution of Individual Stakeholders 
 
The contribution of each of the stakeholders to the understanding of causal factors 
considered ground handling, airline, airport operator, ANSP and the regulator. 
 
• Ground handling 
 
Causal factors found only in the data provided by the ground handing company 
included factors that were observed by Signature personnel that relate mainly to violations 
by operators from other companies. These include: V/PD not complying with the traffic 
rules to give way to preceding traffic; V/PD cutting corners; and V/PD driving too close to 
other traffic as well as driving too fast. Also, V/PD ignoring the taxiway signs / markings; 
V/PD overtaking slower vehicles and infringing onto the manoeuvring area; and V/PD 
driving around a blocked stand and thus entering the manoeuvring area in order to get to 
their destination were factors identified in the data. Furthermore, vehicles that are parked 
on the double-yellow lines (i.e. lines that separate the apron from the manoeuvring area) 
without authorisation were captured as causal factors as well as the unauthorised use of 
mobile phones. 
Often operational personnel report only when they are directly involved in an 
occurrence, and therefore, such reports are an indication for a very good safety culture 
within Signature. Other factors identified in Signature’s data referred to the incorrect 
marshalling of aircraft and FOD caused by handling equipment (chocks, marker cones, 
unit load device (ULD) containers, pallets, tow bars, etc.). 
The identified factors relate mainly to V/PD failures and violations which had not been 
identified in the literature. Also, these factors have not been found in the data from the 
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airport operators, who also function on the airport surface in form of V/PD. This indicates 
that the causal factors differ depending on the stakeholder’s function. This was confirmed 
through interviews with ten personnel from two major U.S. airport operators. The 
interviewees included the Heads of Airfield Operations of both airports, a shift supervisor, 
an airfield escort for contractors, and six operational personnel and were conducted on an 
ad-hoc basis. The staff were asked to give the main reasons, from their perspective, why 
accidents / incidents occur on the airport surface. Their most frequent responses were 
distraction, situational awareness, complacency, multitasking, personnel problems, fatigue 
and visibility. None of the interviewees mentioned wilful violations of traffic rules and 
procedures, as were identified in the ground handling data.  
 
• Airline 
 
Causal factors that were only identified in the airlines’ data included: 
• Inadequate surface infrastructure (e.g. confusing lights; markings partially erased; 
gaps in taxiway lights) and inadequate documentation (e.g. temporary airport charts 
are not up to date);  
• ATC failures that caused pilot deviations (e.g. ATC used non-English language 
with other aircraft which led to a loss of situational awareness for the pilot; no taxi 
routing given by ATC); and  
• Pilot factors such as the pilot’s incorrect perception of speed or misperception of 
distances at the airport; pilot expected a different stand and hence a different taxi 
route; pilot did not check whether the area is clear of other traffic; or pilot 
announcement to the passengers and coordination with cabin crew. 
These factors are more detailed than the ones found in regulatory and ATC databases 
and shed light on why the accidents / incidents occurred.  
 
• Airport operator 
 
The analysis of the airport operators’ data revealed factors in relation to the physical 
airport infrastructure, airport management, security issues and external factors, and V/PD 
deviations. These included amongst other things snow removal activities; FOD inspection 
activities; and taxiway management. Likewise, inadequate procedures for maintenance 
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work and the use of inappropriate materials for maintenance (e.g. use of the wrong kind of 
lights because the right ones were out of stock) have been reported. Furthermore, the 
factors: ground handling did not secure the aircraft properly, which started rolling back; 
V/PD switched off their radio; V/PD did not answer the radio; and drivers that went too far 
away from the vehicle to be able to hear the radio were reported as having caused 
occurrences. In one case a V/PD wanting to help another V/PD to get the job done quicker 
was involved in an incident.  
Furthermore, the databases of the airport operators specified FOs on the surface 
including surface pavement, concrete cracks, and surface infrastructure (e.g. runway edge 
lights). In addition, the inappropriate use of power / jet blast was reported as cause of FOD. 
Finally, security issues (e.g. perimeter road not adequately secured; fences snowed under) 
and the presence of emergency vehicles / ambulances were extracted from the data as 
causal factors. 
 
• ANSP 
 
The ANSP data revealed ATC failures (e.g. ATC misjudgement of timings, which led 
to a situation that was too tight; ATC did not advise the pilot of a safety challenging 
situation) and factors that relate to deviations which ATC observed from the control tower. 
For example, aircraft got disconnected from the tow bar; pilots push back without 
clearance; pilots simply following another aircraft without clearance; and the wilful non-
compliance of pilots with ATC instructions. Furthermore, a controller reported that an 
aircraft wing infringed onto the runway during an aircraft’s turn on a taxiway. The ANSP 
databases also revealed that Air Traffic Services (ATIS) may not always be up to date. 
Finally, the limited view of the manoeuvring area through work in progress and the 
distraction of ATC through visitors in the tower were reported as causes to accidents / 
incidents. 
 
• Regulator 
 
The data collected in regulatory databases added to the understanding of causal factors 
by revealing, along with general factors, the causes of accidents / incidents that occurred at 
very small regional airports which are not covered in the databases of the other 
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stakeholders. These included: unexpected emergency / ambulance flight coming in; 
landing / departure on a closed airport; and a runway operated at reduced length. Also, a 
foreign pilot who believed that the same rules apply as in his / her country as well as pilots 
who were unfamiliar with the ground / tower handover, and underestimated the runway 
downslope, respectively, were reported. The sudden sink of the aircraft on short final and 
the controller not being in the tower and doing a break were also factors extracted from the 
regulatory databases. In addition, vehicle driver and pedestrian factors contributed to 
occurrences, for instance when a V/PD thought that a ‘promise’ for the future is 
automatically a clearance, a V/PD called ATC to ask for clearance, but did not wait for a 
reply, or a vehicle escort failed to obtain a clearance for a vehicle under his / her 
responsibility. Finally, a person running out onto the manoeuvring area to take a picture of 
a landing aircraft was reported to have caused an occurrence. 
 
Overall, most factors depict detailed causes to airport surface accidents and incidents 
that were not covered in the literature. As shown in the literature review in Chapter 5, the 
majority of studies on surface safety that are based on safety data use regulatory databases, 
accident investigation board data, and databases that compile worldwide accidents and 
serious incidents, but not data from the stakeholders directly involved in surface 
operations. Therefore, the analysis presented in this thesis allows a unique insight into 
causal factors from a different perspective. 
 
8.1.4 Examination of Relationships 
 
After showing the distributions of causal factors across stakeholders, this section 
analyses the data for relationships between the variables. There was a significant 
association between the type of stakeholder and the occurrence type X2 (8) =  2999.183, p 
< .001 (Figure 99). With a value of .498, p < .001 Cramer’s V indicates that this 
association is very strong. 
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Figure 99: Occurrence type per stakeholder 
 
All stakeholders capture incursions / collisions. In fact, 99.1% of the ANSP data refer 
to incursions / collisions. As well as incursions / collisions, ground handling also captures 
FOD occurrences, which make up almost 40.0% of the data. The distributions of 
occurrence types for the airlines and airport operators are similar, with predominantly 
incursions and FOD and a very small percentage of excursions being reported. The 
regulators, on the other hand, show a very different frequency distribution of occurrence 
types, with almost 38.0% of reported accidents / incidents being excursions.  
These differences are a reflection of the stakeholder perspectives that are represented 
through the data, and the associated differing interests and responsibilities of the 
stakeholders. For example, ATC is always obliged to report an incursion. It is ATC’s 
responsibility to provide the required separation between two aircraft, or an aircraft and a 
V/PD, to monitor the traffic and report infringements. Excursions and FOD on the other 
hand are the responsibility of airport operators and pilots to report, unless ATC contributed 
to their occurrence, or the occurrence interrupted the flow of normal operations. 
In addition, the reported occurrence types differ depending on the stakeholder’s 
function in the ATM system. For example, Chapter 6 has indicated that regulatory 
databases are underreported. Although most regulators claim that they capture every 
safety-challenging situation, in reality, most of the time, stakeholders report only the more 
serious occurrences to the regulators. Excursions often result in serious incidents or 
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accidents and, therefore, the majority of these occurrences will be captured at the 
regulatory level. On the other hand, a FO(D) occurrence that does not challenge the safety 
of the operations is unlikely to be reported to the responsible regulator, and often stays at 
the airport level, or airline level if the FO(D) has had an impact on the flight operations. 
Furthermore, the physical area of responsibility of the stakeholders influences the type 
of occurrences they capture. For example, regulatory bodies provide the regulations for the 
whole country, including small regional airfields, whereas ATC is only responsible for 
controlled airports. Small regional uncontrolled airports will not experience incursions for 
example, as aircraft do not have to contact ATC to ask for clearances. Therefore, these 
airports will mainly report excursions and FOD. 
Overall, the results indicate that it is necessary to collect data reflecting the different 
perspectives of aviation stakeholders in order to capture all occurrences on the airport 
surface in equal measure. 
Next, the data was tested for associations between the stakeholders and the causal 
factors. Causal factors category 5, which captures the regulatory system, was excluded 
from the analysis due to the very low frequency of regulatory factors extracted from the 
data. 
There was a significant association between the type of stakeholder and the causal 
factors at the first taxonomy level X2 (15) = 1315.527, p < .001 (Figure 100) and Cramer’s 
V (.201, p < .001) indicates a moderate association.  
 
 
!
Figure 100: Causal factors (Level 1) per stakeholder 
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These two tests, together with the preceding descriptive analysis, prove that if safety 
risk mitigation strategies are developed from the perspective of a single stakeholder they 
will always be biased. This is because different stakeholders collect different occurrence 
types and therefore capture different causal factors. Future reporting systems should 
therefore allow for the integration and sharing of safety data. This could be achieved 
through either centralised databases, or a network approach, i.e. a system of data sharing in 
which the appropriate linkages between the individual stakeholders are made. 
8.2 Cross-Occurrence Analysis 
After determining the causes for airport surface safety occurrences the relationships 
between the different occurrence types were analysed.  !
8.2.1 Relationships Between Occurrence Types 
 
Figure 101 provides an overview of how the occurrences influence each other. The 
black lines show interactions that have been identified through the data analysis, while the 
dashed lines indicate indirect connections. Indirect connections are relationships derived 
from the data. That is, in these circumstances the data did not contain instances where one 
occurrence type directly caused another, but it did indicate an indirect connection. To 
illustrate the interactions further, examples for each relationship have been extracted from 
the safety data and are given below. 
 
 
                      Bold lines: direct interactions; dashed lines: indirect interactions 
Figure 101: Influence diagram occurrence types 
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1. Incursion causing an excursion: The data analysis identified situations whereby an 
aircraft infringed onto a runway and caused the excursion of another aircraft. 
2. Occurrences that are both, incursions and excursions: The analysis revealed 
occurrences that could be classified as both excursions and incursions. For 
example, a pilot intentionally left the taxiway and took a short cut through the other 
surface areas (i.e. grassland) in order to reach the apron more quickly. In this case 
the aircraft left the taxiway (i.e. excursion) and was in a position on the airport 
surface where he / she was not supposed to be (i.e. incursion). 
3. Excursions causing incursions: There was no example of an excursion causing an 
incursion identified in the data and therefore no direct link. However, the data 
contained occurrences where incursions happened due to runway / taxiway closures 
(e.g. caused by the pilot not being aware of the closure). After the occurrence of an 
excursion the affected surfaces will typically be closed, and this in turn may cause 
incursions. 
4. Incursions causing ground collisions: Collisions are extreme cases of incursions. 
Thus, every collision will be an incursion before it becomes a collision. 
5. Ground collisions causing incursions: There was no example in the data where a 
collision caused an incursion. However, in theory, in a similar way to which 
excursions can lead to an incursion, collisions also will result in surface closures, 
which can then provoke incursions. 
6. Excursions causing ground collisions: The safety data showed that if aircraft veer 
off the runway they can collide with other aircraft, vehicles, or surface 
infrastructure. 
7. Ground collisions causing excursions: There was no direct link in the data that 
showed collisions leading to excursions. As mentioned before, however, surface 
closures that result from collisions could lead to excursions, when an aircraft needs 
to avoid the closed surface. 
8. FOD causing excursions: Foreign objects on the airport surface can lead to 
excursions, for instance when the FO causes a tire burst. 
9. Excursions causing FOD: An excursion that results in physical damage to the 
aircraft can cause FOD. 
10. FOD causing incursions: FOD can also lead to incursions, when vehicles trying to 
pick up FO infringe onto a runway / taxiway without authorisation.  
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11. Incursions causing FOD: There is no direct link between incursions and FOD. The 
analysis, however, showed that incursions can cause an excursion and that 
excursions can lead to FOD. 
12. FOD causing ground collisions: The data did not contain any direct link showing 
that FOD occurrences cause collisions. As shown in 8. FO can cause excursions 
and an excursion can lead to a collision. Thus, there is an indirect link between 
FOD and collisions. 
13. Ground collisions causing FOD: Collisions cause FOD when physical damage 
occurs as a result of a collision. 
14. FOD causing wildlife strikes: Similarly, there was no direct link found between 
FOD and wildlife strikes. However, the data contained FOD occurrences involving 
rubbish / garbage on the surface. As shown in the literature (e.g. Transport Canada, 
2002; UK Civil Aviation Authority, 2008a) garbage is also a wildlife attractant. 
15. Wildlife strikes causing FOD: Wildlife can lead to FOD when wildlife remains are 
on the airport surface. 
16. Wildlife strikes causing excursions: As seen in the data, wildlife can also cause 
excursions, for instance, when birds are ingested into the engine, which results in 
an engine failure and can lead to an excursion. 
17. Wildlife strikes causing ground collisions: There was no direct link found in the 
data between wildlife and collisions. However, the data showed that wildlife can 
cause excursions and excursions can result in a collision. Thus, there is an indirect 
link between wildlife and collisions. 
18. Wildlife strikes causing incursions: Finally, the data did not contain any situations 
whereby a wildlife strike causes an incursion. However, it has been shown that 
wildlife can lead to FOD and that FOD can cause an incursion. Thus, there is an 
indirect link between wildlife and incursions. 
Only two combinations of occurrence types were identified that do not share a causal 
relationship: 
• An incursion leading to a wildlife strike; and 
• A collision leading to a wildlife strike. 
This analysis proved that the occurrences do not happen in isolation and can follow 
complex event chains (e.g. wildlife remains can cause FOD, which in turn can cause an 
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excursion). As the occurrence types interact in a complicated manner, any assessment of 
the safety of airport surface operations must integrate them all. 
 
8.2.2 Shared Causal Factors 
 
The occurrence types were also analysed for shared causal factors and Figure 102 
shows the results. The data for collisions and incursions were aggregated. The analysis 
identified shared causal factors between incursions / collisions, excursions, and FOD. 
Based on the data, there were no shared factors between these three occurrence types and 
wildlife strikes. 
 
 
Figure 102: Influence diagram of shared causal factors 
8.3 Discussion 
The previous chapter showed that the causal factors were subject to national variations 
and in addition this chapter identified that there were variations within stakeholder types, 
i.e. the same type of stakeholder (e.g. regulator) can capture different causal factors. Also, 
the variety of causal factors captured across the databases (i.e. number of different causal 
factors extracted from each database) differed. 
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•  Low visibility conditions 
•  Pilot – too high taxi speed 
•  Pilot slow and delayed action 
•  Pilot inexperience and insufficient training 
•  Pilot misapplication of procedures 
•  Pilot misperception and misjudgment 
•  Pilot distraction 
•  Pilot - head down tasks 
•  Equipment operating on the airfield 
•  Snow / ice 
•  Inadequate aircraft checks •  Snow / ice 
•  Loss of control over the landing aircraft 
•  Pilot landing technique 
•  Landing and touchdown problems 
•  Inadequate aircraft checks 
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It was also shown that each stakeholder adds a unique perspective to the understanding 
of airport surface safety, i.e. the analysis allowed the extraction of factors from some 
databases that were neither captured in others nor in the literature. 
The analysis in Chapters 7 and 8 showed that the causal factors vary and that they are a 
function of: 
• The underlying national air traffic system and airport infrastructure,  
• The underlying regulations and operational procedures,  
• The reporting system and safety culture, and  
• The viewpoint of the aviation stakeholder that is represented. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the piecemeal approach is sub-optimal in capturing 
the total system safety. An integrated safety assessment of airport surface operations is 
only possible by combining the different stakeholder viewpoints.  
Furthermore, the piecemeal approach implies that safety risk mitigation strategies will 
always be biased depending on the viewpoint of the stakeholder who initiated the control 
measures. For instance, the ‘European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway 
Incursions’ (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2011) 
depicts a consensus of subject matter expertise from major European ANSP’s. It provides 
recommendations for the mitigation of runway incursions for all aviation stakeholders. The 
ICAO’s ‘Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions’ (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007), which is based on the EUROCONTROL developments, has a similar 
intention. Hence, it makes the recommendations in Europe effective on a global level. 
ICAO’s global guide contains an initial reporting form for runway incursions. Through its 
biased development based on SME opinion it fails to capture various factors that are 
critical in the context of runway incursions. For example, the manual does not account for 
the following factors of the new taxonomy: 311-318, 321, 322, 325, and 327 in the context 
of V/PD. This example is typical for the industry and has implications for the data 
collection and reporting. 
Also, the use of data from just one stakeholder to channel risk mitigation efforts can be 
misleading due to the different distributions of causal factors they capture. Using only a 
single data source to guide safety risk mitigation strategies can only be valid if the 
initiative targets the improvement of a particular stakeholder’s operation (e.g. ANSP uses 
ATC data to develop risk mitigation strategies for ATC). Otherwise, risk mitigation 
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strategies should be developed based on an integrated understanding of the subject matter, 
for which data sharing is the first step. 
The analysis further identified that the different occurrence types are highly interactive, 
i.e. one occurrence type can be the cause for another one. The KPIs currently used in the 
industry to measure airport safety performance (as introduced in Chapter 2 section 2.4.1) 
focus on high-level measures, such as aggregated occurrence numbers. To capture the 
dynamics of surface safety these KPIs should capture also the interactions of occurrences. 
In addition, the comparison of causal factors underlying the different accident / 
incident types identified some common causes. Hence, in this context, safety risk 
mitigation strategies would benefit from targeting surface safety as a whole. This will be 
discussed in more detail in the next chapter (section 9.3.2). As the literature review 
showed, risk mitigation programmes are currently designed to prevent single occurrence 
types. If they were designed for surface operations in general, awareness for all accident / 
incident types could be raised within one initiative. In turn, this would lead to more cost-
effective solutions. In fact, the SMEs in Norway pointed out in a structured communication 
that in the past they focused so much on the prevention of incursions that they now 
experience more excursions (Structured communication with Safety Investigatiors Avinor 
AS ANSP, June 2011). This example highlights well the danger associated with focusing 
too much on one aspect of surface safety. 
8.4 Stochastic Elements in the Airport Surface System 
The results of the safety data analysis were used to validate the initial process model of 
normal airport surface operations and to identify the stochastic elements in the airport 
surface system architecture developed in Chapter 3 Figure 28. 
To validate the initial process model, the information extracted from the occurrence 
reports was used. For instance, a report from the FAA RI database states the following: 
“Local Control (LC) instructed an a/c to taxi into position and hold (TIPH) RWY 33. The 
a/c then departed on RWY 33 without clearance. No conflicts reported.” From this 
narrative the following information can be extracted: 
• There was a taxi process; 
• At some point the aircraft transferred from the taxiway to the runway; 
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• The instruction taxi into position and hold means that the aircraft should taxi out 
onto the runway into take-off position and to hold until the final take-off clearance 
is given by ATC  (i.e. that a clearance for take-off is required). 
This information conforms to the tasks described in the initial process model (Table 5).  
In a second example, “a truck, towing a trailer, crossed RWY 10 at TWY D1 without 
authorisation. No conflicts reported.” This report provides the following information: a 
vehicle was taxiing and transferred from a TWY to a RWY. For this a clearance would 
have been required. The tasks ‘taxiing on TWY’, ‘obtaining clearance’, and ‘entering 
RWY’ conform to V/PD tasks outlined in the initial process model (Table 6).  
Occurrence reports where the descriptive narrative did not fit the initial process model 
were used to identify the stochastic elements in the airport surface system architecture. 
Stochastic elements are links that do not exist in theory, but appear in reality. The analysis 
revealed four stochastic elements as follows: 
1. Customers can influence airport surface operations: 
In theory, customers (e.g. passengers) are in contact with various service providers, e.g. the 
airline for booking flights, or the airport operator for information purposes. Passengers, 
however, are not allowed onto the airport surface unless they are sitting in an aircraft. The 
data revealed situations whereby passengers infringed onto the airport surface. In one 
instance a passenger was leaving the aircraft and running out on the surface. In another one 
a passenger lost some papers and was running onto the taxiway to chase them.!
2. Local communities can influence airport surface operations:  
In theory members of the local community are not in contact with the physical 
infrastructure of the manoeuvring area or the actors upon it (e.g. pilot, V/PD, ATC). 
However, the analysis of safety data revealed circumstances where members of the local 
community infringed onto the airport surface. Examples found in the safety data include: 
• Children crawling under a gate that was used for construction purposes and 
infringing onto the airport surface; 
• A mentally ill person escaped from a nearby hospital, jumped over the perimeter 
fence and infringed the manoeuvring area; 
• Perimeter fence being snowed under and pedestrians walking over it without 
realising their infringement onto the airport surface; and 
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• An ambulance vehicle transporting an injured person driving into the protected area 
of the airport and onto the manoeuvring area without clearance in order to get to an 
ambulance helicopter. 
3. The land use surrounding the airport can influence the operations on the airport 
surface: 
Under normal circumstances, the land use surrounding the airport does not influence the 
operations on the manoeuvring area. For instance, whether fields, forest, or local 
communities are established next to the airport does not influence the operations of a pilot, 
V/PD, or ATC. However, there are situations in which this is not true; for example: 
• One airport reported increased bird activity due to a fishing industry next to the 
airport. This disturbed the operations as increased wildlife removal activities were 
necessary; 
• Birds can drag objects from the surrounding land onto the manoeuvring area, which 
causes disruptions. Examples found in the safety data include e.g. graveyard lights, 
golf balls, and crab shells. These examples actually depict a combined influence of 
the environment (wildlife) and the surrounding land use on airport surface 
operations. 
4. There are stochastic interfaces between the apron and the airport surface: 
The airport surface system architecture shows an interface between the airport surface 
and its surrounding infrastructure and operations (e.g. apron). Under normal 
circumstances, the operations of apron and airport surface influence each other. For 
instance, a pilot starts his / her operations on the apron and transfers during taxiing 
onto the manoeuvring area. The data revealed, however, that there are interfaces 
between apron and manoeuvring area that are not expected under normal circumstances 
(i.e. normal operations). These include: 
• Pushback onto a live taxiway;  
• Vehicles being parked on the line that separates the apron and manoeuvring area;  
• Handling equipment infringing onto taxiways; and 
• Situations in which V/PD do not wait for slower vehicles in front of them and 
overtake these vehicles by crossing the line between apron and manoeuvring area. 
Overall, the airport surface system architecture has been updated by adding four links 
to the model of the airport surface system architecture, which are shown in Figure 103 in 
red. 
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Figure 103: Stochastic elements in the airport surface system architecture 
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In addition, the analysis has identified a stochastic interface between the stakeholders. 
To recap, Chapter 3 specified communication as the interface between the various actors 
under normal circumstances. The safety data analysis revealed a second interface: the 
location, i.e. one actor can influence another party in the same location. The following two 
examples will clarify this. An occurrence report extracted from the FAA RI database 
states: “Ground Control (GC) issued an a/c 1 taxi instructions to RWY 33 via TWY A-2, 
hold short of RWY 33. Pilot read back the taxi instructions but not the hold short and 
entered RWY 33 via TWY A-2. An a/c 2 was just taxiing onto RWY 33 approach end with 
a take-off clearance as the a/c 1 entered at A2. Local Control (LC) noticed the conflict and 
cancelled the a/c 2’s take-off clearance. Closest horizontal separation reported was 4,376 
feet.”    
The following information can be extracted from this occurrence report: 
• An aircraft (a/c 1) is instructed to taxi to a runway and to hold short of it; 
• However, the pilot entered the runway and came in conflict with another aircraft 
(a/c 2) that was already on the runway and cleared to take-off; 
• Through this infringement a/c 1 influenced the actions of the second actor (a/c 2), 
as ATC cancelled its take-off clearance. 
Another report contains the following occurrence description “an airport vehicle was 
observed on TWY Bravo and requested clearance to retrieve FOD near TWY B4.  Ground 
Control instructed the airport vehicle to hold short of RWY 30. The vehicle crossed the 
hold lines for RWY 30 and conflicted with a/c crossing landing threshold RWY 30. 
Ground Control instructed the vehicle to immediately return across the hold lines. Closest 
proximity was more than 5,000 feet horizontal after the a/c landed and airport vehicle 
cleared the hold lines.”    
Broken down, the report contains the following information: 
• A V/PD was on the taxiway and instructed to hold short of the runway; 
• However, the V/PD crossed the hold line and conflicted with an a/c; i.e. the 
V/PD influenced the operations of the a/c and ATC by infringing onto the 
runway. 
These two examples highlight that if an actor infringes into an area, this can influence 
the actions of those actors that are operating in respect to that location. The locations of the 
various stakeholders during normal operations have been described in Chapter 3 section 
3.2. 
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In summary, this last section refined the process model through: 
• Validation of the initial process model; 
• Identification of stochastic relationships between the actors / components; and 
• Identification of stochastic interfaces. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter has analysed the causal factors of airport surface accidents and incidents 
at the cross-State level. A novel cross-stakeholder comparison of the factors proved that 
the various stakeholders capture unique viewpoints and that these must be combined in 
order to provide for an integrated risk assessment of airport surface operations. The results 
of the data analysis were then used to update the airport surface system architecture and to 
identify its stochastic elements. This information was used to refine the initial process 
model and therefore contributed to the fulfilment of the second research objective.  
The next chapter summarises the causal factors identified in Chapters 5, 7 and 8 in a 
new taxonomy. In addition, the refined process model is validated and both parts (the 
taxonomy and the process model) are merged resulting in a macroscopic scenario tool. 
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9 A Macroscopic Scenario Tool for 
Airport SMS 
The previous chapters have captured the architecture (Chapter 2) and operational 
aspects (Chapter 3) of airports. Chapters 5 to 8 subsequently, identified the factors that 
lead to occurrences on the manoeuvring area. This information was used to identify the 
stochastic elements in the airport surface system architecture leading to an update of the 
airport surface system architecture. To ensure that the process model is applicable to all 
other airports and not just those used for its development, external validation is required. 
This chapter presents the process and results of the external validation of the process 
model. 
This chapter also concludes the determination of causal factors by summarising the 
factors into a taxonomy that supports the data analysis function of SMS, providing a robust 
basis for data analysis. After the airport surface operations have been modelled and the 
drivers to safety identified (causal factors), the results are combined, resulting in a 
macroscopic scenario tool which supports the management of change (i.e. safety 
assurance), training and education, and safety communication (i.e. safety promotion) 
functions of the SMS.  
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9.1 Process Model of Airport Surface Operations 
9.1.1 Methodology 
External validation was accomplished with Subject Matter Experts (SMEs). They were 
asked in face-to-face interviews to systematically assess it and to comment on its validity. 
The following SMEs were chosen for the reasons discussed below: 
1) Validation of the airport authority model, airport infrastructure, V/PD model, interfaces, 
and airport surface system architecture with: 
• The Airfield Operations Superintendent at a major U.S. airport (LAX),  
• The Head of Health, Safety and Regulatory Compliance of a medium-sized UK 
airport (LPL), and 
• The ATC Tower Supervisor of a small Norwegian airport (BOO). 
These airports were chosen because they provide a mix of U.S. and European airports, of 
different sizes in terms of infrastructure, aircraft movements and passenger boardings, as 
well as different ownership structures. In addition, these airports represent different 
national operational practices, procedures and regulations. SMEs in senior positions with a 
minimum of 15 years service were chosen in order to ensure a high-level of relevant 
experience.  
2) Validation of the ATC model, interfaces and airport surface system architecture with: 
• A civil ATC Tower controller with working experience at a major European airport 
and the Maastricht Upper Area Control Centre (MUAC), and 
• A military ATC Tower controller with working experience at European military 
airports and MUAC.  
The internal validation of the process model (discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.1.4) used a 
U.S. tower supervisor. To make the model valid across borders and air traffic control units 
(i.e. upper airspace), a European perspective was sought for external validation. In 
addition, a controller with military experience allowed validation of the model from a 
different perspective. Both SMEs had more than 15 years of experience in ATC.  
3) Validation of the pilot model, interfaces and airport surface system architecture with: 
• A Captain of a European airline and Safety Manager.  
Similar to the ATC perspective, a U.S.-based chief pilot was used to validate the initial 
process model internally. Therefore, to capture the European perspective, a Captain and 
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Safety Manager of a European airline with more than 15 years of relevant experience was 
consulted. 
9.1.2 Baseline Model for Airport SMS 
The SMEs confirmed the validity of the model and the final airport surface system 
architecture is shown in Figure 104. The stakeholders are highlighted in blue font and 
infrastructure in green. Blue arrows represent interactions between stakeholders and red 
arrows the stochastic elements of the system. Furthermore, other external factors (e.g. 
weather) are highlighted in black font. The initial process model developed in Chapter 3 
represents an ideal system that assumes ‘normal operations’ in which e.g. the actors do not 
make mistakes and the infrastructure / equipment is not subject to malfunctions (the 
assumptions were specified in section 3.1). In contrast to that, the final process model 
presented in this chapter does no longer assume ‘normal operations’. It is therefore rather a 
representation of the reality of surface operations.  
9.1.3 Application 
The developed model captures the components (including physical infrastructure and 
stakeholders) and interactions of the airport surface system and serves as baseline model 
for airport SMS. As introduced in Chapter 4, a Safety Management System (SMS) requires 
the analysis of all system components and their interactions. Therefore, the new model can 
be used to facilitate safety assessments of surface operations, because it shows the relevant 
stakeholders / components involved in airport surface operations and their linkages. 
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Figure 104: Validated airport surface system architecture
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9.2 A New Taxonomy of Causal Factors Underlying Airport Surface 
Safety Occurrences 
After modelling the operations on the airport surface, this thesis analysed the ways in 
which the system can fail. Chapters 5 to 8 identified the causal factors of accidents and 
incidents and the following section summarises them in a new taxonomy. 
9.2.1 Methodology  
The construction of the new taxonomy involved two steps: development and 
validation. The methodology for the analysis of causal factors and the framework for the 
development of the taxonomy were presented in Chapter 6 section 6.7. The next section 
builds on these to construct the final template. A number of reliability and validity checks 
have been undertaken to ensure that the application of the classification system produces 
valid and reliable results. 
9.2.1.1 Taxonomy Development 
The taxonomy has been developed using the analysis of causal factors in Chapters 5 to 
8. Template analysis was applied, since this is a flexible technique which allows for the 
incorporation of different research methods. First, an initial template was constructed using 
the causal factors extracted from the literature. Subsequently, this template was refined 
using the previous analysis of 12 safety databases reflecting the perspectives of airport 
operators, ANSPs, airlines, ground handling companies and regulators in Europe, North 
America and Oceania. To complement this analysis both interviews and observations were 
conducted to better understand the causes of airport surface accidents and incidents. In a 
final step, the taxonomy was validated using statistical analysis and input from SMEs as 
detailed in the next section. Figure 105 summarises the methodology adopted for the 
development of the taxonomy. 
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Figure 105: Methodology for taxonomy development 
9.2.1.2 Taxonomy Validation 
To ensure that the taxonomy produces valid results, a validation strategy has been 
developed based upon internal and external validity checks. Internal validity measures how 
well the taxonomy captures what it intended to capture, i.e. how well the taxonomy 
represents the reality of what is measured. To test for internal validity, construct, content 
and criterion validity were analysed. External validity refers to the extent to which the 
results can be held to be true for other cases. Therefore, the taxonomy was applied to 
different datasets that have not been analysed before. In addition, reliability checks were 
conducted to ensure that the taxonomy has been developed consistently, is of good quality 
and produces robust findings (Saunders, et al., 2007). 
 
• Reliability 
 
To ensure a consistent taxonomy development the data coding (i.e. extraction of the 
causal factors from the descriptive narratives) was checked for reliability using Cohen’s 
Kappa inter-rater reliability test. Cohen’s Kappa (!) computes the extent of agreement 
between two raters taking into account the possibility of agreement occurring by chance. It 
is computed as follows: 
Template analysis 
Literature review 
Initial template 
Interviews / 
observation 
Refined template 
•  U.S. and European  
      pilots  
Safety data 
analysis 
•  Regulators 
•  ANSPs 
•  Airport authorities 
•  Airlines 
•  Ground handling  
      companies 
 
Validation 
•  Validation through SMEs 
•  Statistical analysis  
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     ! ! ! !!!!!!!!                                                                                       (8) 
 
where p is the proportion of units where there is agreement and pe the proportion of units 
which would be expected to agree by chance. If the raters are in complete agreement then ! takes on a value of 1. On the other hand, ! is 0 if there is no agreement other than that 
which would be expected by chance (University of York, 2012). The coding can be 
accepted as reliable if the agreement rate is at least .70 (Fleiss, et al., 2003).  
Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater reliability has been computed for the first three levels of the 
taxonomy, as commonly practiced in aviation accident analysis (e.g. Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003). To establish inter-rater reliability, three independent qualified raters were 
each asked to code a sample of 300 randomly selected occurrences. In accordance with 
previous research (e.g. Jarvis and Harris, 2008) each rater was given 100 occurrence 
reports to analyse at each level of the taxonomy. Each rater was asked to analyse the 
descriptive narratives of 100 reports and to assign a code from the first taxonomy level. In 
case more than one causal factor could be extracted from a report, several codes from the 
first taxonomy level had to be recorded. Subsequently, each rater was asked to code 100 
occurrences using codes from the second, and third levels of the taxonomy, respectively. 
The occurrences to be coded by the raters were randomly selected at each level, so that 
each rater analysed a total of 300 different occurrences. 
The three raters were chosen based on their academic background in aviation safety 
(i.e. two at Master’s-level and one at Ph.D.-level) and each rater was given a data set from 
a randomly selected regulatory body (i.e. UK CAA, U.S. Northeast, and U.S. Western-
Pacific Region). Regulatory datasets were chosen because they capture the greatest variety 
of causal factors, given that all aviation stakeholders are required to report into these 
systems.  
Cohen’s Kappa requires the analysis of reports falling into each of the possible 
outcome categories. For example, the first taxonomy level has five categories (i.e. aircraft 
operations, ATC, airport operations, environment, regulations), and, therefore, at least one 
occurrence that falls into each of these categories should be analysed. This principle was 
retained as far as practically possible. However, in some cases it was necessary to exclude 
causal factor categories from the analysis (i.e. low populated groups of causal factors, 
factors identified through literature, interviews, observations).  
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Whilst all possible causal factor categories have been considered at the first and second 
taxonomy levels, reliability at the third taxonomy level was checked using case studies, i.e. 
a branch of the taxonomy was randomly selected and analysed for each data set. Figure 
106 provides an example of the study design for the UK CAA data. Reliability checks for 
the UK data included the coding of 100 occurrence reports falling into four categories 
(highlighted in orange) at the first taxonomy level by the author and an independent rater. 
Regulatory factors were excluded from the analysis due to their low frequency of 
occurrence. Similarly, at the second taxonomy level, 100 occurrence reports falling into 
eight categories of causal factors (highlighted in green) were considered. Finally, inter-
rater reliability between the independent rater and the author was established using 100 
reports falling into seven categories of pilot human-related factors (highlighted in blue) at 
the third taxonomy level. The categories used to check the reliability of the coding of the 
U.S. Northeast and U.S. Western-Pacific Region datasets are shown in the results section 
9.2.2.1 on reliability checks. 
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Figure 106: Taxonomy reliability checks (Levels 1-3) UK CAA 
Cohen’s Kappa 
Level 1 
(100 occ.) 
Cohen’s Kappa 
Level 2 
(100 occ.) 
Cohen’s Kappa 
Level 3 
(100 occ.) 
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• Construct Validity!
 
Construct validity indicates the extent to which the taxonomy actually measures what it 
theoretically should, i.e. how closely the taxonomy reflects the underlying theoretical 
model (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Saunders, et al., 2007). The airport surface system 
architecture has been modelled in Chapter 3 (section 3.2.9) and validated in Chapter 8 
(section 8.4). If the taxonomy is a good measure of the causal factors underlying airport 
surface safety occurrences, it should reflect the failures of all system components. 
The evaluation of construct validity involved matching the identified causal factors 
against the airport surface system architecture. This allowed the evaluation of whether the 
taxonomy captures all components of the system description.  
One of the tenets of SMS is that each component of a system can fail and therefore 
each component needs to be analysed. An association between system components and 
causal factors exists in theory and statistical analyses of the internal structure of the 
taxonomy were conducted to test for this. To this end the data was tested for associations 
between stakeholders (i.e. system components) and causal factors using the Pearson’s Chi-
Square test. 
 
• Content Validity!
 
Content validity refers to the selection and representativeness of the sample and is an 
estimate of how well the taxonomy encompasses the theory, i.e. whether the taxonomy 
assesses all facets of a theoretical construct (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Saunders, et al., 
2007). 
To achieve content validity, the safety data has been selected based on requirements 
derived from the descriptive model of the airport surface system developed in Chapter 3. 
The model identified five main stakeholders involved in airport surface operations (i.e. 
airport operator, ANSP, airlines, ground handling companies and regulator) and the data 
has been selected so as to represent all perspectives. The data choice was validated with 
senior safety experts from EUROCONTROL, the FAA and major ANSPs in Europe, as 
described in detail in Chapter 6 section 6.2.2. In addition, a variety of research methods 
have been applied in order to ensure that the causal factors are understood in detail. 
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A further aspect of content validity is face validity, which estimates the extent to which 
the taxonomy appears to be a good measure (Carmines and Zeller, 1979; Saunders, et al., 
2007). To achieve face validity, the final structure of the taxonomy was validated with 
SMEs representing each of the relevant stakeholders. The SMEs were chosen to fulfil the 
following criteria: 
• SMEs from organisations with a reputation for a good safety culture; 
• SMEs representing the different stakeholder perspectives; 
• SMEs both from organisations that did, and those that did not, provide the safety 
data used for developing the taxonomy; 
• A mix of SMEs from the U.S. and Europe; and 
• Professional expertise of the SME (e.g. supervisors instead of staff on the 
frontline). 
The SMEs were presented with the taxonomy and given sufficient time to review it and 
asked to comment on its structure, the appropriateness of the causal factors identified, 
missing elements, and terminology. The following ten SMEs validated the taxonomy and 
the results are discussed in section 9.2.2.3: 
• A Chief Pilot of a U.S.-based airline and the Safety Manager of a European airline; 
• A FAA Tower Supervisor, a European civil ATC controller, and a European 
military ATC controller; 
• Two Airfield Superintendents from two major U.S. airport operators and a Safety 
Manager from a European airport authority; and 
• The Head of Safety Regulations at EUROCONTROL (retired) and a Senior Safety 
Expert from the FAA. 
 
• Criterion Validity!
 
The most difficult aspect of validation is criterion validity, which is concerned with the 
question of whether the taxonomy produces valid results, i.e. whether it measures what it 
says it would measure. This can be thought of as a ‘predictive validity’, which assesses 
whether the taxonomy can predict what it should theoretically be able to predict (Saunders, 
et al., 2007). 
New datasets were gathered from the safety data providers and subsequently analysed. 
Three datasets were requested since this allowed 25.0% of the data to be tested for 
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criterion validity. In order to analyse different stakeholder perspectives, three 
organisations: Avinor ANSP (ANSP), OSL (airport operator), and the UK CAA (regulator) 
were asked for their data for 2011. The datasets were pre-processed as before (refer back to 
Chapter 6 section 6.6 for further details) and analysed for causal factors. If the taxonomy is 
valid it should capture all causal factors extracted from the data. A total of 100 randomly 
selected occurrence reports were analysed for each database. 
 
• External Validation !
External validity refers to the extent to which the taxonomy is applicable to new 
datasets (Saunders, et al., 2007). In order to achieve external validity, the taxonomy was 
applied to three new datasets. The taxonomy was tested against ANSP data from the U.S. 
Great Lakes Region,15 for which data for 2005 to 2009 was available from the FAA RI 
database. A hundred randomly selected occurrence reports were analysed using the new 
classification system. In addition, Signature’s database contained 455 reports of accidents / 
incidents that occurred outside the U.S. and UK (i.e. Europe and the Bahamas) between 
2007 and 2011. These were pre-processed as outlined in Chapter 6 section 6.6.3 in order to 
identify those reports that refer to airport surface occurrences. Five relevant occurrences 
were identified and subsequently analysed using the new taxonomy. Moreover, five 
detailed accident and incident reports from a European regulator (i.e. not the UK CAA and 
not the CAA-Norway) were available, which allowed the application of the taxonomy to a 
completely new data set. These data sets were chosen because they represent three 
different stakeholder perspectives and complement the viewpoints that were analysed to 
achieve criterion validity. 
A recent, or new, dataset from an airline was not available. To ensure that the 
taxonomy is valid from a pilot / airline perspective, the taxonomy’s content was checked 
by a Chief Pilot from a U.S.-based airline and the Safety Manager of a European airline. 
Figure 107 summarises the methodology for taxonomy validation including the aim of 
each step, the corresponding methods, and their implementation. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!$%!Illinois (IL), Indiana (IN), Michigan (MI), Minnesota (MN), North Dakota (ND), Ohio (OH), South 
Dakota (SD), Wisconsin (WI) (Federal Aviation Administration, 2000)!
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Figure 107: Methodology of taxonomy validation 
Reliability checks 
Validity checks 
Aim: To ensure a consistent taxonomy development 
Method: Cohen’s Kappa inter-rater reliability test 
Implementation: Coding of each 300 occurrences (randomly selected) by three independent qualified 
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Aim: To ensure that the taxonomy measures what it theoretically should 
Method: Matching of causal factors to the theoretical airport surface system architecture, 
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Aim: To ensure that the taxonomy encompasses the theory 
Method: To ensure the representativeness of the sample: i) the data was selected based on the 
theoretical model of the airport surface system, and ii) validated with SMEs  
Implementation: i) Data from airport operators, ANSPs, airlines, ground handling companies, 
regulators, ii) SMEs from North America and Europe 
 
Aim: To ensure that the taxonomy is a good measure 
Method: Validation of the final taxonomy with SMEs 
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9.2.2 Validation and Reliability Checks 
9.2.2.1 Reliability 
To ensure the reliability of data coding three independent raters were each asked to 
code 300 occurrences at the first three levels of the taxonomy. Figures 108 to 110 show the 
results for Cohen’s Kappa intra-rater reliability (!) as well as the agreement rates between 
each pair of raters (i.e. independent rater vs. researcher). The results indicate that the 
coding of causal factors was reliable and consistent at all stages of the analysis (! > .70).!
 
 
Figure 108: Reliability checks UK CAA !
Level 1 
Agreement rate: 94.14 %  
!".908, p < .001 
Level 2 
Agreement rate: 90.71 %  
!".886, p < .001 Level 3 Agreement rate: 90.23 %  
!".837, p < .001 
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!
Figure 109: Reliability checks U.S. Western-Pacific Region !
!
Figure 110: Reliability checks U.S. Northeast region 
Level 1 
Agreement rate: 95.09 %  
!".928, p < .001 
Level 2 
Agreement rate: 91.62 %  
!".882, p < .001 Level 3 Agreement rate: 90.07 %  
!".875, p < .001 
Level 1 
Agreement rate: 95.71 %  
!".934, p < .001 
Level 2 
Agreement rate: 92.37 %  
!".879, p < .001 Level 3 Agreement rate: 89.52 %  
!".717, p < .001 
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9.2.2.2 Construct Validity 
After evaluating the reliability of the analysis, the taxonomy was checked for its 
validity. Matching the taxonomy to the airport surface system ensured construct validity. 
Figure 111 shows that the taxonomy does indeed capture the airport surface system in all 
its aspects. The analysis in Chapter 7 also revealed an association between stakeholders 
and causal factors (X2 (15) = 1315.527, p < .001), which further supports the theory that 
every system component can fail. 
9.2.2.3 Content Validity 
The validation with ten SMEs lead to minor amendments in the taxonomy structure. 
For example, aircraft technical failures were originally just listed as a generic item in the 
taxonomy. However, the Chief Pilot pointed out that they should be grouped according to 
aircraft components / systems. 
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The corresponding legend for the causal factor codes can be found in Appendix VI. 
 
Figure 111: Construct validity 
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9.2.2.4 Criterion Validity 
The ‘predictive validity’ of the taxonomy was checked by applying the template to the 
latest datasets of three stakeholders. 100 occurrence reports from each of the three 
stakeholders, Avinor ANSP, OSL, and the UK CAA, were analysed and coded using the 
new taxonomy. This led to two interesting cases. One report in the UK CAA database had 
‘V/PD driving on the airport surface without a driving licence’ as the cause for an 
incursion. This cause has not been identified explicitly before, but can be coded as the 
competence-related cause ‘no training’. Furthermore, the analysis identified a new FO on 
the airport surface, i.e. a Chinese lantern. Again, such an object has not been identified 
before. However, it can be coded as ‘other FOD / debris on the runway’. Overall, the 
taxonomy proved to fit the data and to produce valid results. 
9.2.2.5 External Validation  
Finally, the taxonomy was checked for external validity by applying its structure to 
three new datasets as outlined in the methodology in section 9.2.1.2. No conflicting issues 
were identified and the taxonomy was evaluated as valid. 
9.2.3 Taxonomy Structure 
The final taxonomy, after data analysis, divides the causal factors into the five major 
categories of: 
• Aircraft operations, 
• Air Traffic Control, 
• Airport operations, 
• Environment, and 
• Regulatory system. 
The first three levels of the taxonomy’s structure were presented in Chapter 6 section 6.8. 
In total, the taxonomy contains 745 factors at the lowest of nine levels, which are presented 
in Appendix VI. 
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9.2.4 Comparison to Existing Taxonomies 
The new proposed taxonomy addresses the subject of airport surface safety on a global 
basis from the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders involved in surface safety 
occurrences. Through the incorporation of different research methods, the taxonomy is 
more robust than existing approaches, and is applicable for all types of accidents and 
incidents on the manoeuvring area. 
As shown in section 9.2.2.5, the taxonomy has been tested against three new datasets, 
and compared to existing classification schemes. The superiority of the new taxonomy 
over existing approaches is highlighted by three examples where incursions were coded 
using the new taxonomy. In order to compare the results, the same incidents were coded 
according to the ICAO, and EUROCONTROL classification schemes. ICAO’s Runway 
Incursion Causal Factor Identification Form (International Civil Aviation Organization, 
2007) and EUROCONTROL’s Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) (The European Organisation for 
the Safety of Air Navigation, 2011b) were applied, since both are designed for collision / 
incursion incidents. The data originated from the new European regulatory database and 
the analysed incident reports were full investigation reports. As introduced in section 
9.2.1.2, five Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MORs) were available from this European 
regulator. All of them referred to incursions and the three scenarios presented here were 
chosen randomly. The reports included the event sequence, transcripts of interviews, audio 
transcripts, investigation findings and a summary of the causal and contributing factors 
identified by the investigators. The following paragraphs introduce the incident scenarios 
and compare the coding of the occurrences according to the three chosen classification 
schemes. 
 
Scenario I:  
An aircraft was instructed to hold short runway (RWY) at the category (CAT) III holding 
point during low visibility operations. It passed the CAT III stop bar and held short of 
RWY before the CAT I holding point.  
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Table 53: Coding occurrence I 
 
Coding according to the new 
taxonomy 
 
 
Coding according to ICAO  
 
Coding according to  
EUROCONTROL 
• Code 1: ‘Correct readback, 
followed by an unauthorised 
manoeuvre’  
• Code 2: ‘Pilot crossed stop bar 
in front of a runway’  
• Code 3: ‘Pilot entering a 
runway without clearance’ 
 
 
 
 
• Code 1: ‘Flight Crew entered 
the runway after being 
instructed to “hold short”’  
• Code 1: ‘Correct pilot 
readback followed by incorrect 
action’  
 
The taxonomy developed throughout this thesis and the ICAO coding form capture the 
causal factor of ‘pilot entering a runway without clearance’. However, the new developed 
taxonomy is able to describe the occurrence in more detail, highlighting that the pilot 
readback correctly, but still crossed a stop bar in front of a runway. This information 
cannot be gathered through the ICAO coding form. According to RAT the incident can be 
described as ‘correct pilot readback followed by incorrect action’. A more detailed code 
that allows an understanding of what went wrong does not exist at an appropriate level.  
 
Scenario II: 
An aircraft was instructed to enter a taxiway (TWY) to hold short RWY. It passed the stop 
bar on TWY and held short of the Cat I hold. 
 
Table 54: Coding occurrence II 
 
Coding according to the new 
taxonomy 
 
 
Coding according to ICAO  
 
Coding according to 
EUROCONTROL 
• Code 1: ‘Correct readback, 
followed by an unauthorised 
manoeuvre’ 
• Code 2: ‘Pilot crossed stop bar 
on a taxiway’ 
• No mapping existing in ICAO • Code 1: ‘Correct pilot readback 
followed by incorrect action’ 
 
The same conclusions as for the first incident can be drawn for the new taxonomy and 
the RAT classification scheme. As the ICAO Runway Incursion Causal Factor 
Identification Form fails to capture taxiway occurrences, the causal factors underlying this 
incident cannot be captured. 
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Scenario III: 
An aircraft landed on RWY. As the aircraft completed its roll to join TWY, the pilot 
informed the tower that he had seen ground equipment at the runway edge lights on the 
right hand side. Maintenance vehicle X had been managing approved grass cutting 
operations at the time and had been instructed to vacate the flight strip. Maintenance 
vehicle X had informed the tower that all equipment under his supervision was clear of the 
flight strip.  
 
Table 55: Coding occurrence III 
 
Coding according to the new 
taxonomy 
 
 
Coding according to ICAO  
 
Coding according to 
EUROCONTROL 
• Code 1: ‘Authorised airfield 
escort did not ensure that all 
vehicles under his supervision 
had vacated the runway when 
confirmation of vacation to the 
tower was issued’ 
 
Contributing factors:  
• Code 2: ‘Runway not visible to 
ATC’ 
• Code 3: ‘Vehicle – absence of 
beacon’ 
• Code 4: ‘Inconsistent radar 
signal’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Code 1: ‘ATC has limited 
view of the manoeuvring area’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Code 1: ‘Surveillance’ 
 
In this third instance, the new taxonomy captures all the causal factors identified in the 
investigation findings. The application of the ICAO coding form fails. The first code, 
whereby the authorised airfield escort did not ensure that all vehicles vacated the runway, 
could be captured under vehicle driver ‘situational awareness’ or ‘clearances and 
instructions’. However, in order to code this, further information is needed on why the 
airfield escort failed to vacate the runway. The investigation could not bring this 
information to light. In addition, the ICAO coding form fails to capture generic technical 
problems. The RAT taxonomy also fails to capture the incident. RAT does not account for 
airport operations-related factors, such as vehicle driver issues.  
It can be concluded that a taxonomy has to be designed for a specific purpose and 
requires the right amount of detail. ICAO does not capture taxiway events. This is 
important since incidents happen on taxiways just as much as on runways. Indeed, 
collisions on the manoeuvring area, for example, are the highest accident category in the 
aviation system for the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) member states (The 
 9 A Macroscopic Scenario Tool for Airport SMS 
!! "#$!
European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation Safety Regulation Commission, 
2010). In addition, the ICAO Coding Form was inadequate in capturing all causal factors 
underlying the three analysed examples. The RAT taxonomy, on the other hand, seems to 
capture the description of an occurrence at too high a level. In addition, it is developed 
from an ATM perspective focusing on pilot and ATC-related factors as well as, to a large 
extent, on technical problems.  
9.2.5 Application, Transferability and Limitations 
In the context of SMS, the developed taxonomy can support the safety risk 
management process, in particular the data analysis function. The taxonomy provides a 
robust basis for safety data coding and subsequent data analysis. Both are fundamental to 
effective safety performance monitoring (safety assurance component). An example of the 
limitations experienced by one of the safety data providers (referred to as company A) 
highlights the importance of having a robust taxonomy underpinning a safety data analysis 
process.  
When company A receives a safety report, descriptors (occurrence type and what 
happened) are assigned to the occurrence. Based on these descriptors appropriate 
investigators are assigned. Company A currently experiences the problem not having a 
robust taxonomy and that the descriptors evolved over time. This led to a very 
unsystematic classification system with multiple descriptors describing the same causal 
factors, others not in use or forgotten, and no explicit definitions. The safety analysts 
assign these descriptors based on ‘what they think these are’. Company A is currently 
putting a large effort into revising their system, starting with defining safety occurrences 
and ‘cleaning up’ their classification system. A robust taxonomy with a clear structure 
would have prevented such a situation.  
Similar feedback has been received from the FAA in the U.S., where the data analysts 
pointed out that the lack of integrated taxonomies is one of the major problems the 
organisation currently faces. Each department keeps its own data (e.g. data for different 
occurrence types are kept in different databases) and uses its own taxonomies. These 
taxonomies have been developed individually and are not integrated. Consequently, the 
various departments within the FAA cannot communicate effectively with each other. 
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Indeed, the data analysts stressed that the FAA is in desperate need of good taxonomies 
(Structured communication with FAA Runway Safety Office Analysts, August 2011). 
The taxonomy has been developed using a hybrid-methodology that is flexible and can 
be applied to other parts of the airport system, as well as other areas of research. For 
example, there is currently no integrated taxonomy for ground handling, with each 
operator being responsible for its own handling of safety. Therefore, safety assessments for 
ramp operations would also benefit from a holistic taxonomy. This flexibility also makes it 
easier to develop the taxonomy further if needed. This is important, for example, in the 
context of a developing ATM system and ATM upgrade initiatives such as the Single 
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and the Next Generation Air Transport System 
(NextGen) in the U.S. Both SESAR and NextGen are working on the development of a 
technological and operational transformation of the ATM system to meet future airspace 
capacity and safety needs (e.g. The European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, 2013). Changing concepts in respect to operations might introduce new 
failures to the airport surface system and these can be easily incorporated into the 
developed taxonomy. 
The taxonomy has been developed with the aim of providing a tool that supports the 
analysis of safety data (i.e. coding). It is limited by not taking organisational factors (e.g. 
organisational climate, processes, resource management), and detailed regulatory impacts 
into account. These factors cannot be extracted from occurrence reports and, therefore, 
could not be identified through the research methods applied in this thesis. Although the 
new taxonomy is not all encompassing, it provides a robust tool for the analysis of safety 
data.  
9.3 Macroscopic Scenario Tool 
Finally, the system and system failures were matched resulting in a model of airport 
surface operations that allows for the identification of the key drivers of airport surface 
accidents and incidents. The following section presents the details of the model and 
discusses its application in the context of a SMS. 
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9.3.1 Introduction of the Tool 
Figure 116 shows the final airport surface system architecture. The stakeholders are 
highlighted in blue font and infrastructure in green. Associated with the stakeholders and 
infrastructure, denoted through black numbers, are the failures that can challenge the safety 
of operations. Blue arrows represent the interactions between stakeholders and red arrows 
the stochastic elements. How each of the components and interactions can challenge the 
safety of the system is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
9.3.1.1 Direct Drivers 
Chapter 5 noted that the factors causing accidents / incidents are typically identified for 
specific occurrence types from the perspective of a single stakeholder. With the airport 
surface system architecture proposed here it is now possible to show all the drivers of 
airport surface safety occurrences integrated for all relevant stakeholders. These include 
direct and indirect drivers as follows:  
 
Direct drivers: factors that directly challenge the safety of the operation / tasks of a 
stakeholder (Actor A). 
 
The following example clarifies the concept of direct drivers. The occurrences 
presented in this section for illustrative purposes are extracted from the safety databases 
used in this thesis. The aircraft and vehicle identifiers were removed and replaced by a/c, 
and V/PD, respectively. 
 
Example I: 
“An a/c 1 ready for departure was instructed to hold short of Runway 15. The a/c 1 pilot 
read back hold short correctly. Subsequently the a/c 1 was observed holding between the 
hold line and runway edge line at approach end without clearance. No conflicts were 
reported. The a/c 1 was then cleared for take-off.”   
 
In this example, an error occurred in the task sequence of the pilot’s operation. The 
pilot was instructed to hold short, and read back correctly. However, the plane crossed the 
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hold line. The deviation from the normal operation was caused by the pilot (Actor A). 
Figure 112 shows this deviation graphically. 
 
 
Figure 112: Direct drivers 
Figure 112 shows the task sequence of 
Actor A. The red circle highlights the task 
within the sequence that failed leading to an 
occurrence. In Example I the pilot failed to 
hold short, which resulted in a runway 
incursion. The failure can lead directly to an 
occurrence, as seen in Example I. However, 
it is also possible that a failure within the 
task sequence leads to an occurrence only 
after several other tasks have been 
completed. In the airport surface system 
architecture, direct drivers are assigned to 
the corresponding stakeholder / components 
through the numbers in black. 
9.3.1.2 Indirect Drivers 
Indirect drivers: factors that do not directly challenge the safety of the operation / tasks 
of a stakeholder (Actor A), but can become critical for this stakeholder over either one of 
the two specified interfaces. 
 
a) Factors that become critical for a stakeholder’s operation over the interface of 
communication. 
 
Example II: 
 
“An a/c 1 was cleared for take-off on Runway 34R full length. A/c 2 was issued taxi into 
position and hold (TIPH) on Runway 34R after the a/c 1 started take-off. When the a/c 1 
was more than 6,000 feet from the threshold, Local Control (LC) issued take-off clearance 
to the a/c 2. The a/c 2 started take-off roll when the a/c 1 was 7,400 down the runway. The 
Occurrence 
Actor A 
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a/c 1 pilot reported an aborted take-off and the a/c 2 take-off clearance was cancelled. The 
a/c 2 rolled approximately 600 feet before exiting Runway 34R. Closest proximity reported 
was 7,400 feet horizontal.” 
   
In this example, ATC misjudges the distance between two aircraft and clears a/c 2 for 
take-off, although a/c 1 was still on the runway. The result was a loss of separation on the 
runway. Figure 113 highlights how indirect drivers can influence the operations / tasks of 
different stakeholders one another. The important factor to note is that both actors, a/c 2 
and ATC, are in contact with each other over the interface of communication. 
 
 
Figure 113: Indirect drivers – interface 
communication 
In Example II the deviation 
(misjudgement of distance between two 
aircraft) occurred during the execution of 
ATC’s tasks (Actor B). ATC communicated 
the take-off clearance to a/c 2 (Actor A), 
who started its take-off roll. Here, the 
deviation was caused by ATC (Actor B) and 
influenced a/c 2 (Actor A) over the interface 
of communication.  
The deviation within the operations of 
an Actor B can take on two forms 
(highlighted in red circles). The deviation 
can either occur within the task sequence 
(e.g. misjudgement of distances) and is later 
communicated, or can be an error in the 
communication itself (e.g. error in the 
message itself). 
 
Note that Chapter 3 specified ATC’s operation as a multi-tasking operation that does 
not follow a prescribed order of tasks. In order to simplify Figure 113 and the concept of 
indirect drivers, Actor B’s tasks are represented as a task sequence. The blue lines in the 
final system architecture (Figure 116) describe the interactions between the stakeholders. 
The direction of the arrow denotes the direction of the influence. Any interaction can 
Commu-
nication 
Occurrence 
Actor B 
Actor A 
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involve some form of communication and, therefore, all stakeholders connected by blue 
lines can influence each other over the interface of communication. 
 
b) Factors that become critical for one stakeholder’s operation over the stochastic 
interface of location. 
 
Example III: 
“Two V/PD crossed Taxiway Alpha without clearance and without contacting ATC. The 
vehicles crossed in front of a taxiing a/c 1 by an estimated 75-100 feet.” 
 
Example III shows an occurrence where a third party (Actor C), that was not in contact 
with the a/c 1 (Actor A) influenced its operations. In this example, the deviation occurred 
within the task sequence of the vehicle drivers (Actor C). The vehicle did not contact ATC 
and infringed onto the taxiway, which impacted on the operations of an aircraft a/c 1 
(Actor A) that was in the same location. Figure 114 gives a graphical example. 
 
 
Figure 114: Indirect drivers - interface 
location 
The deviation within the operation / 
tasks of an Actor C can take on two forms 
(highlighted in red circles). The deviation 
can either occur within the task sequence of 
Actor C leading to an infringement of 
location later on (e.g. no initial contact to 
ATC was established, followed by an 
infringement onto the surface), or can be the 
infringement itself (e.g. V/PD was 
instructed to hold short, he / she read back 
the instructions correctly, but crossed the 
hold line).  
 
 
Figure 116 shows all actors involved in surface operations in blue font. These 
stakeholders can influence each other over the interface of location. The movements of 
Occurrence 
Actor C 
Actor A 
Location 
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stakeholders during normal surface operations and associated locations have been defined 
in Chapter 3 during the task analysis of each actors’ operation. 
9.3.1.3 Stochastic Drivers 
Another form of indirect driver is a stochastic driver. 
 
Stochastic drivers: Stochastic factors that do not directly challenge the safety of the 
operation / tasks of a stakeholder (Actor A), but can become critical for this stakeholder 
over the interface of location.  
 
Example IV:  
 
“Pilot of an a/c 1, after landing Runway 17C and exiting at K8, advised Ground Control 
(GC) that a passenger had forced open a cabin door, exited the aircraft and was walking 
across the ramp from Runway 17R at K8 towards the terminal. The a/c 1 had just crossed 
17R at K8 westbound and stopped with part of aircraft on 17R. ATCT immediately closed 
17R. Individual was apprehended. No conflicts reported.”  
 
The data analysis in Chapter 8 (section 8.4) showed a stochastic influence of customers 
/ passengers on surface operations and the above example highlights such an influence, i.e. 
a case whereby a passenger infringes onto the airport surface. This infringement can 
influence the operations of all other stakeholders in the same location on the manoeuvring 
area. Figure 115 summarises the case of stochastic drivers graphically. 
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Figure 115: Stochastic drivers 
In this example, the deviation is a 
stochastic factor, which causes an 
occurrence. The factor is critical for the 
operations of other stakeholders (e.g. 
Actor A) over the interface of the location 
(i.e. infringement). Stochastic factors are 
highlighted through red arrows in the 
airport surface system architecture and 
can influence all stakeholders that act 
upon the airport surface. 
9.3.1.4 Other Drivers 
In addition to direct and indirect drivers, the airport infrastructure (e.g. surface 
infrastructure, aircrafts, vehicles) can fail. The infrastructure is represented by green font in 
the airport surface system architecture (Figure 116). Infrastructural failures can influence 
other stakeholders over the interface of location (e.g. inadequate marking, signage, lighting 
on a taxiway can influence the operations of pilots and V/PD on that taxiway). 
Furthermore, other non-stochastic external factors such as weather have an influence on 
airport surface operations. Figure 116 highlights them in black font. Often, these drivers do 
not occur in isolation, but as a combination.  
 
Actor A 
Location 
External  
influence 
Occurrence 
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Figure 116: Macroscopic scenario tool
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1 Aircraft operations 
   11 Aircraft – Technical 
       111 Aircraft technical failure 
       112 Aircraft weight and balance 
       113 Master caution warning 
       114 Aircraft design / manufacturing 
       115 Aircraft improper maintenance 
       116 Environmental influences 
       117 Other 
   12 Pilot – Human 
       121 Resources 
       122 Competence 
       123 Communications 
       124 Situational awareness 
       125 Human-machine interface 
       126 Human reliability 
       127 Team operations 
       128 Procedures 
Legend: 
2 ATC 
   21 ATC – Technical 
       211 Surveillance system 
       212 Navigation system 
       213 Communication system 
       214 Equipment design / manufacturing 
       215 Equipment improper maintenance 
       216 Other 
   22 ATC – Human 
       221 Resources 
       222 Competence 
       223 Communications 
       224 Situational awareness 
       225 Human-machine interface 
       226 Human reliability 
       227 Team operations 
       228 Procedures 
3 Airport operations 
   31 Airport  – Technical 
       311 Vehicle technical failure 
       312 Radio communications 
       313 Absence of radar beacon 
       314 Ground handling equipment 
       315 Tugs 
       316 Airport meteorological equipment 
       317 Vehicle / equipment design / manufacturing 
       318 Vehicle / equipment improper maintenance 
       319 Other 
   32 V/PD – Human 
       321 Resources 
       322 Competence 
       323 Communications 
       324 Situational awareness 
       325 Human-machine interface 
       326 Human reliability 
      
       327 Team operations 
       328 Procedures 
       329 Airport management 
       3210 Airport operations 
   33 Airport – Physical 
       331 Design 
       332 Surface infrastructure and conditions 
4 Environment 
   41 Weather 
   42 Geological disturbances 
   43 Nighttime operations 
   44 Wildlife 
   45 External factors 
5 Regulatory system 
   51 Regulations not existent 
   52 Regulations inadequate 
   53 Regulations existent, nut not implemented 
* The factors 3311, 3312, and 3313 refer to airport location and surrounding land use, airport landscaping, and manoeuvring area design, respectively. 
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9.3.2 Application of the Tool 
The developed model can be used 1) as a training and awareness tool to support the 
safety promotion component of a SMS, and ii) as a macroscopic scenario tool in the 
context of SMS change management.  
The developed model provides a holistic overview of all the stakeholders involved in 
surface operations and enables a detailed understanding of the system failures, i.e. factors 
that cause occurrences, and how these can spread throughout the system. This has 
implications for risk mitigation measures, such as the design of training programmes. For 
example, while a pilot does not need to understand the causes of failures in the operations 
of other stakeholders in detail, he / she needs to be aware of them to the extent that they 
can impact his / her own operations. Training programmes need to account for this in order 
to allow every stakeholder to develop an understanding of what the other actors are doing 
around them and how that can impact their own operations. In addition, a holistic 
understanding of operational practices on the airport surface, and associated hazards, 
improves the situational awareness of all stakeholders, which is one of the most frequently 
cited causes e.g. for incursions (Airbus, 2004c; Federal Aviation Administration, 2008b; 
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2007). Overall, the developed airport surface 
system architecture is applicable to all stakeholders and helps practitioners to think 
‘outside the box’, that is, to identify drivers that are not directly related to an operator’s 
activities, but may indirectly influence their operations and safety. It is recommended as a 
training and awareness tool and, therefore, it supports the training and education, as well as 
the safety communication functions, of the safety promotion component of a SMS. 
 
Aviation is a fast moving environment and the service providers experience permanent 
change which requires the adjustment of safety risk controls in the operational 
environment (International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009e). Therefore, the model is 
also recommended as a macroscopic scenario tool for use in SMS change management, 
thus supporting the safety assurance component of a SMS. Its role in supporting change 
management is illustrated in Figure 117, which shows the scenarios and changes that need 
to be considered when building a new runway. The change in the system (i.e. the build of 
the runway) is shown in green and its system-wide impacts highlighted in red. 
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Figure 117: Scenario evaluation new runway 
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The building of a new runway is a complex decision not only for the airport, but also 
for the whole system. A new runway would change the manoeuvring area design and its 
associated infrastructure (e.g. visual and electronic NAVAIDs). In addition, it has an 
impact on the operations of pilots, V/PD and ATC. Associated with this are possible 
changes in the training programmes and operating procedures of the corresponding service 
providers (e.g. airlines, ANSPs, airport operators). In the case of the airport authority a 
new runway would also require the maintenance of this new piece of infrastructure, which 
influences, e.g., surface inspections and snow removal activities and may even require the 
acquisition of new equipment to accommodate these operations. Furthermore, a change in 
the layout would require the adjustment of, e.g., electronic moving map displays in the 
cockpit, which influences aircraft manufacturers and maintenance engineers that have to be 
trained on the technological changes. A change in the runway configuration also entails the 
change of Standard Instrument Departure Routes and Standard Arrival Routes (SIDs and 
STARs). Moreover, the building of a new runway needs to comply with area restrictions, 
address possible opposition from local communities, satisfy the interests of the government 
and investors, and comply with the regulatory framework. Therefore, the model developed 
here shows, on a macroscopic level, the impact of changes on the system and can therefore 
guide further analysis, for instance, which components should be simulated and analysed 
in further detail.  
Similarly, a change in the components might also entail a change in the causal factors. 
For example, new factors may be needed, existing factors may need modification, or 
factors may need to be eliminated if they are no longer relevant. Since the model shows the 
causal factor groups associated to each component it can guide safety assessments that may 
be required by a change in the system. 
9.4 Summary 
This thesis has shown that the current airport SMS is more of a conceptual construct 
than a toolbox ready for implementation. This is justified by the absence of practical 
guidance on the development and implementation. This has been addressed in this chapter 
by the development of the tools required to support the safety risk management, safety 
assurance and safety promotion components of a SMS. 
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Firstly, the process model of airport surface operations to be used as baseline model for 
SMS has been finalised. Secondly, the chapter has combined the findings of the previous 
chapters in a new taxonomy of causal factors underlying airport surface safety occurrences 
and subsequently applied various checks to ensure its reliability and validity. The 
taxonomy has been developed using a new hybrid methodology that specifically targeted 
the limitations of previous research, resulting in a robust classification scheme which 
provides a better fit to airport surface safety data than existing templates. This was 
achieved through a holistic consideration of surface safety occurrences, a global focus, the 
combination of different research methods and data sources, and an integration of the 
different perspectives of aviation stakeholders involved in airport surface operations. 
The new taxonomy provides a common industry language and state-of-the-art tool that 
supports the data analysis function in the context of SMS and, hence, provides a robust 
basis for data analysis. Its unique feature is its integration and applicability to all relevant 
aviation stakeholders in the context of surface safety. It is recommended for operational 
safety risk management for all aviation stakeholders.  
Finally, a macroscopic scenario tool of airport surface operations was developed. 
Examples of its application for SMS change management (i.e. safety assurance 
component) and the training and education and safety communication functions (i.e. safety 
promotion) were demonstrated. 
So far this thesis has addressed surface safety by modelling the airport surface system 
and identifying the possible failures in the process of surface operations. To identify those 
factors that are most critical for successful surface operations, the next two chapters 
quantify the system by proposing a structured framework for the analysis of causal factors. 
 
!
!
!
!
!
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10 The Impact of Airport Characteristics 
The previous chapters have identified the causal factors underlying airport surface 
safety occurrences. Both, the literature review in Chapter 5 and the analysis of safety data 
in Chapters 7 and 8, have highlighted the importance of airport characteristics and their 
potential impact on airport surface accidents / incidents. For example, manoeuvring area 
geometry, or the inadequacy of airport surface infrastructure (e.g. signage) have been 
mentioned repeatedly for more than two decades as ‘causal’ for airport surface operations 
(Adam, et al., 1992; Federal Aviation Administration, 2008b; International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007; National Transportation Safety Board, 1987). In spite of this, there is a 
lack of robust quantitative analyses in the literature and a relationship between airport 
characteristics and safety occurrences has never been proven. To lay the foundation for the 
seventh research objective (to propose a systematic framework to assess the functional 
relationship between accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors), this chapter 
analyses the impact of airport characteristics on the occurrence of airport surface accidents 
and incidents. 
Chapter 10 is split into four parts. The first presents the problem statement and justifies 
the need to analyse airport characteristics. The relevant data is collected by means of an 
airports survey, and the second part introduces the methodology, including sampling 
considerations and methods of data collection and data analysis. The data is then analysed 
for associations between airport characteristics and airport surface safety occurrences. The 
results are presented in part three and the implications of the findings in the context of 
SMS discussed. Finally, the chapter is concluded in the fourth part.  
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10.1 Background 
Chapter 5 identified the factors in relation to airport characteristics that have the 
potential to impact the safety of surface operations. For example: 
• A complex layout of the airport surface and its related infrastructure may cause a loss of 
pilot situational awareness, leading to an incursion (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2007; La Direction Générale de l'Aviation Civile, 2007; The European 
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, et al., 2011); 
• The physical characteristics of runways, such as runway end safety areas, runway slope, 
runway condition (e.g. contamination), and surface operations and maintenance (e.g. 
snow and ice control and removal) might contribute to an excursion (Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau, 2008b; Flight Safety Foundation, 2009; Hall, et al., 2008); 
• Airport landscaping and surrounding land use may influence the presence of wildlife 
and is associated with the risk of a wildlife strike (Transport Canada, 2008; UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2008a), and;  
• Surface infrastructure, operations and maintenance can lead to debris and eventually 
cause a FOD (Bachtel, 2010; Federal Aviation Administration, 2009a). 
In addition, the analysis of safety data in Chapters 7 and 8 also identified airport 
characteristics (e.g. markings, signage, lighting) as having a potential impact on airport 
surface occurrences. 
All these factors can be grouped under the topic of airport characteristics. However, 
although they are mentioned frequently as ‘causal factors’, there is a surprising lack of 
quantitative studies on the relationship between airport characteristics and surface safety 
occurrences.  
A recent study by Galle, et al. (2010) analysed the impact of runway geometry on the 
rate of runway incursions. The authors clustered 80 airports from the U.S. Great Lakes 
Region into five clusters based on runway geometry. The study compared the rate of 
runway incursions across the clusters and found a similar median across the groups. The 
study concluded that runway geometry is not a significant predictor for runway incursions. 
Whilst this study provides an initial attempt of analysing the impact of airport 
characteristics on surface safety occurrences, it is limited in several respects. The authors 
consider runway geometry simply as one variable and do not elaborate on the particular 
geometric characteristics used for the clustering. However, it may be that only certain 
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geometric aspects are significant (e.g. number of runways, intersecting taxiways), and 
Galle, et al.’s study does not test for this. In addition, their study considers only runway 
geometry and ignores the operation of the runway. Furthermore, Galle, et al. focus on 
analysing the impact of airport geometric characteristics on the rate of runway incursions. 
While airport characteristics may not influence the rate of occurrences, they may impact on 
their severity, or their underlying causal factors, e.g. the type of human errors an airport is 
most likely to suffer. For example, specific airport characteristics may influence the 
occurrence of pilot, ATC, or V/PD-related factors. 
This chapter analyses the impact of airport characteristics on the occurrence of airport 
surface accidents and incidents and their causes. In particular, airport characteristics are 
considered in eight distinct groups including: airport location, traffic characteristics, 
manoeuvring area geometry, equipment and installations, operations and maintenance, 
regulatory and human aspects. Based on the limitations of previous research, this chapter 
explores the associations between these airport characteristics and i) airport surface 
occurrence rates, ii) the severity of occurrences, and iii) the causal factors underlying 
occurrences. 
10.2 Methodology 
The impact of airport characteristics on the safety of surface operations is analysed in 
three steps. The methodology is presented in Figure 118.  
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Figure 118: Methodology outline 
Definition of measurement variables 
•  Measurement variables are derived from: 
-  Subject matter literature 
-  Safety data 
Sampling 
•  Target sample size: 57 towered airports in the U.S., UK, 
NO, NZ 
Survey methodology 
•  Internet-mediated questionnaire 
•  Data collection through the author using Aeronautical 
Information Publication (AIP) 
Pilot survey 
•  1 U.S. and 1 European airport 
Revision of pilot 
•  Minor amendments in the questionnaire design  
Full survey 
•  Distribution of the questionnaire over 
reference organisations: 
-  FAA Regional Runway Safety Managers 
-  UK CAA 
-  Avinor  
-  NZ Pilots Association 
-  Professional Networks (e.g. Transportation 
Research Board of the National Academies) 
Data analysis 
1)  High-level analysis and sample characteristics 
2)  Data distribution 
3)  Data homogeneity 
4)  Tests for associations between: 
-  Airport characteristics and accident / incident rates 
-  Airport characteristics and the severity of occurrences 
-  Airport characteristics and the causal factors that underlie occurrences 
Questionnaire 
refinement 
Validation with SMEs 
•  To ensure content validity the airport characteristics 
and measurement variables are validated with: 
-  FAA Regional Runway Safety Manager, FAA 
Senior Safety Analyst 
-  EUROCONTROL Head of Safety Regulation 
(retired) 
-  Vice President Safety and Regulatory Affairs at 
Airports Council International (ACI) – North 
America 
-  SMEs from a major U.S. airport operator 
Identification of airport characteristics with potential 
impact on surface safety 
•  The airport characteristics to be considered are derived 
from: 
-  Process model of airport surface operations 
-  Literature findings 
-  Analysis of safety data 
2 Airports survey 
Safety data selection and analysis 
•  Safety data from the regulatory bodies of the U.S.,UK, NO, NZ are selected, because:  
-  Accident / incident reporting is mandatory in each of the countries 
-  The common viewpoint (i.e. regulatory) ensures standardisation 
•  Analysis of the descriptive narratives of accidents / incidents for causal factors as 
outlined in Chapter 6 
1 Safety data 
3 Statistical analysis 
AIP 
•  Collection of data in 
relation to surface 
geometry and 
equipment and 
installations through 
AIP and aeronautical 
databases 
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10.2.1 Safety Data 
Safety data from the regulatory authorities of the U.S., UK, NO, and NZ were used for 
this part of the research. Regulatory safety data was selected since the reporting of 
accidents and incidents is mandatory in each of the four targeted countries (e.g. UK Civil 
Aviation Authority Safety Regulation Group, 2011). Therefore, the selected databases 
should encompass all the reports made by the different aviation stakeholders (e.g. airline, 
ANSP, airport authority, regulator, handling companies). A common viewpoint, i.e. 
regulatory, ensures standardised data collection.  
The data available for incursions, excursions and FOD were used. Wildlife strike data 
was excluded due to the inconsistent data collection mechanism together with the highly 
questionable quality of such data, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
New Zealand CAA’s database contains two spreadsheets (see data introduction 
Chapter 6 section 6.6.12). Due to resource and time constraints the previous chapters 
analysed only accidents / incidents that had been investigated. The second spreadsheet, 
containing occurrences that had not been investigated, was not considered. In order to 
make the current analysis comparable to the other countries, New Zealand’s complete 
database is used for this part of the research, i.e. the analysis refers to all occurrences that 
happened at the airports considered in this chapter.  
The data was coded to extract the causal factors following the methodology described 
in Chapter 6 section 6.7. The following section introduces the airport characteristics to be 
analysed.  
10.2.2 Airport Characteristics and Measurement Variables 
The airport characteristics were derived from the process model of normal airport 
surface operations, and were verified through the subject matter literature and findings 
from safety data analysis. The list of airport characteristics was subsequently validated 
with the following SMEs from the U.S. and Europe: 
• A representative of a major U.S. airport authority (Deputy Director of Aviation 
Planning and Strategy), 
• The Vice President of Safety and Regulatory Affairs from Airports Council 
International (ACI) – North America, 
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• The Regional Runway Safety Manager and a Senior Safety Analysts from the FAA, 
• A former (retired) Head of Safety Regulation at EUROCONTROL. 
To capture the airport operator’s perspectives representatives of a U.S. airport authority 
and ACI, the global representative of the airports, were approached. As some of the airport 
characteristics (e.g. ILS) fall under the responsibility of the regulator and ANSP in the 
U.S., representatives of the FAA were consulted also. EUROCONTROL was approached 
to capture the European perspective. All SMEs were senior safety experts with a minimum 
of 15 years of relevant experience in aviation and airport operations as well as in safety. 
The airport characteristics were presented and the SMEs asked to systematically assess and 
comment on their validity (e.g. to assess whether the list in their opinion contained all 
relevant airport characteristics or missed important aspects). Table 56 shows the identified 
characteristics, classified into eight groups. 
 
Table 56: Airport characteristics with potential impact on surface safety 
 
Airport characteristics 
 
Process model  
(Chapter 3) 
 
Literature 
findings 
(Chapter 5) 
 
Analysis of 
safety data 
(Chapters  
6-8) 
 
1. Airport location and surrounding land use ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Airport location ✓ ✓ ! 
• Airport surrounding land use ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Meteorological conditions ✓ ✓ ✓ 
2. Traffic characteristics ! ✓ ! 
3. Manoeuvring area physical characteristics ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Manoeuvring area design ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Landscaping ! ✓ ! 
4. Equipment and installations ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Equipment status ✓ ✓ ! 
• Adequacy ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Equipment failure (operational readiness) ✓ ! ✓ 
5. Visual navigation aids  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Equipment status ✓ ✓ ! 
• Adequacy ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Equipment failure (operational readiness) ✓ ! ✓ 
6. Manoeuvring area operations and maintenance ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Manoeuvring area inspection  ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Surface conditions - adequacy ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Infrastructure maintenance ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Construction management ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Vehicle management ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Wildlife hazard management ✓ ✓ ✓ 
7. Regulations ✓ ✓ ✓ 
8. Human aspects ✓ ✓ ✓ 
• Level of training ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 10 The Impact of Airport Characteristics 
! "#$!
In a second step, measures for the airport characteristics introduced in Table 56 were 
derived. The measurement variables were derived from the subject matter literature and 
airport surface safety data. To ensure content validity, they have been validated with the 
senior safety experts from EUROCONTROL, the FAA, a major U.S. airport authority and 
ACI as outlined above. Table 57 contains the measurement variables and discusses how 
these potentially impact on airport surface safety. Some factors are highlighted as 
‘excluded’. These are variables that could affect surface safety but which are not 
considered in this study for the following reasons: 
• The airport characteristic is assumed to influence the level of wildlife, which is not 
considered in this thesis (e.g. airport surrounding land use); 
• Data collection is expected to give unreliable results (e.g. meteorological conditions); 
• Normal airport surface operations are assumed (e.g. the infrastructure is assumed to be 
in working conditions, failure rates are not considered); 
• Runway / taxiway specific characteristics (e.g. type of ILS) are excluded, since safety 
data would have to be correlated to specific locations at airports. Such information is 
not consistently collected in the safety data.  
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Table 57: Measurement variables 
 
Airport characteristics 
 
Measurement variables 
 
Impact on safety 
 
1. Airport location and surrounding land use 
 
!  Airport location !  Altitude (elevation in metres) !  Aircraft performance reduces at high altitudes 
!  Airport surrounding land use that 
causes disruption to aviation  
Excluded: 
- Airport surrounding land use possibly influences the level of 
wildlife strikes 
!  Certain airport surrounding land uses influence the presence 
of wildlife (wildlife attractants) 
!  Meteorological conditions Excluded: 
- Any typical airport in North America and Europe will 
experience all meteorological conditions 
- Data collection (e.g. number of days certain meteorological 
conditions impact on normal surface operations) will lead to 
unreliable estimations 
!  Weather influences operations and safety (e.g. snow / ice, 
fog, heavy storm, cross-winds) 
 
2. Traffic characteristics 
 
!  Traffic characteristics !  Number of movements per year 
!  Peak number of operations during peak hours 
!  Primary type of traffic handled at the airport 
!  Number of airlines that have their home base at the airport 
!  Traffic volume, in particular during peak hours, increases the 
potential of occurrences 
 
!  High number of airlines increases coordination; low number 
of airlines ensures that all flight crews are trained equally 
 
3. Manoeuvring area physical characteristics 
 
! Manoeuvring area design !  Number of runways (RWY) 
!  Number of taxiways (TWY)  
!  Number of conflict points:  
       - (RWY / RWY) 
       - (RWY / TWY) 
       - (TWY / TWY) 
!  Airfield layout and complexity can lead to confusion 
!  Landscaping Excluded: 
- Airport landscaping possibly influences the level of wildlife 
strikes 
- Data collection would require site visits 
!  Landscaping influences the presence of wildlife (wildlife 
attractants) 
 
4. Equipment and installations 
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!  Equipment status •  Number of communication channels 
•  Number of frequencies 
 
Excluded: 
- Type of landing system, as this is runway / taxiway specific data 
• Number of communication channels and frequencies can 
lead to e.g. frequency confusion 
 
 
 
!  Inadequate equipment can lead to safety challenging 
situations 
 
!  Adequacy !  Adequacy of equipment / installations to support the operations 
based upon them* 
!  Equipment failure (operational 
readiness) 
Excluded:   
- Data collection (e.g. equipment failure rates) using e.g. a 
questionnaire will lead to unreliable estimations, equipment 
failure databases at the airport level would be needed 
- It is assumed that the infrastructure is in working conditions 
during normal operations 
!  Infrastructure / equipment failure can lead to safety 
challenging situations 
 
5. Visual navigation aids  (markings, signage, lighting) 
 
!  Equipment status Excluded: 
- This study considers certified airports, hence, visual navigation 
aids are assumed to be compliant to ICAO Annex 14 
!  Inadequate infrastructure / equipment can lead to safety 
challenging situations 
!  Adequacy !  Adequacy of visual navigation aids to support the operations 
based upon them* 
!  Number of reports / complaints about confusing visual 
navigation aids 
!  Infrastructure / equipment failure 
(operational readiness) 
Excluded:   
- See ‘Equipment and installations – equipment failure’ 
!  Infrastructure / equipment failure can lead to safety 
challenging situations 
 
6. Manoeuvring area operations & maintenance 
 
!  Operational scenario !  Use of runways as taxiways 
 
Excluded:  
- Operational scenario (i.e. runway operational practice), as this 
is runway specific information 
!  The use of runways as taxiways possibly increases the risk of 
an incursion 
!  Manoeuvring area inspection  !  Number of runway condition checks per day !  The mmanoeuvring area not being in a working condition can 
challenge the safety of operations upon it 
!  Maintenance / construction work imposes an additional risk 
as surfaces might be closed during these times, and external 
people might access the surface, etc. 
!  Surface conditions - adequacy 
!  Infrastructure maintenance !  Frequency of maintenance / construction work taking place on 
the manoeuvring area  !  Construction management 
!  Vehicle management !  Requirement for clearance for vehicle drivers !  Free-range policies can challenge safety as vehicle drivers are 
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!  Vehicle equipment with radio communication 
 
!  Subcontractors working on the manoeuvring area 
cleared to use the surface without coordination with ATC 
!  Vehicles not equipped with radio communications impose a 
safety challenge 
!  Subcontracting increases e.g. the level of coordination and 
supervision required 
!  Wildlife hazard management Excluded: 
- Existence of a wildlife hazard management plan  
!  Presence of wildlife imposes a risk to surface operations 
 
7. Regulations 
 
!  Regulations !  Engagement in proactive safety assessments apart from 
regulatory requirements 
 
Excluded: 
- Compliance with regulatory requirements: airports are audited 
regularly, hence, compliance is assumed 
!  Regulatory compliance impacts on safety. Since all airports 
are required to be compliant, it is of particular interest 
whether they engage in proactive safety assessments 
 
8. Human aspects 
 
!  Level of training !  Adequacy of the staffing level for airside operations* 
!  Adequacy of training for operational personnel* 
!  Adequacy of training for subcontractors* 
!  The level of staffing and the adequacy of its training 
influence the safety of surface operations 
Adequacy = fit for purpose as determined by airport operational personnel 
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10.2.3 Sampling 
The relevant airport characteristics data, i.e. measurement variables, were collected 
using a survey methodology. The population of airports sampled in this survey comprised 
airports with diverse underlying characteristics including, for example, manoeuvring area 
design, equipment status and operational practices. This sample was designed to be 
representative of the measurement variables introduced in Table 57. 
The survey focused on towered airports in the U.S., UK, NO and NZ, giving a 
population size of 616 airports (Airways, 2013; Avinor AS, 2011a; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008b; Structured communication with UK Civil Aviation Authority 
Aerodrome Standards Department, 2012). Any sample of airports should be representative 
of the population. However, the collection of the sample should also be manageable given 
the available resources. As guidance, the minimum sample size for any statistical analysis 
should be 20, as defined in previous Air Traffic Management (ATM) research (e.g. 
Subotic, 2007). Salant and Dillman (1994) propose a sample size of 57 for a population 
with 750 members to make estimates with an error of no more than +/- 10.0%, at the 95% 
confidence level. For a population of 500 members a sample of 55 is proposed. The target 
sample for this study was 57 responses, representing 9.3% of the population.  
10.2.4 Survey Methodology 
A survey is defined as “a general view, examination, or description of someone or 
something” (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013). Surveying is a popular research method used for 
exploratory studies that allows the collection of a large amount of data from a sizeable 
population and subsequent statistical analysis (Saunders, et al., 2007). 
The most popular method of surveying is the questionnaire; a technique that requires 
each participant to respond to the same set of pre-defined and ordered questions. The 
following sections discuss the choice between structured interviews, telephone, postal and 
internet-mediated survey techniques (Salant and Dillman, 1994; Saunders, et al., 2007). 
Within a structured interview the surveyor conducts the interview in person using a 
questionnaire. Similarly, surveys can be conducted using the telephone. In both cases a 
pre-defined questionnaire is used, from which the interviewer should not deviate. The use 
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of personal communication in both techniques ensures that the respondent is the person 
who was addressed initially. In addition, through direct contact, a high response rate can be 
achieved (50-70%). Both techniques also allow for open questions, in which the 
respondent can answer each question in their own way, and closed questions that provide a 
number of alternatives to choose from. Whereas questions used in a telephone survey 
should be designed to be simple and easy for the respondent to understand, structured 
interviews allow for more complicated questions, because the interviewer can explain the 
circumstances of the case. While these techniques are preferred for complex topics and in 
situations when respondents are not likely to react by mail, considerable resources are 
required. Structured interviews are time consuming and imply high organisational costs 
(e.g. travel, hospitality), especially for research projects targeting foreign countries. 
Resource and funding constraints also impact on the size of the sample that can be 
collected. Telephone-based surveys offer a quick turn-around, since the average length of 
an interview should not exceed 30 minutes. However, the associated costs must be taken 
into account. 
In contrast to the two surveying techniques introduced above, in postal and internet-
mediated surveys the questionnaires are answered without the interviewer being present. 
This allows for the possibility to collect a large and geographically dispersed sample. Both, 
open and closed questions can be asked, though the questions should not be too complex. 
Via email, the potential respondents for internet-mediated questionnaires can be addressed 
directly, which ensures a high confidence that the right person will respond. However, this 
is not the case for postal surveys. Internet-mediated surveys require the least resources 
since they have low financial implications and allow the targeting of a large sample within 
a short time period. Postal charges need to be considered for mail surveys. However, both 
techniques suffer from their low response rates, which vary between 11 and 30%. For 
Internet-mediated surveys, higher response rates are achieved if they are distributed via 
intranet or a reference organisation.  
After careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of the different survey 
techniques, an internet-mediated technique was adopted based on the need to collect data 
from a sample of 57 airports with a geographical dispersion covering four countries. In 
addition, such a survey enabled the relevant airport personnel to be addressed directly.  
There were considerations related to the collection of data on the physical 
characteristics of the manoeuvring area (e.g. the number of runways, taxiways, and 
intersections). Discussions with the Vice President of Safety and Regulatory Affairs at ACI 
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– North America, revealed considerable inconsistencies in the ways airports count these 
within any country, in addition to variations between countries (Structured communication 
with Vice President Safety and Regulatory Affairs Airports Council International - North 
America, 2011). To ensure a standardised and consistent form of data collection, the data 
was collected directly by the author using the aeronautical information publication (AIP), 
i.e. aeronautical charts. A similar decision was made for other publicly available 
information, i.e. airport equipment and installations. In addition, data collection by the 
author helped to control the length of the questionnaire. Hence, a combined approach of 
internet-mediated questionnaire survey and data collection using AIP and aeronautical 
databases was applied for data collection.  
10.2.5 Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire design was based upon four design principles to account for the 
following: 
1. Clarity of questions to avoid any ambiguity in the self-completion survey. 
2. Definition of all key terms to ensure a common understanding on the part of all 
respondents. 
3. An emphasis on ‘closed questions’, which allow the respondent to choose an answer 
from pre-defined choices. Open questions were only used to gather operational airport 
data (e.g. traffic characteristics). 
4. Structure of the questionnaire around the main objective of the survey research. All the 
questions were designed to match those airport characteristics that have a potential 
impact on surface safety as defined in %&'()!*$ and %&'()!*+.  
The questionnaire was validated with the same SMEs introduced in section 10.2.2. The 
questionnaire was presented and the SMEs asked to systematically assess and comment on 
the validity of questions. The questionnaire was refined over several iterations to only 
include essential questions that enabled meaningful statistical results, while still matching 
the process model. The final version covered a total of 18 airport characteristics and can be 
found in Appendix VII. 
 10 The Impact of Airport Characteristics 
! "#$!
10.2.6 Pilot Survey 
Prior to conducting the full survey, a small-scale pilot survey was conducted both to 
verify the clarity of the questions posed and to assess the time necessary to complete the 
questionnaire. One U.S. airport and one European airport were surveyed and the results 
used to refine the questionnaire design, e.g. rephrasing some of the questions for clarity. 
10.2.7 Full Survey 
The questionnaires were distributed to all the airports in the target population. This 
decision was based on the expected low response rate of internet-based surveys, i.e. 11-
30% (Salant and Dillman, 1994; Saunders, et al., 2007). The questionnaires were 
distributed over reference organisations in: 
• The U.S. where the FAA Regional Runway Safety Managers distributed the survey;  
• NZ where the New Zealand Airports Association assisted with the data collection, and;  
• NO where the survey was distributed by Avinor, the Norwegian ANSP, an organisation 
that is also responsible for the operations of airports in the country.  
In addition, professional networks (e.g. Transportation Research Board (TRB) of the 
National Academies) were exploited to gain more responses. The questionnaire was 
distributed to relevant personnel in senior positions in the operations departments of the 
airport authorities (e.g. Head of Airfield Operations). In the UK, the UK CAA provided the 
contact details of UK airport operations directors, who were subsequently contacted 
directly.  
10.2.8 Aeronautical Information Publication and Aeronautical Databases 
Data on the physical characteristics of the manoeuvring area, as well as equipment and 
installations was collected using two sources of publically available information: 
1. Aeronautical charts to extract geometric characteristics of the manoeuvring area: 
• FAA digital – Terminal Procedure Publication (d-TPP) (Federal Aviation 
Administration National Aeronautical Charting Office, 2011); 
• Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) New Zealand (Civil Aviation Authority 
of New Zealand, 2011);  
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• Aeronautical Information Publication Norway (Avinor AS, 2011a); 
• European AIS Database (EAD) (The European Organisation for the Safety of Air 
Navigation, 2011a). 
2. Aeronautical databases to collect information regarding airport equipment and 
installations status: 
• AirNav (AirNav.com, 2013); 
• Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) (Aircraft Owners and Pilots 
Association, 2013); 
• Airport-Data.com (Airport-Data.com, 2013); 
• World Aero Data (Worldaerodata.com, 2013). 
AirNav and AOPA’s airport directory both use information from official FAA 
publications, such as the Airport / Facility Directory, and present it in a more structured, 
presentable and easy to access manner. The AOPA airport directory, for example, is 
updated every 56 days in conjunction with the FAA update cycle (Aircraft Owners and 
Pilots Association, 2012). Hence, both databases can be evaluated as reliable. This was 
confirmed through structured communications with senior safety experts (Structured 
communication with Vice President Safety and Regulatory Affairs Airports Council 
International - North America, 2011). One disadvantage is that these two databases are 
limited to aeronautical information in the U.S.  
In order to extract the relevant data for Europe and New Zealand two additional 
databases were identified, airport-data.com and World Aero Data. The former provides 
global data compiled from national databases (e.g. National Flight Data Centre (NFDC), 
FAA Air Traffic Airspace ATA-100 database). AirNav, AOPA, and airport-data.com have 
been compared regarding their data entries for U.S. airports and showed similar data 
entries. Thus, airport-data.com is evaluated as reliable source. World Aero Data obtains its 
information from the Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF), a set of files 
containing airport data for the entire world provided by the U.S. military. However, DAFIF 
was closed for public use in October 2006. Since World Aero Data is now seeking 
information from national databases, some of the information in the database might be out-
dated. Thus, World Aero data was used only to determine information regarding 
communication devices in cases where airport-data.com lacked this information.  
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10.2.9 Potential Sources of Error 
Two main sources of potential errors were identified in the assessment of the survey: 
respondent and data pre-processing errors. The former may occur due to two main reasons. 
The first is imprecision in the formulation of the questions and misinterpretation of the 
questions by the respondents. These aspects were addressed by both validating the 
questionnaire with SMEs and by the pilot study. Therefore, they should not have played a 
significant role in generating any such errors. Secondly, the knowledge of the respondent is 
critical. Questionnaire surveys face the challenge that they might be given to low-level 
staff who have inadequate experience and knowledge to answer the questions. This issue 
was addressed through the choice of data collection method and questionnaire design. 
Internet-based surveys offer the advantage of addressing the key personnel directly. The 
questionnaires were distributed directly to operational personnel in senior positions. In 
addition, the questionnaire was designed to be easy to answer for any airport operator. Any 
information that airport operators would not have pre-defined was excluded and collected 
by the author. Thus, lack of knowledge of the respondents should have played only a minor 
role in the data collection process. 
The possibility of errors arising during data extraction from AIP and data pre-
processing was mitigated by extra care during the data input stage (i.e. double checking of 
each input by an independent assessor).  
10.2.10Data Analysis 
After the relevant data had been collected, a master file matching the airport 
characteristics data with the corresponding safety data was created. It was subsequently 
analysed in four steps. 
10.2.10.1 High-level Analysis and Sample Characteristics 
First, descriptive statistics (e.g. frequency analysis, bar charts, boxplots) were used to 
understand the characteristics of the sample and to identify outliers (i.e. data points that are 
not consistent with the others within a sample from the same population). 
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10.2.10.2 Data Distribution 
Following the identification of the data characteristics and detection of outliers the 
distributions of the data were analysed. The dataset contained four different data types, i.e.: 
• Continuous data (e.g. normalised number of occurrences); 
• Ordinal categorical data (e.g. severity of occurrences); 
• Nominal categorical data with multiple categories (e.g. causal factors, use of runways as 
taxiways); 
• Nominal categorical data with two categories (binary) (e.g. adequacy of equipment / 
installations on the manoeuvring area). 
Using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (for samples > 50) and the Shapiro-Wilk test, (for 
samples < 50) the continuous data was tested for normality. These tests compare the 
distribution of a variable in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores. If the tests 
are not significant (p > .05), then the distribution of the sample is not significantly different 
from a normal distribution, i.e. the variable is normally distributed. However, if the test is 
significant (p < .05) then the distribution of the tested variable is significantly different 
from a normal distribution, i.e. it is non-normal (Field, 2009). 
10.2.10.3 Data Homogeneity 
The test for homogeneity is necessary to test whether the data collected from the four 
different countries originate from the same population and can be aggregated. The non-
parametric Kruskal-Wallis (for continuous data) and Pearson Chi-Square (for categorical 
data) tests were applied. Kruskal-Wallis tests whether more than two independent groups 
of continuous data differ, and Pearson’s Chi-Square tests the independence of two 
categorical variables. A significant test statistic (p < .05) indicates a significant difference 
between the tested groups, and such data should not be aggregated (Field, 2009). 
10.2.10.4 Analysis for Associations 
To analyse the relationships among the variables, the data was tested for associations 
as follows: 
• Association between airport characteristics and occurrence rates, 
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• Association between airport characteristics and the severity of occurrences, and 
• Association between airport characteristics and the causal factors that underlie 
occurrences. 
Depending on the nature of the data and its distribution various statistical tests were 
applied, as detailed in Table 58. 
 
Table 58: Statistical tests 
 
Data type variable 1 
 
Data type variable 2 
 
Normal distributed 
variables 
 
 
Non-normal distributed 
variables 
Continuous Continuous Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient (r) 
Spearman’s Correlation 
Coefficient (rS) 
Continuous Ordinal categorical  - Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient (rS) 
Continuous Nominal categorical - binary 
Independent T-Test 
(t) Mann-Whitney U Test (U) 
Continuous Nominal categorical - multiple categories 
Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) Kruskal-Wallis (H) 
Categorical Categorical 
 
Pearson Chi Square (X2) 
 
 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient (r) for parametric data and Spearman’s 
correlation coefficient (rs) for non-parametric data are used to test the strength of 
relationship between two variables (see Chapter 6). The Pearson’s correlation coefficient is 
computed by dividing the covariance of two variables (covxy) by the product of the 
standard deviation of these two variables (sxsy). With N as the total sample size, the test 
statistic is computed as: 
 ! ! ! !"#!"!!!! ! !!! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!                                                           (9) 
 
where xi and yi are the observed values of a variable x, and y, respectively, ! and ! their 
mean values and sx and sy their standard deviations. N is the total sample size. Spearman’s 
test works by ranking the data points in ascending order and then applying the parametric 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient.  
The independent t-test is a test that establishes whether two means collected from 
independent samples differ significantly, and therefore, it is used to test whether two 
independent groups differ. Its statistic is calculated as shown below, where n1 and n2 are 
the sizes of sample 1 and sample 2 respectively, !! and !! are the means of sample 1 and 
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sample 2 respectively, and !!! is the pooled variance (i.e. the variance weighted by the size 
of sample on which it is based).  
 
  ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!                                                                                        (10) 
 
To test whether the means of more than two independent groups differ, the one-
way independent ANOVA test can be applied. Its null hypothesis states that all groups are 
equal and the F-ratio is used to test whether this is true. The F-ratio is a measure of the 
ratio of the variation explained by the model MSM (systematic variation) and the variation 
explained by extraneous factors MSR (unsystematic variation) and is calculated as follows: 
 
     ! ! !!"!!"!                                                                                          (11) 
 
The null hypothesis (i.e. all groups are equal) can be accepted if the F-ratio is not 
significant (p > .05). On the other hand, if the F-ratio is significant (p < .05) then the null 
hypothesis can be rejected, which indicates that the means of the groups are significantly 
different.  
The non-parametric equivalents of the independent t-test and ANOVA are the Mann-
Whitney and Kruskal-Wallis tests. The Kruskal-Wallis procedure was introduced in 
Chapter 6. It tests the null hypothesis that the distributions of observations across k 
experimental conditions are the same. The Kruskal-Wallis procedure first ranks the 
observations and then sorts them into groups. Subsequently, the sum of ranks (Ri) and the 
number of observations ni is obtained for each group. Once Ri and ni have been calculated 
for each group, the test statistic, H, is computed as: 
 ! ! !"!!!!!! ! !!!!!!!!! ! !!! ! !!                                                   (12) 
 
The null hypothesis (i.e. observations are the same across groups) can be accepted if the 
test statistic is not significant (p > .05). 
To test whether the distributions of observations across only two groups are the 
same, the non-parametric Mann-Whitney test can be applied. The Mann-Whitney test is 
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the non-parametric equivalent of the independent t-test. Similar to the Kruskal-Wallis 
procedure, the observations are ranked and grouped and then the sum of ranks (Ri) is 
calculated for each of the two groups. The test statistic, U, is calculated by the following 
equation: 
 
     ! ! !!!!! ! !!!!!!!!!! ! !!                                                           (13) 
 
where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes of groups 1 and 2 respectively, and R1 is the sum of 
ranks for group 1. 
To analyse interactions between two categorical variables the Pearson’s Chi-Square 
test (X2) is typically used. The test compares the actual frequencies observed in certain 
categories to the frequencies that might be expected in those categories by chance and can 
be calculated as follows: 
 
     !! ! ! !!!"!!!"!!!!"                                                                            (14) 
 
where !!" and !!" are the observed and expected frequencies, and i and j represent rows 
and columns in the contingency tables, respectively. The test requires that at least 80.0% of 
the cells in such tables have expected frequencies greater than five and that no single 
expected frequency is lower than one (Agresti, 2007; Field, 2009). 
10.3 Results and Discussion 
This section highlights the results of the analysis for associations. Firstly, a high-level 
analysis, i.e. frequency analysis, describes the characteristics of the sampled airports and 
safety data across the countries. Secondly, the distribution of the data and the 
appropriateness of the statistical tests are discussed, followed by a discussion on data 
homogeneity and its implications. Finally, statistical analysis allows for an in-depth 
investigation of the associations between airport characteristics and safety occurrences. 
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10.3.1 High-level Analysis and Sample Characteristics 
A total of 58 airports responded to the survey, corresponding to a 9.4% response rate, 
slightly above the anticipated 9.3% to get a reliable sample. For sensitivity reasons, the 
airports are anonimised. Of the 58 responses, a major airport authority running five U.S. 
airports and a UK airport operator did not take part for sensitivity reasons. Overall, 52 
airports completed the questionnaire. The distribution among the countries is as follows: 
19 U.S., 14 UK, 16 NO, and 3 NZ. 
The data represents a very diverse sample ranging from small airports with a low 
number of aircraft movements and a small number of runways and taxiway segments, to 
major airports with almost one million annual movements and highly complex layouts. 
This section introduces the characteristics of the sample further. It is organised in ten 
sections, corresponding to the eight classes of airport characteristics factors identified as 
having a possible impact on safety occurrences and a description of the safety data. For 
continuous variables the following are presented: the sample size (N), minimum (Min) and 
maximum (Max) value, the range, mean, and standard deviation (SD). In addition, the 
distribution of the data is indicated (i.e. normal (!), non-normal (")). For categorical 
variables, the frequency distributions of the response categories are presented and 
discussed. This is followed by a discussion on outliers in the data. The data from the four 
countries is aggregated. 
10.3.1.1 Safety Data 
For incursions, the maximum number of normalised incursions is 162.11 per 100,000 
movements. On the other hand, one airport did not report any incursion incident. This 
indicates that the number of incursions varies significantly between airports across 
different countries. The range of normalised excursions is 4.67 (per 100,000 movements) 
indicating that excursions are rare events at an airport with a mean of only 0.28 excursions 
(per 100,000 movements). The number of normalised FOD is slightly higher with a mean 
value of 2.34 (per 100,000 movements) and a range of 20.63 FOD incidents. The 
descriptives for the three considered occurrences types considered are summarised in Table 
59. 
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Table 59: Descriptives - occurrence types 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Normalised number of 
incursions 
Continuous 52 0 162.11 162.11 11.95 25.94 ! 
Normalised number of 
excursions 
Continuous 52 0 4.67 4.67 0.28 0.74 ! 
Normalised number of 
FOD 
Continuous 52 0 20.63 20.63 2.34 5.01 ! 
 
The severity classifications for occurrences differ across the countries. Table 60 shows 
the distribution of the severity levels of the U.S. RI database, which contains only 
incursions. Although the database collects both incursions on runways (i.e. runway 
incursion) and taxiways (i.e. surface incidents), severity assessments are only conducted 
for runway incursions, whereby one of five severity levels (Category (Cat) A to E16) is 
assigned to each occurrence. For this reason the analysis for associations between airport 
characteristics and severity can only take runway incursions into account (surface incidents 
were excluded from the analysis). In addition, the FAA changed its runway incursion 
definition and associated severity classification and adopted the ICAO’s standard as of 1 
October 2007 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2009c). The implication of this is that the 
severity classification before and after October 2007 differs. Consequently, any analysis in 
this chapter which refers to severity uses only a subset of the available data (i.e. runway 
incursions that occurred between 1 October 2007 and December 2009). During the time 
period considered there was almost an equal split between Cat D (48.6%) and Cat C 
(50.0%), whereas high-severity categories A and B occurred only four times (i.e. 1.4%). 
 
 
 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Runway Incursion Severity Classification: 
Category A: A serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided; 
Category B: An incident in which separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision, which 
may result in a time critical corrective / evasive response to avoid a collision; 
Category C: An incident characterised by ample time and / or distance to avoid a collision; 
Category D: An incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as incorrect presence of a single 
vehicle / person / aircraft on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft 
but with no immediate safety consequences; 
Category E: Insufficient information or inconclusive or conflicting evidence precludes a severity assessment 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2010c) 
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Table 60: Severity classification U.S. runway incursions 
 
Severity class 
 
 
Percentage of runway incursions 
A 0.4% 
B 1.0% 
C 50.0% 
D 48.6% !
Occurrences received through the UK CAA MOR scheme are also subject to an 
occurrence grading system, which is based on the severity of the occurrence and the 
likelihood of recurrence. The grading system uses five severity categories Cat A (severe), 
Cat B (high), Cat C (medium), Cat D (low), and Cat E (non-significant) (UK Civil 
Aviation Authority, 2011a). Table 61 shows the severity distribution of all UK 
occurrences. It can be seen from the table that the majority of occurrences are classified as 
low severity (i.e. 89.2%) and non-significant occurrences (Cat E) are in practice not 
captured in the database. 
 
Table 61: Severity classification UK 
 
Severity class 
 
 
Percentage of excursions 
 
Percentage of FOD 
 
Percentage of incursions 
A 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
B 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 
C 1.8% 2.4% 5.7% 
D 2.7% 7.8% 78.7% 
 
Finally, the database provided by the CAA – Norway allowed only a distinction 
between accidents, serious incidents and incident, although no accidents were reported 
over the time period considered. In fact, 99.7% of occurrences were classified as incidents 
and therefore, no associations between airport characteristics and occurrence severity can 
be computed for Norway. Norway’s severity classification for the collected data is 
presented in Table 62. Due to the low response rate of only three airports the severity 
classification of New Zealand has not been attempted. 
 
Table 62: Severity classification NO 
 
 
Severity class 
 
 
 
Percentage of 
excursions 
 
 
Percentage of FOD 
 
 
Percentage of 
incursions / collisions 
 
Serious incident 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
Incident 1.4% 29.4% 69.9% 
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Of the extracted causal factors, a total of 60.8% were related to aircraft operations, 
11.2% to ATC, 26.2% to airport operations, and 1.8% to environment / weather. Due to the 
low response rate in New Zealand, only the safety data from the U.S., UK and NO were 
analysed for their underlying causal factors. The distribution of causal factors per country 
is shown in Figure 119. 
 
 
Figure 119: Distribution of causal factors 
10.3.1.2 Airport Location 
The altitudes of the airports range from just slightly above sea level (2.74 m) to a 
maximum of 1,288 m (Table 63). The altitude is a safety indicator, as aircraft performance 
reduces at high altitudes. In addition, the likelihood of poor weather conditions (e.g. wind 
conditions, fog) increases at high altitudes. 
 
Table 63: Descriptives - airport location 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Altitude (m) 
 
Continuous 51 2.74 1,288.4 1,285.7 114.23 205.27 ! 
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10.3.1.3 Traffic Characteristics 
Table 64 contains the details of the traffic characteristics of the sampled airports. 
 
Table 64: Descriptives - traffic characteristics 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Average number of 
movements per year 
Continuous 52 3,084 979,36
0 
976,27
6 
199,48
1.43 
234,26
5.35 
! 
Peak number of 
operations during peak 
hours 
Continuous 46 2 279 277 52.64 54.30 ! 
Primary type of traffic 
handled at the airport 
Nominal 
categorical 
Unreliable data 
Number of airlines 
with home base at the 
airport 
Continuous Unreliable data 
!
The airports varied significantly in their traffic characteristics, from those with about 
980,000 annual movements on average, to small airports with just over 3,000 annual 
movements. Similarly, the peak number of operations ranged from 2 to 279 at its 
maximum. The answers obtained for two questions from the survey were evaluated as 
unreliable and excluded from a further assessment (e.g. respondents chose multiple 
answers instead of only one). These two questions referred to the primary type of traffic 
and the number of airlines with home base at a particular airport. 
10.3.1.4 Manoeuvring Area Characteristics 
A total of 14 variables related to the geometric characteristics of the manoeuvring area 
were collected, including: the number of runways (RWY), taxiway (TWY) segments, and 
conflict points (RWY / RWY, RWY / TWY, TWY / TWY). When analysing aeronautical 
charts from the different countries, inconsistencies were identified (i.e. how taxiways are 
labelled and counted). Therefore, this thesis considers the number of taxiway segments 
rather than the number of taxiways. A taxiway segment is defined as a piece of taxiway 
between two conflict points A and B.  
A conflict point is a point on the airport surface where two parties (i.e. aircraft, V/PD) 
could conflict with each other, e.g. a crossing. Seven types of conflict points are 
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considered, i.e. Type 2 conflict point – Type 8 conflict point. The number of the type 
corresponds to the number of taxiway segments in conflict with each other. For example, 
in a case where two taxiways cross each other (Figure 122), four taxiway segments are in 
conflict with each other, since each of the four taxiway segments could be occupied by an 
aircraft or V/PD. Each conflict point can occur in three variations: conflict point RWY / 
RWY, conflict point RWY / TWY, and conflict point TWY / TWY. Figure 120 to Figure 
126 show examples of Type 2 to Type 8 conflict points for taxiways. Figure 127 illustrates 
an example of a Type 6 conflict point RWY / TWY. 
 
 
 
Figure 120: Type 2 conflict point (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 121: Type 3 conflict point (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
 
Figure 122: Type 4 conflict point (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
Figure 123: Type 5 conflict point (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
Figure 124: Type 6 conflict points (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
 
Figure 125: Type 7 conflict points (TWY / 
TWY) 
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Figure 126: Type 8 conflict points (TWY / 
TWY) 
 
 
 
Figure 127: Type 6 conflict point (RWY / 
TWY) 
 
The characteristics of the physical layout of the manoeuvring area are described in 
Table 65. The number of runways at the sampled airports ranges from single runways up to 
seven. The number of taxiway segments ranges widely from only two to 327 at the most 
complex airport. The most frequent type of conflict point is Type 3 conflict points, with a 
mean of 27.67 Type 3 conflict points at an airport. The sample contains only low numbers 
of RWY / RWY conflict points, i.e. two runways crossing each other without a taxiway 
crossing in the same location. The maximum number of RWY / RWY conflicts identified 
was seven. The number of TWY / TWY conflict points on the other hand reached 128 at 
its maximum. The maximum total number of conflict points (i.e. RWY / RWY + RWY / 
TWY + TWY / TWY) ranged from two to 207, indicating the number of points at an 
airport where at least two parties may come into conflict with each other. Multiplying this 
number by the number of taxiway segments involved in these conflicts, the total number of 
segments in conflict with each other reaches a maximum of 777 taxiway segments with a 
mean of 156.54.  
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Table 65: Descriptives - manoeuvring area characteristics 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Number of runways 
 
Continuous 52 1 7 6 2.29 1.65 ! 
Number of taxiway 
segments 
Continuous 52 2 327 325 67.54 79.06 ! 
Number of Type 2 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 17 17 6.08 4.40 ! 
Number of Type 3 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 114 114 27.67 30.37 ! 
Number of Type 4 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 84 84 13.08 17.88 ! 
Number of Type 5 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 19 19 1.44 2.99 ! 
Number of Type 6 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 8 8 0.31 1.20 ! 
Number of Type 7 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 3 3 .10 .50 ! 
Number of Type 8 
conflict points 
Continuous 52 0 1 1 .02 .139 ! 
Total number of 
conflict points 
RWY/RWY 
Continuous 52 0 7 7 .50 1.23 ! 
Total number of 
conflict points 
RWY/TWY 
Continuous 52 1 79 78 14.85 16.18 ! 
Total number of 
conflict points 
TWY/TWY 
Continuous 52 0 128 128 31.60 36.25 ! 
Total number of 
conflict points at the 
airport 
Continuous 52 2 207 205 46.94 51.83 ! 
Total number of 
segments in conflict 
with each other  
Continuous 52 6 777 771 156.54 178.53 ! 
10.3.1.5 Equipment and Installations 
The mean number of communication channels is 5.84 per airport and the number of 
frequencies can reach a maximum of 31, see Table 66. In addition, the airport operators 
were asked whether they had experienced any situations in which their equipment did not 
adequately support their operations. For example, an airport may have an ILS CAT I 
runway, but may need a higher category for safe and efficient operations. A total of 13.5% 
of airports were dissatisfied with their equipment and installations. 
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Table 66: Descriptives - equipment and installations 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Number of 
communication 
channels 
Continuous 51 1 11 10 5.84 3.19 ! 
Number of 
frequencies 
Continuous 51 1 31 30 12.18 8.78 ! 
Adequacy of 
equipment / 
installations 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Adequate: 86.5% 
• Not adequate: 13.5% 
10.3.1.6 Visual Navigation Aids 
When asked to evaluate the adequacy of their visual navigation aids, 92.3% of airport 
operators indicated adequacy. In addition, when questioned regarding complaints about 
lighting, markings and signage at their airports airport operators reported the following: 
13.4% had problems with lighting, 23.0% with markings, and 25.0% with signage. The 
results are summarised in Table 67. 
 
Table 67: Descriptives - visual navigation aids 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Response categories: frequency distribution 
Adequacy of visual 
navigation aids 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Adequate: 92.3% 
• Not adequate: 7.7% 
Complaints about 
lighting 
Ordinal 
categorical 
52 • Yes, 10-30: 1.9% 
• Yes, <10: 11.5% 
• No: 86.5% 
Complaints about 
markings 
Ordinal 
categorical 
52 • Yes, 10-30: 3.8% 
• Yes, <10: 19.2% 
• No: 76.9% 
Complaints about 
signage 
Ordinal 
categorical 
52 • Yes, 10-30: 5.8% 
• Yes, <10: 19.2% 
• No: 75.0% 
10.3.1.7 Airfield Operations and Maintenance 
The majority of airports (88.5%) used subcontractors for construction or maintenance 
work on the manoeuvring area. Typically, maintenance work was necessary weekly at 
73.1% of airports. Among vehicle drivers operating on the surface, certain vehicles were 
allowed to operate ‘free-range’ in 23.1% of the airports, i.e. vehicles did not need to 
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contact ATC when moving on the surface, with the exception of active runways. In 17.3% 
of the airports not all the vehicles are equipped with radio communication. The number of 
runway condition checks conducted per day ranged from 1 to 14 with a mean value of 5.33 
checks per day. Finally, 55.8% of airports use runways as taxiways, however for 17.3% 
this is not a standard operating procedure. Table 68 shows the details. 
 
Table 68: Descriptives - operations and maintenance 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
Range 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Nor-
mality 
 
Subcontractors 
working on the airfield 
Nominal 
categorical  
52 • Yes: 88.5% 
• No: 11.5% 
Number of runway 
condition checks / day 
Continuous 52 1 14 13 5.33 3.65 ! 
Use of runways as 
taxiways 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Yes, standard procedure: 38.5% 
• Yes, non-standard procedure: 17.3% 
• No: 44.2% 
Requirement for 
clearance for vehicle 
drivers 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • All of them: 76.9% 
• Some of them: 23.1% 
Vehicle equipment 
with radio 
communication 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Yes, all of them: 80.8% 
• Yes, some of them: 17.3% 
• No: 1.9% 
Frequency of 
maintenance work 
Ordinal 
categorical 
51 • Weekly: 73.1% 
• Monthly: 7.7% 
• Every 2-3 month: 3.8% 
• Every 4-6 month: 9.6% 
• More than 6 month: 3.8% 
• Missing: 1.9% 
10.3.1.8 Regulations 
Of the sampled airports, 82.7% engage in proactive safety assessments apart from 
regulatory requirements (Table 69). 
 
Table 69: Descriptives - regulations 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Response categories: frequency distribution 
Engagement in 
proactive safety 
assessments 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Yes: 82.7% 
• No: 17.3% 
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10.3.1.9 Human Resources 
The last section of the questionnaire required the airport operators to evaluate the 
adequacy of their level of staffing and training. The results are summarised in Table 70. A 
total of 82.7% evaluated their staffing level as adequate and only one airport evaluated the 
level of training of its staff as inadequate. In addition, 11.5% of airport operators indicated 
that the training of subcontractors was inadequate.  
 
Table 70: Descriptives - human resources 
 
Variable 
 
Data type 
 
N 
 
Response categories: frequency distribution 
Adequacy of staffing 
level 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Adequate: 82.7% 
• Under-staffed: 17.3% 
Adequacy of training 
for operational 
personal 
Nominal 
categorical 
52 • Yes: 98.1% 
• No: 1.9% 
Adequacy of training 
for subcontractors 
Nominal 
categorical 
49 • Yes: 82.7% 
• No: 11.5% 
• Missing:  5.8% 
10.3.1.10 Outliers 
Following the high-level analysis the data was analysed for outliers (i.e. data points 
that are not consistent with the others within a sample from the same population). The data 
was tested for outliers both, at the aggregated level and at the State-level. 
While outliers exist, it is highly questionable as to whether to exclude these. For 
example, in the UK, London Heathrow was shown as an outlier among several variables 
(e.g. average annual movements, number of taxiway segments). Likewise, Oslo Lufthavn 
was shown as an outlier for Norway. These airports are characteristic for their countries. 
Both Heathrow and Oslo are the biggest airports in respective countries in terms of 
movements and passenger boardings. Both airports accommodate international flights and 
serve as main country hubs. If removed, the typical characteristics of the underlying 
national airport infrastructures would consequently be removed. Therefore, it was decided 
to create two datasets, one including outliers and one excluding outliers, and the statistical 
tests were run on both datasets in order to assess the influence of outliers on the results. 
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10.3.2 Data Distribution 
The continuous variables were tested for normality and as sections 10.3.1.2 to 10.3.1.9 
showed the majority of variables were found to be non-normal. The test statistics are 
shown in Appendix VIII Table 1. The implication of this is that non-parametric statistical 
tests needed to be applied for most of the variables. Similarly, categorical data required the 
application of non-parametric tests. In addition to testing the aggregated data for normality, 
the data was also tested at the national level with similar results, the majority of variables 
were found to be non-normal. Appendix VIII Table 4 summarises the test statistics. 
10.3.3 Data Homogeneity 
Before a detailed analysis, the data was tested for homogeneity and the consequent 
potential for aggregation. The non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis and Pearson Chi-Square 
tests were applied to test whether samples originate from the same population. The 
homogeneity of the four countries in terms of airport characteristics, normalised number of 
occurrences, and causal factors was tested and the results show significant differences 
across the countries at the 95% confidence level (Kruskal Wallis p < .05; Pearson Chi-
Square p < .05). Therefore, safety occurrence data and airport data from different countries 
should not be aggregated. In addition, attempts to aggregate the European data (i.e. UK 
and NO) showed also significant differences between the countries (Mann Whitney p < 
.05; Pearson Chi-Square p < .05). The test statistics of the homogeneity tests are given in 
Appendix VIII Table 2. 
 To illustrate this finding further, the normalised number of incursions (per 100,000 
movements) aggregated across the four countries (sample of 52 airports) was correlated 
with the collected airport characteristics data and the majority of tested variables showed 
significant correlations as shown in Appendix VIII Table 3.   
When referring back to the underlying data, however, it becomes clear that these 
correlations are less meaningful. For example, the rate of incursions (per 100,000 
movements) is negatively correlated to the number of runways and taxiway segments. This 
indicates that the higher the number of runways and taxiway segments the fewer incursions 
occur. Figures 128 and 129 highlight that this interpretation should not be generalised. 
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Figure 128: Normalised number of incursions (aggregated) vs. number of runways !
!!
Figure 129: Normalised number of incursions (aggregated) vs. number of taxiway 
segments 
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Figures 128 and 129 illustrate that if an airport shows the typical characteristics of a 
Norwegian airport (blue) then it will show a high number of incursions, whereas if an 
airport looks like a typical airport in the U.S. (purple) then incursions occur very rarely. 
These two examples illustrate that the statistical analysis is heavily biased by the reported 
occurrence rate in the four countries and differences in the underlying airport 
infrastructures. The different occurrence rates are a result of different reporting levels in 
the considered countries. Therefore, it would not be sensible to aggregate such data across 
countries. This confirms the results from the homogeneity tests and corresponds to the 
conclusions drawn from the data quality assessment in Chapter 6. 
This analysis was computed using the whole data set. Due to the differences among the 
four countries, outliers cannot be removed, as this would lead to the removal of a 
significant amount of data from specific countries. For example, the normalised number of 
incursions was shown as being an outlier for most Norwegian airports. Similarly, the 
majority of U.S. airports were shown as outliers with respect to their average annual 
movements for example.  
10.3.4 Analysis for Associations 
The data was tested for associations between airport characteristics and i) the rate of 
accidents / incidents per occurrence type, ii) the severity of accidents / incidents per 
occurrence type, and iii) the causal factors that underlie occurrences. 
Since the data cannot be aggregated across countries, each country was analysed 
separately. In NZ, only three airports responded to the questionnaire survey, and therefore, 
statistical analysis was not possible. Also, the airport characteristics may influence the 
three considered accident / incident types differently, and hence, each occurrence type was 
analysed separately. The data quality assessment in Chapter 6 concluded that excursion 
and FOD data in the U.S. are underreported due to a lack of a regulatory requirement to 
report such incidents, and consequently, this data was excluded from the assessment (i.e. 
U.S data refers to incursions only).  
An analysis for associations between airport characteristics and severity levels in the 
U.S. was only possible for runway incursions reported after 1 October 2007. The 
frequency analysis showed that high-severity categories A and B occurred only four times 
during the considered time period. This amount was too small to be used for statistical 
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analysis, and therefore, the data was analysed for associations between airport 
characteristics and severity categories C and D. Similarly, in the UK only 0.9% of 
occurrences were classified as severe and highly severe (Cat A and B), and for this reason 
only categories C and D were taken into account. The categorisation of occurrences into 
accidents, serious incidents and incidents in Norway did not allow for statistical analysis 
since 99.7% of occurrences were classified as incidents. 
 Finally, the data was analysed for associations between airport characteristics and the 
causal factors extracted from accident / incident reports. The causal factors are summarised 
at the highest taxonomy level into the three groups of aircraft operations, ATC and airport 
operations. Environmental factors, which mainly related to weather, were excluded, since 
airport characteristics do not influence the occurrence of weather. Regulatory factors were 
also excluded from the analysis due to their low frequency. Whilst the association between 
airport characteristics and occurrence rates was analysed for each of the accident / incident 
types separately, this analysis is not split by occurrence type. The aim was to identify 
whether airport characteristics influence the occurrence of causal factors at airports in 
general. Knowing which types of causal factors to expect at an airport can then be used to 
channel risk mitigation efforts regardless of the occurrence type.  
10.3.4.1 Results 
Table 71 contains the results and significant associations (at the 95% - level) are 
highlighted by means of a tick (!). The analyses were conducted for both a complete set of 
data and a data file excluding outliers. Since the results varied only marginally, Table 71 
presents the results for the whole data set. The results for the dataset excluding outliers are 
shown in Appendix VIII Table 5. The test statistics for both, analyses including and 
excluding outliers, are shown in Appendix VIII Tables 6 to 18. 
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Table 71: Summary of significant associations 
 
Airport characteristic 
 
Rate of occurrences Severity Causal factors Incursions Excursions FOD 
U.S. UK NO UK NO UK NO U.S. * 
UK 
** 
U.S. UK NO 
Average annual movements - - ! - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Altitude - - - ! - - - - - ! ! ! 
Peak number of operations - - - - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Number of runways - - - - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Number of taxiway segments - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Number of Type 2 conflict points ! - - - - - - - - ! ! ! 
Number of Type 3 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Number of Type 4 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! - - 
Number of Type 5 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! - - 
Number of Type 6 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! ! - 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY ! - - - - - - - - - ! - 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY - - - - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Total number of segments in conflict with each 
other  - - - - - - - ! 
- 
! - ! 
Number of communication channels - - - - - - - ! - ! ! ! 
Number of frequencies - - - - - - - ! - - - ! 
Adequacy of equipment  - - - - - - -a -a -a ! -a 
Adequacy of visual aids - - - - - - - -a n/a -a n/a -a 
Complaints about lighting - - - - ! - - ! - ! - !a 
Complaints about marking - - - - - - - -a - !a - ! 
Complaints about signage - - - - - - - -a - !a - ! 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work - - - - - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a !a 
Subcontractors working on the airfield ! - - - - - ! - -a ! !a - 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle 
drivers - - - - - - - - 
- 
! ! n/a 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication - - - - - - - - - ! ! n/a 
Number of runway condition checks - ! - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Use of runways as taxiways - - - - - - - ! - ! !a ! 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments - - - - - - - -a -a ! -a ! 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside 
operations - - - - - - - ! 
-a 
! -a - 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel - - - - - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  - - - - - - - - n/a ! n/a ! 
*The associations between airport characteristics and runway incursion severity categories C and D were tested (1 October 2007–2009). 
**The associations between airport characteristics and severity categories C and D were tested. 
a: Tests assumptions are not fulfilled 
n/a: The test statistic could not be computed, as one of the variables is a constant. 
 
The results show that most airport characteristics are not associated with the rate of 
airport surface safety occurrences, which confirms the conclusions from Galle, et al. 
(2010). The lack of associations indicates that the rate of accidents and incidents is not 
influenced by the prevailing characteristics at a given airport, such as the manoeuvring 
area geometry.  
Although airport characteristics are not associated with occurrence rates, in the U.S., 
they are associated with the severity of occurrences; in particular, the physical airport 
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surface design (i.e. geometry). For instance, the number of runways, taxiway segments and 
conflict points were found to be associated with the severity of runway incursions in the 
U.S. Other factors e.g. complaints about lighting, or the use of runways as taxiways were 
also found to be associated to severity. On the contrary, the analysis did not show any 
associations between airport characteristics and severity in the UK. This could be due to a 
differing severity classification and a limited range of airport characteristics found in the 
UK. It may be that airports in the UK are more similar to each other in terms of their 
underlying characteristics than in the U.S.  
Moreover, the results show associations between airport characteristics and those 
factors that were found to have caused the occurrences through the analysis of safety data. 
Although there are differences between the countries, the major findings are consistent and 
the data suggests that: 
• A non-standard use of runways as taxiways, and inadequate visual navigation aids (i.e. 
at airports that experienced complaints about lighting, marking, signage) are associated 
with pilot-related factors; 
• A complex manoeuvring area geometry is associated with pilot and ATC-related 
factors; 
• A lack of radios in vehicles, V/PD free-range operations, the existence of subcontractors 
on the manoeuvring area, and an inadequate level of training of subcontractors, are each 
associated with ATC-related factors; and 
• Inadequate subcontractor training and the non-engagement of airports in proactive 
safety assessment are associated with V/PD-related factors. 
The observed differences between the analysed countries could be a result of differing 
distributions of reported occurrence types in the considered countries, and associated 
differing distributions of causal factors (X2  = 419.53, p (2-tailed) < .001).  
10.3.4.2 Discussion 
This chapter introduced a methodology for the assessment of airport hazards that 
supports the safety risk management of airport surface operations. The methodology, 
however, is not limited to hazard assessments of surface operations, but is transferrable to 
all aspects of airports, and aviation in general, e.g. to analyse the impact of airspace 
characteristics on safety occurrences.  
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This research is limited in that it only considers risk factors and neglects mitigation 
measures that might have been implemented. For instance, airports may have a complex 
geometry with a high potential of conflict. However, if the operators (e.g. airport operator, 
airline, ATC) are aware of the risk, the necessary procedures and operating scenarios could 
have been designed to account for that. In this case, the risk factor does exist, but is 
mitigated so well that it does not affect the operations. Future analysis should take 
mitigation measures into account. In addition, the analysis is limited by the small sample 
size (i.e. 14-19 airports per country). A larger sample is required to generalize the findings. 
There are two main findings here with the first concerning the quality of reporting 
systems. The reporting levels were found to be significantly different across the analysed 
organisations. This confirms the findings from the data quality assessment in Chapter 6. In 
addition, based on the collected variables, the airport infrastructure and operations were 
found to be significantly different between the countries. Overall, it can be concluded that 
safety and airport data from different countries cannot be aggregated due to their different 
underlying distributions. Aggregating such data would lead to unreliable results. This in 
turn indicates that data-based risk mitigation strategies (e.g. statistical models) can only be 
valid for individual countries. Although the four analysed countries showed significant 
differences in their reporting levels, this does not mean that certain countries are ‘less safe’ 
than others. It indicates that some countries have a better safety culture and facilitate a 
more open reporting of occurrences than others. Therefore, there is a scope for sharing best 
practice.  
Secondly, it was found that airport characteristics are not associated with the rate of 
airport surface safety occurrences. This in turn indicates that airport surface safety 
occurrences are influenced by other factors, such as human-related factors, and that airport 
characteristics play a minor role. Nevertheless, it was found that, in the U.S., they are 
associated with the causal factors that underlie accidents / incidents (e.g. human factors), 
as well as the severity of occurrences. In these respects, this thesis proves for the first time 
that associations between airport characteristics and safety occurrences exist. The next 
chapter will build upon these results to model the functional relationship between airport 
characteristics, occurrence severity and causal factors, in order to recommend risk 
mitigation strategies. 
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10.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced a methodology for risk and hazard assessment on the airport 
surface. Airport characteristics from a sample of 52 airports were collected, and their 
associations to safety data analysed. It was found that airport characteristics vary 
significantly across countries and that safety data is not comparable between different 
states. While there seems to be no association between airport characteristics and the rate 
of airport surface safety occurrences, the results indicate associations between i) airport 
characteristics and the severity of occurrences and ii) airport characteristics and the causal 
factors an airport experiences.  
This chapter has provided a novel insight into the impact of airport characteristics on 
the safety of surface operations, and has laid the foundation for the fulfilment of the 
seventh research objective. The results are analysed further in the next chapter, which 
develops a systematic analysis framework to model the functional relationships between 
airport characteristics, severity and causal factors. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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11 Airport Surface Safety Model 
The previous chapters have defined airport surface operations and identified the safety 
drivers. In order to quantify the safety of airport surface operations, this chapter develops a 
structured framework for the analysis of airport surface safety occurrences and models the 
functional relationship between accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors 
with the aim of fulfilling the seventh research objective. 
The chapter starts with the definition of the modelling objective, followed by an 
introduction of the data used for modelling and a discussion of its distribution. Based on 
modelling requirements and distribution of the data, an appropriate statistical model is 
chosen and presented in detail. The second section presents the results of the analysis 
starting with the specification of a model of the functional relationship between causal 
factors and occurrences at an aggregated level and discusses why an analysis at this level 
cannot meet the requirements of SMS. The causal factors are then dissected into six classes 
and the impact of each category on safety is modelled. To understand the dynamics 
between the individual categories of causal factors better, the interactions between them 
are then analysed, before section four summarises the relationships. This is followed by a 
discussion of the findings and their impact in relation to traditional data collection 
mechanisms and analysis techniques. Finally, this chapter concludes the analysis presented 
in this thesis and summarises the findings in a framework for a holistic airport safety 
management. 
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11.1 Methodology 
11.1.1 Modelling Objective 
The architecture of the airport surface system developed during the course of this thesis 
defined the system components (i.e. human actors and physical infrastructure) and their 
interactions, and the subsequent analysis of system failures identified the associated causal 
factors. To determine the most critical causes and to guide safety mitigation efforts more 
effectively, the functional relationship between the accidents / incidents and the causal 
factors needs to be modelled using statistical analysis. The lack of robust statistical 
modelling of causal factors has repeatedly been highlighted during the literature review in 
Chapter 5. The objective of this chapter, therefore, is to model the functional relationship 
between airport surface safety occurrences and their underlying causal factors. 
Accidents and incidents can be expressed in terms of their safety risk, i.e. in terms of 
severity and probability. Whilst previous research has attempted to model the probability 
of occurrences on the airport surface, Chapter 5 highlighted the lack of a robust approach 
to modelling the severity of accidents / incidents based upon their causes. In addition, it 
has been shown during the analysis of safety data in Chapters 7 and 8, that all the accident 
/ incident types considered in this thesis occur on a frequent basis and, therefore, it is 
certain that they will happen again. This chapter, therefore, focuses on modelling their 
severity in order to gain a better understanding as to why the most severe occurrences 
happen. The aim is to develop a systematic framework for the analysis of airport surface 
safety occurrences which can be applied to every dataset in order to identify the most 
critical causes. 
11.1.2 Data Choice and Distribution 
The data chosen for this analysis is the U.S. FAA RI Database for the following 
reasons: 
• U.S. airports showed the greatest diversity in terms of airport characteristics (see 
Appendix X Table 1), 
• The severity classification (introduced in Chapter 10 section 10.3.1.1) allows for 
statistical analysis, and 
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• Prior analysis (Chapter 10 section 10.3.4.1) revealed associations between airport 
characteristics, causal factors and severity in the U.S. 
The data comprises the characteristics of 19 airports and the corresponding runway 
incursions that occurred between 1 October 2007 and 31 December 2009. Incursions on 
taxiways are excluded from the analysis for reasons discussed in Chapter 10 section 
10.3.1.1. A total of 283 occurrences were available. Each runway incursion has a severity 
level assigned and its causal factors were analysed and extracted using the new taxonomy.  
11.1.2.1 Runway Incursion Severity Classification 
The FAA RI Database assigns a severity category to runway incursions which follows 
the global standard set by the ICAO and has been introduced in the previous chapter 
(section 10.3.1.1). The runway incursion severity classification takes several factors into 
account (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a): 
• Location: Runway incursions concern the incorrect presence of an aircraft on the 
runway. An unauthorised movement on the airport’s movement area excluding the 
runways is a surface incident; 
• Proximity of the aircraft and / or vehicle; 
• Geometry of the encounter; 
• Evasive or corrective action; 
• Available reaction time; 
• Environmental conditions, weather, visibility, and surface conditions; and 
• Factors that affect system performance. 
Detailed guidance for FAA Runway Safety Office staff on the process for: i) 
determining whether an incident meets the FAA criteria for a runway incursion, and ii) 
assessing the severity of runway incursions based on FAA and international standards is 
given in document AJS-RSO-RRI-T03-F-001 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a). 
This involves guidance on the runway incursion data collection process, the runway 
incursion assessment process, and process measures. 
Runway incursions are assessed weekly in a meeting of analysts from the Runway 
Safety Office who assess the runway incursions systematically using airport layout 
diagrams, available surface surveillance data and additional information (e.g. human 
statements, radio communication tapes). If no consensus is reached, the event is 
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reconsidered and discussed further with other members of staff. The Air Traffic Oversight 
Service (AOV) may observe the assessment meetings. 
The advantage of using the FAA runway severity classification is that it follows a 
common, global, standardised definition. In addition, the severity assessment process is 
subject to a strict and audited process. Disadvantages of using this severity classification 
are the broad definitions of some categories, i.e. in special circumstances the issued 
severity assessment guidelines may be insufficient. The severity assessment process 
requires trained analysts. In addition, the runway incursion severity assessment considers 
only occurrences on the runways. For incursions on taxiways no severity classification is 
provided, although such occurrences are characterised by similar criteria (e.g. proximity of 
aircraft and / or vehicle, geometry of encounter, available reaction time). This is yet more 
evidence of the piecemeal approach to surface safety practiced in the industry and the 
focus of stakeholders on specific aspects of surface safety. 
Overall, the FAA severity classification for runway incursions can be trusted, since i) it 
follows a global standard, ii) the assessment is done by qualified analysts, iii) the 
assessment process is audited.  
11.1.2.2 Distribution of Severity Categories 
The runway incursion severity categories have a logical order from low-severity to 
high-severity. When modelling such data, the ordinal nature of this data must be accounted 
for. Table 72 shows the distribution of the severity categories of the 283 analysed runway 
incursions. 
 
Table 72: Severity distribution U.S. runway incursions Oct 2007 - 2009 
 
Severity classification 
 
 
Percentage of runway incursions 
A 0.4% 
B 1.0% 
C 50.0% 
D 48.6% !
High-severity categories A and B are rare, comprising just 1.4% of all occurrences 
analysed. This amount was too small to be used for statistical analysis, and thus only 
severity categories C (referred to as high severity in the following unless otherwise stated) 
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and D (referred to as low severity in the following) were modelled. This reduces the 
severity classification to a binary variable.  
11.1.2.3 Distribution of Causal Factors 
The causal factors are categories that do not have a logical order to them and can hence 
be classified as nominal categorical data. A total of 524 causal factors were extracted from 
the occurrence reports. Both aircraft and ATC technical factors were each identified only 
once in the data and were therefore excluded from further analysis. Overall, the considered 
runway incursions were caused by predominantly human-related factors (70.0% pilot, 
14.0% ATC, and 16.0 % V/PD). 
11.1.2.4 Distribution of Airport Characteristics 
To model the impact of airport physical characteristics on severity the data collected in 
the previous chapter was used. In particular, variables in relation to the traffic volume (i.e. 
average annual movements, peak number of operations) and the physical design of the 
manoeuvring area (i.e. number of runways, taxiway segments, intersections) were 
analysed. In line with previous research (Simic and Tosic, 2010), traffic and airport surface 
geometry are used in this chapter as a measure for airport surface complexity since layout 
and traffic define an airport in its normal state.  
The variables are continuous and their distribution is shown in Appendix X Table 1. 
Since the analysis is based on a small sample of 19 airports the findings should not be 
generalised for the whole U.S. This chapter rather aims at the development of a 
methodology for the systematic analysis of airport surface safety occurrences and a 
practical demonstration of how to apply it using this sub-set of the data. 
11.1.3 Model Choice 
A statistical tool for estimating relationships between variables is regression analysis. 
This is a way to predict an outcome variable (i.e. dependent variable (DV)) from one or 
more predictor variables (i.e. independent variables (IV)) (Field, 2009). This research uses 
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regression analysis to analyse the relationship between the severity of occurrences and 
their underlying causal factors in a structured manner.  
For categorical outcome variables the logistic regression is applied. There are three 
types of logistic regression models. If the DV has only two categories, the binary logistic 
regression is used. When the DV has more than two response categories, the multinomial 
logistic regression is applied. In cases where the DV is multi-categorical and the categories 
show an order, the ordinal logistic regression is used (Field, 2009). Logistic regression is 
commonly used in aviation safety studies (e.g. Biernbaum and Hagemann, 2012; Dupuy, 
2012) as well as for other transport modes (e.g. Hu, et al., 2010; Phillips and Sagberg, 
2013) where the values or observations of the outcome variable can be sorted according to 
categories.  
Logistic regression is an extension of linear regression that allows the prediction of 
categorical outcomes based on continuous and / or categorical predictor variables. In 
particular, it allows the prediction of the probability of the DV occurring, i.e. the 
probability that a case belongs in a certain category, given known values of the IVs. For a 
linear regression model to be valid, the observed data needs to contain a linear relationship, 
where an increase or decrease in one variable (e.g. IV) will cause a corresponding change 
in another variable (e.g. DV). This assumption is violated when the DV is categorical. 
Transforming the data using a logarithmic transformation is one way around this problem. 
Such transformation is a way of expressing a non-linear relationship in a linear way. Thus, 
the logistic regression equation expresses the linear regression equation in logarithmic 
terms (called logit) as follows: 
 
          ! ! ! !!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!" !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! 
 
 
in which P(Y) is the probability of Y occurring, e is the base of the natural logarithms, b0 is 
the intercept, and bn is the regression coefficient of the corresponding predictor variable Xn.  
The values of the parameters (i.e. correlation coefficients) are estimated using the 
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). MLE is a technique that selects coefficients that 
maximise the probability of obtaining the observed results; in other words, that make the 
observed values most likely to have occurred (Agresti, 2007; Field, 2009). 
When entering several predictors into a regression model, the method for entry needs 
to be selected, with both forced entry and stepwise methods available. The forced entry 
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method whereby all predictors are forced into the model simultaneously has been chosen 
for the analysis for this thesis for reasons discussed in Appendix IX. Appendix IX also 
introduces the assumptions underlying logistic regression models and shows how to assess 
their model fit and how to interpret the results. The odds ratios (Exp(B)) presented in this 
chapter are computed for 95% confidence intervals.  
11.1.4 Modelling Strategy 
The safety of the airport surface system can be analysed in four steps as outlined 
below. 
 
1) High-level analysis 
 
The relationship between the severity of runway incursions and the factors that caused 
these incidents is first modelled using the aggregate of all causal factors. The Pearson’s 
Chi-Square test for associations and binomial logistic regression analysis are applied. 
 
2) Dissection of the data into its components 
 
While modelling the impact of causal factors on severity at an aggregated level will 
pinpoint the most crucial factors that need to be addressed, it will lead to only high-level 
conclusions. To follow SMS principles and, therefore, to be able to give more detailed 
recommendations, the causal factors must be categorised into groups and each category 
and their interactions modelled individually. Using the new taxonomy introduced in the 
previous chapter six categories of causal factors were derived: 
• Aircraft / pilot, 
• Equipment / ATC,  
• Vehicle / V/PD, 
• Airport – physical characteristics, 
• Environment, and the  
• Regulatory system. 
The new taxonomy split the causal factors into the five groups of aircraft operations, ATC, 
airport operations, environment and the regulatory system. In order to capture both, V/PD-
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related factors and the impact of the physical airport infrastructure, the category airport 
operations was split resulting in the six categories shown above.  
 
3) Analysis of the impact of each component on safety individually 
 
To understand the associations in the data better, the data is first plotted and the 
relationships graphically examined in order to guide further analysis. Subsequently, the 
data is analysed for associations (Chi-Square test) and the functional relationships between 
the variables are modelled using logistic regression analysis. 
Since the safety data is limited to only human-related factors (i.e. pilot, ATC, V/PD), it 
is only possible to analyse three of the six proposed categories. Factors related to the 
physical design of the airport surface and its infrastructure, as well as the environment and 
the regulatory system were not reported at the 19 airports in the considered time period.  
Environmental factors, such as weather, can lead to an incursion when, for instance, 
fog, haze, or the reflecting sun limits visibility. These factors have been reported in some 
of the other databases (as identified in Chapter 7) but are missing entirely in the U.S. data 
and, therefore, cannot be modelled. Inadequate reporting might be the reason for this. Also, 
regulatory factors were not captured in the data and could therefore not be analysed 
further.  
Referring back to the analysis of causal factors conducted in Chapter 7, other databases 
also contained reference to the physical characteristics of airports as causes for incursions. 
To analyse this issue further, the airport characteristics data (i.e. traffic and airport surface 
geometry) collected in the previous chapter is used to model the relationship between 
airport characteristics and safety in three steps as outlined below.  
 
i) Modelling the impact of individual airport characteristics on severity: 
 
Binomial logistic regression is applied to estimate the impact of airport characteristics 
on severity. To begin with, each variable is modelled individually to identify those 
characteristics that significantly predict the severity of runway incursions.  
 
ii)   Development of an overall airport complexity measure: 
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Building on these results, cluster analysis is applied to group airports in terms of their 
complexity as defined by traffic volume and manoeuvring area geometry. The aim is to 
come up with airport complexity categories that could then be related to safety. This would 
provide a new categorisation of airports in terms of their probability of experiencing high 
or low severity runway incursions based on airport complexity levels. 
Cluster analysis is a technique that groups raw data based on the degree of similarity 
between cases. A cluster is a group of relatively homogeneous cases. Cases in a cluster are 
similar to each other and dissimilar to the cases outside the cluster. There are several 
methods for how the clusters are formed, with most of them working in a hierarchical way. 
The principle behind each method is similar: beginning with all cases being treated as a 
cluster in their own right. The clusters are then merged based on a criterion specific to the 
chosen method. That is, all methods begin with as many clusters as there are cases and end 
up with just one cluster containing all cases. By inspecting the progression of cluster 
merging it is possible to isolate clusters of cases with high similarity (Field, 2000). 
The airport characteristics that predicted severity best (evaluated by their model fit and 
prediction rate) as identified in the first step (i) were used as input to cluster airports and 
the details are discussed in the results section 11.2.2.4. Ward’s method, which joins cases 
into a cluster so that the variance within a cluster is minimised, was chosen as primary 
method of creating the clusters. In order to see which influence the method has on forming 
the clusters, alternatives (e.g. between-group linkage, nearest neighbour) were also tried 
and the results are discussed in section 11.2.2.4. 
 
iii)   Modelling the impact of airfield geometry elements on severity: 
 
Finally, airport surface geometry is dissected into its elements and the impact of each 
of these elements on severity is systematically assessed using binomial logistic regression 
models. The physical design of the manoeuvring area comprises three elements: the 
runways, taxiways and intersections (referred to as conflict points in this thesis). 
Depending on the number of segments in conflict with each other, different types of 
conflict points can be distinguished (i.e. type 2 to 6). These conflict points again can occur 
in three variations: RWY / RWY, RWY / TWY, and TWY / TWY. Using binomial logistic 
regression these elements are modelled in three levels as shown in Figure 130. 
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Figure 130: Airport surface design elements !
4) Analysis of interactions 
 
After modelling each of the causal factor categories individually, their interactions are 
analysed. First, human interactions are modelled by assessing the impact on severity of 
stakeholder interactions (i.e. occurrences that were caused by more than one party) as 
opposed to occurrences caused by single stakeholders.  
To explain how the physical characteristics of the airport surface influences the human-
related factors, the functional relationship between airport characteristics and the causal 
factors extracted from the safety data is subsequently modelled in four steps as outlined 
below. 
 
i)    Modelling the impact of airports on causal factors: 
 
Firstly, the impact of the airport as a whole on the occurrence of causal factors is 
analysed using contingency tables and the results are discussed in section 11.2.3.2. The 
aim is to identify whether certain airports attract particular causal factors. 
 
ii)   Modelling the impact of airport surface geometry on causal factors (aggregated 
level): 
 
Subsequently, multinomial logistic regression is employed to analyse whether 
individual geometric characteristics of the manoeuvring area (e.g. number of runways, 
taxiway segments, conflict points) influence the causal factors. 
 
TWYs Conflict points 
RWY / RWY RWY / TWY TWY / TWY 
RWYs 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Type 4 
Type 5 
Type 6 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Type 4 
Type 5 
Type 6 
Type 2 
Type 3 
Type 4 
Type 5 
Type 6 
Airport surface  
design Level 1 
Level 2  
Level 3a 
Level 3b 
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iii)  Modelling the impact of airport surface geometry on pilots, ATC, V/PD: 
 
Whilst the surface characteristics may not influence the total of causal factors, they 
might influence particular operations and predict their associated failures. Thus, further 
analysis splits the causal factors into pilot, ATC and V/PD-related factors and analyses the 
impact of airport geometric characteristics on these groups of causal factors using 
multinomial logit models. 
 
iv)   Mapping causal factors to airport surface geometry: 
 
Finally, an analysis at the factor-level relates individual runway incursions and their 
associated causes to the specific locations at the airports where they occurred. To do so, the 
ten most frequent causal factors extracted from the safety data that could be related to the 
physical characteristics of an airport were identified for further analysis. For instance, the 
layout of the manoeuvring area could cause or contribute to the factors ‘ATC 
misjudgement of timings that lead to a situation that was too tight’ or ‘pilot taxi error’, 
whilst an error in the communication process may not be related to the physical design of 
the airport surface. The descriptive narratives of the corresponding occurrence reports of 
272 causal factors were analysed and by means of airport charts the exact locations of the 
incidents determined. This detailed analysis assigned each causal factor a corresponding 
occurrence location and the findings are discussed in section 11.2.3.2. 
 
Figure 131 summarises the analysis framework that quantifies the core of the airport 
surface system, as shown in Figure 132 in blue.  
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Figure 131: Framework for the systematic analysis of airport surface safety 
2)    Dissection of the data into its components 
 
Dissection of the data into categories using the new taxonomy 
Implementation: Dissection of the data into six categories: 
•  Aircraft / pilot 
•  Equipment / ATC 
•  Vehicle / V/PD 
•  Airport – physical 
•  Environment 
•  Regulatory system 
3)    Analysis of individual causal factor groups 
 
a) Causal factors Level 3 – pilot -> Severity 
b) Causal factors Level 3 – ATC -> Severity 
c) Causal factors Level 3 – V/PD -> Severity 
Implementation: graphical assessment, Chi-Square tests for associations,  binomial 
logit 
d) Airport characteristics (traffic, airport surface geometry) -> Severity 
Implementation: graphical assessment, binomial logit, cluster analysis 
 
4)    Analysis of interactions 
 
a) Stakeholder interaction -> Severity 
Implementation: graphical assessment, Chi-Square tests for associations, binomial 
logit 
b) Airport characteristics -> Causal factors 
Implementation: graphical assessment, crosstabulation, multinomial logit 
1)   High-level analysis 
 
Causal factors Level 1 -> Severity 
Implementation: graphical assessment, Chi-Square tests for associations, binomial 
logit 
Collection of safety data 
Severity assessment Identification of causal factors 
Collection of airport 
characteristics data 
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Figure 132: System quantification !
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11.2 Results 
11.2.1 High-level Analysis of Causal Factors 
Section 11.1.2 showed the distribution of causal factors across categories at the second 
taxonomy level. At 70.0%, pilot-related factors contributed most frequently to the analysed 
runway incursions, followed by V/PD human-related factors (16.0%) and ATC human-
related factors (14.0%). Such frequency analyses are often used to guide risk mitigation 
strategies assuming that the factors occurring most frequently impose the highest risk to 
the operations. Whilst this is common practice, this approach does not consider the impact 
of the factors on the outcome (i.e. the severity of an occurrence) and can therefore be 
misleading, as shown in Figure 133. Figure 133 shows the causal factors (Level 2) across 
Cat C and D runway incursions and with 90.5% of all ATC human-related factors being 
associated with high-severity occurrences (i.e. Cat C), ATC’s role stands out. Further 
testing revealed an association between the causal factors (Level 2) and runway incursion 
severity levels (X2 (2) = 69.833, p < .001). 
 
 
Figure 133: Causal factors (Level 2) across severity categories 
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To estimate the impact of ATC, binary logistic regression was applied and the 
contribution of controllers to high-severity occurrences confirmed. ATC (human) was 
found to be 13.70 times more likely than pilots, and 20.41 times more likely than V/PD 
(human) to lead to a high-severity occurrence. Table 73 shows the parameter estimates. 
 
Table 73: Parameter estimates causal factors (Level 1) vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
ATC   45.717 2 .000  
Pilot -2.617 .411 40.510 1 .000 .073 
V/PD -3.032 .461 43.105 1 .000 .049 
Constant 2.559 .397 32.336 1 .000 9.571 
      R2 = .106 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .136 (Cox&Snell), .182 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 76.934, p < .001. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is ATC. 
 
Further analysis indicated associations between the causal factors on the third 
taxonomy level and severity levels (X2 (16) = 91.189, p < .001), however, with the test 
assumptions being violated (i.e. 58.8% of cells having an expected count of less than five) 
the results are invalid. In order to understand the contribution of individual factors better, 
the following sections break down the causes and analyse pilot, ATC and V/PD human-
related factors individually. 
11.2.2 Analysis of Individual Groups of Causal Factors 
11.2.2.1 Air Traffic Control 
The high representation of ATC human-related factors in high-severity Cat C incidents, 
and, therefore, the skewed distribution towards this category, meant that a more detailed 
analysis as to which ATC factors are most crucial using logistic regression was not 
possible and only a frequency analysis could be conducted. Table 74 shows the most 
frequent ATC human-related factors. For Cat C incidents the top five factors (percentage 
of total occurrences with ATC contribution) are shown. Only seven ATC human-related 
factors were extracted from all runway incursions classified as low-severity (Cat D). These 
are shown in in the third column. Also, the dataset contained four occurrences classified as 
Cat A and B that were initially excluded from the analysis due to their low frequency of 
occurrence. ATC was the primary cause for three of them, providing additional evidence 
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that controllers seem to contribute to high-severity occurrences. The factors extracted from 
the Cat A/B reports are shown in the first column. 
 
Table 74: Most frequent ATC factors 
 
Category A and B 
 
 
Category C 
(%age of total occurrences 
with ATC contribution) 
 
 
Category D 
ATC misjudgement of timings 
which lead to a situation that 
was too tight 
ATC misjudgement of timings 
which lead to a situation that was 
too tight (17.8%) 
Blocked view of the 
manoeuvring area from ATC 
tower 
ATC did not check whether the 
aircraft had effectively cleared 
the runway 
ATC - late or inaccurate 
provision of RWY / TWY 
condition information (9.6%) 
ATC forgetting about the closure 
of a RWY 
ATC issued conflicting 
clearances 
ATC issued conflicting 
clearances (9.6%) 
ATC issued conflicting 
clearances 
ATC - clearance given too early Inadequate ATC coordination 
(teamwork) (5.5%) 
Inadequate ATC coordination 
(teamwork) 
 ATC did not correct an error in 
the readback of another party 
(4.1%) 
ATC did not correct an error in 
the readback of another party 
 Others  (53.4%) Communication breakdown 
between ATC and an aircraft 
  
 
ATC thought a readback was 
correct while it was incorrect !
Overall, the factors are a mixture of purely human-related factors (e.g. ATC did not 
check whether the aircraft had effectively cleared the runway) and human factors that 
could have been provoked by the design of the airport surface (e.g. issue of conflicting 
clearances, misjudgement of timings that lead to a situation that was too tight). 
Consequently, the impact of the airport on surface operations is later analysed in more 
detail in section 11.2.3.2. 
Amongst the four causal factors extracted from Cat A/B occurrences: 
• Two were also found amongst the ATC factors identified in Cat C runway 
incursions (highlighted in orange and blue in %&'()!*"), 
• One was found amongst both Cat C and D occurrences (highlighted in yellow), and 
• One of the factors was new and not identified amongst Cat C and D occurrences. 
This shows that runway incursions with a very high severity (Cat A/B) do not occur for 
unique reasons and that the causal factors are for the most part the same across severity 
categories. However, it also shows that the causal factors do not follow the same frequency 
distribution across severity categories. For instance: 
• Two of the factors found in Cat D were neither found in Cat C nor in Cat A/B, 
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• Two of the factors found in Cat D were also found with a low frequency in Cat C, 
but not in Cat A/B (highlighted in pink), and 
• Three of the factors found in Cat D were amongst the top five Cat C factors 
(highlighted in green), and one of these was also found in Cat A/B (highlighted in 
yellow). 
This analysis supports the common cause hypothesis tested by Heinrich (1931) which 
had been introduced in Chapter 4 section 4.2.2 only partially. The theory implies that 
accidents and incidents share the same causes and that a large number of incidents will 
lead over time to a smaller number of accidents. Whilst there is evidence that factors found 
in Cat A and B are also found in low-severity occurrences, their frequency distribution 
differs and this has implications for safety risk mitigation strategies. Mitigating the causal 
factors that most frequently lead to Cat C and D occurrences will not mitigate the risk of 
Cat A and B occurrences.  
Due to the overrepresentation of causal factors in Cat C, the analysis of ATC-related 
factors needs to stop at this level. In summary, this analysis provided evidence that ATC 
human-related factors have a particular impact on the occurrence of high-severity runway 
incursions. Referring back to the literature, Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) drew similar 
conclusions. The authors analysed runway incursions for the whole U.S. over a ten year 
period and found that whilst Operational Errors (OE) (i.e. ATC factors) were the least 
frequent overall, they were overrepresented in severity categories A, B and C, and 
underrepresented in category D. Logit estimation showed that the odds of a severe incident 
were 3.4 times as high for events classified as OE as for non-OE events. This study is 
based on the FAA event classification of runway incursions, which classifies them into 
OE, pilot deviation (PD) and vehicle / pedestrian deviations (V/PD). This categorisation is 
not an indication of the cause of the runway incursion; it is a classification of an error type 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2013b). These error types typically refer to the last 
event in the chain of pilot, ATC, and / or V/PD actions that led to the runway incursion 
and, therefore, Biernbaum and Hagemann’s (2012) estimation differs from the one 
presented in this chapter.  
In addition, the current analysis found that the causal factors are, for the most part, the 
same across severity categories, but differ in terms of their frequencies. This again 
supports the statement that an analysis of accidents and incidents based on frequencies 
alone can channel risk mitigation efforts ineffectively. To understand ATC’s role better, 
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further analysis (presented in section 11.2.3.2) will link these factors to the physical 
characteristics of the airport surface in order to explain under which circumstances ATC 
deviations occur.  
11.2.2.2 Pilot 
Concerning pilot-related factors the taxonomy captures eight categories on the third 
level and five of these were identified in the data. Factors in relation to pilot resources, 
human-machine interface and team operations were not found in the sample. A graphical 
assessment of the data shown in Figure 134 indicates that the likelihood of having a high-
severity occurrence is highest for incidents that show errors in the communication process, 
followed by human reliability-related factors. Competence and situational awareness-
related factors seem to have a similar impact on severity and procedural factors are mainly 
associated with low severity. Further testing confirmed an association between pilot 
human-related factors (level 3) and severity categories (X2 (4) = 13.898, p < .05). 
 
 
Figure 134: Pilot human-related causal factors (Level 3) across severity categories 
 
Using the binomial logit model the following relationships were revealed: 
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• The odds of communication-related factors are 1.8 times the odds of human 
reliability-related factors to result in a high-severity occurrence, 
• The odds of communication-related factors are 15.33 times the odds of procedural 
factors to result in a high severity occurrence,  
• The odds of human reliability-related factors are 8.49 the odds of procedures to be 
classified as high severity, and 
• Pilot competence and situational awareness did not contribute significantly to the 
prediction of severity. 
The accuracy of prediction has improved over the baseline model but only by 2.9%, 
resulting in an overall prediction success of 60.8%. Low R2 values (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke) also indicate a poor model fit. This means that 
although significant predictors were found they are weak for predicting severity. Table 75 
to Table 79 show the estimations. 
The communication-related factors extracted most frequently from the data were: 
• Incorrect readback (47.6% of all communication-related factors, 10.9% of all pilot 
human-related factors), and 
• Correct readback, followed by an unauthorised manoeuvre (32.1% of all 
communication-related factors, 7.4% of all pilot human-related factors). 
The most frequent human reliability-related factors were: 
• Pilot entering a runway without authorisation (32.3% of all human reliability-
related factors, 21.8% of all pilot human-related factors), 
• Pilot not stopping at the required position (e.g. stop bar) (19.8% of all human 
reliability-related factors, 13.4% of all pilot human-related factors), 
• Pilot crossing the hold line in front of a runway (12.9% of all human reliability-
related factors, 8.7% of all pilot human-related factors), 
• Pilot entering a taxiway without authorisation / taxi error (12.5% of all human 
reliability-related factors, 8.5% of all pilot human-related factors), and 
• Pilot non-compliance with ATC instructions (12.1% of all human reliability-related 
factors, 8.2% of all pilot human-related factors). 
To understand the reasons behind the weak predictions, the frequencies of pilot-related 
factors were analysed at the third level of the taxonomy. 67.6% of all pilot-related factors 
are attributed to human reliability and comprise mainly the top five factors that have been 
shown above (these together account for 60.5% of all pilot-related factors). None of these 
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factors reflects a cause of an incident. Rather, they represent high-level ‘outcomes’ 
providing evidence that the causal factors of pilot-related occurrences are to a large extent 
not properly attributed and, therefore, cannot be modelled. 
 
Table 75: Parameter estimates pilot human-related factors (Level 3) vs. severity I 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
  Communication   11.482 4 .022  
  Situational awareness -.976 .639 2.332 1 .127 .377 
  Human reliability -.591 .253 5.432 1 .020 .554 
Procedures -2.730 1.060 6.629 1 .010 .065 
Competence -1.081 .865 1.565 1 .211 .339 
Constant .165 .218 .575 1 .448 1.179 
      R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.493, p < .05. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is communication. 
 
Table 76: Parameter estimates pilot human-related factors (Level 3) vs. severity II 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Human reliability   11.482 4 .022  
Procedures -2.139 1.046 4.184 1 .041 .118 
Competence -.491 .847 .336 1 .562 .612 
Communication .591 .253 5.432 1 .020 1.805 
Situational awareness -.385 .615 .393 1 .531 .680 
Constant -.426 .130 10.740 1 .001 .653 
      R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.493, p < .05. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is human reliability. 
 
Table 77: Parameter estimates pilot human-related factors (Level 3) vs. severity III 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Procedures   11.482 4 .022  
Competence 1.649 1.333 1.530 1 .216 5.200 
Communication 2.730 1.060 6.629 1 .010 15.333 
Situational awareness 1.754 1.199 2.139 1 .144 5.778 
Human reliability 2.139 1.046 4.184 1 .041 8.493 
Constant -2.565 1.038 6.109 1 .013 .077 
      R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.493, p < .05. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is procedures. 
 
Table 78: Parameter estimates pilot human-related factors (Level 3) vs. severity IV 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Competence   11.482 4 .022  
Communication 1.081 .865 1.565 1 .211 2.949 
Situational awareness .105 1.030 .010 1 .919 1.111 
Human reliability .491 .847 .336 1 .562 1.633 
Procedures -1.649 1.333 1.530 1 .216 .192 
Constant -.916 .837 1.199 1 .273 .400 
      R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.493, p < .05. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is competence. 
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Table 79: Parameter estimates pilot human-related factors (Level 3) vs. severity V 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Situational awareness   11.482 4 .022  
Human reliability .385 .615 .393 1 .531 1.470 
Procedures -1.754 1.199 2.139 1 .144 .173 
Competence -.105 1.030 .010 1 .919 .900 
Communication .976 .639 2.332 1 .127 2.654 
Constant -.811 .601 1.821 1 .177 .444 
      R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.493, p < .05. 
      The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is situational awareness. 
11.2.2.3 Vehicle Driver / Pedestrian 
A total of 84 causal factors that relate to V/PD-human were extracted from the safety 
data. With 89.3% of these factors falling into the category of V/PD human reliability-
related factors the distribution of factors at the third taxonomy level is heavily skewed and 
logistic regression was not significant at this level. 
Amongst the V/PD human reliability-related causal factors, three factors dominated, 
representing 72.2% of all such factors: 
• V/PD entering a runway without clearance (48.0% of all human reliability-related 
factors, 41.7% of all V/PD human-related factors),  
• V/PD not stopping at the required position (e.g. stop bar) (23.3% of all human 
reliability-related factors, 20.0% of all V/PD human-related factors), and 
• V/PD entering a taxiway without clearance (12.3% of all human reliability-related 
factors, 10.6% of all V/PD human-related factors),  
As seen during the analysis of pilot-related factors, such factors are generic 
descriptions that represent more the ‘outcome’ of an event, rather than its causes. That the 
causes are not attributed properly is the result of inappropriate reporting and investigation 
of runway incursions. 
Interestingly, an inadequate attribution of causes seems to be only the case for pilot and 
V/PD-related factors. The ATC-related factors were captured in much more detail and 
referred to concrete examples of deviations of ATC operations. This could be a reflection 
of the stakeholder viewpoint represented in the underlying reporting system, which is, in 
the case of the FAA RI Database, the ANSP perspective. This supports the consistent 
contention of this thesis that, unless occurrences are captured from the perspectives of all 
relevant actors, a reporting system will be biased. This is also reflected in the DQI that was 
developed in Chapter 6. The FAA had the worst DQI’s attributed, and future research 
 11 Airport Surface Safety Model 
! """!
should therefore compare the modelling capabilities of other databases in reference to the 
DQI. 
Overall, it has been shown that modelling the causal factors works only on a high-level 
before the causes become too generic as a result of an inadequate attribution of causes 
during the reporting process. 
11.2.2.4 Airport Characteristics 
Getting to the airport level the situation worsens, since none of the occurrence reports 
captured information about the impact of the airports and their physical characteristics. 
Thus, the data collected in Chapter 10 was used to analyse the impact of airport 
characteristics, and in particular traffic and surface geometry, further. The relationship 
between airport characteristics and severity was assessed graphically and it was found that 
increasing complexity in some variables seems to be associated with higher severity. For 
instance, airports with a high number of runways showed a higher percentage of Cat C 
occurrences. This was the case for the number of runways, the number of type 3 and 4 
RWY / TWY conflict points, and the number of type 4 TWY / TWY conflict points, as 
shown in Figures 135 to 138. 
 
 
Figure 135: Severity categories across 
number of runways 
 
 
Figure 136: Severity categories across 
number of type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points 
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Figure 137: Severity categories across 
number of type 4 RWY / TWY conflict points 
 
 
Figure 138: Severity categories across 
number of type 4 TWY / TWY conflict points 
 
• Impact of individual airport characteristics on severity 
 
The previous chapter has already analysed the data for associations and shown that 
traffic and airport surface design related variables are in particular associated with runway 
incursion severity levels. To estimate the impact of airport characteristics on severity, 
binomial logistic regression was applied and to begin with each variable modelled 
individually. The parameter estimates of all tested variables are shown in Table 80. Some 
variables could not be modelled due to the absence of certain airport characteristics across 
the airports (e.g. type 5 RWY / RWY intersection). The parameter estimates given in Table 
80 take the complete data set into account for the same reasons as discussed in the previous 
chapter (i.e. in order to avoid the typical characteristics of the airports are excluded from 
the analysis). Nonetheless, to analyse the effect of outliers, Appendix X Table 2 contains 
the parameter estimates based on a data set that excludes all outliers and the findings are 
discussed below. 
The results show that the majority of tested variables are significant predictors for the 
severity of runway incursions and that, with increasing complexity, the odds of high-
severity occurrences increase. Taking the various goodness of fit measures into account, 
the airport characteristics that predict severity best are the number of runways and taxiway 
segments and the number of conflict points, in particular type 3 RWY / TWY and type 4 
TWY / TWY conflict points. These are highlighted in grey in Table 80. The findings are 
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the same for the data set excluding outliers, however, the elimination of outliers worsens 
the model fit.  
 
Table 80: Parameter estimates airport characteristics vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
  Average annual movements .000 .000 11.689 1 .001 1.000 
  Constant -.804 .268 9.016 1 .003 .447 
   R2 = .030 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .042 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 12.193, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
(High) 
Peak number of operations .007 .002 16.789 1 .000 1.007 
Constant -.756 .220 11.751 1 .001 .470 
   R2 = .047 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .063 (Cox&Snell), .084 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 18.519, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High)* 
Number of runways .419 .084 25.133 1 .000 1.521 
Constant -1.938 .408 22.546 1 .000 .144 
   R2 = .071 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .094 (Cox&Snell), .125 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 28.009, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High)* 
Number of taxiway segments .005 .001 14.386 1 .000 1.005 
Constant -.939 .279 11.371 1 .001 .391 
   R2 = .038 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .052 (Cox&Snell), .069 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.142, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/RWY conflict points -.014 .825 .000 1 .986 .986 
Constant .014 .120 .014 1 .905 1.014 
 R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .000 (Cox&Snell), .000 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = .000, p > .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/TWY conflict points -.008 .058 .019 1 .891 .992 
Constant .033 .182 .033 1 .856 1.034 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .000 (Cox&Snell), .000 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = .019, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 2 TWY/TWY conflict points .102 .044 5.290 1 .021 1.107 
Constant -.927 .426 4.736 1 .030 .396 
   R2 = .013 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .019 (Cox&Snell), .025 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 5.415, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 2 conflict points .056 .033 2.826 1 .093 1.057 
Constant -.635 .404 2.473 1 .116 .530 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .010 (Cox&Snell), .013 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.854, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 3 RWY/RWY conflict points 5.28 .375 1.980 1 .159 1.695 
Constant -.048 .127 .144 1 .704 .953 
R2 = .005 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .007 (Cox&Snell), .009 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.030, p > .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High)* 
Number of type 3 RWY/TWY conflict points .070 .015 20.499 1 .000 1.072 
Constant -1.410 .339 17.272 1 .000 .244 
   R2 = .056 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .076 (Cox&Snell), .101 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 22.393, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 3 TWY/TWY conflict points .011 .005 5.431 1 .020 1.011 
Constant -.517 .257 4.036 1 .045 .596 
   R2 = .013 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .019 (Cox&Snell), .026 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 5.508, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 3 conflict points .012 .004 9.505 1 .002 1.012 
Constant -.794 .289 7.560 1 .006 .452 
   R2 = .024 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .034 (Cox&Snell), .045 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 9.766, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .110 .069 2.535 1 .111 1.117 
Constant -.111 .142 .613 1 .434 .895 
   R2 = .006 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .009 (Cox&Snell), .012 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.606, p > .05.  
Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points .041 .013 10.319 1 .001 1.042 
Constant -.652 .236 7.628 1 .006 .521 
   R2 = .029 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .039 (Cox&Snell), .053 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 11.422, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High)* 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .050 .012 15.955 1 .000 1.051 
Constant -.937 .266 12.427 1 .000 .392 
   R2 = .044 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .060 (Cox&Snell), .080 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 17.503, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 4 conflict points .027 .007 15.310 1 .000 1.027 
Constant -.969 .275 12.375 1 .000 .380 
   R2 = .044 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .060 (Cox&Snell), .079 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 17.427, p < .001.  
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Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 5 RWY/TWY conflict points .146 .099 2.168 1 .141 1.158 
Constant -.135 .156 .748 1 .387 .874 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .008 (Cox&Snell), .010 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.195, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 5 TWY/TWY conflict points .069 .026 7.204 1 .007 1.071 
Constant -.210 .144 2.151 1 .142 .810 
   R2 = .030 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .028 (Cox&Snell), .037 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 7.998, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 5 conflict points .075 .025 8.658 1 .003 1.078 
Constant -.306 .158 3.719 1 .054 .737 
   R2 = .024 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .034 (Cox&Snell), .045 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 9.740, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 6 RWY/TWY conflict points .479 .233 4.239 1 .040 1.614 
Constant -.148 .142 1.079 1 .299 .863 
  R2 = .011 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .015 (Cox&Snell), .020 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.348, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 6 TWY/TWY conflict points .565 .265 4.541 1 .033 1.760 
Constant -.150 .141 1.117 1 .290 .861 
  R2 = .011 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .016 (Cox&Snell), .021 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.613, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 6 conflict points .285 .129 4.857 1 .028 1.330 
Constant -.165 .144 1.317 1 .251 .848 
  R2 = .012 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .017 (Cox&Snell), .023 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.931, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of RWY/RWY conflict points .096 .060 2.544 1 .111 1.100 
Constant -.108 .141 .585 1 .444 .898 
   R2 = .006 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .009 (Cox&Snell), .012 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.621, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of RWY/TWY conflict points .029 .007 16.278 1 .000 1.030 
Constant -1.099 .299 13.511 1 .000 .333 
   R2 = .046 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .062 (Cox&Snell), .083 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 18.169, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C  
 (High) 
Total number of TWY/TWY conflict points .011 .003 11.470 1 .001 1.012 
Constant -.904 .297 9.250 1 .002 .405 
   R2 = .030 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .055 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 11.856, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of conflict points at the airport .009 .002 14.689 1 .000 1.009 
Constant -1.087 .312 12.134 1 .000 .337 
   R2 = .039 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .053 (Cox&Snell), .071 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.530, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of segments in conflict with each 
other 
.003 .001 14.921 1 .000 1.003 
Constant -1.034 .296 12.183 1 .000 .356 
   R2 = .040 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .055 (Cox&Snell), .073 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 16.011, p < .001.  
* Variables with the best model fit  
 
• Airport complexity measure 
 
Building on these results, cluster analysis was applied to group airports in terms of 
their complexity as defined by traffic volume and manoeuvring area design. The aim was 
to come up with airport complexity categories that could then be related to safety. The 
airport characteristics that predicted severity best as identified in the previous section were 
used as input to cluster airports. Cluster analysis was performed using various 
combinations of these variables and available clustering methods. Appendix X Figure 1 
and 2 show two examples using: 
a) Number of runways, number of taxiway segments, and 
b) Number of runways, number of type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points as inputs.  
Ward’s method has been used in these examples as method for clustering. 
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Although the clusters differed depending on the input variables and clustering method, 
each categorisation showed the same feature: in none of the analyses was it possible to 
describe the clusters exclusively. For instance, clusters of airports with a small number of 
runways could show a low, medium or high number of taxiway segments and conflict 
points, whereas clusters with a high number of runways also showed a mix of a low, 
medium or high numbers of taxiway segments and conflict points. Categorisations 
whereby the clusters could be described exclusively worked only when using a single 
variable as input. For instance, Figure 139 shows an example of three airports that were 
assigned to the same cluster when categorising them based on their total number of RWY / 
TWY conflict points. 
The airport on the left hand side in Figure 139 has three parallel runways that are 
surrounded by a network of taxiways. Since the airport has a high number of taxiways 
which cross the runways it shows predominantly type 4 RWY / TWY conflict points, and 
at the edge of the runways type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points. The parallel alignment of 
runways and the crossing taxiways leads to a high number of taxiway segments. In contrast 
to the first airport, the second has six runways that head in three different directions 
leading to multiple RYW / RWY intersections. Only two of the runways lie inside the 
main airport surface and are surrounded by a system of other runways and taxiways. The 
other four runways lie for the most part on the edge of the airport surface and therefore this 
airport is dominated by type 2 and 3 RWY / TWY conflict points at locations where the 
taxiways join the runways. In addition, it shows some type 4 RWY / TWY conflict points 
and has, overall, fewer taxiway segments than the first airport. The manoeuvring area 
design of the third airport is a mixture of the other two. It has three parallel runways and 
one intersecting runway. Two of the parallel runways, as well as the intersecting runway, 
are surrounded by a taxiway system and show predominantly type 3 and 4 RWY / TWY 
conflict points. Also, a small number of higher category RWY / TWY conflict points (i.e. 
type 5 and 6) can be found. The fourth runway lies on the edge of the manoeuvring area 
and therefore has only type 2 and 3 RWY / TWY conflict points.  
This example shows that although the airports are similar in terms of their total number 
of RWY / TWY conflict points, they are very different in terms of their other 
characteristics and the particular types of RWY / TWY conflict points. 
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Source: AirNav.com, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Figure 139: Airport diagrams 
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Overall, the airports were too different in terms of their characteristics and, therefore, it 
was not possible to categorise them in terms of complexity. Hence, airport data should not 
be aggregated. This shows that it is not the complexity of an airport that influences the 
severity of occurrences; rather, it must be individual characteristics. The following section, 
therefore, dissects airport characteristics into their elements and analyses which features 
are the main drivers for severity.  
 
• Impact of airfield geometry elements on severity 
 
The physical design of the manoeuvring area comprises the three elements of runways, 
taxiways and intersections (i.e. conflict points) and binomial logistic regression analysis 
has been used to model the impact of these elements on severity as introduced in the 
methodology section (in Figure 130). The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 140 
and can be summarised as follow: 
• At level 1, the number of runways was a significant predictor for the severity of 
runway incursions. The odds of having Cat C instead of D runway incursions are 
1.666 times higher when the number of runways increases by one unit; 
• Testing the airport characteristics at the second level, the total number of RWY / 
RWY conflict points was found to be a significant predictor for the severity of 
runway incursions. The change in odds of getting Cat C instead of D is 1.177 when 
the number of RWY / RWY conflict points increases by one unit; 
• At the third level, the elements of the number of RWY / RWY conflict points did 
not significantly predict severity. That is, airports are not significantly more likely 
to experience Cat C occurrences when the number of RWY / RWY (type 2, 3 or 4) 
conflict points increases; 
• The number of type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points is a significant predictor for 
severity and, in particular, a unit increase in type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points 
increases the odds of getting Cat C instead of D by about 1.115 times; 
• The number of type 4 TWY / TWY conflict points was also found to be significant 
at the third level of analysis, leading to a change in odds of 1.063; and 
• When dissecting the number of conflict points further (analysis level 3b), the 
number of type 4 RWY / RWY conflict points was a significant predictor for the 
total number of type 4 conflict points, and the odds of having Cat C instead of D 
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are 1.258 times higher when the number of type 4 RWY / RWY conflict points 
increases by one unit. 
 
 
Figure 140: Significant predictors for runway incursion severity 
 
The results are based on the whole data set and Table 81 to Table 86 show the 
parameter estimates. When excluding outliers, the same significant predictors were 
identified. Appendix X Tables 3 to 8 contains the calculations. 
 
Table 81: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 1 vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Number of runways .511 .143 12.700 1 .000 1.666 
Number of taxiways .010 .011 .829 1 .362 1.010 
Total number of conflict points -.020 .020 .984 1 .321 .980 
Constant -1.780 .445 15.963 1 .000 .169 
      R2 = .074 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .097 (Cox&Snell), .130 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 29.102, p < .001. 
 
Table 82: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 2 vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Total number of RWY/RWY conflict points .163 .072 5.164 1 .023 1.177 
Total number of RWY/TWY conflict points .021 .015 2.057 1 .152 1.021 
Total number of TWY/TWY conflict points .006 .008 .615 1 .433 1.006 
Constant -1.484 .366 16.441 1 .000 .227 
      R2 = .060 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .080 (Cox&Snell), .107 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 23.759, p < .001. 
 
Table 83: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (RWY/RWY conflict points) 
vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/RWY conflict points .011 .828 .000 1 .989 1.011 
Number of type 3 RWY/RWY conflict points .106 .661 .026 1 .873 1.111 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .094 .122 .600 1 .439 1.099 
Constant -.106 .147 .514 1 .474 .900 
      R2 = .006 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .009 (Cox&Snell), .012 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.632, p > .05. 
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Table 84: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (RWY / TWY conflict points) 
vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/TWY conflict points -.103 .078 1.760 1 .185 .902 
Number of type 3 RWY/TWY conflict points .109 .033 11.054 1 .001 1.115 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points -.048 .029 2.759 1 .097 .953 
Number of type 5 RWY/TWY conflict points -.017 .124 .019 1 .891 .983 
Number of type 6 RWY/TWY conflict points .558 .335 2.772 1 .096 1.748 
Constant -1.355 .374 13.112 1 .000 .258 
      R2 = .066 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .088 (Cox&Snell), .117 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 26.173, p < .001. 
 
Table 85: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (TWY / TWY conflict points) 
vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 2 TWY/TWY conflict points .081 .053 2.350 1 .125 1.084 
Number of type 3 TWY/TWY conflict points -.007 .008 .935 1 .334 .993 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .061 .028 4.706 1 .030 1.063 
Number of type 5 TWY/TWY conflict points -.026 .062 .168 1 .682 .975 
Number of type 6 TWY/TWY conflict points .239 .432 .305 1 .581 1.269 
Constant -1.551 .479 10.466 1 .001 .212 
      R2 = .054 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .072 (Cox&Snell), .096 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 21.313, p < .001. 
 
Table 86: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (type 4 conflict points) vs. 
severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .230 .078 8.648 1 .003 1.258 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points -.020 .023 .725 1 .395 .981 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .077 .024 10.532 1 .001 1.080 
Constant -1.411 .316 19.983 1 .000 .244 
      R2 = .068 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .091 (Cox&Snell), .121 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 26.955, p < .001. 
 
To summarise, the analysis proved that airport characteristics do have an impact on the 
severity of runway incursions. When testing the variables individually the majority of 
airport characteristics were found to make a significant contribution to the prediction of 
severity. Whilst evidence for the impact of individual characteristics on severity was 
found, it was also shown that airports are too different in their characteristics and that 
therefore such data should not be aggregated. Since it was not possible to categorise 
airports in terms of complexity, the individual elements of surface geometry were analysed 
in more detail. This identified the number of runways and their overall number of conflict 
points as significant predictors. Also, the impact of particular intersections between 
runways and / or taxiways was highlighted. 
Overall, it can be concluded that it is not the complexity of an airport in general which 
influences the severity of occurrences; rather, it is only certain elements of an airport’s 
geometry that seem to create a problem and this has implications for further analysis. The 
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next section looks at interactions between the system components and analyses for 
example, how the airport physical characteristics influence the operations of human 
operators. First, however, the human interactions are modelled. 
11.2.3 Analysis of Interactions  
11.2.3.1 Interaction of Human-Related Factors 
Often, occurrence reports allow the extraction of more than one causal factor from the 
narrative. This can be a combination of factors caused by a single stakeholder (e.g. a pilot 
made several mistakes) or a combination of factors between different parties (e.g. pilot – 
ATC interaction). Therefore, it is analysed whether a combination of causal factors 
between different parties compared to a combination of causal factors caused by a single 
stakeholder influence the severity of occurrences. The data showed an association between 
stakeholder interactions and severity levels (X2 (1) = 6.960, p < .05) and the graphical 
assessment (Figure 141) concluded that almost 80.0% of occurrences that showed an 
interaction between at least two parties were classified as high severity Cat C. 
 
 
Figure 141: Stakeholder interactions across severity categories 
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Binomial logistic regression analysis further revealed that, in fact, occurrences caused 
by a combination of at least two parties are 5.13 times more likely to be high severity than 
occurrences caused by a single stakeholder. Table 87 contains the parameter estimates. 
 
Table 87: Parameter estimates stakeholder interaction vs. severity 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
At least two stakeholders interacting 1.636 .675 5.875 1 .015 5.133 
Constant -.336 .177 3.632 1 .050 .0714 
 R2 = .018 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .048 (Cox&Snell), .064 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 7.199, p < .05. 
The DV reference category is Severity Cat D (Low) and the IV reference category is occurrence caused by only one stakeholder. 
 
The most frequent factor combination leading to high severity was an ATC and pilot 
interaction that involved communication errors. A total of 42.0% of Cat C occurrences 
which showed stakeholder interaction showed pilot – ATC communication related errors, 
and all of these were related to the readback. Out of all occurrences, 52.0% of incursions 
which showed a stakeholder interaction showed communication-related errors and 40.0% 
included readback errors. When modelling the system, communication had been identified 
as the interface between the stakeholders and the current analysis showed that this interface 
is vulnerable and prone to errors. 
11.2.3.2 Influence of Airport Characteristics on Surface Operations 
After having analysed the stakeholder interactions, the following section tries to 
explain how the airport influences the human operations resulting in an accident / incident.  
 
• The impact of airports on causal factors 
 
The impact of the airport as a whole on the occurrence of causal factors was analysed. 
Using contingency tables, no pattern could be identified with the causal factors being 
found to occur across all airports. Appendix X Table 9 shows the distribution of causal 
factors (level 3) across airports. The same analysis was conducted at the factors level, with 
similar findings. The airport as a whole, therefore, cannot explain the occurrence of causal 
factors. 
 
 11 Airport Surface Safety Model 
! "##!
• The impact of airport surface geometry on causal factors (aggregated level) 
 
Subsequently, multinomial logistic regression was employed to analyse whether the 
design of the airport surface (i.e. geometry) influences the causal factors (level 1). 
Although most models showed a significant improvement to the baseline model, their 
overall model fit was poor, leading to the conclusion that geometric characteristics of the 
manoeuvring area are not a significant predictor for the causes underlying runway 
incursions. Appendix X Table 10 summarises the results. The estimates are based on an 
analysis of the whole dataset. 
 
• The impact of airport surface geometry on pilots, ATC and V/PD 
 
Whilst airport geometric characteristics may not influence the total of causal factors, 
they might influence particular operations and predict their associated failures. Thus, 
further analysis split the factors into pilot, ATC and V/PD-related and repeated the analysis 
for each stakeholder individually. Again, airport characteristics did not significantly 
predict the causal factors (level 3), with the results summarised in Appendix X Table 10.  
 
• Mapping causal factors to airport surface geometry 
 
Although the last part of the analysis split the causal factors by stakeholder operations 
the data might still be too aggregated. Further analysis at the factor-level, therefore, related 
individual runway incursions and their associated causes to the specific locations at the 
airports where they occurred.  
For instance, the descriptive narrative 
of an occurrence report stated: “An a/c, 
next in line for departure, taxied into 
position on RWY X at approach end 
without clearance. No conflicts reported.” 
The analysis revealed that this occurrence 
happened at the approach end of a runway 
at a type 3 RWY / TWY conflict point as 
shown in Figure 142. 
 
!
Figure 142: Runway approach end type 3 
RWY / TWY conflict point 
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This detailed analysis assigned each causal factor a corresponding occurrence location 
and Table 88 summarises the identified spots. All incidents occurred at a runway or a 
runway intersection, i.e. RWY / TWY or RWY / RWY conflict point, and the analysis 
revealed causal factors associated to the following locations: 
• ATC factors related to only runways (e.g. ATC cleared an aircraft to start its take-
off roll while another aircraft still occupied the runway); 
• ATC factors related to RWY / TWY conflict points, in particular type 3 and 4 (e.g. 
ATC cleared an aircraft to cross a runway whilst a second aircraft was on final 
approach);  
• V/PD factors related to runways and all types of RWY / TWY conflict points (e.g. 
V/PD entering runways without authorisation in various locations); and 
• Pilot factors related predominantly to type 3 and 4 RWY / TWY intersections (e.g. 
pilot crossing a runway at the approach end in a type 3 RWY / TWY conflict point, 
or pilot crossing in the middle of a runway in a type 4 RWY / TWY conflict point; 
similarly, hold lines can be crossed at the approach end of a runway before line up 
or during taxiing when the pilot was instructed to hold short of a runway)  
The most critical operations at the analysed airports were related to the stochastic 
interface of the location, and, in particular, runway crossings. These were either 
unauthorised crossings initiated by the pilot, or ATC authorised crossings that were 
planned too tightly. In addition, take-offs and landings without clearance were identified 
that were particularly crucial at intersecting runways, or in situations where another aircraft 
crossed the active runway. The airports that have intersecting runways (i.e. RWY / RWY 
conflict points) showed problems associated to those, for example, two aircraft land / start 
the take-off roll at the same time at an intersecting pair of runways. Other common failures 
included taxi errors at RWY / RWY conflict points.  
Overall, the runway incursions occurred most frequently at the runways, type 3 and 4 
RWY / TWY conflict points and type 4 RWY / RWY conflict points, which corresponds to 
the airport characteristics identified in section 11.2.2.4 as best predictors for the severity of 
runway incursions. In contrast to the analyses conducted before, the final part built up 
evidence that there is a link between the geometric characteristics of an airport and the 
causes for surface accidents and incidents. This suggests that in order to understand 
occurrences better data should not be aggregated, but analysed in its elements. 
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Associations between the causal factors and the extracted occurrence locations could 
not be computed due to a large number of cells (i.e. more than 20.0%) in the contingency 
table that showed an expected count of less than five. With a high percentage of zero-
frequency cells the data was also not suitable to model the impact of the location on the 
causal factors using multinomial logistic regression.  
To summarise, the analysis showed that certain causal factors happen in particular 
locations at airports that are associated to high-severity occurrences. Why these causal 
factors happen there, however, cannot be explained since the causal factors are not 
attributed adequately. As the prior analysis showed, apart from ATC factors, the data 
captures predominantly factors that are more representative of an ‘outcome’ rather than a 
cause. Hence, the real causes of the incidents are not explained. That is, airport surface 
operations can fail in many ways before they lead to an incident that occurs in a certain 
location, but this information is not captured through the reporting system. Overall, the 
analysis indicates a link between the characteristics of an airport and the causes underlying 
runway incursions, however, the data is not good enough to model this link. 
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Table 88: Causal factors per airport location 
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Pilot entering a runway without clearance 3 5 2 16 4 38 1 5 0 6 80 
Pilot not stopping at the required position (e.g. stop bar) 0 17 2 4 1 21 1 0 0 3 49 
V/PD entering a runway without clearance 4 1 3 11 3 13 0 0 0 1 36 
Pilot crossing the hold line in front of a runway 2 1 0 7 0 11 2 9 0 0 32 
Pilot entering a taxiway without clearance / taxi error 1 0 0 8 1 11 7 1 0 2 31 
ATC misjudgement of timings that lead to a situation that was too tight 5 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 0 0 13 
Pilot take-off without clearance 4 0 0 3 0 3 0 0 0 0 10 
V/PD entering a taxiway without clearance 3 0 1 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 9 
ATC issued conflicting clearances 2 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 8 
Pilot landing without clearance 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Total 28 24 8 53 14 103 12 16 1 13 272 
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11.3 Discussion  
This chapter proposed a systematic framework for the analysis of airport surface safety 
occurrences and demonstrated its application using the example of the U.S. FAA RI 
database. Within this framework the system architecture was dissected into its elements 
and the impact and interactions of each of the system components on safety modelled. This 
allowed a better understanding of the causal factors and their consequences compared to 
traditional accident / incident analysis methods. The main findings are summarised below. 
 
• Relationship between causal factors and severity 
 
The FAA reporting system is biased by the stakeholder perspective it reflects (i.e. 
ANSP) and, as a consequence, the data is characterised by an inadequate attribution of 
causes for pilot and V/PD human-related factors. Therefore, the data allows pilot and V/PD 
factors to be modelled only on a high-level before they became too generic as a result of an 
inadequate attribution of causes during the reporting process. 
Only ATC-related factors are captured in greater detail and refer to concrete examples 
of deviations of ATC operations. In general ATC’s contribution to high-severity 
occurrences stands out with an overrepresentation of ATC human-related factors in Cat A, 
B, and C. However, as the FAA RI database cannot capture pilot and V/PD factors in 
sufficient detail, the critical role of ATC in causing high severity incursions might be a 
result of the biased and inadequate reporting. Nonetheless, risk mitigation measures should 
address ATC. 
 The analysis identified furthermore that a failure in the interaction of at least two 
stakeholders increases the odds of having high-severity runway incursions; in particular, 
the interface of communication is vulnerable. Communication-related factors had also been 
mentioned most frequently in the literature as causes for incursions and should therefore be 
addressed with priority. This was confirmed by 20 U.S. pilots (see interviews conducted in 
Chapter 7 section 7.2.6) who referred to runway configurations (i.e. crossings) that require 
too much communication between pilots and ATC as one of the main causes for 
incursions. 
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Finally, the analysis showed that high-severity runway incursions do not occur for 
unique reasons and that similar causal factors are reported across all severity categories. 
The factors differ in their frequencies, however indicating that safety risk mitigation 
strategies based on frequency analyses alone could channel risk mitigation efforts 
ineffectively. 
 
• Relationship between airport characteristics and severity 
 
The analysis showed for the first time that airport characteristics influence the severity 
of occurrences. When testing the variables individually the majority of airport 
characteristics were found to make a significant contribution to the prediction of severity 
and the airport characteristics that predicted severity best are the number of runways, 
taxiway segments, type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points, and type 4 TWY / TWY conflict 
points. It was further shown that it is the individual characteristics of an airport that 
influence the severity of occurrences rather than the total complexity of an airport. When 
modelling the elements of the airport surface geometry the number of runways, RWY / 
RWY conflict points, type 3 RWY / TWY conflict points, and type 4 TWY / TWY conflict 
points were the most significant predictors for severity. Therefore, safety mitigation 
strategies should focus on those critical airport design elements and possible risk 
mitigation measures are discussed in section 11.4. 
 
• Relationship between airport characteristics and causal factors 
 
Chapter 11 showed that an analysis of safety and airport data at an aggregated level is 
ineffective: the causal factors are not associated with the airports and also the individual 
airport characteristics are not significant predictors for the causal factors. A more detailed 
analysis, however, could reveal the locations at which the runway incursions 
predominantly happened  (runway, type 4 RWY / RWY conflict point, type 3 and 4 RWY / 
TWY conflict points). These reflect the stochastic interface of the location. Therefore, the 
analyses build up evidence that there is a link between airport surface geometry and causal 
factors. However, due to an inadequate attribution of causal factors and a large amount of 
missing information this link cannot be modelled. Hence, organisations should invest into 
the collection of high quality data to support further statistical modelling. 
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To summarise, the analyses showed that the odds of having a high-severity occurrence 
increase at particular airport locations. In addition, the causal factors that are more likely to 
lead to a high-severity occurrence than others were identified. Finally, it was shown that 
these causal factors occur in the locations that are associated with high severity 
occurrences. Why these causal factors happen there, however, cannot be explained due to 
inadequate reporting practices and a resulting inadequate attribution of causal factors.  
11.4 Recommendations 
Based upon these results, the following paragraphs outline recommendations for the 
mitigation of the safety risk of runway incursions, the collection of safety data, as well as 
the modelling of such data. 
To mitigate runway incursions the critical role of ATC needs to be addressed through 
continuous training. In addition, the analysis highlighted that the interface between ATC 
and pilots is vulnerable and, therefore, problems in the communication process (e.g. 
readbacks) between pilots and ATC need to be addressed and continuously trained for. 
Besides human factors, the analysis also identified the geometric characteristics of the 
airport surface that increase the odds of having high-severity occurrences. To reduce the 
risk of high-severity runway incursions future airport design should avoid RWY / RWY 
conflict points and limit the number of type 3 and 4 RWY / TWY conflict points. Existing 
airports with a high number of RWY / RWY and RWY / TWY conflict points should 
evaluate alternative operating scenarios, in particular to avoid runway crossings. 
Acknowledging that changes in the operating scenarios of existing airports may lead to 
time and cost inefficiencies, the results support the case for new technologies, such as 
Runway Status Lights (RWSL) and the Final Approach Runway Occupancy Signal 
(FAROS), which have been discussed in the literature review. RWSL identify any possible 
conflict with other surface traffic and warn pilots when it is unsafe to cross, enter or begin 
take-off on a runway, via a series of red lights embedded in the pavement. FAROS 
provides a notification to pilots on final approach that their runway for landing is occupied 
and unsafe for landing through a flashing of the PAPI lights. In addition, alternative design 
options, such as perimeter taxiways that allow aircraft to taxi around the approach end of a 
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runway and avoid the crossing of active runways, would help to reduce the potential for a 
runway incursion (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008b).   
To improve the collection of quality safety data the following recommendations are 
formulated. The analysis presented in this chapter is limited to runway incursions only and 
a large number of surface incidents (i.e. taxiway incursions) had to be excluded since no 
severity assessments were conducted for these incidents. In order to get a fuller 
understanding of surface safety both runway and taxiway incursions must be analysed and, 
therefore, a severity assessment is required for all of them. This relates back to a lack in the 
fundamentals of surface safety and data collection and reporting practices. Furthermore, 
incursions need to be investigated more specifically in order to assign the causal factors 
adequately as only an adequate attribution of causes would support a dissection of the 
system into its elements and allow for detailed modelling of each of the system’s 
components. To realise the collection of higher-quality data, the reporting system would 
benefit from the multi-stakeholder approach proposed in this thesis. 
The analysis of airport surface safety and its modelling should follow SMS principles 
which require the analysis of all system components and their interactions. Any analysis, 
therefore, should use the system architecture as its reference, dissect the system and 
analyse each of its components as well as their interactions following a dedicated 
modelling strategy (as outlined in section 11.1.4). Dissecting the problem allows the 
identification of the critical issues for each system components that would not be 
determined using aggregated data. In order to do this, the importance of collecting high-
quality data is once again stressed. 
The aim of this chapter was the development of a systematic analysis framework for 
airport surface safety occurrences and the demonstration of its methodology. Proposing a 
framework (as outlined in Figure 131) and applying it to a sample of 283 runway 
incursions from 19 airports have achieved this, however, the analysis is limited by the 
small sample size of airports and should not be generalised. In addition, the analysis is 
restricted by the quality of the reported data and, therefore, future work should evaluate the 
modelling capabilities of databases with better DQIs that are able to capture the causal 
factors in greater detail. 
To summarise this research, the next section presents the overall framework for a 
holistic airport surface safety management that has been developed throughout this thesis. 
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11.5 Framework for a Holistic Airport Safety Management 
To control safety risks, airports are required to have a dedicated Safety Management 
System (SMS). Although an international legislative framework exists, Chapter 4 showed 
that national regulations for airport SMS are still under development. Therefore, little 
practical guidance for its deployment and implementation is currently available. 
To assist airports and other aviation stakeholder with the development and 
implementation of SMS, this thesis developed a framework for a holistic airport safety 
management. The framework is shown in Figure 143. The analyses to be completed in 
each step are shown in red and the outcomes after each step are highlighted in blue, whilst 
the data inputs are shown in green. 
An integrated safety assessment of airport surface operations requires a fundamental 
understanding of an airport’s static architecture and the process of its operations. A 
prerequisite for the development of an airport SMS is therefore, the modelling of the 
airport surface system architecture in its components (stakeholders, physical infrastructure) 
and their interdependencies. 
The system’s assessment for safety risks starts with identifying its hazards. Therefore, 
the failure modes of the process of surface operations and their underlying causal factors 
must be analysed in detail. To determine the causal factors safety data reflecting the 
perspectives of all relevant stakeholders in the context of surface safety (airport operator, 
airline, ANSP, ground handling company, regulator) needs to be analysed and a dedicated 
data pre-processing strategy must assure the validity of the collected data. In particular, the 
data needs to be assessed for its internal validity, external validity, and for the reporting 
levels. If required, further methodologies should be exploited to gain a more detailed 
insight into the causal factors for certain fuzzy areas that cannot be well defined through 
safety data alone. Validity and reliability checks throughout the analyses ensure the 
framework’s overall robustness. 
To quantify the safety risks of the consequences of the hazards, the airport surface 
system architecture needs to be dissected into its components. The relationship between 
accidents and incidents and their underlying causal factors is modelled for each of the 
components individually and subsequently for their interactions. This allows resources to 
be directed more effectively towards the development of effective solutions for airport 
surface safety analysis and mitigation. 
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Figure 143: Framework for a holistic airport safety management
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The framework (Figure 143) for a holistic airport surface safety management is 
applicable and, therefore, recommended to all relevant aviation stakeholders that are 
involved in surface operations.  
11.6 Summary 
This chapter has quantified the airport surface system by proposing a systematic 
framework for the analysis of occurrences. The framework is based on the system 
architecture and models the functional relationship between accidents / incidents and their 
underlying causal factors by dissecting the system into its elements and analysing each 
component and their interactions separately. The dissection allows the relationships 
between the system characteristics (i.e. airport characteristics), system failures (i.e. causal 
factors), and their consequences (i.e. runway incursions expressed in terms of their 
severity), to be modelled, and this fulfils the seventh research objective. The proposed 
analysis goes beyond traditional approaches for accident / incident analysis and, therefore, 
allows risk mitigation efforts to be channelled more effectively. It is a robust framework 
for the analysis of safety data and, therefore, supports the risk management function of 
SMS. The framework can be applied to any other aviation safety database, providing that 
the causes of accidents and incidents are captured in sufficient detail and that a sensible 
severity classification has been applied. In addition, limitations in current data collection 
practices and reporting systems were identified and recommendations for their 
improvement given. 
Finally, the chapter concluded with the presentation of the overall framework for a 
holistic airport safety management as developed throughout this thesis. 
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12 Discussion and Future Work 
This thesis has investigated the problem of airport surface safety in an integrated 
manner. This final chapter presents the main findings of the research. The approach taken 
is to address each of the research objectives formulated in Chapter 1 and to present the 
corresponding findings and main contributions of this thesis. The chapter concludes with a 
series of ideas for future work and a list of publications from this thesis. 
12.1 Revisiting the Research Objectives 
The aim and objectives of this thesis are re-stated to facilitate the full understanding 
and impact of the main findings of this thesis. The aim of this thesis was to develop a 
framework for a holistic airport surface safety management and Chapter 1 defined a set of 
seven research objectives for this thesis. These are to: 
 
1. Model the physical and functional architecture of airports and define its variability. 
2. Develop a 4-dimensional (4D) process model of airport surface operations. 
3. Provide a systematic literature review to highlight the limitations of current 
approaches and potential barriers to the effective mitigation of airport surface 
accidents / incidents. 
4. Develop a data validation framework. 
5. Determine the causal factors underlying airport surface accidents / incidents. 
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6. Develop a macroscopic scenario tool to support the safety management of airport 
surface operations. 
7. Propose a systematic framework to assess the functional relationship between 
airport surface accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors. 
The next section summarises the main findings and contributions of this thesis. 
12.2 Conclusions 
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) requires airports to implement a 
SMS. Although the international legislative framework exists, national regulations are still 
under development, and therefore, little guidance available how to effectively analyse and 
mitigate safety risks. To overcome the lack of standards in the industry this thesis proposed 
a framework for the development and implementation of a airport SMS. The framework 
provides detailed guidance for aviation stakeholders for SMS development starting from 
the description of the airport system to its quantification in terms of safety risks.  
With the framework this thesis delivered a SMS standard for airports. The standard 
exceeds international requirements by standardizing the two SMS core functions (safety 
risk management and safety assurance) and integrating safety-relevant information across 
all relevant stakeholders. Once implemented, the integrated SMS processes allow the 
utilization of shared data for the safety risk management process of all stakeholders. This 
allows a more effective use of safety information and provides an improved overview on, 
and prediction of safety risks and ultimately improves the safety level of airports and their 
stakeholders. The particular contributions to the state-of-knowledge are summarised 
below. 
12.2.1 Model of the Functional Architecture of Airports 
A model of the static airport architecture has been developed and the physical and 
functional variability in airports defined. One main conclusion was drawn: whilst the 
physical and functional architecture of airports in terms of its components, activities, and 
main stakeholders is invariable, the implementation of these components and activities 
varies (Chapter 2). 
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12.2.2 Development of a 4D Process Model 
The process of surface operations has been modelled and integrated in a high-level 
architecture defining the overall airport surface system. This state-of-the-art model 
presents the first integrated architecture of surface operations showing the interactions 
between the physical infrastructure, the relevant stakeholders and external influences. The 
system architecture is recommended as baseline model to guide the development of SMS 
for airports (Chapter 3). 
12.2.3 Review of the Literature and Current Airport Surface Safety Analysis and 
Mitigation Practices 
A state-of-the art literature review on airport surface safety has been presented. The 
review consolidated the available literature of the different occurrence types and identified 
that current approaches to airport surface safety analysis and risk mitigation lack 
integration and do not comply with the requirements of a SMS. Therefore, data 
requirements for the development of SMS have been derived from the literature and these 
are recommended to all aviation stakeholders (Chapters 4 and 5).  
12.2.4 Development of a Data Validation Framework 
A reference data set, combining a total of twelve safety databases that reflect the 
perspectives of all relevant stakeholders (airport operators, airlines, ANSPs, ground 
handling companies and regulators) has been collected. In addition, a novel data quality 
assessment framework that accounts for the specific characteristics of airport surface safety 
data has been developed. This framework gives a robust indication of the quality of a 
database through a combination of internal validation, external validation, and an analysis 
of the reporting level. It is recommended for data quality assessments of aviation safety 
databases (Chapter 6). 
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12.2.5 Determination of Causal Factors 
A new taxonomy that provides a common industry language for the causal factors of 
airport surface safety occurrences has been developed. The taxonomy provides a state-of-
the-art tool to support the data analysis function in the context of SMS. Its unique feature is 
its integration and applicability to all relevant aviation stakeholders in the context of 
surface safety and, therefore, it is recommended for the operational safety risk 
management of all aviation stakeholders (Chapters 5 to 9). 
12.2.6 Development of a Macroscopic Scenario Tool 
A macroscopic scenario tool to support SMS change management has been developed 
and its use is twofold. The tool allows the evaluation of the impact of changes in the 
airport surface system architecture to guide further analysis. Furthermore, it guides safety 
assessments that may be required as a result of a changing system (Chapter 9). !
12.2.7 Functional Analysis of Airport Surface Safety 
A systematic analysis framework to model the functional relationship between airport 
surface accidents / incidents and their underlying causal factors has been proposed. The 
advantages of using this framework are threefold. Firstly, it is a systematic framework 
illustrating how to dissect the airport surface system architecture and how to analyse its 
components and interactions. Secondly, the model can assess the safety performance of 
airport surface operations and thus help to understand where and how the system can fail 
as a result of certain conditions. Finally, it enables a more thorough analysis and the 
identification of statistically significant factors and interactions to help the decision making 
process for proposing safety recommendations. The framework is recommended to the 
aviation stakeholders for quantification of the safety risks associated to their operations 
(Chapter 11). 
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12.3 Future Work 
The findings suggest a number of directions for future research. These include: 
• The functional relationship between airport surface accidents / incidents and their 
underlying causal factors has been modelled using a sample of 19 U.S. airports. In 
order to generalise the findings, the analysis should be extended and a larger 
sample size considered. In addition, the modelling capabilities of other databases 
with a better DQI should be assessed and compared to the current findings. 
• This work proposed a framework for a holistic approach to airport safety 
management. The idea is to combine all information available from the relevant 
aviation stakeholders in order to allow for an integrated analysis of surface safety. 
Due to data quality considerations, however, an aggregation of safety data was not 
possible at this stage. To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed concept, it 
should be implemented in a case study. That is, all aviation stakeholders of one 
country should collect safety data to common standards that include standardised 
definitions and data collection and investigation processes. Using the tools 
developed in this thesis (i.e. taxonomy, systematic analysis framework) it will then 
be possible to analyse the collected data and to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed multi-stakeholder approach. 
• The work presented in this thesis is based predominantly on historical data 
(accident and incident data) that depict so called lagging indicators. As was noted 
in Chapter 4, a SMS should combine reactive, proactive and predictive methods. 
Therefore, future work should evaluate the transferability of the proposed 
framework to leading indicators that are not occurrence based (e.g. monitoring of 
daily operations to identify abnormalities, safety culture of an organisation).  
• Although, ideally, any situation that may or may not directly challenge the safety of 
the system should be collected, future research should address the cost-benefits of 
safety data collection. This could take the form of, for instance, the development of 
a data collection system in reference to severity levels, in particular, when 
including leading indicators. Similarly, the interdependencies between safety and 
other Key Performance Areas (KPAs) should be assessed to balance the associated 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) with acceptable safety risks. 
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• The analysis presented in this thesis is limited by excluding the Asian market 
despite its significance in terms of global air traffic. Therefore, future work should 
address Asia once the concept of a just culture has been established in this region. 
The tools and methodologies for an airport SMS based on sources of good quality 
safety data have been developed in this thesis. Similarly, developing regions such 
as Africa or South America could benefit from the implementation of the analysis 
framework proposed in this work. 
• Finally, the potential for the proposed framework for a holistic approach to safety 
management to be transferred to other areas of aviation safety that suffer from non-
integrated practices (e.g. ground handling) and other transport modes (e.g. the 
railway system) should be assessed.  
12.4 Publications Relating to this Work 
The following publications have been produced in support of this research.  
12.4.1 Publication Format: Journal – Published 
Wilke, S. and Majumdar, A. (2012). Critical factors underlying airport surface 
accidents and incidents: A holistic taxonomy. Journal of Airport Management, 6(2), pp. 
170-190. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2012). Holistic approach towards airport 
surface safety. Transportation Research Record - Aviation 2012, Vol:2300, pp.1-12. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2013). Airport surface operations: A 
holistic framework for operations modeling and risk management. Safety Science, 63 
(2014), pp. 18-33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.10.015 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2013). A framework for assessing the 
quality of aviation safety databases. Safety Science, 63 (2014), pp. 133-145. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ssci.2013.11.005 
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12.4.2 Publication Format: Conference Proceedings – Published 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2013). The impact of airport characteristics 
on airport surface accidents and incidents. Transportation Research Board – 93rd Annual 
Meeting, Washington, D.C. 12-16 Jan 2014. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2013). Assessing the safety of airport 
surface operations: A 4D process model. The 3rd ENRI International Workshop on ATM / 
CNS (EIWAC), Tokyo 19-22 Feb 2013. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2012). Assessing the quality of aviation 
safety databases: An external data validation framework. 5th International Conference on 
Research in Air Transportation (ICRAT), Berkley 22-25 May 2012. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2012). A holistic approach towards airport 
surface safety. Transportation Research Board – 91st Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C. 
22-26 Jan 2012. 
 
Wilke, S. and Majumdar, A. (2011). A multi-national causal analysis of airport surface 
safety occurrences. 11th AIAA Aviation, Technology, Integration, Operations (ATIO) 
Conference, Virginia Beach 20-22 Sept 2011. 
 
Wilke, S., Majumdar, A. and Ochieng, W. (2011). The potential of automation to 
improve airport surface safety. 1st International Conference on Application and Theory of 
Automation in Command and Control Systems (ATACCS), Barcelona 26-27 May 2011. 
Award for the best Ph.D. presentation at the 1st ATACCS conference. 
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This appendix introduces the main Unified Modelling Language (UML) diagrams and 
their features, as outlined in Schmuller (2009) and Figure 1 summarises upfront the 
corresponding UML notation. 
 
 
Figure 1: UML notation!!!
1 Structure Diagrams 
 
Structure diagrams set the context for any modelling activity and introduce the basic 
terminology for the area of interest. In particular, such diagrams show the ‘things’ that 
must be present when a system is modelled and include class diagrams, object diagrams, 
aggregation diagrams, composites and composite structure diagrams, and interface 
diagrams. 
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• Class Diagrams 
 
The simplest form of a structure diagram is a class diagram, which introduces the 
vocabulary and terminology of the area of interest. A class is “a category or group of 
things that have similar attributes and common behaviours”. For example, pilots can be 
defined as a class with associated attributes and behaviours. Attributes describe the 
properties of the class and a class can have zero, one or multiple attributes. For instance, 
any pilot in this class has attributes such as name, age, pilot license number, and 
experience. The behaviour of a class is represented by its operations. An operation is an 
activity a class can do, for instance, pilots could be defined among others by the following 
operations: ‘entering the aircraft’, ‘preparing the aircraft’, and ‘flying the aircraft’. Figure 2 
shows an example of the UML notation. 
 
 
Figure 2: UML class icon 
 
A class consists of objects defined as “instances of a class and have values for each of 
the class’ attributes.” In UML an object is represented through a rectangle with the name 
of the object stated inside and underlined. 
Associations, i.e. relationships between the classes, are used to connect classes together 
conceptually. They are modelled as a line between two classes and the name of the 
association is shown on top of this line. The roles of the two classes can be added next to 
the classes. For example, a pilot flies an aircraft on behalf of an airline. The airline 
employs the pilot and the pilot is employed by the airline (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3: Association diagram 
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A further important concept in class diagrams is that of generalisation, which states 
that information from one class can be transferred to another. For example, child classes or 
subclasses can inherit attributes or operations from another parent class or superclass. If it 
is known that somebody is a pilot, it is known already that a pilot has a name, age and 
experience, and part of his / her tasks is to prepare and fly the aircraft. Irrespective of 
whether the pilot is a cadet pilot, a first officer or a captain, these attributes and operations 
are always true. Figure 4 summarises the concept of generalisation. 
 
 
Figure 4: Generalisation diagram 
 
In the case that the operations of one class are used by another class, the relationship is 
modelled as a dependency. For instance, the electronic reporting system for safety 
occurrences in an airline allows pilots to make a report from the choice of several reporting 
forms. Among other operations, the computer class is able to display the forms. The form 
the computer displays is dependent on the pilot’s selection. The UML notation in this case 
is a dashed line with an arrowhead that points at the dependent class (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Dependency diagram 
 
• Object Diagrams 
 
While class diagrams provide a general overview on classes, objects and their 
relationships, object diagrams capture the relationship between classes and objects at a 
given  point in time, i.e. they are snapshots used to model specific instances of classes at a 
specific instant in time. 
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• Aggregation Diagrams 
 
Aggregations are used to model hierarchies of classes. An aggregation is defined as “a 
specific type of association in which one class is a component of another. In an 
aggregation, the aggregate class can consist of more than one component class.” Figure 6 
provides an example to illustrate this type of relationship.  
 
 
Figure 6: Aggregation diagram !
• Composites and Composite Structure Diagrams 
 
A composite “is a very strong type of aggregation”. In an aggregation diagram 
components can be connected to various components of classes. In composites, on the 
other hand, each component is a composite that can only belong to just one whole, as 
shown in Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Composite diagram 
 
Appendix I: Unified Modelling Language 
! "##!
To represent the internal structure of a class, UML provides the option of using 
composite structure diagrams. These diagrams show how the components of an object 
relate to one another. 
 
• Interfaces  
 
An interface “is a set of operations that specifies some aspects of a class’s behaviour, 
and it is a set of operations a class presents to other classes”. For instance, the Flight 
Management and Guidance System (FMGS) in the cockpit of an aircraft is an interface that 
allows communication between a pilot and other parties, such as ATC. A possible UML 
notation for this is shown in Figure 8. Interactions through the interface are modelled as a 
dependency, because the pilot, for instance, depends on the interface (i.e. FMGS) to get the 
necessary information. 
 
 
Figure 8: Interface diagram !
2 Use Case Diagrams!!
Use case diagrams represent the system’s behaviour from the user’s point of view, vital 
for system development. For instance, when designing a new aircraft, in order to make sure 
that it meets the requirements of its users, an initial model is produced for the relevant use 
cases. In a use case analysis the different users of a system (in the current scenario, for 
instance, the flight crew, cabin crew, passengers, and maintenance engineers) are asked to 
describe the system and its use from their point of view. Based upon this information, use 
cases are developed. The idea is to get the system users involved in the early stages of 
system analysis and design. Use cases can also be useful in contexts other than system 
design, e.g. to define functional requirements, decision support for choice making, or 
testing new systems.  
The UML notation for a use case model is shown in Figure 9. In this model an actor 
initiates a use case and receives something of value from it. For example, a passenger uses 
the aircraft in order to get from Point A to Point B. 
 
Appendix I: Unified Modelling Language 
! "#$!
 
Figure 9:  Use case model diagram !
3 Behaviour Diagrams!!
Behaviour diagrams model the behaviour of a system, i.e. they emphasise what 
happens in a system. State diagrams, sequence diagrams, communication diagrams, and 
activity diagrams are all behaviour diagrams. 
 
• State Diagrams 
 
State diagrams reflect the state of single objects and allow for the modelling of all the 
changes that objects goes through. Whilst class and object diagrams are used to describe 
static aspects of a system, state diagrams model the change an object goes through in 
response to events and time. The UML notation for the state icon is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10: State diagram 
 
• Sequence Diagrams 
 
Sequence diagrams show interactions of objects in time. The idea behind this is that 
interactions among objects occur in a specified sequence from the beginning to the end.  
The UML notation places the objects on the top of the diagram. Extending downwards 
from each object is a dashed line, called an object’s lifeline. Along the lifeline is a 
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rectangle, the activation, which represents an execution of an operation by an object. The 
objects exchange messages, which are represented by arrows. Time in the sequence 
diagram is represented in the vertical direction, i.e. a message that is closer to the top 
occurs earlier in time than a message at the bottom of the diagram. Figure 11 contains an 
example of a UML notation of a sequence diagram in its simplest form. 
 
 
Figure 11: Sequence diagram 
 
• Communication Diagrams 
 
Like sequence diagrams, communication diagrams also show how objects interact. The 
UML notation for communication diagrams shows the objects along with the messages 
that are exchanged between the objects. Communication diagrams are semantically 
equivalent to sequence diagrams as they present the same information. Both are interaction 
diagrams. The difference lies in the graphical representation: while sequence diagrams 
emphasise the order of interactions according to time, communication diagrams emphasise 
the context and overall organisation of the objects that interact. This means that 
communication diagrams are organised according to space, i.e. according to the links 
among the objects. Figure 12 shows an example. 
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Figure 12: Communication diagram 
 
Communication diagrams are an extension of object diagrams that are snapshots of 
how objects are linked together in an instant of time. The diagrams show the interactions 
of objects over time. 
 
• Activity Diagrams 
 
Activity diagrams show the steps, i.e. activities, in an operation or process. They 
provide a simplified view of what happens during an operation. The roles of different 
actors can be visualised using ‘Swinlanes’, which dissect the diagram into parallel 
segments for each actor. Object nodes (i.e. inputs and outputs for an activity) can be 
specified if needed. Figure 13 shows an example. 
 
 
Figure 13: Activity diagram 
Appendix I: Unified Modelling Language 
! "#$!
4 Architectural Diagrams!!
The last category of UML diagrams, known as architectural diagrams (i.e. component, 
deployment, and package diagrams), is used to model system architecture. 
Component diagrams are used for modelling software components and their interfaces. 
They contain components, interfaces and relationships and their use is intended 
specifically to model computer software. 
Deployment diagrams are used to model the hardware of computer systems. These 
diagrams show how pieces of information that a system uses or produces are deployed on 
system hardware, and how the pieces of hardware connect to one another.  
Finally, package diagrams are designed to group elements (e.g. classes, use cases) of a 
diagram and two possible notations can be used (see Figure 14). 
 
  
Figure 14: Package diagram !!!!!!!!!
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Table 1: Literature overview on incursions 
 
 
Reference 
 
Scope 
 
Represented 
stakeholder 
viewpoint 
 
Data 
 
Analytical 
methodology 
 
Outcomes and 
proposed 
mitigation 
measures 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
   Data source 
 
Time 
period 
 
 
Region 
 
Comments 
on data 
quality 
 
Airbus (2004c): 
Flight operations 
briefing notes. 
Preventing runway 
incursions 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Aircraft 
manufacturer 
!Not specified  !Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Analysis of 
operational 
events (not 
further specified) 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Guidelines for 
runway incursion 
prevention 
!Good overview on 
operational and 
human factors 
involved in runway 
incursions 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
runway-related 
occurrences only) 
!Unknown underlying 
data and methodology 
!Based upon the 
findings of a NLR 
study which is not 
further specified 
!V/PD factors are not 
covered 
Airservices Australia 
(2002): 
Runway incursion 
survey 
!Runway 
incursions 
!ANSP !Not data based !N/A !Sydney 
airport 
!N/A !Survey at 
Sydney airport 
with pilots 
(93.0%), ATC 
(5.0%), V/PD and 
airport 
management 
(2%) 
!Most frequently 
mentioned causal 
factors 
!Insight into the 
causal factors at an 
airport level 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
runway-related 
occurrences only) 
!Methodology is not 
specified 
!Biased sample with 
93% of respondents 
being pilots 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (2004): 
Runway incursions: 
1997 to 2003 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Accident 
Investigation 
Board 
!ATSB 
Occurrence 
Analysis and 
Safety 
Investigation 
System (OASIS) 
database 
!1997-
2003 
!Austra-
lia 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis 
!Identification of 
causal factors 
!Causal factors !Comparison of 
incursions trends in 
Australia with those in 
the U.S. and Europe 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
runway-related 
occurrences only) 
!Unknown method for 
the extraction of 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
Biernbaum and 
Hagemann (2012): 
Runway incursion 
severity risk analysis 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Centre for 
transportation 
expertise 
(VOLPE) 
!FAA Runway 
Incursion database 
!FAA ATQA OE 
and PD 
!METAR 
!2001-
2010 
!U.S.  !The 
quality of 
the 
different 
data 
!Summary 
statistics using 
association tests 
(e.g. Chi-Square, 
Fisher’s Exact) 
!Models of the 
impact of  
-Aircraft factors, 
-Pilot information, 
-Airport 
!Modelling of runway 
incursions / robust 
statistical analysis that 
goes beyond summary 
statistics 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
runway-related 
occurrences only) 
!The impact of V/PD 
related factors is not 
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!FAA Form 5010 
Submissions 
!FAA ETMSC 
!Additional data 
sources for airport 
characteristics 
data17 
sources is 
discussed, 
but limited 
to internal 
data 
quality 
issues (e.g. 
missing 
cells) 
!The 
accuracy of 
the data is 
not 
discussed 
and multinomial 
logit 
!Modelling using 
logistic 
regression models 
characteristics, 
-Radar, 
-ATC variables, 
-Weather 
variables, and 
-Others 
on the severity of 
runway incursion 
!Identification of 
areas for future 
research 
!Identification of 
factors that impact on 
the severity of runway 
incursions 
!Consideration of a 
large number of 
variables 
considered  
!The majority of 
tested variables 
represent risk factors 
(e.g. day vs. night time 
operations, prevailing 
weather conditions) 
and not causal factors 
(e.g. as extracted from 
safety data)  
 
Chang and Wong 
(2012): 
Human risk factors 
associated with 
runway incursions 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Academia !Not data based !N/A !Taiwan !N/A !Identification of 
56 risk factors 
based on the 
SHEL18 model 
and literature 
!Questionnaire 
survey with 
SMEs to weight 
the factors 
!Aggregation of 
the SME 
assessments 
through the 
analytical 
hierarchy process 
(AHP) 
!Risk factors 
!Prioritisation of 
risk factors 
!Robust methodology 
!SMEs include 
regulators, safety 
investigators, and 
pilots 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
assessment of only 
pilot-related factors 
involved in runway 
incursions) 
!Risk factors are based 
upon a literature 
review and not 
supported by data 
analysis 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(2008b, 2009c, 
2010d): 
Annual runway safety 
report 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Regulator / 
ANSP 
!FAA Runway 
Incursion database 
!2007-
2009 
!U.S. 
 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis 
of runway 
incursions 
!Classification of 
runway 
incursions into 
pilot deviation, 
operational error 
and V/PD 
deviations 
!Runway 
incursion trends 
!Overview on 
implemented 
runway incursion 
prevention 
measures, and  
!Overview on 
mitigation 
measured to be 
implemented 
!Good overview on 
the development of 
runway incursions in 
the U.S. and safety 
initiatives 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
!No causal factor 
analysis 
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17 FAA ATQA OE / PD – Air Traffic quality Assurance Operational Error / Pilot Deviation database 
   METAR – French Meteorologique Aviation Regulier 
   FAA ETMSC – Enhanced Traffic Management System Counts 
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Federal Aviation 
Administration (2002): 
Runway incursion 
airport assessment 
report 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Regulator / 
ANSP 
!Site surveys !2001-
2002 
!16 U.S. 
airports 
 
!N/A !Site visits of 16 
airports with a 
high runway 
incursion rate 
(incl. interviews 
and meeting with 
aviation 
stakeholders) 
!Identification of 
causal factors in 
relation to the 
airport  
!Causal factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
mitigation 
measures 
!Analysis of the 
contribution of the 
physical layout and 
infrastructure to 
runway incursions 
!Purely qualitative 
approach 
Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(2007c): 
Wrong runway 
departures 
!Runway 
incursions 
(focus on 
wrong 
runway 
departure) 
!Regulator / 
ANSP 
!NTSB 
!FAA PDS 
!FAA AIDS 
!NASA ASRS 
!FAA NPTRS 
!FAA OEDS19 
!1981-
2006 
!U.S. 
 
!Aggrega-
tion of 
different 
data bases, 
but the data 
are not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Method for the 
extraction of 
causal factors 
from the data is 
not specified 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Proposal of 
safety 
enhancements 
!Evaluation of the 
effectiveness of 
various safety 
mitigation measures 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
wrong runway 
departures) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
descriptive analysis 
Hooey and Foyle 
(2006): 
Pilot navigation errors 
on the airport surface: 
Identifying 
contributing factors 
and mitigating 
solutions 
!Runway 
incursions 
(focus on 
pilot 
navigation 
errors) 
!Research 
institute 
!Real time 
simulations with 
flight crews with 
32 2-pilot crews 
!N/A !N/A !N/A !Description of 
the taxi phase 
!Development of 
a taxonomy of 
pilot navigational 
errors during 
taxiing 
!Application of 
the taxonomy to 
navigation errors 
observed during 
simulation studies 
of surface 
!Taxonomy of 
pilot navigation 
errors 
!Regression 
model showed no 
difference 
between error 
categories 
!Comprehensive 
insight into pilot 
behaviour during 
taxiing 
!Robust methodology 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
focus on pilot 
navigation during 
taxiing) 
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19 NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board 
   FAA PDS – Pilot Deviation System 
   FAA AIDS – Accident / Incident Data System 
   NASA ASRS – National Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System 
   FAA NPTRS – National Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem 
   FAA OEDS – Operational Error / Deviation System 
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operations 
!Analysis of 
simulations using 
a variety of 
methods 
!Frequency 
analysis of errors 
!Logistic 
regression model 
International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
(2007): 
Manual on the 
prevention of runway 
incursions 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Regulator !Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !Identification of 
causal factors 
based on: The 
European 
Organisation for 
the Safety of Air 
Navigation 
(2006) document 
and a global 
consensus / state 
of knowledge 
from SMEs 
!Development of 
recommendations 
to mitigate 
runway 
incursions 
!Causal factors 
!Safety 
recommendations 
and best practices 
to reduce runway 
incursions 
!General 
recommendations and 
guidance materials are 
given (e.g. 
establishment of 
prevention programs, 
incident reporting and 
data collection) as 
well as 
recommendations for 
all relevant 
stakeholders (i.e. 
aircraft operators, 
pilots, ATC and 
ANSPs, regulators) 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Based on SME 
expertise, not 
supported by data 
analysis 
 
Kim and Yang (2012): 
Evaluation of the risk 
frequency for hazards 
of runway incursion in 
Korea 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Academia !Reports of 2 
runway incursions 
in South Korea 
!Literature 
!SMEs 
 
!1980-
2010 
!South 
Korea 
!No 
discussion 
on the 
quality of 
the 
different 
data 
sources 
!Hazard 
identification 
based on 
literature and 
SME expertise 
!Weighting of 
hazards through 
the analytical 
hierarchy process 
(AHP) 
!Estimation of 
hazard 
frequencies based 
on literature 
!Fault tree 
analysis to 
evaluate the risk 
frequency of each 
hazard 
!Causal factors 
!Failure 
probabilities 
!Attempt to model the 
runway incursion risk 
in an Asian country 
that lacks high-quality 
safety data 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Consideration of only 
15 factors 
!Identification of 
hazards for a South 
Korea based on U.S. 
data is questionable 
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La Direction Générale 
de l'Aviation Civile  
(2007): 
Etude inscursions sur 
piste evenèments 2006 
 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Regulator !DSNA database 
(ANSP) 
!ECCAIRS20 
!2006 !France !Limita-
tions of the 
data are 
discussed, 
but 
!No formal 
data 
quality 
assessment 
!Trend analysis !Runway 
incursion 
development in 
France (trends) 
!Causal factors 
!National insight !Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Very limited list of 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
National 
Transportation Safety 
Board (1987): 
Runway incursions at 
controlled airports in 
the United States 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Accident 
Investigation 
Board 
!FAA data !Not 
specified 
!U.S. !Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Analysis of 
safety data 
!Complementary 
interviews with 
ATC, pilots, 
airport managers, 
airlines, and FAA 
!Causal factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for runway 
incursion 
prevention 
measures 
!Combination of 
research methods (i.e. 
data analysis, 
interviews) 
 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Unknown method for 
the extraction of 
causal factors 
!Focus on ATC and 
pilot factors, the role 
of V/PD is not 
discussed 
!Purely qualitative 
analysis 
Rogerson and Lambert 
(2012):  
Prioritizing risks via 
several expert 
perspectives with 
application to runway 
safety 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Academia !Based upon SME 
expertise and 
judgment 
!N/A !N/A !SMEs 
used in the 
case study 
are not 
introduced 
!Identification of 
stakeholders and 
establishment of a 
working group 
!Identification of 
causal factors 
based on SME 
expertise 
!Assessment of 
hierarchical 
factor 
relationships 
from each SME 
!Aggregation of 
the SME 
assessments 
through the 
analytical 
hierarchy process 
(AHP) 
!Causal factors 
!Prioritisation of 
risks associated to 
runway incursions 
!Addresses the 
problem that causal 
factors have different 
importance for 
various stakeholders 
!Consideration of the 
hierarchical order of 
causal factors 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Subjective approach 
reliant on SME 
judgment 
Runway Incursion 
Joint Safety Analysis 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Aviation 
safety 
!NTSB Blue book 
accident reports 
!1990-
2000 
!U.S. !Data 
quality and 
!Event sequence 
analysis (for case 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
!Combination of 
research methods (i.e. 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 DSNA – Direction des Services de la Navigation Aerienne 
   ECCAIRS – European Co-Ordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems!
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Team (2000):  
Results & analysis, 
August 11, 2000; 
Runway Incursion 
Joint Safety 
Implementation Team 
(2002):  
Results and analysis. 
December 2002 
consortia for accidents 
!NAIMS for 
operational errors 
!NTSB accident 
database for 
general aviation 
accidents 
!FAA pilot 
deviation database 
!Pilot reports 
from airlines21 
limitations 
of the 
different 
data 
sources is 
discussed 
studies) 
!Development of 
problem 
statements (what 
happened & why) 
!Causal factors 
!Development of 
intervention 
strategies 
!Prioritisation of 
intervention 
strategies 
intervention 
strategies to 
reduce the 
potential of 
runway incursions 
in the areas of 
training, 
situational 
awareness, 
procedures, 
equipment / 
facilities, crew 
resource 
management, 
safety culture, 
communications, 
and human 
physiological 
limitations 
case studies, high-
level data analysis, 
expert judgment) 
!Consideration of 
commercial and 
general aviation 
occurrences 
!Extensive list of 
recommendations 
occurrences) 
!The findings from the 
analysis are not 
presented (e.g. causal 
factors) 
!Focus on incursions 
involving aircraft (i.e. 
V/PD related factors 
and recommendations 
are not considered) 
Stroeve, et al. (2009): 
Systematic accident 
risk assessment in air 
traffic by Monte Carlo 
simulation; 
Further results 
published in  
Stroeve, et al. (2011): 
Contrasting safety 
assessments of a 
runway incursion 
scenario by event 
sequence analysis 
versus multi-agent 
dynamic risk 
modelling 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Research 
institute 
!Technical system 
specifications 
!Literature and 
SMEs 
!Incident data 
!Interviews 
!Measurements 
from real 
operations and 
simulations 
!Data is not 
further specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Modelling a 
runway incursion 
scenario as multi-
agent system 
!Quantification 
of the scenario 
through Monte 
Carlo simulation 
!Validation 
through 
additional 
simulations and 
interviews with 
SMEs 
!Collision risk 
model 
!Quantitative 
approach 
!Modelling of the 
interactions of all 
relevant stakeholders 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
assessment of a 
specific runway 
incursion scenario) 
!Underlying data sets 
are not specified 
!Collision risk model 
is only valid for one 
specific scenario 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation (2008a): 
ARIA. Development 
of a computer based 
aerodrome runway 
incursion assessment 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Safety 
organisation 
!NLR Air Safety 
Database 
!FAA Runway 
Incursion 
Database 
!CADORS 
!UK CAA 
MORS22 
!Not 
specified 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
incident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
!Identification of 
causal factors 
based on incident 
reports 
!Weighting of 
causal factors 
based on their 
frequency 
!List of causal 
factors 
!List of incursion 
counter measures 
Index that reflects 
the possibility of 
having a runway 
incursion 
!Extensive list of 
causal factors (> 400) 
!Consideration of 
runway incursion risk 
reduction measures 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Literature used to 
extract the causal 
factors is not specified 
!Unknown method for 
the extraction of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board 
   NAIMS – National Aviation Incident Management System 
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for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Identification of 
incursion counter 
measures 
!Weighting of 
counter measures 
based on 
historical 
occurrence data 
and SME 
judgment 
!Development of 
an overall risk 
index 
!Model 
validation 
(correlation f the 
risk index to 
incursion rates at 
18 airports) 
causal factors 
!Although vehicles are 
acknowledged V/PD 
human-related factors 
are missing entirely 
!Additive model may 
not be appropriate for 
a risk index 
!Only high-level 
statistical analysis 
!Consideration of 
predominantly 
regulatory safety data 
!Aggregation of safety 
data from various 
countries with 
potential differing 
qualities 
 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation, et al. 
(2011): 
European action plan 
for the prevention of 
runway incursions 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Industry 
safety 
consortium 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !Development of 
recommendations 
to mitigate 
runway 
incursions based 
on a global 
consensus / state 
of knowledge 
from SMEs 
!Safety 
recommendations 
and guidance 
materials for the 
prevention of 
runway incursions 
!Recommendations 
and guidance 
materials are given for 
all relevant 
stakeholders (i.e. 
airports, aircraft 
operators, ANSPs, 
regulators, military) 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Based on SME 
expertise, not 
supported by data 
analysis 
!Predominantly 
ANSPS participated in 
the development 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation 
Experimental Centre 
(2006): 
Main report for the: 
2005/2012 integrated 
risk picture for air 
traffic management in 
Europe 
!ATM-related 
accidents 
(including 
runway 
collisions and 
taxiway 
collisions) 
!Safety 
organisation 
!Large Western 
commercial jet 
aircraft (data 
source not 
specified) 
!Flight population 
data from Boeing 
!AIRPROX 
frequencies from 
the UK 
AIRPROX 
Board23 
!1990-
2002 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
!Definition of 5 
ATM-related 
accident types 
!Development of 
fault trees for 
each accident 
type 
!Development an 
influence model 
for common 
factors 
!Causal factors  
!Failure 
probabilities for 
causal factors 
!Probability of an 
accident 
!Modelling of 
accident causation 
scenarios 
!Quantitative  
appraoch 
 
!IRP is developed 
from a ATM 
perspective and 
focuses on the impact 
of ATM on accidents 
(e.g. V/PD-related 
factors are not 
considered, pilot 
factors are introduced 
on a very high level) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 NLR – National Aerospace Laboratory of the Netherlands 
   CADORS – Canadian Civil Aviation Occurrence Reporting System 
   UK CAA MORS – UK CAA Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Scheme 
23 AIRPROX – Air proximity hazard 
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!Flight towards 
terrain frequencies 
derived from 
airline data 
aggrega-
tion 
qualities 
Transport Canada 
(2000): 
National civil aviation 
safety committee. Sub-
committee on runway 
incursions. Final report 
September 14, 2000 
!Runway 
incursions 
!Regulator !Transport 
Canada CADORS 
!NAV Canada 
AOR 
!Supplemental 
information from 
NAV Canada 
FFBs and 
Transportation 
Safety Board 
ASIS24 
!1993-
2000 
!Canada !Data was 
validated 
and 
evaluated 
as reliable 
(the 
statement 
is not 
supported 
through 
further 
explana-
tions) 
!Trend analysis 
!Identification of 
causal factors 
!Site analysis at 
the 3 airports 
with the highest 
runway incursion 
risk (meetings 
with airport 
officials to 
discuss problems 
and mitigation 
measures) 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
mitigation 
!Combination of 
research methods (i.e. 
data analysis, site 
visits) 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
occurrences) 
!Report claims the 
data has been 
validated, but no 
details as to how this 
was done are given  
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
!Causal factors focus 
on traffic, airport 
design, and ATC 
related factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
Young and Vlek 
(2009): 
An analysis of the 
causes of airfield 
incursions attributed to 
ground vehicles 
!Airfield 
incursions of 
V/PD 
!Academia / 
Airline 
!FAA Air Traffic 
Quality Assurance 
(ATQA) database 
!1998-
2008 
!U.S. !Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
mitigation 
!First study looking at 
runways & taxiways 
!Identification of 
causes related to 
incursions caused by 
V/PD 
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 CADORS – Transport Canada Civil Aviation Occurrence Reporting System  
   NAV Canada AOR – Aviation Occurrence Reporting 
   NAV Canada FFBs – Fact Finding Boards 
   Transportation Safety Board ASIS –Aviation Safety Information System 
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Table 2: Literature overview on excursions 
 
 
Reference 
 
Scope 
 
Represented 
stakeholder 
viewpoint 
 
Data 
 
Analytical 
methodology 
 
Outcomes and  
proposed 
mitigation 
measures 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
   Data source 
 
Time 
period 
 
 
Region 
 
Comments 
on data 
quality 
 
Airbus (2004b): 
Flight operations 
briefing notes. Human 
factors aspects in 
accidents and incidents 
!Runway 
excursion 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Aircraft 
manufacturer 
!Not specified !Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Analysis of 
operational 
events (not 
further specified) 
!List of causal  
factors 
!Recommended 
practices for flight 
operations 
!Good overview on 
pilot-related human 
aspects that can 
underlie excursions 
!Unknown underlying 
definitions, data and 
methodology 
!Based upon the 
findings of a NASA25 
study, which is not 
further specified 
Ale, et al. (2009): 
Causal Model for Air 
Transport Safety 
(CATS). Final Report 
!Air transport 
accidents 
!Academia !ICAO ADREP 
!In addition to 
ADREP other data 
sources were used 
including: e.g. 
Airclaims, 
Aviation Safety 
Network, FSF, 
airline audits 
(LOSA),  
and incident 
report where 
available 
!1990-
2003 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident / 
incident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Development of 
separate causal 
models for 7 
accident types 
and 33 scenarios  
!Development of 
Event Sequence 
Diagrams (ESD) 
and Fault Trees 
for each accident 
type 
!Conversion of 
these single 
elements into a 
Bayesian Belief 
Net (BBN) 
!Validation: 
comparison with 
other models, 
expert peer 
review 
!Causal factors  
!Failure 
probabilities for 
causal factors 
!Probability of an 
accident 
!Modelling of 
accident causation 
scenarios 
!Quantitative  
appraoch 
!Extensive list of 
causal factors is given 
for excursions 
!Tool to support the 
decision making 
process of aviation 
stakeholders 
 
!CATS includes also a 
model of collisions on 
runways, which is 
limited to pilot and 
ATC factors –> it 
takes on a flight 
perspective rather than 
a wider ATM 
perspective 
!Causal factors and 
failure probabilities 
are linked to specific 
accident scenarios and 
event chains 
!Many failure 
probabilities are based 
on SME judgement 
due to a lack of data 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
 
Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (2008b, 
2009): 
Runway excursions 
part 1: A worldwide 
!Runway 
overruns 
during 
landing 
!Runway 
!Accident 
Investigation 
Board 
!Data from World
 Aircraft  
Accident 
Summary 
(WAAS) 
!1998 - 
2007 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
!High-level data 
coding based on 
the UK CAA 
Accident 
Analysis Group 
!List of causal  
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Outline of 
!Extensive 
explanations of the 
causal factors and 
their implications, as 
well as risk controls 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
landing accidents) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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review of commercial 
jet aircraft runway 
excursions; Runway 
excursions part 2: 
Minimising the 
likelihood and 
consequences of 
runway excursions 
veer-offs 
during 
landing 
 
 
!Complementary 
accident 
investigation 
reports from 
ATSB, NTSB, 
TSB, NTSC26 and 
other national 
safety 
investigation 
bodies 
!Occurrences 
involving 
commercial jet 
aircraft 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
(AAG) 
taxonomy; lower-
level data coding 
using a 
classification 
scheme outlined 
in the FSF 
Approach-and-
Landing Accident 
Reduction 
(ALAR) Toolkit 
Briefing Notes 
!Trend analysis 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
preventive risk 
controls (i.e. 
recommendations 
for different 
aviation 
stakeholders) and 
recovery risk 
controls (i.e. 
available 
technologies and 
recommendations 
for airport design) 
 
 
 
qualities 
!No discussion on the 
appropriateness of 
existing taxonomies 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
Es, 2005; Es, et al. 
(2009): 
1) Running out of 
runway;  
2) Development of a 
landing overrun risk 
index 
!Runway 
overruns 
during 
landing 
 
!National 
Aerospace 
Laboratory of 
the 
Netherlands 
(NLR) – 
Research 
institute 
1) !NLR Air 
Safety Database 
!Commercial 
transport aircraft 
2) !14,000 
landings for 
narrow bodied 
aircraft (2004-
2005) 
!1970-
2004 
 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
1)!Development 
of a taxonomy of 
factors that 
influence landing 
performance 
!Analysis of 
safety data using 
this taxonomy 
!Trend analysis 
for landing 
overruns 
!Frequency 
analysis and 
calculation of risk 
ratios for each of 
the identified 
factors 
2)Calculation of 
risk ratios for 
individual 
operators (airline) 
!Estimation of 
risk associated 
with various 
landing factors 
and identification 
of factors that 
increase the 
landing overrun 
risk 
!Proactive study that 
aims to identify 
hazards associated to 
landings  
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway landing 
overrun accidents) 
!Unclear how the 
taxonomic factors 
were derived (e.g. 
literature, SMEs?) 
!Study stops with  
statistical associations, 
no causal relationship 
are analysed  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 ATSB – Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
   NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board 
   TSB – Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
   NTSC – National Transportation Safety Committee of Indonesia!
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Federal Aviation 
Administration 
(2007a): 
Advisory circular 91-
79 runway overrun 
prevention 
!Runway 
overruns 
during 
landing 
 
!Regulator / 
ANSP 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !List of causal  
factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
mitigation 
!Raises awareness in 
the industry 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway overruns) 
!Very limited list of  
causal factors and 
associated 
recommendations is 
presented (i.e. four 
types of causal factors) 
!Not data based 
Flight Safety 
Foundation (2009): 
Reducing the risk of 
runway excursions 
!Runway 
veer-offs 
!Runway 
overruns 
!International 
aviation safety 
consortium 
with members 
of more than 
1,200 
organisations 
in 150 
countries 
(including e.g. 
aircraft 
manufacturers
, airlines, 
airport 
operators, 
regulators) 
!WAAS 
!Accidents 
involving 
Western- and 
Eastern-built 
commercial jet 
and turboprop 
!1995 - 
2008 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Method for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
from the data is 
not specified 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
!List of causal  
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Factor  
interactions 
!High-level 
recommendations 
for pilots, airport 
operators, ATM, 
regulators, and 
aircraft 
manufacturers  
!The study represents 
the first major effort 
of the industry to 
address runway 
excursions 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
accidents) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
Flight Safety 
Foundation (2000): 
Approach-and-landing 
accident reduction 
(ALAR) briefing note 
8.1 - Runway 
excursions and runway 
overruns; 
Methodology specified 
in: Khatwa and 
Helmreich (1999): 
Analysis of critical 
factors during 
approach and landing 
in accidents and 
normal flight  
!Approach  
and 
landing 
accidents 
(ALA) 
!International 
aviation safety 
consortium (as 
outlined 
above) 
1) 287 fatal ALA 
accidents of 
jet and turboprop 
aircraft  
(maximum take-
off weight above 
12,500 pounds) 
from WAAS 
2) 76 case studies 
of accidents and 
serious incidents 
using final 
occurrence reports 
from a variety of 
sources 
3) Line audits of 
3,000 flights 
!1980-
1997 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!1) Extraction of 
causal factors by 
analysing the 
descriptive 
narrative of 
occurrence 
reports 
2) Data coding 
using a 
combination of 
taxonomies 
including AAG 
3) Analysis of 
line audits 
!Trend analysis 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
!1) Summary of 
causal factors in a 
taxonomy (UK 
CAA Accident 
Analysis Group 
(AAG) taxonomy) 
2/3) List of causal 
factors and most 
frequent causal 
factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for 
regulators, flight 
crews, ATC, 
airports, accident 
investigation 
boards, aircraft 
manufacturers, 
and the industry 
!Use of a combination 
of safety data and 
operational audits 
!Good  
methodological  
approach 
!In-depth analysis of 
the causal factors that 
underlie ALA 
!Recommendations 
given for all aviation 
stakeholders 
!Focus on ALA, not 
excursions in general 
!Limited list of causal 
factors for excursions 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
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Hall, et al. (2008): 
Airport Cooperative 
Research Program 
(ACRP) Report 3. 
Analysis of aircraft 
overruns and 
undershoots for 
runway safety areas 
(Also published in: 
Ayres, et al. (2013): 
Modelling the location 
and consequences of 
aircraft accidents; 
Further results 
published in: Wong, et 
al. (2009a, b): 
The development of a 
more risk-sensitive 
and flexible airport 
safety area strategy: 
Part I. The 
development of an 
improved accident 
frequency model; Part 
II. Accident location 
analysis and airport 
risk assessment case 
studies) 
!Runway 
landing 
overruns 
!Runway 
landing 
undershoots 
!Runway 
take-off 
overruns 
!Accidents 
and incidents 
!Applied 
research 
program 
(including 
aviation 
consultants 
and academia) 
!Data sources 
included mainly 
Accident 
Investigation 
Boards: FAA 
AIDS, 
FAA/NASA 
ASRS, NTSB, 
TSB, ICAO 
ADREP, ATSB, 
BEA, AAIB, 
TAIC, AAIB of 
Singapore, AAIU,  
CIAIAC27 
!Additional data 
sources were used 
to gather aircraft, 
airport, weather 
data 
!1982-
2006 
!World-
wide 
!Problems 
associated 
to the 
quality of 
individual 
reports are 
discussed 
(e.g. 
missing 
info) 
!Data 
quality 
issues 
arising 
from the 
aggrega-
tion of 
multi-
national 
data sets 
are not 
addressed 
!Functional 
Hazard Analysis 
to identify the 
relevant factors 
associated to 
runway overrun / 
undershoots 
events 
!Development of 
a database for 
runway overruns 
and undershoots 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors from 
occurrence 
reports 
!Development of 
risk models for 
event probability, 
location 
probability, and 
accident 
consequences 
!Software 
development 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Runway safety 
area risk 
assessment (risk 
models) 
 
!Quantitative risk 
assessment 
!Integration of 
frequency and 
location models for 
the evaluation of the 
likelihood of an 
accident with an 
accident consequences 
model 
!Limited scope (i.e. no 
veer-offs) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
 
International Air 
Transport Association 
(2011): 
Runway excursion 
analysis report 2004-
2009 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Airline trade 
group 
!IATA runway 
excursion data  
!Western and 
eastern built jet 
aircraft greater 
than 15,000 kg 
!2004- 
2009 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
!Trend analysis 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
 
!Good introduction to 
the main causal  
factors that underlie 
runway excursions 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
accidents) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 FAA AIDS – Federal Aviation Administration Accident / Incident Data System 
   FAA/NASA ASRS – FAA / National Aeronautics and Space Administration Aviation Safety Reporting System 
   NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board Accident Database & Synopses 
   TSB – Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
   ICAO ADREP – ICAO Accident / Incident Data Reporting system 
   ATSB – Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
   BEA - France Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile 
   AAIB – UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
   TAIC - New Zealand Transport Accident Investigation Commission 
   AAIB of Singapore - Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore 
   AAIU - Ireland Air Accident Investigation Unit 
   CIAIAC - Spain Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Inci- dentes de Aviación Civil 
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and turboprop 
aircraft greater 
than 5,700 kg 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of the 
causal factors 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
/ International Air 
Transport Association 
(2011):  
Runway Excursion 
Risk Reduction 
(RERR) toolkit 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Regulator /  
Airline trade 
group with 
contribution 
of others (e.g. 
safety 
organisations, 
national 
regulators, 
research 
institutes) 
!The toolkit is 
based on the 
findings from the 
International Air 
Transport 
Association 
(2011) and other 
contributory 
reports from e.g. 
Australian 
transport safety 
Bureau *2008b, 
2009); Flight 
Safety Foundation 
(2009); The 
European 
Organisation for 
the Safety of Air 
Navigation 
(2010d) are used 
as input for the 
toolkit 
!N/A !N/A !N/A !Knowledge 
compilation from 
various safety 
organisations and 
aviation industry 
stakeholders 
!Toolkit that  
contains best 
practices, 
recommendations, 
and self audit 
checklists for 
airports, ANSPs, 
airlines, and 
regulators, as well 
as materials to 
support runway 
excursion 
workshops 
!Industry awareness 
toolkit 
!Materials and 
recommendations for 
all relevant aviation 
stakeholders are 
provided 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
events) 
!Focus on prevention 
rather than analysis of 
causes 
!Based upon the 
findings of other 
reports and therefore 
their limitations apply 
 
Ju (201): 
Fuzzy ANP-based 
research on the risk 
assessment on runway 
excursions 
!No 
definition 
given 
!Academia !Not specified !Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Definition of 
excursion risk 
factors 
!Fuzzy-
Analytical 
Network Process 
(ANP) to model 
the key risk 
factors 
!List of key risk 
factors for 
excursions 
!Quantitative 
approach 
!Missing definitions 
!It is unclear how the 
risk factors have been 
derived 
!It is not specified 
how the ANP has been 
modelled 
!Overall, the data 
sources and 
methodology remain 
unclear 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation, et al. 
(2013): 
European action plan 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Industry 
safety 
consortium 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !Safety 
recommendations 
and guidance 
materials based on 
the results of the 
European 
!Recommendations 
and guidance 
materials are given for 
all relevant 
stakeholders (i.e. 
airports, ANSPs, 
!Recommendations 
are based on the 
results of the European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation (2010d) 
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for the prevention of 
runway excursions 
Organisation for 
the Safety of Air 
Navigation 
(2010d) study and 
a consensus of 
SME expertise / 
knowledge 
aircraft operator, 
aircraft manufacturer, 
regulator, EASA) 
study that identified 
only 18 causal factors 
and does not address 
the impact of e.g. 
airports, ATC, 
regulators 
!Further limitations as 
outlined above apply 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation (2010d): 
A study of runway 
excursions from a 
European perspective 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Safety 
organisation 
!NLR Air Safety 
Database 
!Jet and turboprop 
commercial and 
business transport 
flights 
!1980-
2008 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
!Data coding 
using ECCAIRS / 
ADREP 
taxonomy 
!Trend analysis 
!Frequency 
analysis of causal 
factors 
!Calculation of 
risk ratios for 
each causal factor 
!Validation 
through SMEs  
!List of most 
important causal 
factors 
!Risk ratio for 
each causal factor 
!Recommendation
s for preventive 
measures 
!Results serve as 
input for the European 
Organisation for the 
safety of Air 
Navigation, et al. 
(2013) action plan 
!Comparison of 
excursion trends 
between Europe and 
the rest of the world 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
accidents) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
!Only high-level 
statistical descriptive 
analysis 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation SKYbrary 
(2012b):  
Runway excursion 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Runway 
undershoot 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Wrong 
runway use 
!Industry 
safety 
consortium 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !Introduction to 
typical runway 
excursion 
scenarios, 
including causes 
 
!Raises awareness in 
the industry 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway-related 
events) 
!Very limited list of  
causal factors  
!Not data based 
!Overall, only a high-
level introduction to 
runway excursions 
Valdes, et al. (2011): 
The development of 
probabilistic models to 
estimate accident risk 
(due to runway 
overrun and landing 
undershoot) applicable 
to the design and 
construction of runway 
safety areas 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Runway 
undershoot 
 
!Academia / 
industry 
!Data sources 
included mainly 
Accident 
Investigation 
Boards: AAIU, 
ATSB, BFU, 
TSB, BEA, 
CIAIAC, AAIB, 
AIDS, NMACS, 
NTSB28 
!1984-
2007 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide 
accident 
data is 
used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality and 
!Analysis of 
accidents for their 
causal factors 
!Probability 
model for having 
an overrun or 
undershoot 
!Case study at 
one airport 
!List of causal 
factors 
!Most frequent 
causal factors 
!Probability of 
having an overrun 
or undershoot 
 
!Quantitative risk 
assessment 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only runway overruns 
and undershoots) 
!Aggregation of data 
with potential differing 
qualities 
!Unknown 
methodology for the 
extraction of causal 
factors from the safety !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 AAIU - Ireland Air Accident Investigation Unit 
   ATSB – Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
   BFU – Bundesstelle fuer Flugunfalluntersuchung 
   TSB – Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
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!Additional data 
sources from 
private entities 
were used 
potential 
for 
aggrega-
tion 
data 
!The impact of the 
causal factors is not 
modelled 
Ziegler (2012): 
Runway excursion 
modelling and 
analysis: a web-based 
geographic 
information system 
solution 
!Runway 
overrun 
!Runway 
undershoot 
!Runway 
veer-off 
!Academia !NTSB data 
!Airport terrain 
data 
!Past 20 
years 
(study 
published 
in 2012) 
!U.S. !Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Design of a 
geographic 
information 
system (GIS) that 
overlaps airport 
terrain data with 
the locations of 
previous runway 
excursions at 
similar airports  
!GIS map that 
highlights specific 
danger zones of 
runways and past 
excursion points 
!The tool 
visualises the 
probability of an 
excursion 
occurring at 
specific locations 
along an airport’s 
runway and its 
expected severity 
!The tool allows 
making more 
informed decisions 
and to channel safety 
mitigation measures 
more effectively 
!The tool helps 
assessing whether 
proper mitigation 
measures are 
implemented at the 
correct areas of a 
runway 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only occurrences on 
runways) 
!Focus on the 
prediction of the 
location of runway 
veer-offs and 
overshoots, and their 
severity 
!Causal factors for 
excursions are not 
analysed 
!Purely graphical tool, 
not supported by 
statistical analysis !!!!
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
   BEA - France Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile 
   CIAIAC - Spain Comisión de Investigación de Accidentes e Inci- dentes de Aviación Civil 
   AAIB – UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch 
   FAA AIDS – Federal Aviation Administration Accident / Incident Data System 
   NMACS – FAA Near Midair Collision System 
   NTSB – National Transportation Safety Board Accident Database & Synopses 
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Table 3: Literature overview on FOD 
 
 
Reference 
 
Scope 
 
Represented 
stakeholder 
viewpoint 
 
Data 
 
Analytical 
methodology 
 
Outcomes and 
proposed 
mitigation 
measures 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
   Data source 
 
Time 
period 
 
 
Region 
 
Comments 
on data 
quality 
 
Bachtel (2010): 
Foreign Object Debris 
and Damage 
prevention 
!FOD !Aircraft 
manufacturer 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis Specifies: 
!FOD sources 
!Elements of a 
FOD control 
program 
!Outline of the 
elements of a FOD 
control program 
!Compilation of 
knowledge 
!Not data-based 
 
Federal Aviation 
Administration (1996, 
2009a, 2010b): 
Advisory circular 
150/5220-24; 
150/5380-5B; 
150/5210-24 on FOD 
!FOD !Regulator / 
ANSP 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis Specifies:  
!FOD sources 
!FOD detection 
systems 
(technologies) 
!Requirements for 
a FOD 
management 
program 
!Overview on  
available FOD  
detection  
technologies 
!Outline of the 
elements of a FOD 
control program 
!Not data-based 
 
Kraus and Watson 
(2001): 
Guidelines for the 
prevention and 
elimination of Foreign 
Object Damage / 
Debris (FOD) in the 
aviation maintenance 
environment through 
improved human 
performance 
!FOD !Industry 
(technology 
company) / 
regulator 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis !Outlines two 
concepts of FOD 
prevention and 
their elements 
!Emphasis on the 
human factors 
involved in FOD 
prevention 
!Not data-based 
 
(MBJ Airports (Year 
not specified): 
FOD awareness 
!FOD !Airport 
operator 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis Specifies:  
!FOD sources 
!Elements of a 
FOD prevention 
program 
!Outline of the 
elements of a FOD 
prevention program 
!Compilation of 
knowledge 
!Not data-based 
 
National Aerospace 
FOD Prevention Inc. 
(Year not specified): 
FOD prevention 
guideline 
!FOD to 
aircraft 
!Aerospace 
industry 
consortia 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis Specifies:  
!FOD sources 
!Elements of a 
FOD control 
program 
!Best practices 
!Report identifies that 
FOD that can damage 
aircraft 
!Compilation of 
knowledge 
!Not data-based 
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Prather (2011): 
ACRP synthesis 26. 
Current airport 
inspection practices 
regarding FOD 
(Foreign Object 
Debris/Damage) 
!FOD !Consultant !Stakeholder 
survey 
!N/A !U.S. !N/A !Literature 
review 
!Survey with 
airports 
!Survey with 
manufacturers / 
technology 
suppliers 
!Results are 
complemented by 
SME opinions 
Specifies: 
!FOD sources 
!Types of FOD 
!Damage caused 
by FOD 
!Elements of 
FOD management 
programs 
!Overview on 
current FOD 
practices and 
available 
equipment and 
technologies that 
support a FOD 
control program 
!Extensive review and 
synthesis of FOD 
knowledge 
!State-of-the-art 
overview on current 
FOD management 
practices 
!Limited to FOD 
practices in the U.S. 
!Synthesis of 
knowledge, no 
analysis of safety 
knowledge 
!Results from the 
survey are only used 
qualitatively 
(frequency analysis of 
responses) 
 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation SKYbrary 
(2013b, c): 
Foreign Object Debris; 
Preventing FOD 
!FOD !Industry 
safety 
consortium 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis Specifies: 
!FOD sources 
!Elements of a 
FOD control 
program 
!Outline of the 
elements of a FOD 
control program 
!Compilation of 
knowledge 
!Not data-based 
 
The FOD Control 
Corporation (2010):  
FOD defined 
!FOD !Technology 
company for 
FOD 
prevention 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !No analysis !High-level 
introduction to 
FOD and its 
sources 
 !Compilation of 
knowledge 
!Not data-based !!!!!!
 !!!!!
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Table 4: Literature overview on wildlife strikes 
 
 
Reference 
 
Scope 
 
Represented 
stakeholder 
viewpoint 
 
Data 
 
Analytical 
methodology 
 
Outcomes and 
proposed 
mitigation 
measures 
 
Advantages 
 
Disadvantages 
   Data source 
 
Time 
period 
 
 
Region 
 
Comments 
on data 
quality 
 
Airbus (2004a): 
Flight operations 
briefing notes. 
Birdstrike threat 
awareness 
!Birds !Aircraft 
manufacturer 
!Not specified !Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Not 
specified 
!Analysis of 
Airbus bird strike 
occurrences (not 
further specified) 
!Overview on 
operational 
consequences of 
bird strikes 
!Guidelines for 
bird strike 
prevention 
!Good overview on 
the operational 
problems caused by 
bird strikes that 
airlines face 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Unknown underlying 
data and methodology 
!Causal factors are not 
specified 
 
Allan (2006): 
A heuristic risk 
assessment technique 
for birdstrike 
management at 
airports 
!Birds !Research 
institute 
!UK CAA29 
Birdstrike 
Database 
!1976-
1996 
!United 
Kingdom 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Estimation of 
bird strike risk 
(severity 
estimation using 
linear regression, 
frequency 
estimation using a 
rolling mean) 
!Determination 
of risk category 
per species 
!Methodology for 
the development 
of a bird strike 
risk assessment 
tool 
!Proposed 
methodology can be 
adapted easily by any 
airport 
!Tool supports the 
identification and 
selection of 
management options 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Only considers real 
strikes, not the 
presence of birds in 
general 
Australian Airports 
Association (2005): 
Bird and animal 
hazard management 
plan 
!Wildlife !Airports 
association 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !Introduction to 
the elements of a 
wildlife 
management plan 
!Guidelines for 
wildlife management 
!Not data-based 
!Causal factors are not 
specified 
!Focus on the 
mitigation of wildlife 
hazards 
Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau 
(2008a): 
An analysis of 
Australian birdstrike 
occurrences 2002 to 
2006 
!Birds !Accident 
investigation 
Board 
!ATSB Aviation 
Safety Database 
!CSIRO bird 
species data 
!BITRE aircraft 
movement data30 
!Airservices 
!2002-
2006 
!Austra-
lia 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis 
!Identification of 
circumstantial 
factors 
!Description of 
temporal and 
operational factors 
that were present 
during bird strikes 
and bird strike 
consequences 
!Analysis of 
circumstances under 
which bird strikes 
most commonly occur 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 UK CAA – United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 
30 ATSB – Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
   CSIRO – Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
   BITRE – Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics 
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Australia 
Dao-De, et al. (2010): 
Ranking birdstrike 
risk: A case study at 
Huanghua 
International Airport, 
Changsha, China 
!Birds !Airport / 
academia 
!Survey (bird 
counts and 
observations) 
!2006-
2008 
!Huang-
hua 
Interna-
tional 
Airport, 
China 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Observation of 
bird over a 2-year 
period 
!Assessment of 
each species for 
11 criteria 
!Calculation of a 
bird strike risk 
level for each 
species 
!Cluster analysis 
to cluster species 
into risk groups  
!Four clusters of 
birds species 
(high-risk to low-
risk species) in 
order to prioritise 
prevention 
measures 
!Airport case study 
 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!The study analyses 
which birds are 
present at the airport 
and impose the 
greatest risk, without 
analysing as to why 
they are appear 
Appropriateness of the 
statistical model (i.e. 
multiplication of 
factors) is not 
discussed 
Dennis and Lyle 
(2009): 
Bird strike damage & 
windshield bird strike. 
Final report 
!Birds !Research 
project under 
a European 
Aviation 
Safety Agency 
contract 
!UK CAA 
!Transport 
Canada 
!USDA31 
!1990-
2007 
!United 
States, 
Canada, 
United 
Kingdom 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis 
!Analysis of bird 
strikes for the 
damage they 
caused 
!Risk assessment 
based on strike 
frequency 
!Overview on the 
consequences of 
bird strikes to 
aircraft 
!Conclusion that  
regulatory 
requirements are 
currently met 
!Investigation of the 
adequacy of aircraft 
certification 
requirements 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
!Causal factors are not 
specified 
!Risk is calculated 
based on occurrence 
rates only 
Fennessy, et al. 
(2005): 
Ground versus air – 
seasonal changes in 
the use by birds of an 
Irish airport 
!Birds !Academia !Survey (bird 
counts) 
!1995-
2002 
!Dublin 
Airport, 
Ireland 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Ground counts 
and counts of 
overflying birds 
!Comparison of 
bird counts to the 
airport’s strike 
profile 
!Species that are 
present at the 
airport 
!Seasonal 
distribution 
!Profile of strikes 
does not closely 
reflect the profile 
of species 
recorded during 
bird counts 
!Comparison of bird 
strike and bird count 
profiles 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Methodology is not 
specified in detail (e.g. 
how often bird counts 
were conducted) 
!Purely qualitative 
approach 
Hesse, et al. (2010): 
Wildlife management 
practices  at western 
Canadian airports 
!Wildlife !Academia !Not data based !N/A !Canada !N/A !Survey with 38 
airports 
Overview on: 
!Causal factors 
!Animal control 
countermeasures 
and their 
effectiveness 
!Data collection 
systems 
!Survey methodology, 
which can capture 
more details than 
safety data 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 UK CAA – United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority 
   USDA – U.S. Department of Agriculture!
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!Bird strike trends 
that Canadian 
airports 
experience 
International 
Birdstrike Committee 
(2006):  
Standards for 
aerodrome bird / 
wildlife control; 
Adapted by Cleary 
(2007) 
Best management 
practices for airport 
wildlife control 
!Birds / 
wildlife 
!Industry 
consortia 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !Development of 
recommendations 
for wildlife 
management 
based on a global 
consensus / state 
of knowledge 
from 
ornithological 
and aviation 
experts 
!Recommended 
practices for 
airfield habitat 
management, 
wildlife dispersal 
and removal, and 
data reporting and 
analysis 
!Recommendations 
for wildlife 
management 
!Causal factors are not 
specified 
!Based on SME 
expertise, not 
supported by data 
analysis 
International Civil 
Aviation Organization 
(1991): 
Airport services 
manual part 3. Bird 
control and reduction 
!Birds !Regulator !ICAO Bird 
Strike Information 
System (IBIS) 
!Un-
known 
!World-
wide 
!World-
wide bird 
strike data 
is used, but 
the data are 
not 
assessed 
for their 
quality 
!Trend analysis 
!Development of 
recommendations 
for an airport bird 
strike control 
program 
!Causal factors 
!Recommenda-
tions for the 
development and 
implementation of 
a bird strike 
control program 
!High-level 
guidelines for the 
development of a bird 
strike control program 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!It remains unclear 
whether ICAO has 
done the data analysis 
or whether the 
document refers to the 
results of another 
study 
!Unknown where the 
causal factors come 
from 
Laty (1982):  
Birds on airports and 
the reason for their 
presence 
!Birds !Unknown !Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !Causal factors !Early study that 
provides already a 
comprehensive 
overview on the types 
of causal factors 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Unknown where the 
causal factors come 
from 
Manktelow (2000): 
The effect of local 
weather conditions on 
bird-aircraft collisions 
at British airports 
!Birds !Research 
institute 
!Bird strike data 
from MAFF32 
!Meteorological 
Office of England 
and Wales 
!1976-
1995 
!Nine 
airports 
in the 
United 
Kingdom 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Statistical 
analysis 
!Investigation of 
the role of 
weather 
!Detailed analysis of 
the role of weather 
conditions 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
 
Maragakis (2009): 
Bird population trends 
and their impact on 
aviation safety 1999-
!Birds !European 
Aviation 
Safety Agency 
(regulator) 
!Bird strike 
accident data from 
ICAO, UK CAA, 
and EURBASE33 
!1999-
2008 
!World-
wide 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis !Bird population 
trends 
!Bird population 
trends 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 MAFF - Central Science Laboratory of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and FOOD 
33 ICAO –International Civil Aviation Authority 
   UK CAA – UK Civil Aviation Authority 
    EURBASE – European military bird strike database!
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2008  
Nikolaidis and Koloka 
(2005): 
Bird strike in Hellas – 
Civil Aviation 
!Birds !Consultants !ICAO Bird 
Strike Information 
System (IBIS) 
!Airport data (not 
further specified) 
 !Until 
2004 
!Greece !Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis !List of causal 
factors 
!Outline of 
available dispersal 
methods and bird 
strike avoidance 
methods used in 
Greece 
!National overview 
on the bird strike 
situation in Greece 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
!Unknown where the 
causal factors come 
from 
Soldatini, et al. (2010): 
An ecological 
approach to birdstrike 
risk analysis 
!Birds !Academia !Survey (bird 
counts and 
observations) 
!Airport 
movement and 
bird strike data 
!2006-
2007 
!Venice 
Airport, 
Italy 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Observation of 
bird over a 2-year 
period 
!Statistical 
analysis 
!Birdstrike Risk 
Index (BRI)  
!Quantitative 
approach 
!BRI describes the 
risk on the basis of the 
actual presence of 
birds at airports 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Appropriateness of 
the statistical model 
(i.e. multiplication of 
factors) is not 
discussed) 
!Consideration of only 
species that have had a 
strike before 
Steele (2001):  
Factors influencing the 
incidence of bird-
strikes at Melbourne 
Airport 
!Birds !Academia !Survey (bird 
counts) 
!ATSB bird strike 
data 
!Airport 
movement data 
!BOM weather 
data34 
!1997-
2000 
!Mel-
bourne 
Airport, 
Australia 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed 
!Trend analysis 
!Tests for 
statistical 
associations 
!Identification of 
circumstantial 
factors 
!Description of 
temporal and 
operational factors 
that were present 
during bird strikes 
!Airport case study 
!Analysis of 
circumstances under 
which bird strikes 
most commonly occur 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
 
The European 
Organisation for the 
Safety of Air 
Navigation SKYbrary 
(2013a): 
Bird strike 
!Birds !Industry 
safety 
consortium 
!Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !N/A !Introduction to 
typical bird strike 
scenarios, 
including causes 
!Raises awareness in 
the industry 
!Limited scope (i.e. 
only birds) 
!Not data based 
!Overall, only a high-
level introduction to 
bird strikes 
Transport Canada 
(2002, 2010a): 
Sharing the skies 
(TP13549); Wildlife 
control procedures 
manual (TP11500) 
!Wildlife !Regulator !Not data based !1991-
1999 
!Canada, 
United 
States 
!Data 
quality is 
not 
discussed, 
but an 
under-
reporting 
of the data 
acknowled-
ged 
!Trend analysis 
!Development of 
recommendations 
for wildlife 
management 
!Bird population 
trends 
!Description of 
temporal and 
operational factors 
that were present 
during bird strikes 
!Recommenda-
tions for the 
development and 
!Detailed overview on 
the bird strike 
problem, bird control 
measures 
!Recommendations 
for all aviation 
stakeholders to 
mitigate bird strikes 
!High-level statistical 
descriptive analysis 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 ATSB – Australian Transport Safety Bureau 
   BOM – Bureau of Meteorology!
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implementation of 
a bird strike 
control program 
UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (2008a): 
CAP 772 Birdstrike 
risk management for 
aerodromes 
!Birds / 
wildlife 
!Regulator !Not data based !N/A !N/A !N/A !Development of 
guidelines for 
bird strike risk 
management for 
airports 
!Causal factors 
!Recommended 
practices for bird 
strike risk 
identification, 
reduction, and 
reporting 
!Recommendations 
for wildlife 
management 
!Not data-based 
!Unknown where the 
causal factors come 
from 
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1. Who can make a report?  
2. How does the underlying reporting form look like? May I have a copy? 
3. How are occurrences reported (e.g. electronic reporting form, per telephone, post, 
email)? 
4. Is some of the information captured automatically (i.e. automatic recordings)? 
5. Is some of the information captured through multiple sources? 
6. Is your database a primary database? If not, which of the original information goes 
into your database and what happens to the information that does not go into your 
database? How does the raw data look like? 
7. If your database is a secondary database, how is the information transferred from 
the primary data collection system to the secondary database (e.g. manually / 
automatic)? 
8. Does the database contain the original reports that people submitted or is it a 
summary report written by an investigator and / or analyst? 
9. How is the information processed? What happens after a report is received? 
10. Are you investigating every incident? If not, who is investigating and at what 
stage? 
11. How are incidents followed-up (e.g. feedback to the reporters), and what happens 
with the data (e.g. use for safety mitigation measures)? 
12. What kind of safety statistics / documents does your organisation produce? 
13. Do you report to somebody else apart from regulatory requirements (i.e. do you 
share your data with other organisations)? If yes, to whom? 
14. Within recent years, have there been any changes in the reporting system? 
15. Do you see any limitations in the reporting system, e.g. where could information 
get lost, and where could errors arise? 
16. If you could do anything to make the reporting system better, with no budget limits 
or time constraints, would you do anything? What would it be? 
17. What are the underlying definitions for your data? Have there been any changes? 
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Appendix IV: Evaluation of MCDA 
Techniques 
 
 
Chapter 6 developed a weighting scheme for safety databases based on MCDA. The 
choice of an appropriate MCDA method depends on the data input and assumption, the 
required output and methodological requirements. This appendix evaluates different 
MCDA methods for their applicability to the current decision problem. Elementary 
methods, single synthesising criteria methods, outranking and qualitative methods are 
evaluated. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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1 Elementary Methods 
 
Elementary methods reduce a complex problem to a singular basis and are suitable for single-decision makers with a few alternatives and 
criteria. Disadvantageous is that elementary methods do not necessarily weight the relative importance of criteria. In addition, they combine the 
criteria to produce an aggregate score. 
 
Table 1: MCDA - Elementary methods 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Elementary 
 
Method 
 
 
Weighted Sum Method 
(WSM) 
 
 
Weighted Product 
Method (WPM) 
 
Conjunctive Method 
 
Disjunctive Method 
 
Simple Dominance 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Rank & Choice Rank & Choice Classification & Choice Classification & Choice Choice (best solution) 
Quantitative output 
 ✓ ✓ 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed depending on 
input 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed depending on 
input 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed depending on 
input 
Output for all options 
 ✓ ✓ ! ! ! 
 
Input / Assumptions 
 
Data input (qualitative / 
quantitative / mixed) 
Discrete, however, 
qualitative data can be 
incorporated 
Discrete, however, 
qualitative data can be 
incorporated 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed possible 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed possible 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed possible 
Finite amount of options 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Static preferences 
 ✓ ✓ ! Threshold can change 
! 
Threshold can change 
✓ 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Certainty ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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Methodology 
 
Hierarchical model 
 ! ! ! ! ! 
Comparison to a reference 
system possible 
Can be incorporated during 
scoring 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring 
Reference system could 
be set as threshold 
Reference system could 
be set as threshold 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring 
Method of weighting 
 Direct Direct Direct Direct Direct 
Compensation of criteria  
 ✓ ✓ ! ! ! 
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Simplicity 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Description 
 
• Criteria are defined and weighted 
• Alternatives are scored on the 
criteria 
• Scores and weights are 
aggregated using an additive 
relationship assuming that the 
sum of all weighted criteria 
impacts on the solution 
• Criteria are defined and 
weighted 
• Alternatives are scored on 
the criteria 
• Scores and weights are 
aggregated using a 
multiplicity relationship 
• Minimal acceptance levels 
for each criterion are used to 
screen out unacceptable 
alternatives 
• All alternatives are 
considered 
• Alternatives that do not 
meet the minimal acceptable 
level for all criteria are 
rejected 
• Disjunctive method 
assumes no acceptable 
alternative at the beginning 
• Lower thresholds are 
specified for each criterion 
• Alternatives that meet the 
required criteria values are 
accepted 
• Method aims to identify a 
‘non-dominated’ solution  
• An alternative is dominant 
when it is better in at least 
one criterion without being 
worse in all other criteria 
• Pairwise comparison is used, 
the dominating solution is 
retained and compared to the 
next alternative until the best 
alternative is identified 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability 
 Applicable 
Applicable,  
however, multiplicity 
relationship seems 
inadequate 
Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
References 
 
 Garoufalia (2007); 
Guitouni and Martel (1998); 
Hwang and Yoon (1981); 
Wang, et al. (2009) 
Triantaphyllou and 
Sanchez (1997) 
Antunes and Dias 
(2012); Guitouni and 
Martel (1998); Hwang 
and Yoon (1981) 
Antunes and Dias 
(2012); Guitouni and 
Martel (1998); Hwang 
and Yoon (1981) 
Antunes and Dias 
(2012); Hwang and 
Yoon (1981) 
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Table 1: MCDA - Elementary methods - continued 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Elementary 
 
Method 
 
 
Maximin 
 
Maximax 
 
Lexicographic 
 
Linear assignment 
method 
 
 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Choice (best solution) Choice (best solution) Choice (best solution) Rank  
Quantitative output 
 
Quantitative, qualitative 
depending on input 
Quantitative, qualitative 
depending on input 
Quantitative, qualitative 
depending on input 
Quantitative, qualitative 
depending on input  
Output for all options 
 ! ! ✓ ✓  
 
Input / Assumption 
 
Data input (qualitative/ 
quantitative/ mixed) Quantitative, qualitative possible (all criteria must 
use a common scale) 
Quantitative, qualitative 
possible (all criteria 
must use a common 
scale) 
Quantitative, qualitative, 
mixed possible 
Quantitative, qualitative 
possible (all criteria 
must use a common 
scale) 
 
Finite amount of options 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Static preferences 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Certainty 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
 
Methodology 
 
Hierarchical model 
 ! ! ! ! 
 
Comparison to a reference 
system possible 
Can be incorporated during 
scoring 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring  
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Method of weighting 
 Direct Direct Direct Direct  
Compensation of criteria  ! ! ! ✓  
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ! ! ✓ ✓  
Simplicity 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Description 
 
• The performance of an option is 
determined on the basis of a 
single criterion 
• Method tries to maximise the 
poorest performing criteria 
• The weakest criterion for each 
alternative is identified 
• The alternative with the highest 
score on the weakest criterion is 
preferred 
• The performance of an 
option is determined on the 
basis of a single criterion 
• The best performing 
criterion is identified for 
each alternative 
• The alternative with the 
highest score on the best 
criterion is preferred 
 
• Criteria are weighted 
• The option with the highest 
score on the highest 
weighted criterion is 
preferred 
• All alternatives are ranked 
for each of the criteria 
• Alternatives with many 
high ranked criteria are 
ranked highest 
 
 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability 
 Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable  
References 
 Antunes and Dias (2012); Guitouni and Martel (1998); 
Hwang and Yoon (1981) 
Antunes and Dias 
(2012); Hwang and 
Yoon (1981) 
Antunes and Dias 
(2012); Guitouni and 
Martel (1998); Hwang 
and Yoon (1981) 
Hwang and Yoon (1981)  
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2 Single synthesising criteria methods 
 
Single synthesising criteria approaches seek to build a unique criterion taking into account all the relevant aspects of the decision problem. 
  
Table 2: Single synthesising criteria methods 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Single synthesising criteria 
 
Method 
 
 
Analytical Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) 
 
Multi Attribute Utility 
Theory (MAUT) 
 
Multi Attribute Value 
Theory (MAVT) 
 
Simple Multi Attribute 
Rating Technique 
(SMART) 
 
 
Utilities Additives 
(UTA) 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Rank & Choice Rank & Choice Rank & Choice Rank & Choice 
Underlying preference 
model for ranked data 
Quantitative output 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Output for all options 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ! Quant. value function 
 
Input / Assumptions 
 
Data input (qualitative / 
quantitative / mixed) Mixed data possible Mixed data possible Mixed data possible Mixed data possible 
Quantitative ranking of 
options 
Finite amount of options 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Static preferences 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n/a 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Certainty 
 ✓ ✓ SME-approach SME-approach ✓ 
 
Methodology 
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Hierarchical model 
 ✓ ✓ ! ✓  
Comparison to a reference 
system possible ! 
Can be incorporated 
during scoring ! ! ! 
Method of weighting 
 Pairwise comparison 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible n/a 
Compensation of criteria  
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ n/a 
Simplicity 
 ✓ ✓ 
Fair 
Stakeholder input to a 
large extent required 
Fair 
Good judgment needed No 
Description 
 
• Decision problem is modeled 
hierarchically 
• Criteria are weighted and 
alternatives are scored through 
pairwise comparison 
• Global priorities are calculated 
• User preferences are defined 
in relation to the criteria 
• User preferences and 
weighted scores are 
aggregated 
• MAUT selects the 
alternative that fulfills best 
user requirements 
• Similar to WSM, however 
MAVT uses SME 
preferences to score the 
alternatives on the options 
rather than actual 
performance  
• Similar to WSM, however 
SMART uses value 
functions rather than actual 
performance 
• During scoring the analyst 
assesses the value of an 
alternative on a criterion 
• UTA is a disaggregation-
aggregation approach 
• The decision is known and 
the ranking of options is 
given, the aim is to determine 
the underlying preference 
model 
• Assumes an underlying 
additive value function 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability 
 
Applicable, however not 
appropriate as the 
alternatives cannot be 
compared to a reference 
system 
Not appropriate as it 
evaluates alternatives 
according to user 
preferences 
Not appropriate as 
MAVT is based on SME 
preferences 
Not applicable, as a 
value function cannot be 
determined for the 
current problem 
Not applicable, as it 
decomposes the final 
ranking 
References 
 
Guitouni and Martel (1998); 
Ramanathan and 
Ramanathan (2010); Wang, 
et al. (2009) 
Dias and Antunes 
(2010); Schaefer (2001) 
Dias and Antunes 
(2010); Hostmann, et al. 
(2005) 
Kriwaczek (2011) Siskos, et al. (2005) 
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Table 2: Single synthesising criteria methods - continued 
 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Single synthesising 
criteria 
 
 
Method 
 
 
Technique for Order 
Preference by Similarity 
(TOPSIS) 
 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Rank & Choice 
Quantitative output 
 ✓ 
Output for all options 
 ✓ 
 
Input / Assumptions 
 
Data input (qualitative / 
quantitative / mixed) 
Quantitative, qualitative 
possible 
Finite amount of options 
 ✓ 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ 
Static preferences 
 ✓ 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ 
Certainty 
 ✓ 
 
Methodology 
 
Hierarchical model 
 ! 
Comparison to a reference 
system possible ✓ 
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Method of weighting 
 
Direct weighting 
Compensation of criteria  ✓ 
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ✓ 
Simplicity 
 Fair 
Description 
 
• TOPSIS aims to find the solution 
that is nearest to an ideal solution 
and furthest from a negative-ideal 
solution 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability 
 Applicable 
References 
 Jaditi, et al. (2010) 
 
Single synthesising criteria methods using fuzzy methods exist. Fuzzy logic can process incomplete data and finds an approximate solution. It 
deals with reasoning that is approximate rather than fixed/exact. As the current decision problem assumes certainty fuzzy methods are not 
considered (Figueira, et al., 2005). 
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3 Outranking 
 
Outranking methods are appropriate for complex choice problems with multiple criteria and multiple participants. Outranking indicates the 
degree of dominance of one alternative over another. Outranking methods are based on pairwise comparison and provide a preference ranking of 
alternatives, not a cardinal measure of preference relations. Outranking methods do not assume a certain functional form and can perform with 
incomplete value information. The aim of the current study is to measure how good each of the reporting systems performs in relation to an ideal 
system, rather than comparing the reporting systems against each other. Thus, outranking methods are excluded from this assessment, as they do 
not suit the underling problem (Figueira, et al., 2005). 
 
4 Qualitative methods 
 
This section evaluates qualitative MCDA methods. 
 
Table 3: MCDA – Qualitative methods 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Qualitative Methods 
 
Method 
 
 
QUALItative and FLEX 
ible assessment (Qualiflex) 
 
Regime 
 
Organisation, 
rangement et synthese 
de donnees 
relationnelles 
(ORESTE) 
 
 
Achieving Respect for 
Grades by Using 
ordinal Scales 
(ARGUS) 
 
Evaluation matrix 
(EVAMIX) 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Ranking & Choice Ranking & Choice Ranking & Choice Rank Ranking & Choice 
Quantitative output 
 Index Index Index ! Index 
Output for all options 
 
For all combinations of 
alternatives ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Input / Assumptions 
 
Data input (qualitative/ 
quantitative/ mixed) Qualitative (binary) Qualitative (binary) Qualitative (binary) Qualitative (ordinal) Mixed data is required 
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Finite amount of options 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Static preferences 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Certainty 
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Methodology 
 
Hierarchical model 
 ! ! ! ! ! 
Comparison to a reference 
system possible ! ! ! ! ! 
Method of weighting 
 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Different weighting 
methods possible 
Compensation of criteria  
 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Simplicity 
 
No 
(Computational 
requirements) 
No 
(Computational 
requirements) 
No 
(Computational 
requirements) 
Fair 
No 
(Computational 
requirements) 
Description 
 
• QUALIFLEX evaluates all 
possible rankings (permutations) 
of alternatives 
• Alternatives are pre-ordered 
• Using pairwise comparison 
QUALIFLEX computes a 
concordance index for each pair 
of alternatives 
• QUALIFLEX aims to maximise 
the value of these indices 
• REGIME is an ordinal 
generalisation of pairwise 
comparisons for binary data 
 
• Applicable to problems 
where the alternatives are 
ranked according to each 
criterion and the criteria are 
ranked according to their 
importance 
• Based on pairwise 
comparison 
• ARGUS uses ordinal values 
to express the intensity of 
preference between two 
alternatives 
• Based on pairwise 
comparison 
• Separate concordance indices 
are constructed for 
qualitative and quantitative 
criteria 
• Overall dominance measure 
for an alternative is 
determined as the sum of the 
weighted indices 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable Not applicable 
References Figueira, et al. (2005) Figueira, et al. (2005) Figueira, et al. (2005) Figueira, et al. (2005) Figueira, et al. (2005) 
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Table 3: MCDA – Qualitative methods - continued 
 
 
 
Class of methods 
 
 
Qualitative Methods 
 
Method 
 
 
DEX 
 
Measuring 
attractiveness by a 
categorical based 
evaluation technique 
(MACBETH) 
 
 
Output 
 
Solution (Rank / Choice / 
Classification / Description) Description Rank & Choice 
Quantitative output 
 ! ✓ 
Output for all options 
 ✓ ✓ 
 
Input / Assumptions 
 
Data input (qualitative / 
quantitative / mixed) Qualitative 
Designed for qualitative 
data, but mixed possible 
Finite amount of options 
 ✓ ✓ 
Predefined set of alternatives 
 ✓ ✓ 
Static preferences 
 ✓ ✓ 
Independence of options and 
criteria ✓ ✓ 
Certainty 
 ✓ ✓ 
 
Methodology 
 
Hierarchical model 
 ✓ ✓ 
Comparison to a reference Can be incorporated during ! 
Appendix IV: Evaluation of MCDA Techniques 
! "#$!
system possible scoring 
Method of weighting 
 
Different weighting 
methods possible Direct weighting 
Compensation of criteria  
 ✓ ✓ 
Methodology takes all criteria 
into acc. ✓ ✓ 
Simplicity 
 ✓ ✓ 
Description 
 
• DEX provides a visual 
representation of the scoring of 
alternatives on the criteria 
• MACBETH measures 
attractiveness between 
alternatives (i.e. which 
alternative is more attractive 
and what is the distance 
between the options) 
• Based on pairwise 
comparison 
 
Overall evaluation 
 
Applicability 
 Not appropriate, as only 
graphical output 
Not appropriate, as the 
alternatives cannot be 
compared to a reference 
system 
References 
 Rozman, et al. (2009) Joerin, et al. (2010) 
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Table 1: Top five airports with the highest occurrence rates per region U.S. 
 
 
Airport1 
 
Region 
 
Normalised number of 
incursions 
 
 
Total movements 2005-
2009 
1 U.S. Northeast 8.64 196,771 
2 U.S. Northeast 7.10 436,339 
3 U.S. Northeast 4.29 933,455 
4 U.S. Northeast 3.69 1,976,749 
5 U.S. Northeast 3.46 491,337 
1 U.S. Mountain Region 49.31 2,028 
2 U.S. Mountain Region 8.71 218,107 
3 U.S. Mountain Region 7.44 215,142 
4 U.S. Mountain Region 5.81 154,983 
5 U.S. Mountain Region 4.77 419,716 
1 U.S. Southwest 6.47 648,994 
2 U.S. Southwest 5.67 511,838 
3 U.S. Southwest 4.60 239,288 
4 U.S. Southwest 4.15 433,507 
5 U.S. Southwest 3.85 285,825 
1 U.S. Western-Pacific 7.64 982,250 
2 U.S. Western-Pacific 7.59 65,910 
3 U.S. Western-Pacific 6.89 420,670 
4 U.S. Western-Pacific 5.22 230,008 
5 U.S. Western-Pacific 4.79 772,259 
1 For sensitivity reasons the airports are de-identified. 
 
Table 2: Descriptives operations U.S. Northeast, Mountain Region, Southwest, Western-
Pacific 
 
 
Region 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
U.S. Northeast 624,595.96 535,334.95 122,591 2,516,410 
U.S. Mountain Region 582,939.26 582,979.37 2,028 3,034,827 
U.S. Southwest 577,444.66 579,850.49 136,708 3,401,728 
U.S. Western-Pacific 836,899.109 601,792.65 135,380 3,155,674 
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Table 3: Causal factors (Level 3) U.S. per stakeholder 
 
 
Causal factor 
 
Responsibility 
 
Database 
 
 
RI 
Database 
 
 
AIDS 
 
SHEBBA 
1 Aircraft operations 
   1 Aircraft - Technical Airline, 
Engineers, 
Aircraft 
manufacturer, 
Ground-
handling 
   
      111 Aircraft technical failure 0.65% 28%  
      112 Aircraft weight and balance  0.36%  
      113 Master caution warning    
      114 Aircraft design/manufacturing    
      115 Aircraft improper maintenance  0.55%  
      116 Environmental influences  0.18%  
   12 Pilot - Human Pilot    
      121 Resources  0.18%  
      122 Competence 1.24% 5.09%  
      123 Communication 15.17%   
      124 Situational awareness 4.20%   
      125 Human-machine interface 0.11%   
      126 Human reliability 45.89% 41.27%  
      127 Team operations 0.04% 0.55%  
      128 Procedures 1.39%   
2 ATC 
   21 ATC - Technical ANSP, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
0.06%   
      211 Surveillance system    
      212 Navigation system    
      213 Communication system    
      214 Equipment design/manufacturing    
      215 Equipment improper maintenance    
   22 ATC - Human ATC    
      221 Resources 0.06%   
      222 Competence 0.02%   
      226 Communication 1.85%   
      223 Situational awareness 1.78%   
      224 Human-machine interface 0.02%   
      225 Human reliability 3.74% 0.18%  
      227 Team operations 1.22%   
      228 Procedures 0.08%   
3 Airport operations 
   31 Airport – Technical Airport 
authority, 
Ground-
handling, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
0.04%   
      311 Vehicle technical failure    
      312 Radio communication    
      313 Absence of radar beacon    
      314 Ground handling equipment   3.78 
      315 Tugs    
      316 Airport meteorological equipment    
      317 Vehicle/equipment design/manufacturing    
      318 Vehicle/equipment improper maintenance    
      319 Other 0.04%   
   32 V/PD - Human V/PD, 
Airport 
authority 
   
      321 Resources 0.02%  7.55% 
      322 Competence 0.04%  1.89% 
      326 Communication 1.62   
      323 Situational awareness 0.06%   
      324 Human-machine interface    
      325 Human reliability 20.14%  64.12% 
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      327 Team operations 0.06%  1.89% 
      328 Airport management 0.04%   
      329 Airport operations 0.04%   
      330 Procedures 0.02%  1.89% 
    33 Airport - Physical Airport 
authority, 
Airport 
planner 
   
      331 Airport design 0.13% 0.18% 1.89% 
      332 Surface infrastructure and conditions 0.09% 10.73% 13.21% 
4 Environment 
   41 Weather External 
influences 
   
      411 Winds  11.64%  
      412 Turbulence/Wake vortex 0.02%   
      413 Insufficient visual reference/low visibility  
             conditions 
0.11%   
      414 Snow/Ice  1.09%  
      415 Rain/aquaplaning   1.89% 
      416 Nice weather    
      417 Other    
   42 Geological disturbances    
   43 Night time operations    
   44 Wildlife    
   45 External factors   1.89 
5 Regulatory system Regulator    
 
Legend: 
> 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 10.0 and 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 5.0 and 10.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
< 5.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Table 4: Top five airports with the highest occurrence rates per organisation UK 
 
 
Stakeholder / 
airport1 
 
Region 
 
Normalised number of 
occurrences** 
 
 
Total movements 2005-
2009 
       UK CAA* 
1 UK 48.72 22,579 
2 UK 36.41 10,985 
3 UK 30.07 23,277 
4 UK 21.67 18,808 
5 UK 20.09 139,379 
          easyJet 
1 Europe 203.80 1,472 
2 Europe 59.45 3,364 
3 Africa 86.28 1,159 
4 Africa 63.85 1,566 
5 Europe 59.74 1,674 
1 For sensitivity reasons the airports are de-identified. 
*Considers only the 50 airports for which movement data was available 
** Excluding wildlife 
 
 
Table 5: Descriptives operations UK 
 
 
Organisation 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
UK CAA 114,651.42 149,363.41 4,016 921,216 
easyJet 34,212.54 37,063.57 3 173,891 
 
!
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Table 6: Causal factors (Level 3) UK per stakeholder 
 
 
Causal factor 
 
Responsibility 
 
Database 
 
 
MORS 
 
 
AQD 
 
SHEBBA 
1 Aircraft operations 
   1 Aircraft - Technical Airline, 
Engineers, 
Aircraft 
manufacturer, 
Ground-
handling 
5.99%   
      111 Aircraft technical failure    
      112 Aircraft weight and balance 0.21%   
      113 Master caution warning    
      114 Aircraft design/manufacturing 0.15%   
      115 Aircraft improper maintenance 0.05%   
      116 Environmental influences    
   12 Pilot - Human Pilot    
      121 Resources 0.31% 1.33%  
      122 Competence 2.53% 0.44%  
      123 Communication 7.90% 4.87%  
      124 Situational awareness 4.13% 13.72%  
      125 Human-machine interface    
      126 Human reliability 49.15% 29.20% 2.04% 
      127 Team operations 0.05%   
      128 Procedures 0.52%   
2 ATC 
   21 ATC - Technical ANSP, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
   
      211 Surveillance system    
      212 Navigation system    
      213 Communication system 0.05% 0.44%  
      214 Equipment design/manufacturing    
      215 Equipment improper maintenance    
   22 ATC - Human ATC    
      221 Resources 0.26%   
      222 Competence 0.15%   
      226 Communication 1.34% 2.65%  
      223 Situational awareness 1.60%   
      224 Human-machine interface    
      225 Human reliability 1.24% 3.10%  
      227 Team operations 0.10%   
      228 Procedures 0.21%   
3 Airport operations 
   31 Airport - Technical Airport 
authority, 
Ground-
handling, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
   
      311Vehicle technical failure    
      312 Radio communication 0.36% 0.44%  
      313 Absence of a radar beacon    
      314 Ground handling equipment   1.02% 
      315 Tugs    
      316 Airport meteorological equipment    
      317 Vehicle/equipment design/manufacturing    
      318 Vehicle/equipment improper maintenance    
      319 Other    
   32 V/PD - Human V/PD, 
Airport 
authority 
   
      321 Resources 0.05%  2.04% 
      322 Competence 0.26%   
      326 Communication 0.77%   
      323 Situational awareness 1.14% 0.44% 1.02% 
      324 Human-machine interface 0.15%   
      325 Human reliability 9.09% 1.77% 54.08% 
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      327 Team operations 0.21%  1.02% 
      328 Airport management 0.05% 0.44%  
      329 Airport operations    
      330 Procedures 0.41%   
    33 Airport - Physical Airport 
authority, 
Airport 
planner 
   
      331 Airport design  2.21%  
      332 Surface infrastructure and conditions 5.22% 33.67% 33.67% 
4 Environment 
   41 Weather External 
influences 
   
      411 Winds 3.41%  4.08% 
      412 Turbulence/Wake vortex 0.46%   
      413 Insufficient visual reference/low visibility  
             conditions 
1.45% 0.88%  
      414 Snow/Ice 0.72%   
      415 Rain/aquaplaning 0.41%   
      416 Nice weather    
      416 Other    
   42 Geological disturbances 0.05%   
   43 Night time operations    
   44 Wildlife  4.4%  
   45 External factors   1.02 
5 Regulatory system Regulator 0.05%   
!
Legend: 
> 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 10.0 and 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 5.0 and 10.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
< 5.0 % of causal factors fall into this category 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Table 7: Top five airports with the highest occurrence rates per organisation – Norway 
 
 
Stakeholder / 
airport1 
 
Region 
 
Normalised number of 
occurrences* 
 
 
Total movements 2005-
2009 
    CAA-Norway 
1 Norway 138.67 10,817 
2 Norway 129.84 24,646 
3 Norway 90.81 6,607 
4 Norway 94.07 10,630 
5 Norway 60.89 26,277 
    Avinor-ANSP 
1 Norway 259.38 9,253 
2 Norway 94.07 10,630 
3 Norway 105.95 6,607 
4 Norway 64.71 10,817 
5 Norway 63.82 9,402 
  Avinor-Airports  
1 Norway 110.94 10,817 
2 Norway 77.09 24,646 
3 Norway 68.50 26,277 
4 Norway 59.59 43,629 
5 Norway 54.98 7,275 
            OSL 
1 Oslo 30.22 675,080 
1 For sensitivity reasons the airports are de-identified. 
* Excluding wildlife  !!
Table 8: Descriptives operations Norway 
 
 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Deviation 
 
Minimum 
 
Maximum 
CAA-Norway 52,176.04 108,882.14 3,546 675,080 
Avinor-ANSP 100,017.10 153,297.19 6,607 675,080 
Avinor-Aiports 39,246.10 61,546.79 3,546 284,078 
OSL 675,080 675,080 675,080 675,080 
!
!
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Table 9: Causal factors (Level 3) Norway per stakeholder 
 
 
Causal factor 
 
Responsi-
bility 
 
Database 
 
E
C
C
A
IR
S 
 
M
E
SY
S 
(A
T
C
) 
 
M
E
SY
S 
(A
ir
-p
or
ts
) 
IF
S 
A
Q
D
 
Se
nt
in
el
 
1 Aircraft operations 
   1 Aircraft - Technical Airline, 
Engineers, 
Aircraft 
manufac-
turer, 
Ground-
handling 
      
      111 Technical failure 1.82% 0.80% 0.24% 1.38% 1.04%  
      112 Aircraft weight and balance 0.13%  0.24%    
      113 Master caution warning   0.24%  1.04%  
      114 Aircraft design/manufacturing       
      115 Aircraft improper maintenance    0.34%   
      116 Environmental influences       
   12 Pilot - Human Pilot       
      121 Resources 0.39% 0.16%   6.25% 7.69% 
      122 Competence 1.04% 0.80%     
      123 Communication 2.73% 6.87%  37.42
% 
4.17% 19.23
% 
      124 Situational awareness 2.73% 3.19%  1.03% 11.46
% 
9.62% 
      125 Human-machine interface 0.39% 0.16%   6.25%  
      126 Human reliability 23.87
% 
38.65
% 
8.21% 0.74% 45.82
% 
46.15 
% 
      127 Team operations     3.13%  
      128 Procedures  0.16%    7.69% 
2 ATC 
   21 ATC - Technical ANSP, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufac-
turer 
      
      211 Surveillance system  0.16%     
      212 Navigation system       
      213 Communication system       
      214 Equipment design/  
             manufacturing 
      
      215 Equipment improper  
             maintenance 
      
   22 ATC - Human ATC       
      221 Resources 0.26% 0.32%     
      222 Competence 0.39% 0.48%  0.34%   
      226 Communication 1.43% 2.72% 1.74% 1.38% 4.17% 9.62% 
      223 Situational awareness 1.43% 3.35% 0.24% 2.76%   
      224 Human-machine interface       
      225 Human reliability 1.30% 1.76% 0.49% 2.07% 5.21%  
      227 Team operations 0.26% 0.16% 0.49% 0.34%   
      228 Procedures  0.16% 0.24%  1.04%  
3 Airport operations 
   31 Airport– Technical Airport 
authority, 
Ground-
handling, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufac-
turer 
      
      311 Vehicle technical failure 0.26% 0.32%     
      312 Radio communication 0.78% 1.92% 0.75% 0.34%   
      313 Absence of a radar beacon       
      314 Ground handling equipment    0.34%   
      315 Tugs  0.16%     
      316 Aerodrome meteorological  
             equipment 
      
      317 Vehicle/equipment design/           
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             manufacturing 
      318 Vehicle/equipment improper  
             maintenance 
      
      317 Other       
   32 V/PD - Human V/PD, 
Airport 
authority 
      
      321 Resources 1.43% 0.16% 1.49%  1.04%  
      322 Competence 0.65% 0.80% 1.99% 0.74%   
      326 Communication 2.99% 3.83% 1.99% 2.76%   
      323 Situational awareness 0.13% 2.24% 0.49% 0.74%   
      324 Human-machine interface 0.26% 0.32%     
      325 Human reliability 22.02
% 
19.80
% 
18.76
% 
19.65
% 
3.13%  
      327 Team operations 0.97% 0.48% 1.24% 1.03%   
      328 Airport management  0.16% 0.49% 0.74%   
      329 Airport operations 9.22% 1.12% 10.45
% 
2.76% 1.04  
      330 Procedures 0.39% 0.48% 2.23% 0.34%   
    33 Airport Physical Airport 
authority, 
Airport 
planner 
      
      331 Airport design 0.91% 1.60% 3.23% 2.76% 1.04%  
      332 Surface infrastructure and  
             conditions 
17.66
% 
6.07% 42.78
% 
18.97
% 
3.13%  
4 Environment 
   41 Weather External 
influences 
      
      411 Winds 1.30% 0.48% 0.49%    
      412 Turbulence/Wake vortex       
      413 Insufficient visual reference/ 
             low visibility conditions 
0.26% 0.16%     
      414 Snow/Ice 0.65%  0.49% 1.03%   
      415 Rain/aquaplaning       
      416 Nice weather       
      417 Other       
   42 Geological disturbances       
   43 Night time operations 0.13%      
   44 Wildlife   0.24%    
   45 External factors 1.82%  1%  1.04  
5 Regulatory system Regulator       
  
Legend: 
> 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 10.0 and 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 5.0 and 10.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
< 5.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
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Table 10: Causal factors (Level 3) NZ 
 
 
Causal factor 
 
Responsibility 
 
Database 
 
 
ASMS 
 
1 Aircraft operations 
   1 Aircraft - Technical Airline, 
Engineers, 
Aircraft 
manufacturer, 
Ground-
handling 
2.69% 
      111 Aircraft technical failure  
      112 Aircraft weight and balance    
      113 Master caution warning 0.21% 
      114 Aircraft design/manufacturing  
      115 Aircraft improper maintenance  
      116 Environmental influences  
   12 Pilot - Human Pilot  
      121 Resources 1.24% 
      122 Competence 2.69% 
      123 Communication 5.17% 
      124 Situational awareness 7.85% 
      125 Human-machine interface 1.03% 
      126 Human reliability 44.17% 
      127 Team operations 1.03% 
      128 Procedures 0.21% 
2 ATC 
   21 ATC - Technical ANSP, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
 
      211 Surveillance system  
      212 Navigation system  
      213 Communication system  
      214 Equipment design/manufacturing  
      215 Equipment improper maintenance  
   22 ATC - Human ATC  
      221 Resources  
      222 Competence 0.62% 
      226 Communication 1.45% 
      223 Situational awareness 6.41% 
      224 Human-machine interface 0.21% 
      225 Human reliability 10.74% 
      227 Team operations 0.62% 
      228 Procedures 0.41% 
3 Airport operations 
   31 Airport – Technical Airport 
authority, 
Ground-
handling, 
Engineers, 
Equipment 
manufacturer 
 
      311 Vehicle technical failure  
      312 Radio communication  
      313 Absence of a radar beacon  
      314 Ground handling equipment  
      315 Tugs  
      316 Airport meteorological equipment  
      317 Vehicle/equipment design/manufacturing  
      318 Vehicle/equipment improper maintenance  
      319 Other  
   32 V/PD - Human V/PD, 
Airport 
authority 
 
      321 Resources 0.21% 
      322 Competence 0.21% 
      326 Communication 0.83% 
      323 Situational awareness  
      324 Human-machine interface  
      325 Human reliability 2.89% 
      327 Team operations  
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      328 Airport management 0.41% 
      329 Airport operations 0.62% 
      330 Procedures 0.21% 
    33 Airport - Physical Airport 
authority, 
Airport 
planner 
 
      331 Airport design 0.21% 
      332 Surface infrastructure and conditions 3.51% 
4 Environment 
   41 Weather External 
influences 
 
      411 Winds 3.31% 
      412 Turbulence/Wake vortex  
      413 Insufficient visual reference/low visibility  
             conditions 
0.21% 
      414 Snow/Ice 0.21% 
      415 Rain/aquaplaning 0.41% 
      416 Nice weather  
      417 Other  
   42 Geological disturbances  
   43 Night time operations  
   44 Wildlife  
   45 External factors   
5 Regulatory system Regulator  
!
Legend: 
> 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 10.0 and 20.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
Between 5.0 and 10.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
< 5.0% of causal factors fall into this category 
!
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1 Aircraft operations 
11 Aircraft - Technical  
111 Aircraft technical failure 
1111 Engine / power plants 
 11111 Engine 
  111111 Poor acceleration 
 11112 Thrust reverser 
1112 Landing gear and breaking system 
 11121 Tires and wheels 
111211 Brakes 
111212 Anti-skid system 
111213 Oleo strut 
 11122 Nose gear steering system 
111221 Missing 
111222 Malfunction 
1113 Airframe 
11131 Canopy 
 111311 Malfunction 
111312 Flew off 
11132 Doors 
11133 Storage room hatch 
11134 Windscreen 
1114 Flight controls 
11141 Wing 
111411 Flaps 
111412 Spoiler 
111413 Ailerons 
11142 Tail 
11143 Rudder 
1115 Air condition pressuring system 
1116 Electrical system 
1117 Hydraulic system 
1118 Fuel system 
1119 Avionics 
11110 Navigation devices 
11111 Computer system 
111111 In-flight system (e.g. FMS) 
111112 Airspeed indicator 
 11112 Automation system (e.g. autopilot) 
11113 Communications system 
111131 No radio 
111132 No headset used 
111133 Stuck microphone 
111134 Poor radio contact 
111135 Transmission completely or partially blocked 
111136 Double transmission 
11114 Cabin 
111141 Technical problems in cabin 
11115 Other 
 111151 Seats 
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 111152 New technologies are not available to pilots 
112 Aircraft weight and balance 
1121 Fuel 
11211 Forgotten 
11212 Not enough 
1122 Cargo 
11221 Side load 
1123 People 
113 Master caution warning 
114 Aircraft design / manufacturing 
1141 Design short comings 
1142 Necessary changes rejected by aircraft manufacturers due to costs 
considerations 
1143 Lack of appropriate operational and performance information for operators 
that accounts for the spectrum of runway conditions they might experience 
1144 Outdated technology 
11441 Technology being ten years behind 
11442 Technology not available to pilots 
1145 Manufacturing defect 
1246 Other 
115 Aircraft improper maintenance 
1151 Maintenance not conducted 
1152 Inappropriate manintenance 
11521 Failure not detected 
 1153 Engine ground run 
 1154 Other 
116 Environmental influences 
1161 Engine bird ingestion 
1162 Other 
117 Other 
 
12 Pilot - Human 
121 Resources 
1211 Multi-tasking job 
1212 Workload 
1213 Pressure 
12131 To be on time / not to loose a slot 
12132 By being already delayed 
12133 By other crew members 
12134 By semi-annual check 
1214 Fatigue 
1215 Medical conditions 
 12151 Flying although feeling sick 
1216 Other 
122 Competence 
1221 Training 
 12211 Insufficient 
12212 In-flight training on going 
1222 Inexperience 
 12221 First time flying into a controlled airport 
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1223 Pilot certification 
12231 Missing 
12232 Not renewed 
12233 Maintenance engineer taxies the aircraft 
1224 Other 
123 Communication 
1231 Contact establishment 
12311 Pilot missed ATC calls 
12312 Pilot failed to contact ATC when required 
123121 No initial contact to ATC to ask for clearance (pilot never 
contacted ATC) 
123122 Pilot failed to contact ATC as required after an initial 
contact had been made (pilot was in contact with ATC but failed to 
report as required) 
123123 Pilot failed to inform ATC when he/she could not comply 
with a clearance 
123124 Pilot did not advise ATC of a delay on the runway prior to 
take-off 
12313 Use of incorrect frequency 
123131 Pilot did not switch to the right frequency / frequency 
confusion 
123132 Pilot did not know the frequency of the concerned airport 
1232 Phraseology 
 12321 Non-English language 
12322 Non-standard ICAO phraseology 
12323 Articulation  
123231 Poorly enunciated / heavily accented 
123232 Rapidly spoken 
1233 Communication process 
12331 Pilot statements to ATC 
 123311 Incorrect statement 
 123312 Incorrect position report 
12332 Instructions from ATC and other parties 
123321 Misunderstanding of ATC instructions 
123322 Acceptance of ATC instructions for another party / call sign 
confusion 
1233221 Aircraft 
1233222 V/PD 
123323 Acceptance of instructions from a party other than ATC 
1233231 Pilot following the instructions of another pilot 
from another aircraft 
12333 Read back 
123331 Incorrect 
123332 Only reading back part of the instructions 
123333 Not conform to the issued clearance 
123334 Correct, followed by an unauthorized manoeuvre 
123335 No read back 
12334 Clarifications 
123341 Not asking for clarifications when pilot did not understand 
ATC instructions 
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123342 Not asking for clarification when pilot realized ATC 
instructions are wrong / ambiguous 
123343 Not asking for clarification when pilot is unsure about 
something (in general) 
  12335 Other 
124 Situational awareness 
1241 Flight operations 
12411 Forgetting / confusion 
124111 Clearances 
1241111 Forgetting to ask for clearance 
1241112 Forgetting a clearance the pilot had received 
1241113 Forgetting part of a clearance the pilot had received 
1241114 Confusion / unsureness about a clearance the pilot 
had received 
124112 Airport operating mode 
1241121 Pilot thought the tower was closed 
1241122 Pilot thought the tower would be open when it was 
closed 
1241123 Pilot thought the airport is uncontrolled 
1241124 Pilot expected another type of CAT operations (e.g. 
CAT I instead of III) 
1241125 Pilot not being aware about a closed runway 
   124113 Other 
12412 Distraction 
124121 Head down task 
1241211 Checklist 
1241212 FMGS 
1241213 Due to a technical problem 
124122 No sterile flight deck 
 1241221 Coordination with cabin crew 
1241222 Announcements to passengers 
124123 Conversations in cockpit 
124124 Concentration / focusing 
124125 By another aircraft 
124126 First officer training 
124127 License validation check 
124128 Medical emergencies in the cabin 
124129 Other 
12413 Inattention 
1242 ATC 
12421 Last minute changes of 
 124211 Taxi routes 
 124212 Departure / arrival runway 
124213 SID / STAR 
12422 Use of non-standard taxi routes 
12423 ATC using non-English language with other aircraft, which affects 
the situational awareness of the concerned crew 
12424 Other  
1243 Airport  
12431 Familiarity 
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 124311 Familiar 
  1243111 Complacency 
1243112 Pilot had flown the same route already several 
times and assumed ATC would give him the same taxi route 
as used previously 
124312 Unfamiliar 
1243121 Temporary layout changes of the manoeuvring area 
1243122 New layout configuration (permanently) 
1243123 Difficulties to identify the displaced threshold 
1243124 Holding point expected in another location 
12432 Disorientation 
 124321 Pilot landed / departed 
  1243211 On a wrong runway 
1243212 From a taxiway 
  1243213 On the wrong airport 
  1243214 On a closed airport 
124322 Pilot confused runway edge lights with centerline lights and 
tried to depart along the edge 
124323 Pilot confused a taxiway with a runway 
124324 Crew orientated themselves on what another aircraft did and 
thought it would apply for them as well 
12433 Airport charts 
124331 Missing / not using 
124332 Inaccurate / out of date / information missing 
124333 Up to date charts, but crew uses old ones 
124334 Unreadable 
124335 Ambiguous statements on charts / confusing charts 
12434 ATIS 
124341 Pilot did not listen to ATIS 
124342 Misunderstanding of ATIS 
124343 NOTAM 
1243431 Pilot did not read the NOTAM 
1243432 Misunderstanding of NOTAM  
12435 Other 
1244 Aircraft 
 12441 Unfamiliarity 
 12442 Other 
1245 Personal  
12451 Daydreaming / mind on other things / taking personal problems to 
work  
12452 Other 
 1246 Other 
125 Human-machine interface 
1251 Incorrect selection on instruments 
1252 Radio 
12521 Radio switched off 
12522 Pilot turned down the volume of the radio 
12523 Pilot did not plug in his headset properly 
1253 Other 
12531 Use of nosewheel-steering tiller at airspeeds that are too fast 
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12532 Failure to arm ground spoilers 
12533 Pilot inadvertently applied pressure to the ruder pedals 
12534 Pilot did not push prop control 
126 Human reliability 
1261 Planning 
12611 Inadequate aircraft check 
12612 Improper planning of ground operations 
12613 Aircraft weight calculation error 
12614 Taxi route not briefed 
12615 Improper checklist use 
12616 Other 
1262 Action 
12621 With clearance 
 126211 Slow / delayed action 
126212 Non-compliance with ATC instructions / clearances 
  1262121 Willful 
12622 Without clearance 
126221 Pushback  
126222 Taxiing 
1262221 Entering area without clearance 
  12622211 Runway 
  12622212 Taxiway / taxi error 
12622213 Pilot used the manoeuvring area before the 
airport was open 
 1262222 Not stopping at the required position 
  12622221 In front of a runway (hold line) 
  12622222 On a taxiway 
126223 Take-off 
126224 Landing 
126225 Other  
   1262251 Pilot simply followed another aircraft 
  126226 Non-flight related 
1262261 Pilot wanted to pick up things on the 
runway/taxiway (e.g. signage / FOD) 
 1263 Execution 
12632 Taxi phase 
126321 Pilot started taxiing while handling crew was still on the 
taxiway and not clear of the aircraft 
126322 Pilot did not check whether the area is clear of obstacles and 
other traffic 
126323 Taxi speed too high 
126324 Pilot did not break in time 
126325 Inappropriate use of power / jet blast 
126326 Inappropriate turns 
 1263261 Turn too wide 
 1263262 No turn 
 1263263 Aircraft slides during turn 
1263264 During a turn on the taxiway a wing infringed the 
adjacent runway 
1263265 Pilot cutting corners 
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126327 Pilot taxied around another aircraft / vehicle that blocked the 
taxiway 
126328 Aircraft route deviation / excursion 
1263281 Pilot leaving the taxiway and going straight to the 
destination (e.g. over grassland) 
1263282 Aircraft leaving the paved surface with one wheel 
1263283 Deviation from centerline 
1263284 Loss of control during taxiing 
126329 Aircraft collision 
 1263291 With equipment/infrastructure 
 1263292 With another aircraft 
1263210 Other 
12633 Take-off 
 126331 Directional control 
 126332 Thrust asymmetry 
 126333 Rotation 
  1263331 No rotation 
  1263332 Before VR35 
 126334 Ground loop 
126335 Unable to take-off within available / remaining runway 
length 
 126336 Rejected take-off 
  1263361 Initiated at a speed greater than V136 
  1263362 Before V1 is reached 
  1263363 Not considered 
 126337 Loss of control in take-off 
 126338 Brakes mistakenly applied 
 126339 Loss of control over rudder pedals 
1263310 Pilot did not check whether the area is clear of obstacles or 
other traffic 
 1263311 Pilot failed to detect the changing wind/weather conditions 
 1263312 Other 
12634 In-flight 
 126341 Pilot failed to detect the changing wind/weather conditions 
 126342 Loss of control in flight 
 126343 Other 
12635 Approach / landing 
 126351 Directional control 
 126352 Unstabilized approach/landing 
  1263521 Approach 
12635211 Path/glide slope deviation 
12635212 Fast 
12635213 High 
12635214 Below safe attitude 
12635215 Sudden sink during short final 
12635216 Incorrect assessment of landing distance / 
required runway length !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 VR is the rotation speed 
36 V1 is the decision speed, i.e. the maximum speed at which a rejected take-off can be initiated in the event 
of an emergency (Airbus, 2004d)!
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12635217 Go-around not conducted 
12635218 Forgetting to extend landing gear 
12635219 Pilot technique inappropriate for prevailing 
meteorological conditions 
 126352191 In crosswinds 
 126352192 Downwind landings 
126352110 Pilot raised flaps on short final 
126352111 Inappropriate speed control 
126352112 Rudder control 
1263521121 Too much rudder control / 
excessive use / overcompensation 
1263521122 Application of wrong rudder  
1263521123 Loss of rudder control 
126352113 Inappropriate flare 
126352114 Aircraft struck object on final approach 
126352115 Other 
  1263522 Landing / touchdown 
   12635221 Long 
12635222 Fast 
12635223 Hard 
12635224 Bouncing 
12635225 Off-centre 
12635226 Short  
12635227 Failure to observe a reasonable distance to 
land behind another aircraft 
12635228 Tail / propeller / other aircraft parts strike 
12635229 Other 
126353 After touchdown 
1263531 Incorrect perception of speed 
1263532 Late / incorrect use of thrust reverser 
1263533 Braking 
 12635331 Inappropriate 
126353311 Too excessive 
126353312 Late 
126353313 Auto-break use not adequate 
126353314 Pilot could not reach the breaks 
12635332 Ineffective 
126353321 Due to runway contamination 
126353322 Other 
1263534 Pilot does not vacate the runway quickly enough 
1263535 Aircraft could not vacate runway completely due to 
other traffic in front of the aircraft 
1263536 High-speed acceleration stop manoeuvre 
1263537 Pilot overreaction 
12635371 In general 
12635372 While trying to overcome the tendency of 
the aircraft to veer 
12635373 Oversteering 
1263538 Aircraft route deviation / excursion 
12635381 Deviation from runway 
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12635382 Pilot allowed aircraft to veer 
12635383 Aircraft became off-centre 
12635384 Pilot allowed nose to veer to one side (one 
wing dropped) 
12635385 Ground loop 
12635386 Loss of control on runway 
 126353861 Due to another aircraft still being 
on the runway 
12635387 Loss of control during runway exit 
12635388 Pilot could not stop in the remaining 
runway distance 
12635389 Aircraft became disabled in runway safety 
area 
    1263539 Other 
12636 Pilot misperception / misjudgment 
126361 Incorrect assumptions concerning clearances (pilot being 
sure about a clearance that was not issued) 
1263611 Pilot believed to have the same clearance as a 
couple of days before 
1263612 Pilot assumed that a prior issued clearance is still 
valid 
1263613 Misinterpretation - Pilot gets VFR clearance and 
assumes he/she got departure clearance 
1263614 Pilot did not realize a condition in the clearance 
126362 Pilot did not expect holding point in this position 
126363 Misinterpretation / misjudgment of distances at the airport 
126364 Misjudgment of distance to a landing aircraft 
126365 Pilot not aware of the implications of a reduced runway 
length  
126366 Underestimation of runway downslope 
126367 Misjudgment of breaking coefficient 
126368 Pilot expected to get another parking position and taxi route 
126369 Pilot misunderstood the intentions of another aircraft 
1264 Other 
12641 Pilot did not want to pay landing fees 
127 Team operations 
1271 Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
1272 Improper Cross check / Coordination 
1273 Inadequate pilot-in-command supervision of first officer 
1274 Flight instructor – student 
 12741 Student pilot misunderstanding of flight instructors instructions 
 12742 Non-compliance with flight instructors instructions 
1275 Other 
128 Procedures 
1281 Inadequacy 
12811 Necessary instructions are not in the pilots handbook / flight manual 
contained poor instructions 
12812 Aircraft manufacturer did not promulgate adequate procedures 
1282 Misapplication 
 12821 Non-compliance 
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12822 Misunderstanding 
1283 Other 
 
2 ATC 
21 ATC - Technical 
211 Surveillance system  
2111 Not existent 
2112 Total failure 
2113 Inconsistent signal 
212 Navigation system 
213 Communication system 
2131 Communication breakdown 
 21311 ATC – Aircraft 
 21312 ATC – V/PD 
2132 Stuck microphone 
2133 Transmission completely or partially blocked 
2134 Double transmission 
214 Equipment design / manufacturing 
2141 Inadequate equipment design 
21411 Integration of different systems 
215 Equipment improper maintenance 
216 Other 
 
22 ATC - Human 
221 Resources 
2211 Complex task / multi-tasking job 
2212 Workload 
22121 Lack of vigilance, inattentiveness, and boredom during periods of 
low workload 
2213 Time pressure 
2214 Fatigue 
2215 Tower staffing problem / shortage of ATC 
2216 Other 
222 Competences 
2221 Training 
 22211 Insufficient training 
 22212 Trainee not confident enough to challenge the air crew 
2222 Inexperience 
2223 Other 
223 Communication 
2231 Phraseology 
22311 Non-English language 
22312 Non-standard ICAO phraseology 
22313 Articulation 
223131 Over complex, rapidly spoken 
223132 Ambiguous 
223133 Badly enunciated 
223134 Different accents 
22314 Omission of one or more steps 
22315 Issue to a wrong party  
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223151 Aircraft 
223152 V/PD 
22316 Other 
2232 Communication process 
22321 Instructions / statements received by ATC 
 223211 Misunderstanding 
22322 Read back 
223221 ATC acknowledgment (of the read back of another party) 
2232211 Incorrect 
2232212 Not conform to the requested clearance/subject 
2232213 No acknowledgment 
2232214 Other 
223222 Read back from another party (pilot / V/PD) 
2232221 ATC did not ensure that the read back conforms to 
the clearance issued 
2232222 ATC did not correct errors in a received read back 
2232223 ATC did not obtain read back at all 
2232224 ATC thought the read back is correct while it was 
incorrect 
22323 Clarifications 
223231 Not asking for clarification when ATC id not understand the 
pilot / V/PD 
 22324 Other 
2233 Other 
22331 Misperception of information ATC issues 
223311 Misperception of clearance content / ATC believing it 
issued another clearance 
22332 Misperception of information ATC receives 
223321 Misperception of message content / ATC believing pilot / 
V/PD said something he did not say 
22333 Busy communications with a lot of coordination 
22334 Use of similar call signs 
22335 Frequencies  
223351 Use of multiple frequencies leading to confusion 
223352 Busy frequencies / frequency congestion 
223353 More than 1 ATC position combined on 1 frequency 
224 Situational awareness 
2241 ATC operations 
22411 Forgetting / confusion 
224111 ATC forgetting aircraft position 
2241111 On approach to land 
2241112 That an aircraft had already landed 
2241113 On runway 
2241114 On taxiway 
224112 ATC forgetting V/PD position 
2241121 On runway 
2241122 On taxiway 
224113 ATC forgetting clearance 
2241131 To issue a clearance 
2241132 That a clearance has been issued 
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 22411321 To take-off 
22411322 To land 
22411323 For crossing 
224113231 A runway 
224113232 A taxiway 
2241133 Limits of the issued clearance 
224114 ATC forgetting closures 
2241141 Of a runway 
2241142 Of a taxiway 
 224115 Confusion of two aircraft/vehicles 
224116 Other 
22412 Distraction 
224121 Traffic processing 
 2241211 Inputting flight data 
 2241212 Coordination over the telephone 
2241213 On-the job training 
2241214 Handover 
224122 Duties other than traffic processing 
2241221 Operational 
22412211 Weather observations and recording 
22412212 Telephone calls 
22412213 Other 
2241222 Non-operational 
22412221 Conversations 
22412222 Telephone calls 
22412223 Reading material 
22412224 Visitors in the tower 
22412225 Administrative duties 
22412226 Other 
22413 Inattention 
2242 Airport 
22421 ATC not aware of recent configuration changes (runway / taxiway) 
22422 View on the manoeuvring area from ATC tower 
224221 Limited view from ATC tower 
224222 Lack of visual scanning 
2242221 Lack of visual scanning, because ATC monitors the 
cameras that allow him / her to see parts of the manoeuvring 
area that are not visible from the tower 
  22423 Other 
2243 Personal 
22431 Daydreaming / mind on other things / taking personal problems to 
work 
22432 Bad relationships with colleagues 
22433 ATC attitude / behavior  
22434 Other 
2244 Other 
225 Human-machine interface 
2251 Misused equipment 
2252 Other 
226 Human reliability 
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2261 Non, or inaccurate provision of information 
22611 ATC services 
 226111 ATC not in tower, doing a break 
22612 Wind weather information 
226121 Not in time 
226122 Not accurate 
22613 Runway condition information 
226131 Not in time 
226132 Not accurate 
22614 Information of work on the manoeuvring area 
22615 Taxi routes 
226151 No use of standard taxi routes 
226152 No use of progressive taxi instructions 
22616 Information about safety challenging situations 
22617 ATIS not up to date 
22618 Other 
2262 Incorrect / inadequate instructions / clearances 
22621 For take-off 
22622 For approach / landing 
226221 Failure to descent the aircraft appropriately 
226222 Failure to allow aircraft the appropriate approach speed 
226223 Issuing clearance to land on a runway although another 
runway would have been preferential  
2262231 Breaking coefficient 
2262232 Wind 
2262233 Runway length 
22623 Wrong instructions issued 
22624 Last minute changes of instructions 
 226241 Taxi routes 
226242 Departure / arrival runway 
 226243 SID / STAR 
22625 Clearance to use inappropriate / unsafe surfaces 
22626 Clearance given too early 
22627 Conflicting clearances 
22628 Conditional clearance  
 226281 With wrong condition 
226282 Given too early 
22629 Line up clearance that requires an aircraft to hold on the runway for 
more than 90sec 
226210 Clearance given to a bunch of vehicles 
226211 ATC giving instructions during high periods of workload (e.g. short 
final) 
226212 Other 
2263 Misidentification/misjudgment 
22631 Position (Aircraft / V/PD) 
22632 Miscalculation of the required separation 
22633 Misinterpretation / misjudgment of the aircraft performance 
22634 Misjudgment of timings that led to a situation that was too tight 
2264 Other 
22641 ATC did not check if the aircraft had effectively cleared the runway 
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22642 ATC not using flight strips 
22643 Mishandling of flight strips 
22644 Mishandling of traffic lights 
22645 ATC gives the pilot a hard time when requesting Marshalls 
227 Team operations 
2271 Inadequate teamwork 
22711 Coordination 
22712 Handover 
22713 Issue of conflicting clearances 
2272 Supervision 
22721 Inadequate supervision 
22722 Absence of a supervisor in the tower when situation required one 
2273 One controller covering more than one position 
2274 Other 
228 Procedures 
2281 No procedures in place 
 22811 No standard taxi practices exist 
2282 Inadequacy 
22821 Inadequate clearance procedures 
22822 ATC agreement between 2 airports was not documented properly 
22823 Provision of taxi routes to the pilots only after the aircraft touched 
down 
2283 Misapplication 
22831 Non-compliance 
228311 Willful 
228312 Not willful 
22832 Misunderstanding 
2284 Other 
 
3 Airport operations 
31 Airport - Technical 
311 Vehicle technical failure 
312 Radio communications 
 3121 No radio 
3122 Radio technical failure 
3123 Discharged battery 
 3124 Poor radio contact 
 3125 Stuck microphone 
3126 Double transmissions 
 3127 Two airports turning into each other’s frequencies 
 3128 Communication problems due to new equipment 
313 Absence of radar beacon on the vehicle 
314 Ground handling equipment (cargo dollies, baggage carts, etc.)  
 3141 Locking device – equipment breaking loose 
315 Tugs 
3151 Tug connecting element – aircraft got disconnected 
316 Airport meteorological equipment 
317 Vehicle / equipment design / manufacturing 
318 Vehicle / equipment improper maintenance 
319 Other 
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32 V/PD - Human 
321 Resources 
3211 Workload  
3212 Fatigue 
3213 Medical conditions 
3214 Work attitude 
32141 Ambition 
 321411 Eagerness to solve a safety-challenging situation 
321412 Wanting to be efficient / proceeding with a new task 
 321412 Helpful / wanting to help colleagues 
3215 Other 
322 Competences 
3221 Training 
32211 No training 
32212 In-training (e.g. flying school) 
32213 Inadequate training 
3222 Inexperience 
3223 Other 
323 Communications 
3231 Communication V/PD with ATC 
32311 Contact establishment 
323111 V/PD missed ATC calls 
3231111 Person physically too far away from the radio 
323112 V/PD failed to contact ATC when required 
3231121 No initial contact to ATC to ask for clearance 
(V/PD never contacted ATC) 
3231122 V/PD failed to contact ATC as required after an 
initial contact had been made (V/PD was in contact with 
ATC but failed to report as required) 
3231123 Not contacting ATC immediately after a vehicle 
technical problem occurred 
323113 V/PD use of incorrect frequency / frequency confusion 
323114 V/PD contacts tower, but does not await a reply 
32312 Phraseology 
323121 Non-English language 
323122 Non-standard ICAO phraseology 
323123 Articulation 
32313 Communication process 
323131 V/PD statements to ATC 
 3231311 Incorrect statement 
 3231312 Incorrect position report 
323132 Instructions from ATC 
3231321 Misunderstanding 
3231322 Acceptance of instruction for another party / call 
sign confusion 
32313221 V/PD 
32313222 Aircraft 
323133 Read-back 
3231331 Incorrect 
3231332 Not conform to the issued clearance 
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3231333 Correct, followed by an unauthorized manoeuvre 
3231334 No read back 
323134 Clarifications 
3231341 Not asking for clarification when V/PD did not 
understand ATC instructions 
3231342 Not asking for clarification when V/PD realized 
ATC instructions are wrong/ambiguous 
   323135 Other 
3232 Communication V/PD with pilot 
3233 Communication between V/PDs 
32331 Miscommunication between escort vehicle and following vehicle 
324 Situational awareness 
3241 V/PD operations 
32411 Forgetting / confusion 
 324111 V/PD forgetting details / limits of a clearance 
 324112 V/PD confused an escort vehicle with another car 
324113 V/PD thought the tower is closed 
324114 V/PD thought a runway / taxiway is closed 
324115 Other 
32412 Distraction 
324121 Current work 
324122 V/PD watching / focusing on other aircraft/V/PD  
324123 Monitoring more than one frequency 
324124 Mobile phone 
324125 Noise level 
324126 Other 
32413 Inattention 
3242 Airport 
32421 Unfamiliarity 
32422 Disorientation 
32423 Lack of knowledge  
324231 About aerodrome signs and markings 
324232 Where safety area starts 
32424 Airport charts 
324241 Missing/not using 
324242 Inaccurate/out of date 
32425 Not referring to the current NOTAM 
32426 Other 
3243 Personal 
32431 Daydreaming / mind on other things / taking personal problems to 
work  
32432 Other 
3244 Other 
325 Human-machine interface 
 325 Radio 
3251Radio switched off 
3252 V/PD turned radio off / to a lower volume after initial communication 
with ATC 
 326 Other 
326 Human reliability 
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3261 Action 
32611 Action with clearance 
326111 Slow / delayed action 
326112 Non-compliance with ATC instructions 
32612 Action without clearance 
326121 Incorrect parking 
3261211 Parking on the line that separates apron and 
manoeuvring area 
3261212 Blocked clearway 
3261213 Obstacle for landing aircraft 
3261214 Handling equipment parked inappropriately 
326122 Pushback 
3261221 Pushback without clearance 
3261222 Long pushback / pushback on taxiway 
326123 Taxiing 
3261231 Entering area without clearance 
32612311 Runway 
32612312 Taxiway 
32612313 Manoeuvring area – unknown 
3261232 Not stopping at the required position on runway / 
taxiway (e.g. hold line, stop bar) 
 326124 Pedestrians / bicyclists 
3261241 Unintended penetration of the manoeuvring area 
32612411 Person unaware that access to the 
manoeuvring area is not allowed 
32612412 Person assuming that entering the 
manoeuvring area is allowed after the tower is closed 
32612413 Person running out to make pictures of a 
landing aircraft 
32612414 Aircraft maintenance crew entering 
manoeuvring area 
3261242 Willful penetration of the manoeuvring area 
3262 Execution 
32621 Groundhandling 
326211 Operator started ground handling while engines still running 
326212 Aircraft being insufficient secured and starting to roll 
326213 Incooperative groundhandling personnel 
326214 Other 
32622 V/PD driving style 
326221 V/PD disregarded traffic rules 
326222 V/PD did not give way to preceding traffic 
326223 V/PD overtaking slower vehicles and infringing the 
manoeuvring area 
326224 V/PD driving too close to other traffic 
326225 V/PD driving too fast 
326226 V/PD ignoring runway/taxiway signs 
326227 V/PD cutting corners 
326228 V/PD avoiding action (not to collide with other traffic) 
326229 Other 
  32623 V/PD route deviation / excursion 
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326231 Loss of control over vehicle 
326232 V/PD hits airfield infrastructure during surface operations 
32624 V/PD Misperception / misjudgment 
326241 V/PD assumed a promise for a future clearance is 
automatically a clearance 
326242 V/PD acts according to an old clearance assuming it is still 
valid 
326243 V/PD expected that he got the clearance he requested and 
failed to notice that he had received another clearance 
326244 V/PD expected ATC would know the route he was taking 
326245 Other 
32625 Other 
327 Team operations 
3271 Authorised airfield escort 
32711 Escort did not ensure that all V/PD vacated the runway when 
confirming to ATC 
32712 Escort did not obtain clearance for all vehicles under his/her 
responsibility 
32713 Escort did not ensure that all cleared vehicles are together, some 
vehicles running behind 
32714 V/PD simply followed an authorized escort without having clearance 
3272 Inadequate supervision 
32721 V/PD not being adequately briefed at shift start  
3273 Operational personnel not following supervisor’s instructions 
3274 Missing communication between two team members 
3275 Other 
328 Procedures 
3281 Inadequate procedures 
32811 Airport operator published unsafe procedures / inadequate guidelines 
in place 
32812 Outside airport opening hours procedures 
32813 Procedures for construction / maintenance work 
32814 Winter maintenance procedures 
32815 Emergency procedures 
32816 Push-back procedures 
32817 Procedures for free range operations 
3282 Inadequate implementation - New procedures not being passed on to the 
relevant personnel 
3283 Procedures were not changed after a problem had been discovered 
3284 V/PD not following procedures 
3285 Capacity enhancing procedures 
3286 Other 
329 Airport management 
3291 Inappropriate obstacle assessment 
3292 No or inadequate risk assessment for procedural and/or infrastructural 
changes 
3293 No clear decision and communication whether a taxiway belongs to the apron 
or manoeuvring area and a clearance is required 
3294 Lack of communication and coordination between two parties at the airport 
3295 Security 
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32951 Fencing 
 329511 Inappropriate/defect 
3295111 For animals - animals jumping over fences, coming 
through holes in fences 
3295112 For people – people jumping over fences, children 
crawling underneath, etc. 
 329512 Snowed under 
32952 Airport security gate 
  329521 Open 
  329522 Faulty 
93743 Perimeter road not adequately secured 
 3296 Other 
3210 Airport operations 
32101 Runway operations 
321011 Multiple runway operations 
3210111 Crossing 
3210112 Closely spaced parallel 
321012 Runways used as taxiways 
321013 Aircraft must backtrack on runway 
321014 Runway operated at reduced length 
321015 Runway not closed when conditions dictated 
321016 Failure to allow use of wind-preferential runway  
32102 NOTAM 
321021 Runway closure not advised by NOTAM 
321022 Work on the manoeuvring area not advised by NOTAM 
32103 Information about temporary work areas not adequately disseminated 
32104 Provision of incorrect surface condition information deliberately 
32104 New temporary tower in operation 
32105 Maintenance / construction work 
 321051 Improper maintenance 
  3210511 Maintenance personnel forgetting tools, etc. 
  3210512 Maintenance personnel working sloppily 
  3210513 Use of inadequate materials  
32105131 Use of wrong materials, because correct ones were 
out of stock 
   32105132 Bad quality supplies 
321052 Poor housekeeping 
 3210521 Deterioration of infrastructure 
 3210522 Inadequate inspections / audits 
 3210523 Irregular inspections / audits 
32106 Surface inspection / FOD removal 
32107 Snow removal 
32108 Grass cutting 
32109 Emergency vehicles in operation / emergency exercise 
321010 Wildlife management 
3210101 Shooting 
321011 Low visibility procedures 
321012 Towing 
321013 Technical help for an aircraft that broke down 
321014 Aircraft marshaled incorrectly 
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321015 Training exercise 
321016 Security 
3210161 Security inspection (e.g. fencing) 
3210162 No security measures in place after they had been requested 
3210163 Visitors left unattended 
321017 Traffic 
 3210171 Traffic volume 
3210172 Traffic mix 
 3210173 Unexpected traffic (e.g. emergency / ambulance flights) 
321018 Other 
 
33 Airport - Physical 
331 Design 
3311 Airport location and surrounding land use 
33111 Forest and vegetation 
33112 Residential areas 
33113 Industry 
33114 Landfill / waste / composting facilities 
33115 Agriculture / fields 
331151 Crops 
331152 Livestock 
 33116 Water sources 
33117 Fishing 
33118 Entertainment facilities 
33119 Other 
3312 Airport landscaping 
33121 Water sources 
33122 Grassland 
33123 Bushes / trees 
33124 Wildlife shelter 
33125 Other 
3313 Manoeuvring area design 
33131 Complex runway / taxiway layout 
331311 Rapid exit taxiway 
331312 Angled intersections to enter the runway 
331313 Insufficient spacing between parallel runways 
331314 Intersecting runways 
331315 Crossing of multiple active runways necessary to get to the 
desired destination 
33132 Unusual layout 
33133 Hotspot 
33134 Runway-specific design 
331341 Runway surface construction and slope 
331342 Inadequate runway safety areas 
33135 Apron design 
331351 Insufficient spaces for the operations 
33136 Construction area 
331361 Temporary layout changes 
331362 Temporary signs / markings are inadequate 
331363 Work in progress (WIP) limits the view from the tower 
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331364 Barriers to mark WIP are too close to a runway / taxiway 
331365 New permanent manoeuvring area configuration 
 33137 Other 
332 Surface infrastructure and conditions 
3321 Runway 
33211 Lighting 
332111 Not provided 
332112 Inadequate / confusing 
332113 Not working / not in use 
332114 Timer function switches on stop bars automatically after 90 
seconds  
33212 Markings / Signage 
332121 Not provided 
332122 Inadequate / Non-ICAO compliant 
332123 Confusing 
332124 With snow covered / difficult to see 
332125 Hold line not visible from cockpit 
332126 Not well maintained (e.g. erased lines, signs unreadable) 
332127 Signs in unusual position 
332128 Markings are poorly lit 
332129 Irregular spaced 
3321210 Recent changes 
33213 Approach / landing aid 
33214 Surface conditions 
332141 Contamination 
332142 Slippery runway 
332143 Concrete cracks, dips, humps, ruts in runway 
332144 FOD 
3321441 Wildlife remains 
3321442 Vehicles / equipment operating on the surface 
3321443 Construction debris 
3321444 Tools / small parts (e.g. screws) 
3321445 Concrete, asphalt, joint filler (pavement) 
3321446 Runway infrastructure (e.g. lights) 
3321447 Personal belongings of passengers and employees 
3321448 Aircraft parts 
33214481 Wheels/tire 
33214482 Engine 
33214483 Door / hatch 
33214484 Window 
33214485 Canopy 
33214486 Communication antenna 
33214487 Other aircraft parts 
3321449 Environmental (e.g. gravel, sand, stones, parts of 
trees) 
33214410 Other parts / debris on the runway 
332144101 Baggage tags, loading documents, other 
paper 
332144102 Plastics / packing materials 
332144103 Garbage / rubbish bags 
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332144104 Glass 
332144105 Bags / luggage / freight 
332144106 Handling equipment (e.g. chocks, cones, 
ULD container) 
332144107 Rubber 
332144108 External (pieces not found at an airport, 
e.g. graveyard lights, golf balls) 
332145 Other 
33215 Other 
3322 Taxiway 
33221 Lighting 
332211 Not provided 
332212 Inadequate / confusing 
332213 Not working / not in use 
33222 Markings/signage 
332221 Not provided 
332222 Inadequate / non-ICAO compliant 
332223 Confusing 
332224 With snow and ice covered 
332225 Other 
33223 Surface conditions 
332231 Contamination 
332232 Slippery taxiway 
332233 Concrete cracks, dips, humps, ruts in runway 
332234 FOD 
3322341 Wildlife remains 
3322342 Vehicles / equipment operating on the surface 
3322343 Construction debris 
3322344 Tools / small parts (e.g. screws) 
3322345 Concrete, asphalt, joint filler (pavement) 
3322346 Runway infrastructure (e.g. lights) 
3322347 Personal belongings of passengers and employees 
3322348 Aircraft parts 
3322349 Environmental (e.g. gravel, sand, stones, parts of 
trees) 
33223410 Other parts / debris on the runway 
332234101 Baggage tags, loading documents, other 
paper 
332234102 Plastics / packing materials 
332234103 Garbage / rubbish bag 
332234104 Glass 
332234105 Bags / luggage / freight 
332234106 Handling equipment (e.g. chocks, cones, 
ULD container) 
332234107 Rubber 
332234108 External (pieces not found at an airport, 
e.g. graveyard lights, golf balls) 
332235 Other 
33224 Other 
3323 Manoeuvring area 
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33231 Limits of the manoeuvring area not visible due to snow and ice 
 
4 Environment 
41 Weather 
411 Winds 
 4111 Wind sheer / gusts / other winds 
 4112 Cross winds 
 4113 Thunderstorm 
 4114 Tailwind 
412 Turbulences/wake vortex 
 4121 Turbulence 
4122 Wake vortex 
413 Insufficient visual reference/low visibility conditions 
 4131 Reflecting sun 
 4132 Fog/haze 
414 Snow / ice 
415 Rain / aquaplaning 
416 Nice weather 
417 Other 
42 Geological disturbances 
43 Nighttime operations 
44 Wildlife 
441 Wildlife dragging FOD on the manoeuvring area 
45 External factors 
451 Human 
 4511 People feeding birds 
 4512 Mentally sick person  
 4513 Other people (pedestrians, children, etc.) 
 4514 Passenger 
  45141 Passenger chasing lost items 
  45142 Crazy passenger 
452 Other 
 
5 Regulatory system 
51 Regulations not existent 
52 Regulations inadequate 
53 Regulations existent, but not implemented 
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Airport Characteristics Questionnaire 
 
Dear Sir/Madam,  
 
I am a Ph.D. research student in the department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at 
Imperial College London and I am trying to develop a new categorisation of airports, based 
upon certain factors related to safety. I want to investigate the impact of different airport 
characteristics (e.g. airfield geometry, equipment, operations) on the occurrence of 
accidents and incidents on the airport surface (manoeuvring area) by correlating these 
characteristics to safety data. Based upon that information a new airport categorisation will 
be proposed.  
 
This questionnaire survey is aimed at gathering some of the information about the different 
airport characteristics that might impact on surface safety. Other characteristics, such as 
e.g. airfield geometry, are investigated using data provided by the FAA. The FAA also 
provided accident and incident data.  
 
Such an airport categorisation in terms of safety would benefit airports by providing a tool 
kit that allows classification of airports into different safety-critical categories, in order to 
provide recommendations on how to improve the safety level for each of the categories. 
 
I hope you will take a few minutes to complete the enclosed questionnaire. The 
questionnaire is designed to include only aspects that should be easy to determine for any 
airport operator, as otherwise such a categorisation would never be used. The questionnaire 
should not take longer than 10 minutes to complete. 
 
The questionnaire is created in Microsoft® Word. It is my intention to enable you to fill it 
out electronically and directly send it back to me by using the following e-mail address 
s.wilke09@imperial.ac.uk.  
 
Please be assured that your responses will be held in the strictest confidence. I am 
interested in identifying clusters of airports and to describe their characteristics rather than 
determining the safety level of individual airports. If the results of this study are used for 
publication, no identifying information will be used. 
 
Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
                                                                                         Sincerely, 
                                                                                            
      Sabine Wilke 
      Imperial College London    
      Department of Civil Engineering 
      Centre for Transport Studies 
      Skempton Building, Room 609 
      London SW7 2 AZ 
      s.wilke09@imperial.ac.uk 
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Airport Characteristics Questionnaire 
 
Airport name: ……………………………………… 
ICAO identifier: …………………………………… 
 
 
1. Traffic characteristics 
 
! Primary type of traffic handled at your airport. Please specify by choosing ONE of 
the following options: 
! Civil aviation, please specify further: 
! Scheduled air transport 
!  International 
! Domestic > 2000 km  (distance at your discretion) 
! Domestic < 2000 km  (distance at your discretion) 
! General Aviation (GA) 
!  International 
! Domestic > 2000 km  (distance at your discretion) 
! Domestic < 2000 km  (distance at your discretion) 
! Military. 
! Peak number of operations during peak hours. Please specify: 37 
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
! Number of airlines that have their main base at the airport. Please specify: 
………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
2. Equipment and installations: 
 
! In your opinion, are there situations when your landing system (e.g. precision 
approach system / non-precision approach system / visual approach) does not 
adequately support the operations based upon them? Please specify: 38 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Please specify the maximum number of operations (arrivals and departures together) your airport handles 
during peak hours. 
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! Yes 
! No 
 
3. Visual aids for navigation (signage, markings, lighting): 
 
! In your opinion, are there situations when the visual aids for navigation do not 
adequately support the operations based upon them? Please specify: 39 
! Yes 
! No 
! Have there been reports / complaints about confusing visual navigation aids?  
Please specify: 
! Lighting system: 
  ! Yes 
  ! No 
 If yes, how many reports have been made within the last 5 years? 
   ! Less than 10 
   ! 10 to 30 
   ! More than 30  
! Markings: 
  ! Yes 
  ! No 
If yes, how many reports have been made within the last 5 years? 
  ! Less than 10 
  ! 10 to 30 
  ! More than 30  
! Signage: 
  ! Yes 
  ! No 
 If yes, how many reports have been made within the last 5 years? 
   ! Less than 10 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 This question refers to the adequacy of your equipment, for instance, is your ILS sufficient for the 
operations it is supposed to support (e.g. your airport is equipped with ILS category I, but you would need a 
higher category in order to operate appropriately). 
39 This question refers to the adequacy of your visual aids for navigation.!
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   ! 10 to 30 
   ! More than 30  
 
4. Operations / maintenance 
 
! Are subcontractors working on the manoeuvring area? Please specify: 40 
! Yes 
! No 
! How often are runway condition checks undertaken? Please specify: 
Every …………… hours.  
! How is the manoeuvring area operated?  
! Are runways used as taxiways and under what conditions? Please specify: 
! Yes 
! No  
If yes, is it a standard procedure? 
! Yes 
! No  
! Do vehicle drivers need clearance to operate on the manoeuvring area? 
Please specify: 
! Yes, all of them 
! Yes, some of them 
! No  
! Are all vehicles that have access to the manoeuvring area equipped with 
radio communication? Please specify: 
! Yes, all of them 
! Yes, some of them 
! No  
! How often does construction / maintenance work on the manoeuvring area take 
place? Please specify by choosing one of the following options: 
! Weekly 
! Monthly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Subcontractors refer to all operational personnel that have access to the manoeuvring area (e.g. vehicle 
drivers, construction workers). 
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! Every 2 - 3 month 
! Every 4 - 6 month 
! More than 6 month 
 
5. Regulations  
 
! Do you engage in pro-active safety assessments apart from the regulatory 
requirements (e.g. Part 139 Airport Certification)? Please specify: 
! Yes 
! No 
 
6. Human aspects  
 
! In your opinion, do you have the right level of staffing to run the airside operations 
of your airport? Please specify: 41 
! Yes 
! Under-staffed 
! Over-staffed 
! In your opinion, is your operational staffs adequately trained? Please specify: 
! Yes 
! No 
! If applicable, do you think your subcontractors are adequately trained? Please 
specify: 
! Yes 
! No 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to answer these questions. Your time and participation are 
greatly appreciated. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 The question refers to the operational personnel that run the airfield (e.g. operational, maintenance, safety 
staffs). 
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1 Analysis at the Aggregate Level  
 
The following sections contain the results for the data analyses conducted at the aggregated level (i.e. U.S., UK, NO, NZ aggregated). 
 
1.1 Normality Tests  
 
The continuous variables were tested for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for samples > 50, and the Shapiro-Wilk test for samples 
< 50. If the test statistic is significant (p < .05) then the data is non-normal. Table 1 shows the results of the normality tests for the aggregated 
data (U.S., UK, Norway, NZ). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 1: Normality tests – aggregated data 
 
 
Variable 
 
Complete data set 
 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Test 
 
Shapiro-Wilk Test 
 
Statistic 
 
Sig. Statistic Sig. 
Number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) .350 .000 .423 .000 
Number of excursions (per 100,000 movements) .348 .000 .438 .000 
Number of FOD (per 100,000 movements) .342 .000 .532 .000 
Average annual movements .211 .000 .788 .000 
Altitude .294 .000 .521 .000 
Peak number of operations .193 .000 .757 .000 
Number of runways .263 .000 .781 .000 
Number of taxiway segments .228 .000 .790 .000 
Number of Type 2 conflict points .124 0.45 .947 .023 
Number of Type 3 conflict points .241 .000 .792 .000 
Number of Type 4 conflict points .268 .000 .739 .000 
Number of Type 5 conflict points .315 .000 .513 .000 
Number of Type 6 conflict points .486 .000 .280 .000 
Number of Type 7 conflict points .538 .000 .195 .000 
Number of Type 8 conflict points .536 .000 .122 .000 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY .427 .000 .470 .000 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY .232 .000 .775 .000 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY .215 .000 .809 .000 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  .215 .000 .809 .000 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  .216 .000 .797 .000 
Number of communication channels .153 .004 .922 .002 
Number of frequencies .173 .001 .894 .000 
 
On an aggregated level, the tested variables are non-normal. 
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1.2 Data Homogeneity Tests 
 
The data was tested for homogeneity and its consequent potential for aggregation. The appropriate statistical tests have been introduced in 
Chapter 10 section 10.2.10.4. Table 2 contains the test statistics based upon the complete data set (including outliers). Variables that could be 
aggregated (p > .05) across countries are highlighted in grey. 
 
Table 2: Homogeneity tests 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
All 4 countries aggregated 
 
North America vs. Europe 
 
Norway vs. UK 
Number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) H (3) = 35.47, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 21.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 47.00, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of excursions (per 100,000 movements) H (3) = 20.18, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 178.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 57.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of FOD (per 100,000 movements) H (3) = 20.81, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 94.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 72.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Critical factors (Taxonomy level 1) X2 = 303.83, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 96.64, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 181.55, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Average annual movements H (3) = 32.01, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 44.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 29.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Altitude H (3) = 2.74, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 207.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 81.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations H (3) = 28.77, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 29.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 33.00, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of runways H (3) = 28.09, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 50.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 91.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments H (3) = 26.80, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 51.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 64.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points H (3) = 27.43, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 49.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 64.00, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points H (3) = 24.34, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 63.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 65.00, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points H (3) = 29.30, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 36.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 77.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points H (3) = 13.52, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 133.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 90.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points H (3) = 4.40, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 240.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 96.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 7 conflict points H (3) = 1.23, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 279.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 104.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 8 conflict points H (3) = 2.71, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 275.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 104.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY H (3) = 10.73, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 169.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 110.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY H (3) = 26.62, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 48.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 71.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY H (3) = 25.51, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 53.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 76.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  H (3) = 26.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 51.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 73.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  H (3) = 26.66, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 49.50, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 69.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels H (3) = 36.57, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 8.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 39.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of frequencies H (3) = 33.90, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 94.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment X2 = 8.15, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = .004, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .536, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of visual aids X2 = 16.07, p (2-tailed) < .001 a X2 = .111, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .905, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
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Complaints about lighting X2 = 4.14, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .647, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.36, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about marking X2 = 1.89, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .126, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .914, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about signage X2 = 7.04, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .051, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 2.12, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work X2 = 32.18, p (2-tailed) < .001 a X2 = 7.26, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 12.40, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Subcontractors working on the airfield X2 = 1.49, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .085, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .871, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers X2 = 11.53, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = .056, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 10.44, p (2-tailed) < .001 a 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication X2 = 25.46, p (2-tailed) < .001 a X2 = 7.06, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 2.45, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Number of runway condition checks H (3) = 19.70, p (2-tailed) < .001 a U = 90.00, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 90.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways X2 = 13.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 5.61, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 6.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments X2 = 8.03, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 2.78, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 3.87, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations X2 = 4.60, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 3.61, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .238, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel X2 = 1.77, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.61, p (2-tailed) > .05 a Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  X2 = 6.32, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 3.64, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.04, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a The Pearson Chi-Square test assumptions are violated. 
 
At the aggregated level, the majority of variables are heterogeneous and therefore not comparable between the countries. Some variables were 
found to be comparable. However, the statistical test assumptions for most of these tests are not fulfilled invalidating the results.  
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1.3 Associations Between Airport Characteristics and Incursion Rates  
 
At the aggregated level the data was tested for associations between the number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) and the collected airport 
characteristics. The Pearson’s and Spearman’s Correlation Coefficients, Mann-Whitney U Test, Kruskal-Wallis Test, and the Pearson Chi-
Square Test were applied as specified in Chapter 10 section 10.2.10.4. Table 3 contains the test statistics and significant test statistics (p < .05) 
are highlighted in grey. 
 
Table 3: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
Average annual movements rS = -.670**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Altitude rS = -.135, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = -.627**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of runways rS = -.562**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of taxiway segments rS = -.567**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = -.496**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = -.541**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = -.585**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = -.354**, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = -.218, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = -.017, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 8 conflict points rS = .107, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.246, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = -.552**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = -.535**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = -.551**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = -.570**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of communication channels rS = -.675**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of frequencies rS = -.619**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Adequacy of equipment U = 108.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = 72.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(2) = .885, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = .235, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = .398, p (2-tailed) >.05 
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Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(4) = 26.90*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 138.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = .136, p (2-tailed) >.05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(2) = 7.99* p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = -.370*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = 5.47, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 99.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = 1.41, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = 72.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
     **. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
     *. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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At a national level the continuous variables were tested for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test for samples < 50. If the test statistic is 
significant (p < .05) then the data is not normally distributed. Table 4 contains the results. Normal distributed variables are indicated by means of 
a tick (✓) and highlighted in grey. 
 
Table 4: Normality test per country 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
UK 
 
U.S. 
 
 
Norway 
 
Complete 
data 
 
Excluding 
outliers 
Complete 
data 
Excluding 
outliers 
Complete 
data 
Excluding 
outliers 
Number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) ! ✓ ! ✓ ! ! 
Number of excursions (per 100,000 movements) ! ! n/a n/a ! ! 
Number of FOD (per 100,000 movements) ! ✓ n/a n/a ! ! 
Total number of occurrences (incursions + excursions + FOD) ! ✓ n/a n/a ! ✓ 
Total number of occurrences (per 100,000 movements) ! ✓ n/a n/a ! ✓ 
Average annual movements ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Altitude ! ✓ ! ! ! ! 
Peak number of operations ! ✓ ! ✓ ! ! 
Number of runways ! ! ✓ ✓ ! Variable is constant 
Number of taxiway segments ! ✓ ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Number of Type 2 conflict points ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ! 
Number of Type 3 conflict points ! ✓ ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Number of Type 4 conflict points ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Number of Type 5 conflict points ! ! ! ! ! Variable is constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points ! Variable is constant ! ! Variable is constant Variable is constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points ! Variable is constant ! ! Variable is constant Variable is constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points ! Variable is constant Variable is constant Variable is constant Variable is constant Variable is constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY ! Variable is constant ! ! ! Variable is constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
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Total number of conflict points at the airport  ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Number of communication channels ! ! ✓ ✓ ! ! 
Number of frequencies ! ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
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2.2 Summary of significant associations – excluding outliers 
 
Table 5: Summary of significant associations – excluding outliers 
 
 
Airport characteristic 
 
Rate of occurrences Severity* Causal factors Incursions Excursions FOD 
U.S. UK NO UK NO UK NO U.S. UK U.S. UK NO 
Average annual movements - - - - - - ! ! - ! - ! 
Altitude - - - ! - - - - - ! - ! 
Peak number of operations - - - - - - - ! - ! - - 
Number of runways ! - - - - - - ! - - - n/a 
Number of taxiway segments - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Number of Type 2 conflict points - - - - - - - - - ! - ! 
Number of Type 3 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Number of Type 4 conflict points - - - - - - - ! - ! - - 
Number of Type 5 conflict points - ! - - - - - ! - ! ! n/a 
Number of Type 6 conflict points - - - - - - - - - ! n/a n/a 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY - - - - - - - - - ! n/a n/a 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  - - - - - - - ! - ! - ! 
Number of communication channels - - - - - - - ! - ! ! - 
Number of frequencies - - - - - - - ! - - - - 
Adequacy of equipment  - - - - - - -a -a -a ! -a 
Adequacy of visual aids - - - - - - - -a n/a -a n/a -a 
Complaints about lighting - - - - ! - - ! - ! - !a 
Complaints about marking - - - - - - - -a - !a - ! 
Complaints about signage - - - - - - - -a - !a - ! 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work - - - - - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a !a 
Subcontractors working on the airfield ! - - - - - ! - -a ! !a - 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers - - - - - - - - - ! ! n/a 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication - - - - - - - - - ! ! n/a 
Number of runway condition checks - - - - - - - - - ! - ! 
Use of runways as taxiways - - - - - - - ! - ! !a ! 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments - - - - - - - -a -a ! -a ! 
Appendix VIII: Supplementary Analysis to Chapter 10 
! "#"!
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations - - - - - - - ! -a ! -a - 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel - - - - - - - n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  - - - - - - - - n/a ! n/a ! 
       *The associations between airport characteristics and runway incursion severity categories C and D were tested (1 October 2007–2009). 
       **The associations between airport characteristics and severity categories C and D were tested. 
            a: Tests assumptions are not fulfilled 
       n/a: The test statistic could not be computed, as one of the variables is a constant. 
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2.3 Test statistics 
 
2.3.1 United Kingdom 
 
At the national level. the data was tested for associations between the collected airport characteristics and i) the number of occurrences (per 
100,000 movements), ii) the severity of occurrences, and iii) the causal factors. The appropriate statistical tests have been discussed in Chapter 
10 section 10.2.10.4. Significant test statistics (p < .05) are highlighted in grey. 
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Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .174, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .018, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .380, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .017 p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = .325, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .052, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = .281, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.066, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .108, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = -.132, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = .239, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .045, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .033, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .043, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = .211, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.157, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = .290, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .609*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = -.203, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = .310, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points rS = .310, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.034, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = .038, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.102, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .159, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.078, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = .143, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.046, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .156, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.091, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .225, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .317, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = .401, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .141, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 12.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Complaints about lighting H(1) = .156, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .889, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(1) = .491, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Complaints about signage H(1) = 2.67, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 2.26, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(1) = .145, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .260, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = 1.80, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .323, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(1) = .133, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .551*, p (2-tailed) < .05 rS = .509, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = .778, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = .813, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments Variable is a constant U = 5.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .138, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .021, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of excursions (per 100,000 movements) – UK 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = -.093, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.086, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .776**, p (2-tailed) < .001 rS = .735*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Peak number of operations rS = -.175, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .063, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = -.066, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.090, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .041, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .071, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = .121, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .188, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = -.055, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.055, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = .094, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .094, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = -.138, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .138, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = .307, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = -.035, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points rS = -.035, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = .104, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = -.325, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.340, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .060, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .095, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = -.021, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.004, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .022, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .047, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = -.304, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.304, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = -.187, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.170, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 11.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 11.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Complaints about lighting H(1) = 1.93, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 1.93, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > 05 H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(1) = .006, p (2-tailed) >. 05 H(1) = .006, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(1) = -.301, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = -.301, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = .338, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .338, p (2-tailed) >. 05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(1) = 1.03, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 1.03, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .374, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.374, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = 3.65, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.65, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = 1.57, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 1.57, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 8: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of FOD (per 100,000 movements) – UK 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .178, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .256, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = -.282, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = -.303, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = .115, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .280, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = -.032, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .309, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .256, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .466, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = .287, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .050, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .163, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .197, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = .171, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .119, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = .173, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.267, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = -.282, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = -.104, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points rS = -.104, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.348, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = .274, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .428, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .217, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .180, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = .212, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .175, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .213, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .182, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .372, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .301, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = .307, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .558, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 10.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 10.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Complaints about lighting H(1) = 3.25, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 3.06, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(1) = .223, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .066, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(1) = .2.73, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 1.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(1) = .150, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .204, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 3.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = .204, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(1) = .136, p (2-tailed) >.05 H(1) = .361, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .331, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .470, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = .511, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.25, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 5.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .016, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .073, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 9: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of total occurrences (per 100,000 movements) – UK 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .191, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .018, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .477, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .214, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = .256, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .087, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = .200, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .258, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .205, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = -.050, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = .350, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .154, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .064, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .023, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = .262, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.065, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = .241, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .418, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = -.101, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = .241, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points rS = .241, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.103, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = .011, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.195, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .236, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .046, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = .198, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .032, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .222, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.009, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .237, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .294, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = .383, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .157, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 11.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Complaints about lighting H(1) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .222, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(1) = .152, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .046, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(1) = 5.10*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(1) = 4.62*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(1) = .087, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .186, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 5.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 3.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = .690, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .007, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(1) = .300, p (2-tailed) >.05 H(1) = .046, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .438, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .318, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = .221, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = .063, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .385, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .189, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 10: Associations between airport characteristics and causal factors – UK 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements H(2) = 6.239*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 1.045, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude H(2) = 11.708*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 3.759, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations H(2) = 6.694*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 5.777, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways H(2) = 10.635*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 5.887, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments H(2) = 5.119, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.167, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points H(2) = 7.827*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = .117, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points H(2) = 6.141*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = .369, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points H(2) = 4.444, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 5.878, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points H(2) = 3.976, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 9.759*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points H(2) = 5.99*, p (2-tailed) < .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points H(2) = 9.113*, p (2-tailed) < .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points H(2) = 9.113*, p (2-tailed) < .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY H(2) = 11.598*, p (2-tailed) < .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY H(2) = 6.682*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = .744, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY H(2) = 3.920, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 2.077, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  H(2) = 5.977, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = .182, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  H(2) = 5.380, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.292, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels H(2) = 8.789*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 8.789*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of frequencies H(2) = 3.844, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.956 p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment X2 = 12.757*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 12.757*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Adequacy of visual aids Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Complaints about lighting X2 = 6.153, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = 6.153, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking X2 = 5.814, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = 5.814, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage X2 = .623, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = .623, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Subcontractors working on the airfield X2 = 37.654**, p (2-tailed) < .001 a  X2 = 37.654**, p (2-tailed) < .001 a 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers X2 = 15.288**, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 15.288**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication X2 = 7.986*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 7.986*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of runway condition checks H(2) = 2.232, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.232, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways X2 = 14.913*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a  X2 = 14.913*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments X2 = 2.990, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 2.990, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations X2 = 2.990, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 2.990, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a The Pearson Chi-Square test assumptions are violated. 
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2.3.2 United States 
 !
Table 11: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of incursions – U.S. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .019, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .149, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = -.069, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.105, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = -.005, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .086, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = .206, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .527*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .019, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .111, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = .522*, p (2-tailed) < .05 r = .396, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .093, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .134, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = -.026, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .189, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = -.003, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .078, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points rS = .143, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .158, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 7 conflict points rS = .086, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .117, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = .552*, p (2-tailed) < .05 rS = .471, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = .142, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .307, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .063, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .053, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = .063, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .147, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .017, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .158, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .284, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .465, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = .185, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = .306, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 3.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 3.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 4.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(1) = 2.83,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .494,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = 1.76,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.76,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = 2.41,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 2.82,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(1) = -.325, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = -.334, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 2.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 2.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers H(1) = 1.04,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 1.77,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication H(1) = 0.865,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = 2.54,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks rS = -.024, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.144, p (2-tailed) > 0.5 
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Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = .916,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = .281,  p (2-tailed) >.05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 1.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .695,  p (2-tailed) >.05 H(1) = 2.49,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel U = .00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = .00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = 12.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 12.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
The analysis uses the data available from 2005-2009. 
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Table 12: Associations between airport characteristics and the severity of runway incursions – U.S. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set (only Cat C, D, excl. A, B) 
 
Excluding outliers (only Cat C, D, excl. A, B) 
Average annual movements U = 7723.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7723.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Altitude U = 8871.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 8868.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations U = 6779.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 5711.00**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of runways U = 6584.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 4343.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of taxiway segments U = 7513.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7513.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 2 conflict points U = 9147.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 9147.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points U = 7761.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7761.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 4 conflict points U = 7111.00**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 6043.00**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 5 conflict points U = 8033.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 6965.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 6 conflict points U = 8730.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 7662.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 7 conflict points U = 9186.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 9186.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 8 conflict points U = 10080.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 10080.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY U = 9607.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 8123.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY U = 6799.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 5731.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY U = 7527.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7527.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  U = 7448.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7448.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  U = 7435.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 U = 7435.50**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of communication channels U = 8548.50*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 8548.50*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of frequencies U = 8287.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 8287.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Adequacy of equipment X2 = .366, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .366, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of visual aids X2 = .366, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .366, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about lighting X2 = 6.09* p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 6.09* p (2-tailed) < .05 
Complaints about marking X2 = 1.17 p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.17 p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about signage X2 = 1.42, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.42, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Subcontractors working on the airfield X2 = 3.31, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = 3.31, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers X2 = 2.45, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = 2.45, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication X2 = .185, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = .185, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runway condition checks U = 68328.50, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 6117.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways X2 = 8.14*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 8.14*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments X2 = .001, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = .001, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations X2 = 6.54*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 6.54*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  X2 = .779, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = .779, p (2-tailed) > .05 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a The Pearson Chi-Square test assumptions are violated. 
The analysis uses the data available from 1 October 2007-2009. 
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Table 13: Associations between airport characteristics and causal factors – U.S. 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements H(2) = 26.14**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 26.14**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Altitude H(2) = 16.85**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 20.61**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Peak number of operations H(2) = 48.52**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 36.10**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of runways H(2) = 13.12**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 5.21, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of taxiway segments H(2) = 31.36**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 31.56**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 2 conflict points H(2) = 10.24*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 10.24*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points H(2) = 25.41**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 25.41**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 4 conflict points H(2) = 22.29**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 11.75**, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points H(2) = 43.01**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 31.05**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 6 conflict points H(2) = 53.40**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 53.40**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 7 conflict points H(2) = 15.85**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 15.85**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 8 conflict points H(2) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY H(2) = 3.74, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 10.03*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY H(2) = 15.47**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 6.74*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY H(2) = 30.71**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 30.71**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  H(2) = 30.20**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 30.20**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  H(2) = 31.72**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 31.72**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of communication channels H(2) = 7.12*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 7.12*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of frequencies H(2) = 5.23, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 5.23, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment X2 = 1.39, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.39, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of visual aids X2 = 1.39, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 1.39, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about lighting X2 = 27.60**, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 27.60**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Complaints about marking X2 = 14.51*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 14.51*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Complaints about signage X2 = 9.59*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 9.59*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Subcontractors working on the airfield X2 = 8.80*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 8.80*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers X2 = 9.64*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 9.64*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication X2 = 11.19*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 11.19*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of runway condition checks H(2) = 35.14**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 17.19**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Use of runways as taxiways X2 = 75.40*, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 75.40*, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments X2 = 7.56*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 7.56*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations X2 = 6.59*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 6.59*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  X2 = 12.46*, p (2-tailed) < .05 X2 = 12.46*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a The Pearson Chi-Square test assumptions are violated. 
The analysis uses the data available from 2005-2009. 
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2.3.3 Norway 
 
Table 14: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of incursions (per 100,000 movements) – Norway 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = -.659*, p (2-tailed) < .05 rS = -.527, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .154, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.196, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = -.287, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.452, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = -.087, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of taxiway segments rS = -.355, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.456, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = -.150, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.258, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = -.403, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.440, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = -.191, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.383, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = .253, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = .084, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = -.331, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.347, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = -.296, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.435, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = -.383, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.431, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = -.369, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.410, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = -.322, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.385, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = -.292, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.478, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 2.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(2) = .819,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.33,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = .588,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.02,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = 3.35,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.02,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(4) = -.218, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(4) = .175, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 18.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 15.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .092, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.100, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = .201,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.77,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 16.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 16.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .908,  p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .015,  p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 15: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of excursions (per 100,000 movements) – Norway 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .173, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.024, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .060 p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.231 p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = .492, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .312, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = .127, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of taxiway segments rS = .282, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .109, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = -.004, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.004, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .274, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .098, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = .219, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .219, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = -.228, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.123, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = .331, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .331, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = .136, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .136, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = .248, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .248, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = .284, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .284, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .459, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .426, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = -.423, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .210, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(2) = 9.36*, p (2-tailed) < .05 H(2) = 9.36*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = 3.52, p (2-tailed) > 05 H(2) = 3.52, p (2-tailed) > 05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = 1.20, p (2-tailed) >. 05 H(2) = 1.20, p (2-tailed) >. 05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(4) = .048, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(4) = .048, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 15.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 15.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .387, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .387, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = 4.40, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 4.40, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 30.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 30.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .488, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .488, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 6.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 16: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of FOD (per 100,000 movements) – Norway 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = .457, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .538*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Altitude rS = -.135 p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .193 p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = .021, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .097, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = -.264, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of taxiway segments rS = -.186, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.172, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = -.235, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.235, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .033, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = -.280, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.280, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = -.382, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.313, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = -.095, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.095, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = -.216, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.216, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = -.135, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.135, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = -.127, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.127, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of communication channels rS = .025, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .017, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = -.422, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.403, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(2) = 1.87, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.87, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = .379, p (2-tailed) > 05 H(2) = .379, p (2-tailed) > 05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = 1.88, p (2-tailed) >. 05 H(2) = 1.88, p (2-tailed) >. 05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(4) = -.148, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(4) = -.148, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 3.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 U = 3.00*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of runway condition checks rS = .387, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.426, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = 3.21, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 3.21, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 29.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 29.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .416, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .416, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 1.50, p (2-tailed) > .05 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 17: Associations between airport characteristics and the number of total occurrences (per 100,000 movements) – Norway 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements rS = -.579*, p (2-tailed) < .05 rS = -.335, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Altitude rS = .214 p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = .042 p (2-tailed) > .05 
Peak number of operations rS = -.250, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.304, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways rS = -.365, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of taxiway segments rS = -.491, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.598*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points rS = -.318, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.484, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 3 conflict points rS = -.458, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.457, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points rS = -.274, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.497, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points rS = .071, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY rS = -.084, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY rS = -.377, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.407, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY rS = -.455, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.636*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  rS = -.496, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.589*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  rS = -.483, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.569*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of communication channels rS = -.348, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.330, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies rS = -.137, p (2-tailed) > .05 r = -.720, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Adequacy of equipment U = 7.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 5.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of visual aids U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 5.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about lighting H(2) = 1.48, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 1.53, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Complaints about marking H(2) = 1.43, p (2-tailed) > 05 H(2) = 2.34, p (2-tailed) > 05 
Complaints about signage H(2) = 1.26, p (2-tailed) >. 05 H(2) = 2.34, p (2-tailed) >. 05 
Frequency of maintenance / construction work H(4) = .194, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(4) = -.251, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Subcontractors working on the airfield U = 12.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 12.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of runway condition checks rS = -.030, p (2-tailed) > .05 rS = -.252, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Use of runways as taxiways H(2) = 2.06, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 4.61, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments U = 13.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 U = 13.00, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations H(1) = .403, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(1) = .138, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  U = .000, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 18: Associations between airport characteristics and causal factors – Norway 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Complete data set 
 
Excluding outliers 
Average annual movements H(2) = 34.807**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 7.223*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Altitude H(2) = 17.111**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 7.110*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Peak number of operations H(2) = 20.963**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = .250, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of runways H(2) = 28.632**, p (2-tailed) < .001 Variable is a constant 
Number of taxiway segments H(2) = 29.738**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 6.346*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 2 conflict points H(2) = 20.390**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 20.390**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of Type 3 conflict points H(2) = 33.694**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 7.940*, p (2-tailed) < .05 
Number of Type 4 conflict points H(2) = 2.911, p (2-tailed) > .05 H(2) = 2.911, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of Type 5 conflict points H(2) = 5.519, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 6 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 7 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of Type 8 conflict points Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-RWY H(2) = .209, p (2-tailed) > .05 Variable is a constant 
Total number of conflict points RWY-TWY H(2) = 34.614**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 34.614**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points TWY-TWY H(2) = 28.654**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 28.654**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of conflict points at the airport  H(2) = 31.969**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 31.969**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  H(2) = 33.927**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 33.927**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Number of communication channels H(2) = 28.674**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = .396, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Number of frequencies H(2) = 21.976**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 1.314, p (2-tailed) > .05 
Adequacy of equipment X2 = 5.10, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 5.100, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Adequacy of visual aids X2 = 5.10, p (2-tailed) > .05 a X2 = 5.100, p (2-tailed) > .05 a 
Complaints about lighting X2 = 35.77**, p (2-tailed) < .001a X2 = 35.277**, p (2-tailed) < .001a 
Complaints about marking X2 = 36.181**, p (2-tailed) < .001  X2 = 36.181**, p (2-tailed) < .001  
Complaints about signage X2 = 18.184**, p (2-tailed) < .05  X2 = 18.184*, p (2-tailed) < .05  
Frequency of maintenance / construction work X2 = 26.254*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a X2 = 22.254*, p (2-tailed) < .05 a 
Subcontractors working on the airfield X2 = 2.768, p (2-tailed) > .05  X2 = 2.768, p (2-tailed) > .05  
Requirement of clearances for all vehicle drivers Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Vehicle equipment with radio communication Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Number of runway condition checks H(2) = 34.057**, p (2-tailed) < .001 H(2) = 34.057**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Use of runways as taxiways X2 = 30.501**, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 30.501**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Engagement in pro-active safety assessments X2 = 17.584**, p (2-tailed) < .001 X2 = 17.584**, p (2-tailed) < .001 
Adequacy of staffing level for airside operations X2 = 0180, p (2-tailed) > .05 X2 = .180, p (2-tailed) > .05 
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Adequacy of training for operational personnel Variable is a constant Variable is a constant 
Adequacy of training for sub-contractors  X2 = 10.119*, p (2-tailed) < .05  X2 = 10.102*, p (2-tailed) < .05  
**. Test statistic is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
a The Pearson Chi-Square test assumptions are violated. 
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1 Method 
 
When entering several predictors into a regression model, the method for entry needs 
to be selected, with both forced entry and stepwise methods are available. Forced entry is a 
method in which all predictors are forced into the model simultaneously. It relies on good 
theoretical reasoning for the inclusion of the chosen predictors. On the other hand, the 
choices of which predictors are entered into a model in stepwise regressions are based on a 
mathematical criterion. Two methods can be distinguished: forward and backward 
stepwise regression. Using a forward method an initial model is defined which contains 
only the constant, and the predictors are then added to the model based on a specific 
criterion. The backward methods, on the other hand, begin by placing all predictors in the 
model and then removing them using removal criteria.  
Stepwise methods take many methodologically important decisions out of the hands of 
the researcher and can lead to over-fitting (i.e. having too many variables in the model that 
make little contribution to predicting the outcome) and under-fitting (i.e. leaving out 
important predictors). Forced entry based the selection of meaningful variables is 
preferable, therefore, and stepwise methods should be avoided except for exploratory 
studies (Field, 2009). Based on this criticism of stepwise methods the forced entry method 
has been chosen for the analysis in this thesis. 
 
2 Assumptions 
 
A logistic regression requires the following assumptions to be true (Agresti, 2007; Field, 
2009): 
 
1) Linearity: Ordinary regression assumes a linear relationship between the DV and 
the IVs. As introduced in the last section, this assumption is violated in logistic 
regression and therefore the log (i.e. logit) of the data is used. In logistic regression, 
the assumption of linearity assumes a linear relationship between any continuous 
IV and the logit of the outcome variable.  
 
2) Independence of errors: The cases of data should not be related (e.g. repeated 
measures design where the same people are measured at different points in time). A 
violation of this assumption produces overdispersion, a situation in which the 
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observed variance is bigger than would be expected for the logistic regression 
model. 
 
3) Multicollinearity: IVs should not be too highly correlated. 
 
Ordered logistic regression assumes in addition: 
4) Proportional odds: The slope coefficients in an ordered logistic regression model 
are the same across the response categories. That means the relationship between 
any two pairs of outcome groups is statistically the same. !
3 Assessing the Model Fit 
 
The statistical package SPSS was used to estimate the logistic regression models 
presented in this thesis and this section explains how to assess the output of the SPSS 
logistic regression estimation tables.  
The overall fit of the estimated model is assessed using the log-likelihood statistic, also 
referred to as -2LL (SPSS output: -2 Log likelihood). The log-likelihood statistic is an 
indicator of how much unexplained information there is after the model has been fitted. 
Large values indicate a poor fitting statistical model, since the larger the value the more 
unexplained observations there are. To make the interpretation of the log-likelihood 
statistic meaningful, the -2LL of the fitted model is compared against a baseline model. 
The baseline model is the model that provides the best prediction when nothing but the 
values of the outcome variable are known (i.e. the logistic regression model when only the 
constant is included). In logistic regression this corresponds to the prediction of the 
outcome category that occurred most often. A reduction in the -2LL from the baseline 
model to the fitted model indicates that the new model is better at predicting than the 
baseline model. The difference in the -2LL values shows the reduction in the inaccuracy of 
the model resulting from fitting the regression model to the data, i.e. how much new 
variance has been explained by the fitted model. The significance of this reduction in 
unexplained variance is tested using the chi-square statistic (X2). A significant X2 (p < .05) 
indicates that the estimated model explains a significant amount of the original variability. 
The log-likelihood statistic indicates whether a model provides a better fit than the 
baseline model. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the model is a good fit to 
the data. In multinomial logistic regression the Pearson and Deviance Chi-Squared Tests 
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are used to assess the model’s goodness of fit (SPSS output: Pearson, Deviance). These 
statistics test whether the predicted values differ significantly from the observed values. If 
the test statistics are not significant (p > .05) then the predicted values are not significantly 
different from the observed values, i.e. the model is a good fit. An alternative is the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test, which is mainly used to assess the goodness of fit for 
binomial logistic regression models. Its interpretation is the same. 
In addition, the Cox and Snell’s R2CS and Nagelkerke’s R2N should be assessed (SPSS 
output: Cox and Snell, Nagelkerke). Both statistics show the proportion of improvement 
due to the model, i.e. how much the badness of fit improves as a result of the inclusion of 
the IVs. R2CS and R2N can vary between 0 and 1. A value of 0 indicates that the IVs are 
useless in predicting the DV and a value of 1 indicates that the model predicts the DV 
perfectly. 
The b-values (SPSS output: B) are the estimated coefficients of the IVs included in the 
model. The b-value represents the change in the logit of the DV associated with one-unit 
change in the IV. To assess whether an IV is making a significant contribution to the 
prediction of the DV the Wald statistic is used (SPSS output: Wald). The Wald statistic 
tests whether the b-coefficient for an IV is significantly different from 0. If so (p < .05), 
then the IV is making a significant contribution to the prediction of the DV. 
Crucial to the interpretation of logistic regression models is the interpretation of the 
odds ratio (SPSS output: Exp(B)). The odds ratio is an indicator of the change in odds 
resulting from a unit change in the IV. The odds of an event occurring are defined as the 
probability of an event occurring divided by the probability of that event not occurring. A 
value greater than 1 indicates that as the IV increases the odds of the DV occurring 
increase. In contrast, a value less than 1 indicates that as the IV increases, the odds of the 
outcome occurring decrease. Section 0 will give examples for the interpretation of logistic 
regression models (Field, 2009).  !
4 Interpretation 
 
The interpretation of the SPSS output, and in particular the odds ratio, is not 
straightforward. The following paragraphs provide examples for interpreting the SPSS 
parameter estimates output for binary, multinomial and ordinal regression models. 
Table 1 shows an example of the SPSS output for a binary logistic regression. The DV 
is a binary variable with two categories (DV Cat 1, DV Cat 2). The lowest coded variable 
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(DV Cat 1) is set as the reference category and therefore, DV Cat 2 must be interpreted in 
comparison to this reference category. The IV is a nominal categorical variable with three 
categories (IV, IV(1), IV(2)). IV is set as reference category and therefore IV(1) and IV(2) 
must be interpreted in comparison to this reference category. 
 
Table 1: Example SPSS parameter estimates output for the binomial logistic regression 
!
!
 
The B-value represents the estimated coefficient. It represents the change in the logit of 
the DV associated with a one unit change in the IV. For instance, a one unit increase in 
IV(1) is associated with a .674 increase of the logit of the outcome variable.  
The Wald statistic is used to assess the contribution of individual predictors. In the 
example in Table 1 all IVs are significant predictors (p < .001). 
The interpretation of the odds ratio (Exp(B)) is important. The odds ratio indicates the 
change in odds that results from a unit change in the IV. For categorical predictors the 
interpretation is as follows: the odds of IV(1) having the response category DV Cat 2 
(rather than the reference category DV Cat 1) is 1.963 in comparison to the reference 
category IV. In other words, IV(1) compared to its reference category (IV) is almost twice 
as likely to have the outcome response DV Cat 2 rather than DV Cat 1. Similarly, IV(2) 
compared to its reference category IV is 12.29 times more likely to have the outcome 
response DV Cat 2 rather than DV Cat 1. 
 
Table 2 shows the SPSS output for the parameter estimates for a multinominal logistic 
regression model. The DV is a nominal categorical variable with three outcome categories 
(DV Cat 1, DV Cat 2, DV Cat 3). DV Cat 3 is set as the reference category to which all 
DV = Dependent variable 
IV = Independent variable 
Represents DV Cat 2, 
Interpretation in 
comparison to 
the DV reference 
category (DV Cat 1) 
Estimated  
coefficient 
Contribution of each 
predictor to the model Odds ratio 
Reference category of the IV 
Interpretation in comparison to 
the IV reference category 
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other DV categories are compared. This model contains only one IV. The IV is also a 
nominal categorical variable with three categories (IV Cat A, IV Cat B, IV Cat C). For the 
predictor IV Cat C is set as the reference category. Therefore, all other IV categories are 
interpreted in comparison to this reference category. !
Table 2: Example SPSS parameter estimates output for the multinomial logistic regression 
 
!
 
First, the significance of the IVs is assessed using the Wald statistic. For instance, both 
IV Cat A and IV Cat B are significant predictors for DV Cat 1 (p < .001). The B-value 
shows the estimated coefficients. A positive B-value indicates that the cases in an IV 
category have a higher probability than cases in the IV reference category, to be classified 
as the considered DV category compared to the DV reference category. Continuing the 
example of DV Cat 1, cases in both IV Cat A and IV Cat B have a higher probability to be 
classified as DV Cat 1 (rather than DV Cat 3) in comparison to cases in the reference 
category IV Cat C.  
The odds ratio (Exp(B)) shows the change of odds resulting from one unit change in 
the IV. For categorical predictors the odds ratio can be interpreted as follows. IV Cat A 
compared to its reference category IV Cat C is 20 times as likely to have DV Cat 1 (rather 
than DV Cat 3). Similarly, IV Cat B compared to its reference category IV Cat C is almost 
15 times more likely to have DV Cat 1 (rather than DV Cat 3). 
 
 Table 3 provides an example for the output interpretation of the parameter estimates 
for an ordinal logistic regression model.  !
Represents 
the DV 
DV = Dependent variable 
IV = Independent variable 
Reference category of the IV 
Estimated  
coefficient 
Contribution of each 
predictor to the model Odds ratio 
Interpretation in 
comparison to 
the DV reference 
category (DV Cat 3) 
Interpretation in 
comparison to 
the IV reference 
category (IV Cat C) 
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Table 3: Example SPSS parameter output for the multinomial logistic regression 
 
 
 
“Threshold” represents the DV. The DV, in this case, is an ordinal variable with three 
categories (DV Cat 1, DV Cat 2, DV Cat 3). DV Cat 3 is set as reference category. The IVs 
are shown under “Location”. This model uses only one IV to predict the outcome. The IV 
is a nominal categorical variable with three categories (IV Cat A, IV Cat B, IV Cat C). IV 
Cat 3 is set as reference category. This means that all parameter estimates of the IV are 
interpreted in comparison to this reference category.  
First, the significance of the contribution of each IV to the model is assessed. Both, IV 
Cat A and IV Cat B are statistically significant predictors of the outcome (p < .001). Here, 
the interpretation of the odds ratio is crucial. The odds ratio indicates how one unit change 
in the IV changes the odds of change of one level in the DV; in other words, the odds of 
being entered into a higher tier, or response category, in the ordinal outcome. Due to the 
assumption of proportional odds, the change in odds is the same for all levels of the DV. 
This means the odds ratio is the same for, e.g., the change from DV Cat 1 to DV Cat 2, and 
the change from DV Cat 2 to DV Cat 3. 
“Estimate” represents the estimated coefficient. The ordinal logistic regression output 
does not automatically give the odds ratio. It can be calculated by taking the exponent from 
the Estimate. The Estimate for IV Cat A is .652. The exponent of .652 is 1.92 (odds ratio). 
The odds of IV Cat A being entered into a higher tier (DV category) are 1.92 the odds for 
IV Cat C. In other words, the odds of IV Cat A achieving a higher tier are approximately 
twice the odds for IV Cat C. The Estimate of IV Cat B is 2.480 and the associated odds 
ratio is 11.94. The odds of IV Cat B being entered for a higher tier are approximately 
Reference category of the IV 
DV = Dependent variable 
IV = Independent variable 
Represents 
the DV 
Represents 
The IV 
Interpretation in comparison to 
the IV reference category 
Estimated  
coefficient 
Contribution of each 
predictor to the model 
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twelve times the odds of IV Cat C being entered for a higher tier (Field, 2009; National 
Centre for Research Methods, 2011).  !!!!!!
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Table 1: Sample descriptives 
 
 
Variable 
 
D
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ty
pe
 
 
Sa
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M
ax
im
um
 
va
lu
e 
 
R
an
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M
ea
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St
an
da
rd
 
de
vi
at
io
n 
Average annual 
movements Continuous! 19 47220 979360 932140 405157.83 263506.956 
Peak number of operations 
 Continuous! 19! 40 279 139 99.75 65.588 
Number of runways 
 Continuous! 19! 1 7 6 3.84 1.675 
Number of taxiway 
segments Continuous! 19! 8 327 319 135.79 86.720 
Number of Type 2 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous! 19! 0 1 1 .05 .229 
Number of Type 2 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 7 7 2.11 1.941 
Number of Type 2 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 2 14 12 7.74 3.088 
Total number of Type 2 
conflict points  Continuous! 19! 4 17 13 9.89 3.695 
Number of Type 3 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous! 19! 0 1 1 .11 .315 
Number of Type 3 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 1 34 33 15.68 8.926 
Number of Type 3 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 2 86 84 36.74 25.798 
Total number of Type 3 
conflict points  Continuous! 19! 3 114 111 52.53 33.140 
Number of Type 4 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous! 19! 0 6 6 .89 1.449 
Number of Type 4 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 1 43 42 12.74 9.780 
Number of Type 4 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 41 41 15.74 11.160 
Total number of Type 4 
conflict points  Continuous! 19! 1 84 83 29.37 19.825 
Number of Type 5 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous! 19! 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Number of Type 5 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 3 3 .84 1.167 
Number of Type 5 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 18 18 2.32 4.097 
Total number of Type 5 
conflict points  Continuous! 19! 0 19 19 3.16 4.362 
Number of Type 6 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous! 19! 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Number of Type 6 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 2 2 .26 .562 
Number of Type 6 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous! 19! 0 1 1 .16 .375 
Total number of Type 6 
conflict points  Continuous! 19! 0 2 2 .42 .838 
Number of Type 7 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Number of Type 7 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous 19 0 3 0 .16 .688 
Appendix X: Supplementary Analysis to Chapter 11 
! "#$!
Number of Type 7 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Total number of Type 7 
conflict points  Continuous 19 0 3 0 .16 .688 
Number of Type 8 conflict 
points RWY / RWY Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Number of Type 8 conflict 
points RWY / TWY Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Number of Type 8 conflict 
points TWY / TWY Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Total number of Type 8 
conflict points  Continuous 19 0 0 0 .00 .00 
Total number of conflict 
points RWY/RWY Continuous 19! 0 7 7 1.05 1.682 
Total number of conflict 
points RWY/TWY Continuous 19! 2 79 77 29.53 18.292 
Total number of conflict 
points TWY/TWY Continuous 19! 4 128 124 62.68 38.187 
Total number of conflict 
points at the airport Continuous 19! 6 207 201 93.26 54.930 
Total number of segments 
in conflict with each other  Continuous 19! 21 777 756 315.05 193. 779 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 2: Parameter estimates airport characteristics vs. severity - excluding outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
  Average annual movements .000 .000 11.689 1 .001 1.000 
  Constant -.804 .268 9.016 1 .003 .447 
   R2 = .030 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .042 (Cox&Snell), .056 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 12.193, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
(High) 
Peak number of operations .007 .002 16.789 1 .000 1.007 
Constant -.756 .220 11.751 1 .001 .470 
   R2 = .027 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .046 (Cox&Snell), .061 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 10.683, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of runways .419 .084 25.133 1 .000 1.521 
Constant -1.938 .408 22.546 1 .000 .144 
   R2 = .071 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .094 (Cox&Snell), .125 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 28.009, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of taxiway segments .005 .001 14.386 1 .000 1.005 
Constant -.939 .279 11.371 1 .001 .391 
   R2 = .038 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .052 (Cox&Snell), .069 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.142, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/TWY conflict points -.183 .092 3.981 1 .046 .833 
Constant .289 .210 1.906 1 .167 1.336 
   R2 = .010 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .016 (Cox&Snell), .021 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.080, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 2 TWY/TWY conflict points .102 .044 5.290 1 .021 1.107 
Constant -.927 .426 4.736 1 .030 .396 
   R2 = .013 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .019 (Cox&Snell), .025 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 5.415, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 2 conflict points .056 .033 2.826 1 .093 1.057 
Constant -.635 .404 2.473 1 .116 .530 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .010 (Cox&Snell), .013 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.854, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 3 RWY/TWY conflict points .070 .015 20.499 1 .000 1.072 
Constant -1.410 .339 17.272 1 .000 .244 
   R2 = .056 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .076 (Cox&Snell), .101 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 22.393, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 3 TWY/TWY conflict points .011 .005 5.431 1 .020 1.011 
Constant -.517 .257 4.036 1 .045 .596 
   R2 = .013 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .019 (Cox&Snell), .026 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 5.508, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 3 conflict points .012 .004 9.505 1 .002 1.012 
Constant -.794 .289 7.560 1 .006 .452 
   R2 = .024 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .034 (Cox&Snell), .045 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 9.766, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .076 .163 .216 1 .642 1.079 
Constant -.094 .161 .340 1 .560 .911 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .001 (Cox&Snell), .001 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = .216, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points .053 .023 5.171 1 .023 1.054 
Constant -.803 .341 5.538 0 .019 .448 
   R2 = .013 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .021 (Cox&Snell), .027 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 5.301, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .050 .012 15.955 1 .000 1.051 
Constant -.937 .266 12.427 1 .000 .392 
   R2 = .044 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .060 (Cox&Snell), .080 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 17.503, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 4 conflict points .037 .011 11.667 1 .001 1.038 
Constant -1.269 .374 11.535 1 .001 .281 
   R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .048 (Cox&Snell), .064 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 12.445, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 5 RWY/TWY conflict points .146 .099 2.168 1 .141 1.158 
Constant -.135 .156 .748 1 .387 .874 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .008 (Cox&Snell), .010 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 2.195, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 5 TWY/TWY conflict points .105 .080 1.712 1 .191 1.110 
Constant -.267 .187 2.045 1 .153 .765 
   R2 = .004 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .007 (Cox&Snell), .009 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 1.724, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 5 conflict points .132 .065 4.093 1 .043 1.141 
Constant -.451 .221 4.169 1 .041 .637 
   R2 = .010 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .016 (Cox&Snell), .022 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.152, p < .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
Number of type 6 RWY/TWY conflict points .479 .233 4.239 1 .040 1.614 
Constant -.148 .142 1.079 1 .299 .863 
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 (High)   R2 = .011 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .015 (Cox&Snell), .020 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.348, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Number of type 6 TWY/TWY conflict points .565 .265 4.541 1 .033 1.760 
Constant -.150 .141 1.117 1 .290 .861 
  R2 = .011 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .016 (Cox&Snell), .021 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.613, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of type 6 conflict points .285 .129 4.857 1 .028 1.330 
Constant -.165 .144 1.317 1 .251 .848 
  R2 = .012 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .017 (Cox&Snell), .023 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 4.931, p < .05. 
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of RWY/RWY conflict points .070 .153 .209 1 .647 1.072 
Constant -.093 .161 .336 1 .562 .911 
   R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .001 (Cox&Snell), .001 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = .209, p > .05.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of RWY/TWY conflict points .036 .010 11.737 1 .001 1.036 
Constant -1.299 .380 11.694 1 .001 .273 
   R2 = .031 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .048 (Cox&Snell), .064 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 12.435, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C  
 (High) 
Total number of TWY/TWY conflict points .011 .003 11.470 1 .001 1.012 
Constant -.904 .297 9.250 1 .002 .405 
   R2 = .030 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .041 (Cox&Snell), .055 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 11.856, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of conflict points at the airport .009 .002 14.689 1 .000 1.009 
Constant -1.087 .312 12.134 1 .000 .337 
   R2 = .039 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .053 (Cox&Snell), .071 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.530, p < .001.  
Severity  
 Cat C 
 (High) 
Total number of segments in conflict with each 
other 
.003 .001 14.921 1 .000 1.003 
Constant -1.034 .296 12.183 1 .000 .356 
   R2 = .040 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .055 (Cox&Snell), .073 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 16.011, p < .001.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Figure 1: Number of runways / number of taxiway segments dendogram 
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Figure 2: Number of runways / number of type 3 RWY/TWY conflict points dendogram  
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Table 3: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 1 vs. severity – excluding 
outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Number of runways .511 .143 12.700 1 .000 1.666 
Number of taxiways .010 .011 .829 1 .362 1.010 
Total number of conflict points -.020 .020 .984 1 .321 .980 
Constant -1.780 .445 15.963 1 .000 .169 
      R2 = .074 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .097 (Cox&Snell), .130 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 29.102, p < .001. 
 
Table 4: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 2 vs. severity – excluding 
outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 Severity  
  Cat C 
  (High) 
Total number of RWY/RWY conflict points .376 .179 4.435 1 .035 1.456 
Total number of RWY/TWY conflict points .033 .032 1.085 1 .298 1.033 
Total number of TWY/TWY conflict points .003 .012 .057 1 .811 1.003 
Constant -1.762 .448 15.504 1 .000 .172 
      R2 = .037 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .067 (Cox&Snell), .090 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 15.740, p < .001. 
 
Table 5: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (RWY/RWY conflict points) vs. 
severity – excluding outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .076 .163 .216 1 .642 1.079 
Constant -.094 .161 .340 1 .560 .911 
      R2 = .000 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .001 (Cox&Snell), .001 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = .216, p > .05. 
 
Table 6: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (RWY / TWY conflict points) 
vs. severity – excluding outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 2 RWY/TWY conflict points -.128 .117 1.191 1 .275 .880 
Number of type 3 RWY/TWY conflict points .120 .038 9.985 1 .002 1.127 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points -.082 .046 3.118 1 .077 .921 
Number of type 5 RWY/TWY conflict points -.034 .134 .064 1 .800 .967 
Number of type 6 RWY/TWY conflict points .495 .344 2.069 1 .150 1.641 
Constant -1.067 .501 4.530 1 .033 .344 
      R2 = .044 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .074 (Cox&Snell), .098 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 13.335, p < .05. 
 
Table 7: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (TWY / TWY conflict points) 
vs. severity – excluding outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 2 TWY/TWY conflict points .078 .055 2.012 1 .156 1.081 
Number of type 3 TWY/TWY conflict points -.008 .008 .969 1 .325 .992 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .064 .032 4.180 1 .041 1.067 
Number of type 5 TWY/TWY conflict points -.060 .170 .124 1 .725 .942 
Number of type 6 TWY/TWY conflict points .334 .617 .292 1 .589 1.396 
Constant -1.508 .518 8.485 1 .004 .221 
      R2 = .037 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .057 (Cox&Snell), .076 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 14.859, p < .05. 
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Table 8: Parameter estimates airport characteristics level 3 (type 4 conflict points) vs. 
severity – excluding outliers 
 
Event B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Severity  
 Cat C   
 (High) 
Number of type 4 RWY/RWY conflict points .607 .204 8.870 1 .003 1.835 
Number of type 4 RWY/TWY conflict points -.037 .034 1.164 1 .281 .964 
Number of type 4 TWY/TWY conflict points .096 .026 13.571 1 .000 1.101 
Constant -1.754 .443 15.692 1 .000 .173 
      R2 = .053 (Hosmer&Lemeshow), .089 (Cox&Snell), .119 (Nagelkerke). Model X2 = 21.222, p < .001. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 9: Distribution of causal factors (Level 3) across airports 
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A 4 14 0 31 0 3 0 9 0 1 0 10 3 0 0 75 
B 0 5 3 14 0 0 3 2 3 0 0 15 0 0 3 48 
C 0 4 0 16 0 0 1 6 6 1 0 5 0 0 0 39 
D 0 14 2 14 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 5 0 0 0 37 
E 1 0 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 14 
F 0 5 2 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 17 
G 0 10 0 40 2 0 0 5 2 4 0 9 1 0 0 73 
H 0 1 1 10 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 
I 0 11 3 41 4 0 2 3 0 0 0 13 1 0 0 78 
J 0 1 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7 
K 1 2 0 9 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
L 0 1 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 10 
M 0 2 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9 
N 0 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 8 
O 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
P 1 3 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 10 
Q 0 4 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 16 
R 0 4 0 34 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 
Total 7 85 13 248 14 3 9 38 15 8 1 74 5 1 3 524 
*The airports are shown in descending order based on their average annual movements. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Table 10: Parameter estimates Airport characteristics (AC) vs. causal factors (CF) (Level 1 and 3) 
 
 
Airport characteristics  
A
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
 L
ev
el
 1
* 
A
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
pi
lo
t 
L
ev
el
 3
 –
 p
ilo
t 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
vs
. o
th
er
s*
* 
A
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
pi
lo
t 
L
ev
el
 3
 –
 p
ilo
t 
hu
m
an
 r
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
vs
. o
th
er
s*
* 
A
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
A
T
C
 
L
ev
el
 3
 –
 A
T
C
 
co
m
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
vs
. o
th
er
s*
* 
A
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
A
T
C
 
L
ev
el
 3
 –
 A
T
C
 
hu
m
an
 r
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
vs
. o
th
er
s*
* 
C
 v
s. 
C
F 
V
/P
D
 
L
ev
el
 3
 –
 V
/P
D
 
hu
m
an
 r
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
vs
. o
th
er
s*
* 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
L
R
 X
2 
Si
gn
. 
G
oo
dn
es
s-
of
-f
it 
Average annual movements ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Peak number of operations ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Number of runways ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of taxiway segments ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 2 conflict points RWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 2 conflict points TWY / TWY " " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Total number of Type 2 conflict points  " " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 3 conflict points RWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 3 conflict points TWY / TWY ! " ! " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of Type 3 conflict points  ! " ! " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 4 conflict points RWY / RWY " " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 4 conflict points RWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Number of Type 4 conflict points TWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of Type 4 conflict points  ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 5 conflict points RWY / TWY " " " " " " " " " " " " 
Number of Type 5 conflict points TWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Total number of Type 5 conflict points  ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
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Number of Type 6 conflict points RWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Number of Type 6 conflict points TWY / TWY ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Total number of Type 6 conflict points  ! " " " " " " " ! " " " 
Total number of conflict points RWY/RWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of conflict points RWY/TWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of conflict points TWY/TWY ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of conflict points at the airport ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
Total number of segments in conflict with each other  ! " " " " " " " " " " " 
     * Multinomial logistic regression 
     ** Binomial logistic regression !!!!!!!!!!
 
 
 
 
 
 
